Rightsizing of the Armed Forces

The recent global developments in general and the ongoing standoff with India along the Line of Control in particular, not only corroborate that in traditional military terms, the huge Pak Army fulfils few strategic functions, it also implies that Indian numerical superiority is not at all that threatening as most of our military leaders often fondly depict.

Lets begin with the first premise. The ditching of the Taliban, the U-turn on Kashmir, the re-alignment of freelance jihad, although long due imperatives, are neither voluntary reversals nor indicative of an organic transformation of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Putting it bluntly, these somersaults were brought about under blatant American and Indian coercion. And thus one of the Third World’s largest and strongest militaries has proven completely helpless even to somewhat influence the events as per its aspirations, let alone flout the American diktats and defy Indian ultimatums altogether.

Yes, some illusory importance and superficial prominence did toss upon Pakistan in the immediate aftermath of September 11. But that owes more to geography and logistical necessities than to its military muscles. Regardless of the underlying reasons for this transitory significance, the bottom line for Pakistan is that it has been compelled to relinquish its national sovereignty to the Pentagon.

Then, regarding the subsequent assertion: How could the incumbent military government undertake a referendum, where the COAS personally headed his gigantic canvassing campaign, Corps Commanders extended widespread organizational support and a number of overt/covert agents of our security agencies facilitated the “desired” outcome, amid gravest external threats, most serious since 1971, according to General Musharraf himself?

Isn’t it a rather bewildering that Pakistan could afford to spare hundreds of star officers for WAPDA, NAB, PCB, the Hockey Federation, in short for almost every single civilian institution worth mentioning, while a million combat-ready Indian troops remained poised on the border and Mr Vajpayee was talking of a “decisive battle”?

What else, if it doesn’t conclude, beyond any doubt, that the volume of the Pak Armed Forces, above all of the Army, is illogically disproportionate to our security needs and far exceeds the required/justifiable level, by any measure. Please, try to enumerate the dividends, if any, this enormity has yielded for the nation so far? Quite the opposite, it can be claimed that the conspicuous price for the mega enterprise is quashed democracy, institutional meltdown, perpetuation of the military’s hegemony and abject poverty.

The historian Paul Kennedy, author of “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers” convincingly argues that the decline of great powers – Spain, France, Britain and recently the Soviet Union – was due to military overstretch, and taking on of commitments that simply could not be sustained or financed. An appropriate question in our case would be: How long can Pakistan bear the expenses of military extravaganzas without jeopardizing its very existence as a nation state?

In view of that, one of the most urgent tasks being faced by Pakistan is to strike a balance between defence and social spending. Rightsizing in the defence sector would be the first step in the right direction. A (successful) endeavour in this respect will not only generate tremendous socio-economical benefits, it would paradoxically also enhance our defence by conveying an implicit message to all concerned that:

A quantitatively inferior Pakistan is no more capable to survive a prolonged conventional onslaught, any stupid venture across the borders would leave it with few viable options other than to deploy its nuclear arsenal, the moment it feels itself cornered. As a result, restructuring the armed forces would indirectly help us pre-emptively thwart aggressive designs and in reality renders our nuclear deterrence far more credible, in stark contrast to current perceptions.

In the same manner, diverting at least a part of our massive defence budget to social development will, in the mid- to long-term, positively contribute to Pakistan’s economy and internal stability thus strengthening its political, diplomatic and international standing -- the decisive factors these days.

Probably, most importantly, a significant reduction in the total number of men on disposal of the top brass would (hopefully) curtail their political manoeuvrability by forcing them to focus their energies more on professional duties than to interfere in state running -- the root cause of our predicaments.

Numerically, India, the foremost rival, will always outnumber us. Any attempt to counter threats from our eastern flank by the virtue of manpower is completely devoid of rationality. We have to devise some non-orthodox methods to handle this disparity. Investing in quality rather than the quantity is one alternative. Striving for a smaller but slick, leaner but agile striking force soundly backed up by a content populace, and shrewd diplomacy is another way to offset the dimensional disadvantage.

Therefore, slashing the strength of the Pak Army by 25 %, as a minimum, would have nominal, if at all, impact on its fighting potential. In fact, only half in number well-trained, highly motivated and dedicated soldiers interested primarily in the responsibilities they are recruited/paid for, would be more than enough to defend the motherland than to have more admirals than naval ships.

Moreover, in relation to country’s per capita income Pakistani senior military officers are one of the best paid in the world. No other career, with equivalent academic qualifications and so little productivity produces comparable personal affluence as that of the officer cadre of the Pak military. Hence, trimming down the XL size of the security apparatus and cutting back lavish perks for the higher echelon will have no direct effect on our overall defence.

To be honest, the nation is being starved and the entire societal structure being torn apart only to appease a handful of officers at the top of the military hierarchy. We have to realize, at the earliest, that no army in the world can defend a poorly fed, illiterate and politically disoriented nation for very long.

To wind up, it would be pertinent to mention that utilizing gullible youth, as cannon fodder under the cover of “jihad” despite ploughing the lion’s share of scarce national resources into defence is/was deplorable, whatever gauge of ethics/patriotism one may apply. What purpose does the half-million strong army serve if jihad still has to be carried out by civilian mercenaries?

While providing adequate delivery systems in tandem with a reasonable stockpile of nuclear warheads to our troops, we have to rearrange our national priorities, in order to survive. A comprehensive overhaul of the military set-up, with absolutely no room for khakis in civilian spheres or policymaking, must be the starting point. The chain of command has to be rearranged in favour of democratically elected representatives.

PS. I am fully aware of the fact that the talk of delivery systems and stockpile of nuclear warheads at the end doesn’t sound pacifying or friendly. No doubt, the ideal, optimal [and absolutely preferable] solution to many of our tribulations would be a genuine and comprehensive demilitarisation of the region. But as long as it is not attainable, and when very few, if any, among our leaders are willing to give the real peace a chance, lets go for the least expensive option. Moreover, without offering a formidable deterrent as an alternative, slashing of defence budget is not even a theoretical possibility in Pakistan.