Negotiating Peace in Kashmir

What is at Stake?

President Clinton regards South Asia as the "world's most dangerous place."

It is home to 1.3 billion people, most of whom live in conditions of abject

poverty on a per capita income of less than $500 a year. In the near term,

the biggest threat to security comes not from poverty but from the rivalry

between Pakistan and India for control of Kashmir.


On the ground, control over the land is split between the two countries,

one-thirds to Pakistan and two-thirds to India. Pakistan regards the entire

Kashmir region as disputed territory. India regards Kashmir as Indian

territory, and has recently asked Pakistan to vacate the portion it

"occupies illegally." Attempts to find either a military or negotiated

solution have failed.


Both countries are incurring significant long-term economic and human

development costs because of their Kashmir policies. On a global scale,

both rank in the third or fourth quartile on most economic and social

criteria. The security of both countries is comprised by excessive defense

spending, not enhanced. This constitutes strategic myopia.


Frustrated by the impasse over Kashmir, and seeking to recover from their

military reverses in Kargil in 1999, some defence analysts in India are

advocating a limited war with Pakistan to solve the Kashmir problem once and

for all. However, such a war may not remain limited for very long. Faced

with imminent defeat in a conventional war, Pakistan would use nuclear

weapons at an early stage to offset its inferiority in conventional weapons.

This could push the region closer to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe.

Even a limited war with Pakistan would be very costly for India, and derail

its ambitious program of economic liberalization.


Breaking the Impasse

The leaders of both Pakistan and India will need courage and imagination to

accept the short-term personal political costs associated with promoting a

significant shift in their Kashmir policy to their citizens. However, these

costs are not likely to be so great as to unseat them.

A bilateral approach to finding a peaceful resolution has never gotten off

the ground, and is even more unlikely to do so now. Thus, the only way to

break the impasse is to involve a third party. This may involve the

following seven steps, implemented gradually over a five-to-ten year period:


--First, both countries will pull back their artillery and mortars

from the Line of Control in Kashmir (LoC)

--Second, a demilitarized zone will be created around the LoC,

supervised by the existing group of UN Observers.

--Third, Pakistan will end all military support to separatist

guerrillas.

--Fourth, both Pakistan and India will simultaneously withdraw their

military and paramilitary forces from Kashmir. A UN Peacekeeping

Force would take their place

--Fifth, Pakistan and India will both withdraw their irredentist

claims to Kashmir, and let the people of Kashmir decide their own

future

--Sixth, the UN will hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, giving the people

of Kashmir a choice between four --rather than the traditional two--

options. Their options would be: (1) Convert the LoC into an

international border, (2) Create an independent state of Kashmir, (3)

Accede to India, and (4) Accede to Pakistan.

--Seventh, the option which is ranked the highest would be

implemented, provided it got at least a two-thirds majority vote.

Otherwise, the top options would be ranked in a second plebiscite.


Pivotal US Role

The US is in an unprecedented position to bring India and Pakistan to the

negotiating table. Times are very different from the early sixties when

President Kennedy confided to Pakistan's President Ayub that while there was

an urgent need for a solution of the Kashmir problem, he was not in a

position to play an active and direct role in the matter.

In July 1999, Clinton made a commitment to the people of Pakistan, through

Nawaz Shariff, that he would take a personal interest in resolving the

problem of Kashmir. This was the quid pro quo for Pakistan's agreement to

withdraw its forces from Kargil.


Just as he has cautioned Pakistan's leaders not to resort to "re-drawing

borders with blood," President Clinton should also exhort the Indian leaders

to go back to Gandhi's doctrine of non-violence, and accept UN mediation to

advance the cause of peace. As an incentive, he should work with the G-8

countries to offer significant economic aid to both countries if they

resolve the Kashmir dispute. There are precedents for doing this, most

notably the Egypt-Israeli peace accords over Sinai. To further increase the

peace dividend, the G-8 should offer to write-off a portion of the foreign

debt owed by India and Pakistan, and make this write-off proportionate to

the amount by which the two countries reduce their defense spending.

Restoration of democracy in Pakistan could be made an essential condition

for providing debt relief. Treasury Secretary Summers has presented a

debt-write off plan to Nigeria recently, as an incentive to implement

democracy, and to increase spending on education and health care.