1971 in 2000

The year 1971 resonates in the history of Pakistan. At that junction, lies both the fracture of our national spirit and the promise of its rejuvenation. It is the single most important event in our history and hence must have been the subject of much critical analysis. And yet, the culture in Pakistan is so ahistorical that this singular event is consigned to the "dustbin of history". The separation of our country, the purported massacre of our fellow citizens and the alleged connivance and corruption of our leading politicians is wrapped up in the simple, digestible epithet, "Thank God, we're rid of the Bengalis. What with their poverty, their numbers, their cyclones..." and so on, in a litany of accusations against a people, who for 24 years, were our fellow countrymen. Clearly, there is a case for examining this chapter in our history. Buried in the events of those fateful days, are keys to the political psyche of the time. Yet it is not just an abstract desire for understanding an event from our past which need impel a close examination of that time. The specter of separation has since been raised in various other quarters. Surely, there are some lessons to be learnt here.
Between the time this paper was originally written (1991) and today, two significant developments have taken place which shed new light on these events. These are:
\\* The publication of the confidential Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report: the internal Commission of Inquiry constituted by the Government of Pakistan to look into the events of 1971. Though long classified as confidential, the magazine, India Today, published it in August 2000.
\\* The publication in 1999 of "The American Papers", a collection of confidential US documents relating to these events obtained under the Freedom of Information Act.
These two sources shed dramatic new light into the central concerns of this paper.
The events leading up to the separation of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh have been described in detail in quite a few accounts. I shall start by presenting a historical survey of the events leading up to 26 March 1971, a key date and then briefly describe the events from there on, till December 16 1971, when General "Tiger" Niazi signed the Instrument of Surrender in Dacca. The overall context is an attempt to answer two specific questions. These are:
\\* The responsibility of the Pakistan Army after 25 March 1971 in the reported "massacre" of the Bengalis.
\\* The role, (if any), of Z. A. Bhutto in bringing about the separation of East Pakistan.
In answering the two questions above, it is obviously necessary to be somewhat speculative. The chronology of events leading up to 1971 rests on more objective ground. Even there however, I feel it appropriate to add a note of caution: In reading through the material for this talk, I have formed some tentative conclusions to the questions I wish to address. Hence, the importance given to certain events and the language used in describing will betray the chimerical ideal of absolute objectivity. The ultimate solution is, as always, for the reader to reach his own conclusions working from the source material directly. (References to guide such efforts are listed at the end).
A Brief Historical Summary leading up to 1971
Before 1971, the key event in the saga that was to unfold occurred in Lahore on 23 March 1966. Mujibur Rehman, the leader of the Awami League, an almost exclusively Bengali political party, unveiled his Six Points. To present his demand for provincial autonomy, Mujib had chosen the most evocative time and place. The Six Points, in themselves, provide most interesting reading. They are shown below as presented on that day [Sp225]. (The Six Points were later to be modified by the Awami League). In what follows, the actual Points are in quotes followed by commentary.
"The Constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan in its true sense on the basis of the Lahore Resolution, and Parliamentary form of Government with supremacy of Legislature directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise".
The demand for universal franchise was a rejection of the Basic Democracy introduced by General Ayub in 1962. This system envisaged the election of Basic Democrats (B.D.) through direct election. The President was then elected from a vote within the B.D.'s. It was alleged that the B.D.'s, being few in number, were very susceptible to political pressure and subsequent manipulation of electoral results. Also, universal franchise worked in favor of the Bengalis who had the majority of the population of the country. The demand for a Federation on the basis of the Lahore Resolution refers to the fact that the 1940 resolution asked for the Muslim majority provinces to be "grouped to constitute Independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign." [Ap58]. In 1966, the implications of such a structure for the unity of Pakistan were profound.
"Federal government shall deal with only two subjects, viz. Defence and Foreign Affairs, and all other residuary subjects shall rest in the federating states". !!
"Two separate but freely convertible currencies for two wings may be introduced OR One currency for the whole country may be maintained. In this case, effective constitutional provisions are to be made to stop the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. Separate Banking Reserve is to be made and separate fiscal and monetary policy to be adopted for East Pakistan".
This refers to the prevailing conception that foreign exchange earnings accruing from the export of jute grown in East Pakistan were used to subsidize development in West Pakistan. More on this shortly.
"The power of taxation and revenue collection shall vest in the federating units and the Federal Center will have no such power. The Federation will have a share in the state taxes for meeting their required expenditure. The Consolidated Federal Fund shall come out of a levy of certain percentage of all state taxes". This rendered the Center, already deprived of any function except for Defence and Foreign Affairs, entirely dependent on the charity of the provinces in deciding what constituted an agreeable percentage of taxes to be given to the Center.
"There shall be two separate accounts for foreign exchange earnings of the two wings. Earnings of East Pakistan shall be under the control of the East Pakistan Government and that of West Pakistan under the control of the West Pakistan Government. Foreign exchange requirement of the Federal Government shall be met by the two wings either equally or in a ratio to be fixed. Indigenous products shall move free of duty between the two wings. The Constitution shall empower the unit Governments to establish trade and commercial relations with, set up trade missions in and enter agreements with, foreign countries". Again the issue of foreign exchange. The subtext of these demands was the perceived economic inequity between the two wings of the country. Thus, the Awami League wished to reserve for itself the use of export earnings generated from East Pakistan. The stipulation allowing Provinces to enter into agreements with foreign countries undermined considerably, the only two roles left for the Center. A foreign affairs policy from the Center could not be effective in the face of possibly conflicting trade links initiated by any of the provinces. The proposed foreign economic links also raised strategic and defence concerns.
"The setting up of a militia or a paramilitary force for East Pakistan". For General Ayub's government, relying ultimately on the military for its legitimacy, this was a demand to undermine its very core.
Clearly the Six Points were a direct challenge to the prevailing political structure. In reading them today, one is struck by the extreme nature of some of the demands, e.g. Point 2 in combination with Point 5 which relegates the Center almost to insignificance. These demands were not made in a vacuum. They had behind them a history of political developments which had helped radicalise the Awami League to the present juncture. While this is not the place to detail the convoluted political history of Pakistan, a brief survey of events relevant to the development of Bengali nationalism follows.
The first such event was on 21 March 1948 when the Quaid e Azam, in a speech in Dacca, declared Urdu to be the sole national language of Pakistan. (It can be argued that a divide between the Bengali Muslim leadership and the Muslim League predated this. During the mid-1940s an alternate Bengali Muslim party formed the Provincial Government of the Bengal. This conflict was, however, resolved by 1945-6. See Wolpert, "Jinnah of Pakistan" and Jalal, "The Sole Spokesman" for details). Bengali students, in particular, took this as a grave insult, feeling that the status of the Bengalis as the majority ethnicity was not being duly recognized. Rioting followed. In 1952, the Basic Principles Committee of the Constituent Assembly re-iterated that Urdu would be the sole national language.
On 21 February 1952, a general strike was observed in East Pakistan. Processions violating an imposed ban were carried out. These were fired upon by the police and at least three students died. A Shaheed Minar was raised in Dacca, which 25 years later formed a focus for protest.
Meanwhile, Maulvi Fazlul Haque, (who had moved the Lahore Resolution), started a new political party which together with the Awami League and others formed the United Front in provincial elections held in 1954. The first demand of the U.F. was recognition of Bangla as an official language. There was also a demand for greater provincial autonomy. The Muslim League won only 9 seats out of 310, and the U.F. formed a new provincial government. Within two months, the Center dismissed this government, allegedly due to "seditious" statements made by the Chief Minister, Maulvi Fazlul Haque.
By 1955, things had reached a stage where Mr. Ataur Rehman of the Awami League said in the East Pakistan Assembly, "The attitude of the Muslim League cotorie here was of contempt towards East Bengal, towards its culture, its language, its literature and everything concerning East Bengal. In fact, Sir, I tell you that, far from considering us an equal partner, the leaders of the Muslim League thought that we were a subject race and they belonged to a race of conquerors. [Fp14]" Again, during the debate over the Constitution Bill in 1956, Abul Mansoor from East Pakistan commented, "Pakistan is a unique country having two wings which [have] ...a common religion and ...a common struggle. With the exception of these two things ...everything is different. There is in fact, nothing in common to the two wings, particularly in respect to those things which are the sine qua non to form a nation." [Fp14]
The reasons for this divide were two-fold. Firstly, the political, military, and bureaucratic elite of the country was largely from the Western wing. This was in turn due to two factors. Firstly, the Center being located in the West clearly provided a privileged position. More importantly, at the time of partition, both the military and the civil service had few Bengalis. The British, considering the Pathans and Punjabis to be martial races had recruited the bulk of the Indian Army from these regions. Also, the Muslims of Bengal were in such a deprived position that at partition, there was only one Muslim Bengali officer in the Indian Civil Service (the top echelon of the bureaucracy). Thus, the civil and military administrators of East Pakistan immediately after independence were largely West Pakistanis leading to a sense of deprivation in the Bengali middle class which had just been liberated from the dominant position of the Hindus in Bengal. This problem of Bengali under-representation within the highest administrative circles, even if it was recognized, could only be rectified gradually. Thus by 1959, the proportion of Bengalis in the civil service had risen to 29% and by 1970, this number was 40%. [Mp277] However, even in 1970, the proportion of Bengalis at the highest (and policy formulating) levels was extremely small; a relic of the skewed ethnic distribution inherited at independence.
Secondly, the material infrastructure of East Pakistan considerably lagged the Western wing at partition. As a result, capital and investment tended to concentrate in the relatively well-developed areas. This effect was accentuated during the sixties. Even though annual rate of income growth in East Pakistan was 4.2%, this was a full two points less than that in West Pakistan. In 1959, per capita income in West Pakistan was 32% greater. By 1969, this difference had increased to 61%. [Cp15]. Thus, development funds were initially largely spent within West Pakistan. This was coupled with the fact that a large fraction of the foreign exchange earnings of the country were from East Pakistani jute. These are summarized in the two tables given below [H].
Development Expenditure in each Wing as % of Total
Period West Pakistan East Pakistan

Pre-plan 1950-51 - 1954-55 80% 20%

First Plan 1955-56 - 1959-60 74% 26%

Second Plan 1960-61 - 1964-65 68% 32%

Third Plan 1965-66 - 1969-70 64% 36%

Share of East Pakistan in exports and imports

Plan Exports Imports

Pre-plan 1950-51 - 1954-55 50.1% 28.0%

First Plan 1955-56 - 1959-60 61.4% 32.1%

Second Plan 1960-61 - 1964-65 59.5% 30.6%

Third Plan 1965-66 - 1969-70 49.8% 32.8%
This apparent difference in the sums "earned" by East Pakistan (through its exports), and those "invested" in it provided considerable fuel for the nationalistic fervour of Bengali intellectuals. There may well have been extremely sound macroeconomic reasons for the imbalances in development expenditures detailed above.
The lack of infrastructure that hindered the infusion of development funds has been mentioned above. Also, in the early years of Pakistan's history, a large fraction of the budget was earmarked for defence. Since this was concentrated almost entirely in the Western wing, this further contributed to the sense of isolation in the East. However, no matter what the rationale behind these decisions, politically they were disastrous. Bengali leaders were hardly likely to believe what in their eyes were simply self-serving explanations. To them, the inequity was clear and, increasingly it appeared indelible.
The gulf between the perceptions of the economic picture within East and West Pakistan was later dramatised in the Report of the Panel of Economists on the Fourth Five Year Plan (1970-75). In it, the Bengali economists were to state: "Our analysis indicates that despite the formal commitment of the Government of Pakistan to reduce disparity, the extent of disparity in per capita income between East and West Pakistan has widened at an increasing rate... ...Disproportionately higher levels of development and non-development expenditure ...led to the creation of a thriving private enterprise in West Pakistan, while that in the East was deliberately left to lag behind." [Emphasis added]. Economists from West Pakistan commented, "The phenomenon [regional disparity] was inherited at the time of partition. ...But it is obvious that the disparities cannot be removed overnight. ...The national objective must be to bring about a reduction in disparity not by lowering the growth rate in West Pakistan but by raising it in East Pakistan." [Cp62] Thus, even the economists were divided along partisan lines. The feeling of deprivation amongst the Bengalis, no matter whether justifiable or not, was tangible and concrete.
In the event, several factors converged to bring about the rise of Bengali nationalism expressed finally in the Six Points. A historical feeling of having their culture and language slighted, disenfranchisement from elite circles, the concentration of development funds within the Western wing were all potent causes. With hindsight, many authors cite the cultural chasm between the two wings as a harbinger of the events which unfolded in 1971. Certainly many intellectuals in East Pakistan felt a close affinity to the center of Bengali culture: Calcutta, in India. However, these cultural ties had been, in 1947, freely forsaken by the Bengalis of East Pakistan in the name of religion. Thus, to conclude that the united Pakistan was stillborn is not really tenable. This is reflected by the fact that during the sixties, after the trying times immediately following independence had passed, the integrity of Pakistan as a sovereign was scarcely doubted by anyone. That the bonding ties of religion were later to be cast aside was the result of the peculiar logic of political development in the five years from 1966 to 1971.
We arrive then, at the announcement of the Six Points by the Awami League by 1966. The immediate political context is also noteworthy. In the wake of the 1965 war with India, President Ayub had gone to Tashkent to discuss a settlement. On his return, it was widely felt in the country that the gains of battle had been lost on the negotiating table. (This theme was to be later used in the 1970 elections by Z. A. Bhutto as a potent rallying cry in the Punjab). After almost a decade in which the country seemed to have made tremendous economic progress, the position of the Government itself was suddenly quite weak.
Fundamentally authoritarian, the Government responded to the Six Points with a show of force by imprisoning Mujibur Rehman in Dacca. Over the next two years, the bubble of prosperity which the earlier part of the decade had seemingly conjured up, suddenly burst. (See Rashid Amjad, "Private industrial investment in Pakistan, 1960-1970", who argues that the rapid industrial growth was largely predicated on foreign aid. The cutoff in aid after the 1965 war triggered the downturn in the economy.) Even within West Pakistan, agitation against the Government almost spontaneously cropped up.
These events formed the backdrop for the announcement of the Agartala Conspiracy by the Government in January 1968. It was alleged that Mujib in collusion with the Indian First Secretary in Dacca had planned to overthrow the government. Various other leaders of the Awami League were also arrested. A wave of protest arose in East Pakistan where it was felt that, with Mujib already in jail, it was hardly possible for him to organize such an event. Various Pakistani sources, (G. W. Choudhury, Siddiq Salik), have claimed that there was truth in the claims of the Government, that Mujib's wife was used as a courier in communications between the Indian diplomat and Mujib. A public trial was scheduled where the Government felt that evidence of Mujib's collusion with the Indians would irrevocably tarnish his reputation. The trial was held amidst unprecedented publicity. Mujib's defence lawyer, a member of the Awami League, fully exploited the court as a stage to deliver the message of Bengali nationalism. The purported flag, and the national anthem of Bengal were all introduced in the court. On the other hand, the seeming prevarication of the Government witnesses rendered the charges dubious.
Within East Pakistan, the event was widely seen as another example of the persecution of the Bengalis. It served mainly to increase the support of the Awami League within East Pakistan. No less important, the Agartala case served to harden attitudes amongst West Pakistani policy makers as well. Having access to intelligence reports, there was little doubt amongst them that India had been involved. (G. W. Choudhury reports, "Mujib's chief defence lawyer, Abdus Salam, an Awami Leaguer, himself told me that he had no doubt about India's involvement in the case.") Combined with the earlier Six Points, Mujib was perceived by many as a secessionist. Mujib's repeated claims of desiring only greater political autonomy and not independence for East Pakistan were seen as a cover for his real intentions. Whether Mujib himself, at that time, desired independence or merely increased autonomy is hard to tell. He was himself later to claim that independence for East Pakistan had been his goal since 1947. But, as Herbert Feldman has pointed out, these ex post facto statements can hardly be treated as reliable.
Within the year, Ayub Khan had fallen from power because of the growing unrest in all parts of the country and his own failing health. In turn, he handed over power to the military which clamped yet another martial law, this time under the command of General Yahya Khan. Recognizing the political exigencies of the time, Yahya Khan announced the dissolution of the 1962 Constitution and Basic Democracy scheme. Direct elections based on universal adult franchise were to be held with the resulting National Assembly also being the Constituent Assembly for the formulation of a new constitution. The One Unit Structure inherited from the 1956 constitution was also repealed with West Pakistan reverting back to the original four provinces. (The One Unit was scheme was devised to create parity between the two wings. Both Urdu and Bangla had been recognized as state languages. While parity resolved the issue of Bengali predominance (due to their larger population), the scheme was unpopular in the three smaller provinces of West Pakistan). Simultaneously, official action was taken to remove the economic disparities. A National Economic Council was created which proposed that for the Fourth Five Year Plan, East Pakistan would receive 52.5% of the total development funds. To many Bengalis on the Council, this seemed inadequate redress for the inequities of the past twenty years. Western economists, on the other hand, felt that this constituted a fair beginning, [Cp63], again reflecting the wide gap in perceptions which had developed.
Two further contentious issues still needed to be resolved. Firstly, the Bengalis wanted a Constituent Assembly based uncompromisingly on universal franchise and without any loopholes such as a requirement of a two-thirds, or a 60% majority in forming and ratifying the new constitution. (East Pakistan had 162 out of 300, or 54%, of the seats in the proposed legislature). This was anathema to many policy makers in West Pakistan who feared that the East Pakistanis might foist some entirely unacceptable form of constitution. The Six Points were widely regarded as incompatible with the integrity of the country. Another example of the inversion of Eastern and Western views: the Six Points were seen by Bengali academics as for example, "the establishment of social justice for Bengalis and the end of exploitation by West Pakistan." [Mp210] [Emphasis added] This is another illustration of how social distortion and inequities in East Pakistan were seen to flow exclusively from exploitation by West Pakistan. The issue at heart was the form of Center-Province relations. The Awami League had sketched out a radical and extreme vision. Even among West Pakistani politicians there was a feeling that the high degree of centralization in previous administrations needed to be reformed. The critical question was the degree of reform, with many in the ruling military junta wary of the demands of the politicians.
Finally Yahya Khan issued the Legal Framework Order (LFO) on March 30 1971. This provided the legal basis for the interregnum before the elections. General Elections for the National Assembly were announced for December 5, 1970. The LFO provided for an adult franchise with no bar on constitution making by the elected House apart from a simple majority. However, any proposed constitution would have to adhere to five points which were deemed minimally necessary to preserve the integrity of the country. These five points were: (1) Pakistan must be based on Islamic ideology. (2) The country was to have a democratic constitution. (3) Pakistan's territorial integrity must be upheld in the constitution. (4) The [economic] disparities between the wings must be eliminated by statutory provisions to be guaranteed in the constitution. (5) The distribution of power between the Center and the Provinces must be made in a way consistent with giving the central government adequate power to discharge its federal responsibilities including the maintenance of the country's territorial integrity.
The LFO has subsequently been severely criticized. Two main points are noteworthy. Firstly, Article 25 of the LFO stated, "The Constitution Bill as passed by the National Assembly shall be presented to the President for authentication. The National Assembly shall stand dissolved in the event that authentication is refused." [Fp66] It was further stipulated that the Assembly must present the Constitution within 120 days of being convened. This clause effectively undermined a democratic constitution making process rendering it ultimately subordinate to the will of Yahya Khan. Furthermore, in a later clarification on December 3, 1971, Yahya Khan asserted that if a Constitution (amenable to his views) was not prepared in the stipulated time, Martial Law would continue. As a result, the LFO was met with considerable protest. The Awami League asked for the removal of Article 25.
A second flaw was the deliberate vagueness of Point 5, which dealt with the distribution of power between the Center and the Provinces. The intention behind this was probably to provide maneuvering room to the military junta in the post-election scenario. However, the unforeseen result was to allow the Awami League to campaign on the basis of the Six Points since it was not explicitly clear that they were in violation of the LFO. It is indeed possible that an alternative situation in which the Center-Province issue was resolved would have provoked the wrath and massive retaliation from the Awami League. Also, G W Choudhury suggests that the Governor of East Pakistan, Admiral Ahsan, (not a Bengali), had repeatedly assured Yahya Khan that Mujib has promised to alter the Six Points after the elections and hence a confrontation with the League at this stage was unnecessary.
The LFO led to a six month period of election campaigning before the elections. In East Pakistan, "Sheikh Mujib was assiduously preaching his Six Point Programme, affirming that nothing less would satisfy East Pakistan. ...at a press conference in Dacca on 26 November he said he wanted maximum autonomy not secession, and when asked about independence, he replied, ’No, not yet.' " [Fp89] His basic theme was the exploitation of the Bengalis at the hands of West Pakistan and the coming golden age of prosperity in Bengal once the Six Points provided deliverance from the exploiters. The rallying cry of Mujib's supporters was "Joy Bangla!" (Victory to Bangladesh). The polarization between the two wings was shown by the fact that the People's Party did not field a single candidate in East Pakistan and the Awami League, only eight in West Pakistan. The main results of the national elections are summarized in the table below. [Cp128].
National Assembly Election Results, December 1970
Party Punjab Sind NWFP Baluchistan West Pakistan East Pakistan
AL 160

PPP 62 18 1 81

PML 1 1 7 9

Ind. 5 3 7 15 1

Others 14 5 10 4 33 1

Total 82 27 25 4 138 162
The results were unexpected for two main reasons. Firstly, the almost clean sweep of East Pakistan by the Awami League which enabled it to claim a majority in the House by itself. A second surprise was the strong showing by the People's Party in West Pakistan where it emerged unquestionably as the strongest party. This point was the penultimate step in the tragedy of 1971. It was, as Feldman describes it, a "Descent into the Maelstrom"...
In the Eye of the Maelstrom
The elections served bring to the fore three major players in the events which were to unfold. The Government of Yahya Khan, (which was to soon shed its civilian mask as Yahya disbanded his Cabinet), Mujib and the Awami League, and an unexpected third party, Z. A. Bhutto. We focus first on the immediate response of the two political parties to the emergent scenario.
The reaction of the Awami League was a hardening of their position. Mujib declared that, "Our people have recorded a historic verdict. ...A constitution on the basis of the six-point formula has to be framed and implemented in all its aspects. The resounding victory of the Awami League is, in fact, the victory of ...Bangladesh." On another occasion, "These [the Six Points] are no longer my party's programme. The Awami League cannot amend it now. No one would be able to stop us framing a constitution on the six-point programme." [Cp145] As related by G W Choudhury, before the elections, Mujib had declared in secret meetings with the Government, that he would alter the Six Points. In public meetings early in 1970 he had declared that, "Pakistan has come to stay and there is no force that can destroy it." On the other hand, before the elections, intelligence had recorded Mujib clearly saying, "My aim is to establish Bangladesh; I will tear the LFO into pieces once the elections are over. Who could challenge me when the elections are over?" [Cp97-98] Thus, it seemed that the Awami League had, at the very least, several plans ranging from a constitutional achievement of the desired autonomy, through to independence. However, the election results afforded the League the liberty to pursue constitutional means by challenging the Government to convene the Assembly.
Z. A. Bhutto, at this stage acquired a critical role in the forthcoming events. Even though, strictly speaking, his position was of a leader of a minority party, the fact that his was the largest party in West Pakistan combined with its exceptional showing in Punjab provided Bhutto the credibility to make himself heard. Up to this stage, Bhutto had not explicitly expressed his opinion on the Six Points. The elections within West Pakistan had been contested on the basis of economic reforms, (his promised ’Islamic Socialism'). Bhutto was riding on the crest of a certain revolutionary zeal in the country. However, the increasingly strident tone of the Awami League worried many in the junta some of whom now looked upon Bhutto as a natural ally.
With each passing day, it was increasingly unclear when or whether the Assembly would be convened. Surprisingly, Yahya had declared on 14 January 1971, at Dacca Airport that Mujib would be the future prime minister of Pakistan. This was clearly not an opinion shared by many of his military colleagues as long as Mujib so forcefully demanded his Six Points. Yahya attempted to negotiate a settlement secretly with Mujib whereby at least a partial withdrawal from the Six Points to something more acceptable to the junta could be achieved. Without some sort of agreement, Yahya was unprepared to call the assembly and, so to speak, let the Awami League loose.
At this critical juncture, with the junta deeply reluctant to convene the assembly, Bhutto took upon himself, a strange mantle. I reproduce some of his relevant statements. It is worth remembering that Bhutto was the leader of a party which had 81 seats out of 300 in the Assembly; compared to the Awami League's 162. "No constitution could be framed, nor could any government at the Center be run without my party's cooperation." The PPP, he added, was not "prepared to occupy the opposition benches in the national assembly." While he stated that he had ’regard' for Mujib's majority, "Majority alone does not count in national politics." And in a remark that was to become a cause celebre, "Both these parties [PPP \& AL] have to share responsibilities of the country as the majority parties." (These remarks were made to various newspapers on December 22 and 25) [Cp146]As mentioned above, many in the junta now thought of Bhutto as an ally and Yahya Khan went with some of his advisors to Larkana for a short visit. In Bhutto's own version of these discussions, "We discussed with the President, some of the implications of the Six Points and expressed our serious misgivings about them." [Cp152] Soon after, on January 27 1971, Bhutto went to East Pakistan to discuss the form of the future constitution. In Dacca, however, Yahya's meeting with Bhutto was seen in a conspiratorial light. Bhutto's meetings with Mujib carried on with little progress, with Bhutto finally registering his difficulties with the Six Points directly with the Awami League. Finally, on 13 February, Yahya Khan summoned the Assembly to meet on 3 March. "Bhutto immediately announced that his party would not attend the session unless Mujib agreed to take part in discussions beforehand to reach a consensus upon the basis of the constitution." [Jp28]
Meanwhile, Bhutto had obtained antedated resignation letters from his elected Party members. These were essentially useless since the LFO explicitly stated that a member of the Assembly could only resign after the Assembly had convened. However, on 20 February, the LFO was amended by Presidential order such that, with immediate effect, any member could resign before the Assembly convened. "The entire affair lent further weight to the suggestion of collusion, since Yahya Khan had, by this amendment, made it possible for Bhutto to force a postponement of the National Assembly by requiring all his men to resign prior to the summoning of the Assembly, thus making numerous bye-elections necessary." [Fp112] Two days later, Yahya Khan dismissed his civilian cabinet as the junta now clearly and directly assumed command. On 28 February, Bhutto declared in a speech in Lahore that either the LFO must be amended and the 120 days limitation on constitution making removed or else the convening of the Assembly be postponed. Two days later, Yahya postponed the Assembly summons indefinitely.
Within East Pakistan, this announcement was met with strong protest. On the night of 1 March, six people died as a result of military fire in Dacca. Mujib announced a non-violent program of civil resistance, while issuing a press statement, "calling upon all sections of society, including government servants, to rise against the unlawful government." [Sp47] A total strike was observed on 3 March as a result of a call by Mujib. Yahya invited Mujib to a conference with other politicians. Mujib refused announcing that he would make a public speech on March 7. The atmosphere was charged to the extent that it was widely speculated that Mujib would take the opportunity to announce secession. In a parallel development, the military had mounted an extensive reinforcement program in East Pakistan. This in turn had raised concerns as to the intentions of the military. Indeed, in Chittagong, Bengali dockers refused to unload ships bringing in materiel. And yet, the news of the massive influx of weapons spread quickly and widely. On 6 March, in an attempt to preempt Mujib's speech scheduled for the next day, Yahya announced that the Assembly would be convened in Dacca on March 25. This was tempered by an official notice appointing General Tikka Khan as the new Governor of East Pakistan. (General Tikka had "previously won a reputation in Baluchistan (!) for his toughness in situations of civil disorder." [Jp29])
The next day, addressing a mammoth public meeting, Mujib announced four conditions for attending the National Assembly. The most important of these was a demand for the "immediate transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people, (i.e. the National Assembly would become a sovereign institution." [Fp117] For Yahya Khan, who had reserved for himself the privilege of ’authenticating' the constitution, this seemed unacceptable. Meanwhile violence continued unabated. An official statement released on 10 March stated that 172 people had been killed and 3558 injured. Rumours multiplied these totals by factors of ten or twenty. Finally on 15 March, Yahya Khan came to Dacca to negotiate a settlement. The endgame had commenced.
Over the next one week, a complicated series of proposal and counter-proposals were presented. The Awami League was clearly in a strong negotiating position, holding as it did the trump card of openly declaring secession at any point. As a counter, Yahya could only turn to the traditional last resort: military strength. As reported by S Salik, the Army had drawn up various operational plans. On 18 March, "Operation SEARCHLIGHT" was planned out.
The opening paragraphs of the plan deserve reading. "Basis for Planning. 1. AL [Awami League] actions and reactions to be treated as rebellion and those who support [AL] or defy M.L. [Martial Law] action to be dealt with as hostile elements. 2. As AL has widespread support even amongst the EP [East Pakistani] elements in the Army, the operation has to be launched with great cunningness, surprise, deception and speed combined with shock action." [Sp228] Note that Points 1 and 2 together imply that a large fraction of the East Pakistani population, including military units, were "hostile elements". These were then to be dealt with "shock action".
Whether the junta was conducting the negotiations in good faith is hard to judge. Bengali sources allege that these were merely a delaying tactic to introduce more troops into the country. S Salik contends that no troops were actually flown in over these two weeks. Certainly, the Government maintained the appearance of much serious discussion. However, many of the most contentious issues seem somewhat trivial in retrospect. For instance, in reply to the Awami League demand that Martial Law be lifted immediately, Yahya asserted that the legal framework established by the LFO could not be discarded. Thus, a President ruling under Martial Law sought refuge within legalities. The Awami League, too, had progressively increased its demands beyond the Six Point framework. Finally on March 23, the Awami League presented the Government with a "final" plan. This plan, in referring to the powers of the central Government viz. the "State of Bangladesh", limited the Center to defence and foreign affairs excluding foreign trade and aid. Even in defence, the powers of the Center were severely curtailed. The proposed Confederation of Pakistan was unworkable from any administrative perspective. The plan marked the end of the negotiations.
March 23 1971 was celebrated in East Pakistan as "Resistance Day". The Pakistani flag was confined to the Governor House and the military cantonments. Everywhere else, the green and red Bangla flag was raised. Mujib took salute from a parade of party militants, some bearing weapons. The next day, in a meeting with the President, the Awami League expressed its opinion that, "from our side, there is no need of further meeting." [Fp126] Mujib declared that, "Our demands are just and clear and they have to be accepted." [Cp178] The next day, March 25, he called for a strike two days later. General Yahya left for West Pakistan the same day.
On the night of 25-26 March, Operation SEARCHLIGHT commenced.
Before discussing the events which followed, I would like to attempt to draw some conclusions about the culpability of Z.A. Bhutto and Yahya Khan in the events thus far. About General Yahya, the most charitable assessment can be that of a ruthless fool. His actions, politically immature and inept as they were, are witness to his utter incompetence. His ruthlessness was subsequently to be demonstrated in his cavalier attitude towards the East Pakistanis. The irony is that this is the most charitable interpretation of Yahya Khan's actions. Bhutto presents a far more complex picture. He was himself later to write that several months before the events of March 1971, he had realized Mujib's intention to break away. Bhutto's actions in preventing the Assembly from being convened played directly into the hands of Mujib's secessionist plans. Especially if Bhutto knew what Mujib intended, his actions seems culpable.
Yet the atmosphere of the moment must also be kept in mind. Bhutto was riding the tiger of popular acclaim. His public meetings commonly attracted audiences in the hundreds of thousands. There was a widespread feeling in West Pakistan that to convene an assembly and allow Mujib to form a government would spell the end of Pakistan, since he would impose his Six Points. This was coupled with a strong element which advocated a crackdown to teach the Bengalis a lesson for their temerity. Bhutto was certainly to some degree, a captive of this emotion, just as Mujib's options were circumscribed by the militant elements in the Awami League and its student wing. On the balance then, a more principled politician might have taken more strictly democratic stance. Bhutto, jealously protective of his popularity, refused to lead his constituency, choosing the easier path of pandering to hard-line views and opinions. That he also harbored the ulterior motive of splitting the country to gain control of the Western half, as is alleged, is difficult to judge.
Military Action: 26 March 1971 and beyond
I had earlier intended to attempt to investigate the allegations against the Pakistan Army of genocide in East Pakistan. Numbers as high as three million casualties are quoted. The Pakistani response has been that these numbers are grossly inflated and largely the product of exaggerations by the Western media. A dispassionate examination of the evidence is almost impossible. Most accounts are polemical and uncompromisingly insistent on their own veracity.
The publication of the Hamood Report and the US documents now allow us to examine the situation with better information.
The evidence presented in the Hamood Report is so damning that it perhaps would suffice to simply present some of salient quotations:
"15. Lt. Col. Mansoorul Haq, GSO-I, Division, appearing as Witness No 260, has made detailed and specific allegations as follows: "A Bengali, who was alleged to be a Mukti Bahini or Awami Leaguer, was being sent to Bangladesh-a code name for death without trial, without detailed investigations and without any written order by any authorised authority." Indiscriminate killing and looting could only serve the cause of the enemies of Pakistan. In the harshness, we lost the support of the silent majority of the people of East Pakistan.... The Comilla Cantt massacre (on 27th/28th of March, 1971) under the orders of CO 53 Field Regiment, Lt. Gen. Yakub Malik, in which 17 Bengali Officers and 915 men were just slain by a flick of one Officer's fingers should suffice as an example. There was a general feeling of hatred against Bengalis amongst the soldiers and officers including Generals. There were verbal instructions to eliminate Hindus. In Salda Nadi area about 500 persons were killed. When the army moved to clear the rural areas and small towns, it moved in a ruthless manner, destroying, burning and killing. The rebels while retreating carried out reprisals against non-Bengalis". [HR]
"18. The statements appearing in the evidence of Lt. Col. Aziz Ahmed Khan (Witness no 276) who was Commanding Officer 8 Baluch and then CO 86 Mujahid Battalion are also directly relevant. "Brigadier Arbbab also told me to destroy all houses in Joydepur. To a great extent I executed this order. General Niazi visited my unit at Thakargaon and Bogra. He asked us how many Hindus we had killed. In May, there was an order in writing to kill Hindus. This order was from Brigadier Abdullah Malik of 23 Brigade." [HR]
That people were killed by Army action is indisputable. The numbers were certainly in the tens of thousands within the first month of Army action. [Again, some accounts claim that as many as 25,000 people died in Dacca alone on the first night.]
Indeed, as the Hamood Report comments: "the latest statement supplied to us by the GHQ shows approximately 26,000 persons killed during the action by the Pakistan Army. This figure is based on situation reports submitted from time to time by the Eastern Command to the General Headquarters. It is possible that even these figures may contain an element of exaggeration as the lower formations may have magnified their own achievements in quelling the rebellion. However, in the absence of any other reliable date, the Commission is of the view that the latest figure supplied by the GHQ should be accepted." [HR]
I would suggest that the mind-numbingly callous attitude of the senior officers indicated in the quotations above would indicate a far higher toll: this was not a hyper-efficient Nazi killing machine which recorded every last murder. This was a bunch of thugs out on a rampage.
Further evidence of this mindset is provided by the internal classified situation assessments of the US Embassy in Pakistan. For example, in a document titled "East Pakistan or Bangla Desh: Some Observations" dated July 2, 1971, the report comments: "Army officials and soldiers give every sign of believing they are now embarked on Jehad against Hindu-corrupted Bengalis" and "The indiscriminate pillage, execution, collective punishment and molestation which appears to have characterized the Army's operations in certain areas in East Pakistan, against Muslims as well as Hindus, might have created a psychological climate where fear only barely submerges a desire for revenge on the part of some peasants personally affected by the Army's actions". [APp614-616]
Further evidence is provided in a document entitled "Pakistan Internal Situation" dated August 2, 1971 which says: "Main instance de-Hinduization was expulsion of Hindus. Hindu monuments were being destroyed some areas. Such destruction observed in Dacca and Chittagong and Hindu sculpture now very easy to obtain". This was an early example of ethnic cleansing. [APp626]
(As an interesting footnote, internal US assessment as early as February 1971 regarded the creation of an independent Bangladesh the most likely outcome). [APp505-517]
The Hamood Report mentions the attacks on the Army and Biharis and West Pakistanis living in East Pakistan as extenuating circumstances and an explanation for a mindset of revenge. However, these are explanations more apt to describe the actions of a lynch mob: not a supposedly disciplined and professional army.
Having read through a mind numbing litany of horrors as reported in the New York Times, The Times, Newsweek, etc. I can only conclude that whatever happened was awful enough that we bear a heavy collective burden of guilt. That those in charge of the military, that those who drew up the plans, that those who executed the plans, were never even questioned in West Pakistan is testament to our ability to delude ourselves into believing a self-serving version of reality. The guilt, then, remains not just confined to those soldiers and those policemen who committed individual acts, or even those officers who drew up plans and policies which allowed this to happen. The guilt is ours, as a nation, for failing to confront our own twisted, inverted image. Today, twenty years after the events, most of those involved have died or else retired from military service. There is then, perhaps, nothing gained in bringing them to task. But our continual denial that the events ever took place serves only to raise the possibility of their repetition.
I reproduce below, just four extracts from a multitude of reports available.
Simon Dring, The Daily Telegraph, 30 March 1971.
"Only the horror of military action can be properly gauged- the students dead in their beds, the butchers in the market killed behind their stalls, the women and children roasted alive in their houses, the Pakistanis of Hindu religion taken out and shot en masse, the bazaars and shopping areas razed by fire and the Pakistani flag that now flies over every building in the capital..."
Tony Clifton, Newsweek, 28 June 1971."Anyone who comes to the camps and hospitals along India's border with Pakistan comes away believing the Punjabi army capable of any atrocity. I've seen babies who've been shot, men who've had their backs whipped raw. I've seen people literally struck dumb by the horror of seeing their children murdered in front of them..."
Report of a World Bank Economist, (as printed in the New York Times) 13 July 1971. "The situation is far from normal. Nor are there any signs that normality is being approached. ...[There is a] general sense of fear and lack of confidence on the part of most of the population. ...Approaching Jessore, it became soon clear that this was the area where the army punitive action had been very severe. From the air totally destroyed villages were clearly visible, a building still on fire, and to eastern side of the runway, a good many houses had been destroyed. ...Some 20,000 people were killed in Jessore. The city's Center has been destroyed; commerce has come to a standstill. More than 50% of the shops have been destroyed.
Sidiq Salik
"[A Pakistan Army] column, maintaining its diligent pursuit on the way, finally reached Tangail in the evening. It replaced the Bangla Desh flag with the national flag over the Circuit House, fired eight shells in the environs to announce its arrival and settled down for the night." [Sp89] [Emphasis added] No further mention of the effects of these eight shells on the ’environs' is made.
Conclusions
The creation of Bangladesh is the darkest chapter in Pakistan's history: dark for what we did and what we wrought. In short:
1) The Pakistan Army was guilty of the ethnic cleansing of Hindus from East Pakistan.
2) The Pakistan Army was guilty of the massacre of certainly more than 100,000 East Pakistanis, Muslims and Hindus alike
3) The Pakistan Army was guilty of multiple violations of the Geneva conventions forbidding collective punishment etc.
4) Z A Bhutto played a role in facilitating the events which lead up to March 1971 and the descent into darkness thereafter.
The fact that the Hamood Commission report was shelved, the fact that Generals directly held responsible for massacres, cowardice and extreme incompetence were never court-martialed remains a signal and continuing failing on our part. Indeed, had the Army been held responsible for 1971, would it have repeated more of the same in Baluchistan from 1973-76? History keeps coming back to haunt us. In the prophetic words of the Hamood report, "we came to the conclusion that the process of moral degeneration among the senior ranks of the Armed Forces was set in motion by their involvement in Martial Law duties in 1958, that these tendencies reappeared and were, in fact, intensified when Martial Law was imposed in the country again in March 1969". [HR}
As we enjoy the fourth Martial Law of our history, these are words to remember. One day, we will certainly have cause to do so.
Sources
The notation used, ([Cp15]), points to the author with the initial capitalized letter(s), followed by the page number. The letters used, and the corresponding authors are
[C] Golam W. Choudhury, "The Last Days of United Pakistan", Indiana University Press, 1974. Dr Choudhury was a member of Yahya Khan's Cabinet from 1969-71. He is a Bengali but did not sympathize with the Awami League. His is an insider's account of the negotiations and maneuverings leading upto 1971. His book is notably sympathetic towards Yahya Khan and harsh on both Z.A. Bhutto and Mujibur Rehman.
[F] Herbert Feldman, "The End and the Beginning: Pakistan 1969-71"}, Oxford University Press, 1975. A scholar who had earlier written a scathing account of Ayub Khan's regime. On the whole, sympathetic to the Pakistani side of things.
[S] Siddiq Salik, "Witness to Surrender", Oxford University Press, 1977. (Then) Major Salik was a participant in the events of 1971.
[J] Robert Jackson, "Crisis in South Asia"}, Praeger Publishers, 1975. The author, a fellow at Oxford, has written an account in the main of the military events in the war of 1971.
[H] E. S. Mason, R. Dorfman and S. A. Marglin, "Conflict in East Pakistan: Background and Prospects", Unpublished. A paper authored by three Harvard professors which was widely quoted in later Bangladeshi and Indian documents.
[M] Michigan State University, Asian Studies Center. "South Asia Series, Paper 21: West Bengal and Bangladesh, Perspectives from 1972", MSU, East Lansing, Michigan. A collection of essays by various Bengali, Pakistani, and Western academics.
[A] Ayesha Jala