Congress Party's Dilemma

With general elections in India just around the corner, the ruling Congress Party is in a difficult spot. Opposition parties keen to usurp votes from the Congress are already accusing them of being, “soft on terror,� – an allegation that deeply irks India’s voters, who bear fresh memories of the Mumbai mayhem.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government has little choice. They must dispel notions of their impotence in the face of terror by pressing Pakistan to act swiftly against extremist outfits.

So we have seen a familiar exchange of threats and recriminations between the two governments. But India’s foreign policy towards Pakistan has been paralyzed by a fear of the alternative. New Delhi is well aware that increasing pressure on President Asif Zardari to act against Lashkar-e-Taiba will only weaken his position and in turn, strengthen Pakistan’s radical right-wing.

Between a nuclear-armed theocracy and an imperfect democracy, New Delhi understands that, despite all their faults, Islamabad’s current leadership is better than the alternative.

But in the interests of his people, his party, and his country, the Indian Prime Minister still has to show resolve. Appointing the efficient and media-friendly P. Chidambaram to the Home ministry, and empowering the intelligence bureaus are measures that the Congress hopes will convince voters of their seriousness.

But the government would be wise to make certain that the stringent anti-terror measures are both implemented and institutionalized, because another atrocity before election-time would put the Congress Party out for a long time to come.

In dealing with Pakistan in the short-term, it is likely that the path chosen by the Indian government will be the one that promises the greatest electoral yield.

If Manmohan Singh wants to avoid a war, but still wants to pander to the rampant anti-Pakistan sentiment among the masses, he can either: (i) move troops into aggressive postures and use the ensuing period of tense brinksmanship to rally the country behind the Indian flag; (ii) appease the electorate - allow cultural and political relations with Pakistan to take a haircut, issue strong statements and lobby Western powers aggressively to India’s stance; or (iii) stall and wage a pitched media battle, while strengthening India’s terror-policing architecture.

By most measures, India seems to be going unequivocally down Track II, while seemingly toying with Track I as a back-up option.

President Asif Zardari, on the other hand, faces equally vexing challenges. Judging by his flamboyant press statements and his offer to send the ISI boss to India, he is no hawk. He favors cooperation with India but, despite his best intentions, is powerless in the face of a powerful military establishment and public sentiment.

His dilemma lies in having to balance intense pressure from the world community to exterminate the scourge of radicalism, with his people’s religious sympathies and their fundamental economic concerns. The Pakistani Army’s offensives in the troubled north-west areas only seem to be evoking more sympathy for the Taliban; who already now control the Swat valley and are busy imposing their austere version of Islamic law.

What Zardari does now, and how they do it, will be critical in defining relations with the Indian establishment, and the world. Will Islamabad try to whitewash the links between its intelligence services and the extremist outfits, or will it probe and expose these murky ties?

Meanwhile, India is seeing the local consequences of a Pakistani and Islamist threat. Passions are running high, and right-wing Hindu movements are gaining traction. The ‘moral policing’ attacks in Mangalore by the Sri Ram Sena, who attacked women drinking at a local pub, is emblematic of the fallout.

Mumbai’s attacks seem to have unleashed intense religious biases and right-wing sentiments in the region which effectively feed off each other: the rise of Hindutva movements only further empowers Islamists across the border and vice versa.

But the appointment of Richard Holbrooke as a special envoy to the region brings much hope. It creates a civilian counterbalance to the military hand of General Petraeus, and harmonizes U.S. foreign policy in the region, which has often been conflicting in its approach to the inter-related situations in Kabul, Islamabad and New Delhi.

But easy solutions and happy endings are often hard to come by. And this time will be no different.