Is Jehad Passe’?

Many Pakistani liberals are rejoicing Islamabad's u-turn on its Taliban

policy. With the international community firmly behind our self-appointed

President, they seems convinced, we are poised to rise from the ashes of the

twin towers as a progressive, liberal and secular state. Sane voices in

Pakistan, few and far between, have only cautiously welcomed this purported

liquidation of Islamabad's jihad franchise, wary as they are of the societal

dissonance set in motion by the rising influence of rabid Islamic

fundamentalism in the country. But this fundemantalism is now deeply

embedded in the socio-political psyche of sizeable numbers across ethnic,

sectarian and linguistic divides. And the peculiar world-view spawned by

this religious orthodoxy is not only worrying but seems too rigid to lend

itself to sudden policy shifts.

The state-subsidised radicalization has been a slow, corrosive process

gaining strength in well over two decades. The widespread destitution,

disempowerment and frustration that millions of Pakistanis encounter every

day continue to add fuel to this fire. Can a few million dollars from

Pakistan's western benefactors affect the day-to-day fate of this virtually

silent, wretched, disenfranchised majority? Will they say no to fanatical

entrepreneurs who offer them money and a ticket to heaven when the state

will not even provide for their basic human needs? Whether Pakistan is

further radicalised or liberalised is an open question. But the appeal of

radical Islam, and those who espouse it, could grow before it wanes. As

Pakistan absorbs the multi-faceted effects of the war in Afghanistan, and as

more civilian dead bodies wash ashore, chances are the rising anti-US,

anti-Musharraf sentiment could help Islamic parties garner more public

support.

Does Islamabad's new official posturing augur an actual abrogation of the

use of militant jihad as an instrument of foreign policy? In other words, is

jihad really passé?

On the one hand, General Musharraf has consolidated this new policy shift by

purging 'hard-line' elements from the army's ranks, and by cracking down on

Islamic fundamentalist groups. On the other, the General is still adamant in

his public pronouncements that Kashmir, terrorism in Afghanistan and

sectarianism in Pakistan are all different phenomena. 'Not to be confused

with each other', as he puts it.

One would certainly hope that this is nothing more than political

face-saving to stem the growing hard-line perception that by siding with the

US, Musharraf has compromised the freedom struggle in Kashmir. But old

habits die hard. For years, Islamabad has faced virtual international

diplomatic isolation on account of its 'strategic compulsions.' Pakistan has

been financially ruined by these skewed national security priorities, but

General Musharraf, much like his illustrious predecessors, insisted until

very recently that Pakistan is a power to reckon with. Ironically, the

establishment is still betting on 'moderate Taliban,' still holding on to

the hope that the post-Taliban set up in Afghanistan will be of Islamabad's

choosing (or Islamabad-friendly?). More worrying though are reports that

'indigenous' jihadis have been asked to wait in the wings till Kashmir is up

for liberation again.

It remains to be seen whether this about-face on jihad is a tactical retreat

to tide over the storm or a paradigm shift? For one, the India-bashing on

PTV clearly belies Islamabad's purported reversal of its jihad policy. While

state-fed intellectuals never tire of flaunting Musharraf's earnest desire

for peace in South Asia, two caveats are in order. First, it is critical to

situate the intransigent anti-India posture of the establishment in the

context of what political psychologists call the "need for the enemy." For

the establishment, Islamabad's maximalist national security vision is more

than just an operational exigency. Rather, it is a 'win-win' strategic

calculus driven primarily by a desire to keep India bleeding, besides

holding the Pakistani nation hostage to the state's threat perception.

Second, peace requires a fundamental transformation in the mutual

perceptions of the parties in conflict. Any real and sustainable solution to

the conflict in Kashmir, for example, requires a radical shift in the

military's worldview. Real political dialogue with he 'Hindu' enemy may be

anathema to the military's rigid institutional mindset. This argument can

also be situated within the civil-military configuration of Pakistan - that

the Pakistani military in fact derives its political legitimacy and

influence from the 'hostility consensus' it continues to build up against

India. The "jihad" in Kashmir is thus only a logical extension of that. To

say the least, the relentless anti-India public propaganda campaign is

hardly conducive to regional peace. Real peace making begins in the minds of

the public. Public opinion mobilisation is essential if peace is to be made

acceptable and durable. That is not in sight.

The optimists therefore need to think twice before jumping to any

conclusions. Pakistanis know where the previous 'strategic engagements' with

the US took the country. Where the billions of dollars in American aid have

gone, and where more arms for the military have landed Pakistan.

Dictatorships, at least of the Pakistani military variety, are aggressive,

authoritarian and conservative. Totalitarian power wielded by self-appointed

rulers without institutional checks and balances is hardly a recipe for

progressive liberalism, socio-economic progress or peace. History lessons,

anyone?