The Pattern of Violence

The transformation of the man projected as the reluctant saviour of a nation into a political being with naked ambition has been more than disillusioning for those who believed in his ability to change things. If he continues to play the mass-appeal game, Gen. Parvez Musharraf will find himself as compromised as his elected predecessors, with disastrous consequences, not just for himself and the nation, but also the so-called ’war against terror' that he has pulled Pakistan into. Leaving aside the question of whether he had a choice in the matter or not, the fact is that the General is, or was, uniquely placed to cut the umbilical ties that have long bound the Pakistani establishment with the militant ’Islamic' groups that are behind the current wave of terror in the country.

There are no two ways about it: what's needed to prevent the rise of religious extremism is political will and determination - always sadly lacking here. The very fact that Gen. Musharraf backtracked so quickly and easily on the issue of the ’blasphemy law' just months after taking over power, indicated his unwillingness to rock the boat where the religious parties were concerned, emboldening them once again. The dangers of this law (Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code, introduced in the Zia years) have been amply demonstrated by the number of false cases registered under it, and the rise in ’religious violence' as a result. All that was being proposed was a procedural change in how a complaint under this law would be made, in order to minimize the chances of false accusations (and consequential attacks on the life of an accused). A similar proposal had been made during Benazir Bhutto's first term, for which then law minister Iqbal Haider paid with his post as the ensuing protests forced the government to beat a retreat, and force his resignation.

The ’religious' (religio-political) lobby which initially opposed the very creation of Pakistan has since 1947 been engaged in trying to appropriate the country according to their own narrow vision - although, as Justices Munir and Kiyani observed in their straightforward report, no two learned divines could agree on the fundamental of what it meant to be a Muslim. The twelve years under Gen. Ziaul Haq, while not solely accountable for the slide into their wicket, played a significant part in strengthening their lobby. A part in this slide was played by those have tried to censor the founder of the nation Mr Jinnah's address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on Aug 11, 1947, in which he stressed that citizens of Pakistan would be free to go their places of worship, and that this would have nothing to do with the business of the state. The slide downwards was further accelerated by those who pushed through the Objectives Resolution, declared Islam to be the ’state religion' (forgetting that it is people who have religion, not states), and were instrumental in dropping the word ’freely' from the Preamble to the Consitution when it came to the right of citizens of Pakistan to freely practice their religion and beliefs. Then came Z.A. Bhutto, who rushed to appease the religious lobby when he felt his government was on weak ground - a mistake every Pakistani government has made since.

Gen. Zia conveniently consolidated and took much further the trend that had already begun. In this of course he had the political objective of staying on in power, easily accomplished once Pakistan became a front line state in the Afghan war, and a key US ally in the fight against Communism. Twenty years later, the wheel came full circle, with another General in the driving seat, initially denounced for usurping power - until once again, another Afghan ’war' (if dropping bombs can be called that) made it expedient for Washington to again enlist Islamabad's help as an indispensable ally of ’democracy', but again in reality, primarily for its own political, strategic and economic interests.

In jumping on the ’war against terrorism' bandwagon, Islamabad forgot that terrorism is a state of mind, manifested in physical violence to support an ideology. That ideology is still being propagated in many ways in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The rubble left by the Zia years has yet to be cleared away. Laws still exist on the statute books that were enforced for political, rather than religious, reasons. As the government-instituted Commission of Inquiry for Women (1997) noted, "all the Hudood laws were conceived and drafted in haste. They are not in conformity with the injunctions of Islam". Even the punishment of stoning to death for adultery was at one point struck down by the Federal Shariat Court itself, only to be later restored because of political reasons. The consequences of retaining such laws on the statute books are painfully clear, as the recent sentence of stoning to death for a rape victim in Kohat demonstrates.

What is needed in Pakistan is ’zero tolerance of intolerance'. Much of this intolerance stems from what is taught at sectarian-minded madrassahs, which fill the vacuum left by the education system (public and private). Despite high-sounding intentions, no steps have been taken to regularize or mainstream these religious seminaries or their curriculum. It is here that the religious groups mainly draw their cadres and from where the now reviled Taliban emerged. The number of these institutions has increased drastically since the Afghan war.

The 150 or so madrassahs in Pakistan in 1947 had increased to 563 in 1971. Another thirty years later, in 2002, there are about 20,000, with nearly three million students. Seven thousand of these seminaries belong to the Deobandi sect from which most of the militant cadre is derived. It is estimated that at the current rate of growth, the number of madrassahs will equal the government run primary and secondary schools by the year 2010. The sectarian division of the madrassahs has been particularly detrimental to pluralism and tolerance in Pakistan, as they have given rise to a crop of ideologically committed and armed cadre of militants, each group convinced that the others are infidel. The rise of violent sectarian outfits has resulted, since 1990, in the killing of about a thousand people each year, estimates the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan.

The arrests of religious extremists since 9/11 have proved to be largely tokenism and face-saving. In most cases, there have been no formal charges, and recently, many of those arrested (including those wrongly arrested) were allowed to go free after signing affidavits about never indulging in violence again. But then, as PPP Central Information Secretary Taj Haider says, formal charges against those arrested would expose the Pakistan army's and the agencies' role in their affairs. Incredibly, a court even awarded a monthly maintenance (Rs 10,000) for the family of Maulana Azhar of the Jaish-e-Mohammad, while he is under preventive detention. Given that no such generosity has ever been forthcoming for the families of political detenues, and given the Jaish's claim for much of the violence not just in Pakistan but in the Kashmir Valley, what kind of message does this send to this, and other like-minded groups?

Militant outfits like the Jaish-e-Mohammad (Army of Mohammad), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (the Guardians of the Friends of the Prophet) and its armed wing, the even more violent Lashkar-e-Jhangvi have been banned. But the ban means nothing when they are still effectively in operation all over the country, spearheading attacks on religious congregations, individual professionals (doctors, lawyers, religious scholars). Most of the individuals killed (over 80 doctors over the last ten years) have belonged to the Ahle-Tashih, but since 9/11 non-Muslims have also been considered fair game.

Over the years, the authorities have turned a blind eye to pronouncements declaring the Ahle-Tashih as ’kafir' (infidel) and ’wajib-ul-qatal' (ordained to be killed). Such violence-inciting rhetoric has been tolerated in the publications of the militant groups, besides being allowed to be plastered on public transport and property, even in newspaper headlines while quoting ’religious' leaders. Even after the ban on militant groups, many of their publications (several in Arabic, indicating funding from the Gulf countries) continued to be available at bookstalls throughout the country -- it was not until March 14 that the federal government directed the provinces to ensure the ban on publications of militant organisations under the relevant clauses of the Anti-Terrorist Act. Some of these dailies claimed to sell up to 60,000 copies a day; the monthly Majallah Al-Daawa claims a circulation of 400,000 copies a month, while the weekly Zarbe-Momin claims to sell 250,000 copies every week.

All this has been long tolerated by the authorities because of their own involvement in training and providing other support to such groups. However, allowing the sectarian groups to operate freely has contributed to the increasing power of the militant outfits in general. Most were active in the Afghan war; some took it upon themselves to support those fighting for Kashmir's liberation from India. Their involvement has cost the Kashmiris dear, increasing the level of violence in the Valley and allowing the Indian authorities to label the struggle as foreign or Pakistani-sponsored and using force to crush it, rather than acknowledging it as an indigenous uprising which can only be resolved through political dialogue and democratic means.

As for democratic dispensation back home, the Pakistan Peace Coalition (PPC) notes that the lack of civil and political liberties is a contributing factor to the rise of the militant groups. If alternative opinions are given space, and tolerance and respect are promoted, the PPC argues that this will "provide a necessary challenge to extremism, as well as temper the urge for many frustrated elements to resort to reactionary violence." One may add that that it would also limit the space for mischief from outside, although such a limitation may well be somewhat inconvenient for those who habitually blame everything that goes wrong on India (a trait reciprocated by New Delhi, as mentioned above).

Closing off borders, re-shuffling the police order, checking suspicious looking passers-by and planting armed guards at places of worship, is not the answer. Nor is a ban motorcycle pillion riding, and providing arms training and protection to threatened citizens, as suggested by the police when a delegation of the Pakistan Medical Association met with the Sindh Governor in March in the wake of the ’doctors' killings' in Karachi. Nor will simply banning these militant groups, as General Musharraf has done, mean anything unless it is accompanied by firm measures that prove his sincerity and political will in curbing such violence.

The recent spate of violence sends a clear message about his lack of control over the law and order situation at home, even as he is lauded for his anti-terrorist stand abroad. Among the public, there is widespread fear and distrust of the religio-political groups, whose influence over government policies far exceeds their political support: besides being unable to make any significant electoral gains, they have not succeeded in communalizing the public the grassroots or community level. There also no popular support or public sanction for the violence that is committed in the name of religion. And yet no government has had the political will to call a spade a spade.

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, firm measures and a foreign policy shift might have prevented the jihad ’coming home' to Pakistan, as ideologically committed militants who had been trained to fight for Islam turned their sights to this country. But the authorities were unable, or unwilling, to rein in these groups. "These extremists have been very useful to the government, which might need their services again maybe for Kashmir," says an official, speaking on condition of anonymity. At least some elements of the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) are believed to still protect the militants they nurtured, trained and armed over the years.

These policies have resulted in keeping the spiral of violence high in Pakistan over the past decade, with the intensity increasing since 9/11 since the government's u-turn on its erstwhile Afghan policy - the militant groups have turned with ferocity against the state that had until now been among the hands that fed them. Nor has there been any shortage of such hands, ranging as they do from the world's only superpower the USA, to its oil-rich Saudi and Gulf state allies, and other countries with strategic and political interests in the region and its ideological profile, like Iran (which stopped financially supporting Shi'ite groups in 1996).

The intelligence agencies' level of competence can be gauged by the lack of progress made in the killing of the interior minister Gen. Moinuddin Haider's older brother, who was gunned down the day after the minister announced that terrorism would not be tolerated. This was unfortunately not the only casualty. Even an abridged version of violent attacks provides chilling evidence not only of this, but also of the ’jihadi' mentality.

An attack at a church congregation in Bahawalpur on October 28, 2001 by six unidentified gunmen killed 18 people and injured 20 others. A hitherto unknown group calling it self 'Sipah-e-Umar' (Omar's Army) claimed responsibility in faxes on printed letterheads to newspaper offices. The next major attack on a church was in the country's capital, Islamabad, in the heart of its secluded and well-guarded Diplomatic Enclave, on March 17, 2002. The attack killed five churchgoers, including two Americans, besides one of the suspected attackers.

Another religious congregation was attacked on April 25, just five days before the presidential referendum, when a bomb was set off in the women's section of an imambargah at the Punjabi town of Bhakkar, killing nine women and three children - the first time that women have been deliberately targeted (although women and children were also among those killed when militants opened fire at an imambargah congregation at Mominpura, Lahore, in 1998).

The bomb that shattered the Pakistan Navy bus in front of the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi on May 8, killing 11 French engineers, seems to be part of this sinister pattern, even though those killed were identified by nationality rather than religion. The action against Al-Qaeda in France and the French support to the US led ’war against terror' could well be motives for the attack. The pattern fits the story even if the actual target was the New Zealand cricket team, about to leave the Pearl Continental opposite the Sheraton, in a similar bus for the second Test at Karachi's National Stadium -- their physiotherapist, Dayle Shackel, already seated in the bus, was injured by glass shrapnel.

As the militant extremist groups attempt to assert themselves in the face of the withdrawal of government support, they obviously want to make the maximum impact: targeting women, professionals, foreigners, makes headlines and sends a clear message about their opposition to the government polices as well as lack of control. This control it can only wrest back if the man at the helm of affairs sees the larger picture and takes firm steps to consolidate the process that he had begun.