False Consciousness and Foreign Policy

How do countries think? How do they react? We often delude ourselves when we claim to know the behavior of states. So we ascribe motives to them and make predictions that are way off the mark. When those who shape our foreign policies and those in the media that interpret these fall prey to similar tendencies, there are serious ramifications. Diplomacy is not simply the art of influencing behavior but of understanding it.

The cynics would talk of foreign relations being an exclusive language spoken by forked tongues. It is tricky to pinpoint the motives of a country but that does not prevent one from doing exactly that. When faced with an event that is of consequence, most would discard logic for bias and make categorical statements grounded in false consciousness.

For instance, if India accuses Pakistan of fomenting trouble in its territory and the latter makes a counterclaim, the world around jumps the gun and makes grim prognostications of impending war. After the Mumbai terror attacks of November 26, 2008, while the governments of the two countries went through the routine of rhetorical rebuffs and backdoor diplomacy, the foreign press and world leaders cautioned against war. The two points that can be gathered by the assortment of views are:

(a) They believe the two countries to be short on reason and long on impulse- who would rather be suicidal than reasonable. So they need to be shown the way and who best but the West.

(b) They attribute their tendencies and behaviors on those they are trying to figure out. So if the US did not hesitate to go on a “war” on terrorism, why should two countries, having a history of hostility, hesitate in pulling the trigger?

Now these two views contradict each other. If those trying to pull the countries back from the precipice of debilitating war have themselves indulged in similar policies, then they have no moral leg to stand upon. To play the Devil’s Advocate, they might defend their acts by saying that “see, we did a cost-benefit analysis and being much more powerful than our adversary, our actions made sense. But yours don’t.” A more charitable and hopefully not improbable view will be that having learned the error of their ways, they would ask others not to repeat their mistakes.

When India and Pakistan did not act in the expected manner the interest died down, which was good as fear-mongering helps only those who make a profit out of it. But what was amiss was a discerning voice to raise the question why they didn’t prove the predictions right. Why the reality of state conduct continues to be different despite a body of work dedicated to predicting behavioral patterns?

A host of international relations theories from realism, liberalism, constructivism and their sub domains have tried to figure out how countries act. If the purpose of theory is to explain the reality, these have just managed to scratch the surface of the psychology of states. Politicians, journalists, academics and diplomats have their own ways of looking at the world molded by their professional and personal beliefs while the people at large tend to have pretty set notions about governments. To dissect the thought process of a country and predict how they will react is complicated by so many variables that it is easy to revert to intellectual hand-me-downs from the past rather than adopt a fresh perspective that is clued into the changing realities.

Instead of broad brushing all states with similar behavior patterns and making predictions based on this, it would be more fruitful to understand each state as an individual entity with its peculiarities even though they all operate within the community of states. This would allow one to consider the fact that a country that reacted in a particular manner ten years ago might not react in a similar way now. The best way to deal with them is on an event-by-event basis hoping that these would set the tone for a long-term relationship grounded in cordiality and not conflict.

This also applies to countries that have had a shared history like India and Pakistan. They might have had some similarities at one point of time but both have gone through their own evolutionary process and have accumulated new characteristics. Rather than harking back to past-whether a glorified one of commonality or the infamy of Partition and wars, it is better to deal with each other in the present as one would deal with any other state in the world.

International law and practice has defined the area of action between states but this is a fungible construct that acquires the intentions and the connotation of the state interpreting it. This is what makes foreign policy such a complex, challenging and exciting phenomenon.

Most students of foreign policy commit themselves to probabilities and not to certainties. The only thing that one can control and be certain of, to an extent, is one’s action and reaction. An honest appraisal of our capabilities, possible allies and policy plans will make us aware of our strengths and weakness. This consciousness about oneself is better than a false consciousness about the other.

We can reduce uncertainties with certain guesstimates about the other state but our behavior cannot be based on presumptions. We might go wrong if we do and the past bears many reminders of the folly of assuming to know a lot when one knows little. If there are no permanent foes and friends there is a reason for this. Each state has the luxury to change its mind. How best does this suit the state it is interacting with depends on how the two make the effort to understand each other and optimize this understanding.