How real is Musharraf’s real democracy?

“I wish to inform you that the armed forces have moved in as a last resort, to prevent any further de stabilization. I have done so with all sincerity, loyalty and selfless devotion to the country with the armed forces firmly behind me.”
— General Pervaiz Musharraf [address to the

Nation after the coup de’tat Oct. 12, 1999]


12th Oct. ’99: Musharraf assumes power. Establishes National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB), National Security Council (NSC) and announces the Devolution of Power plan. May 2000: The Supreme Court approves of the coup citing “doctrine of necessity”; demands elections to be held by Oct. 2002. Musharraf holds a referendum in April 2002, seeking an approval of a five-year extension of his self-appointed presidency — 97.5% approval. 10th Oct. 2002: National and Provincial Assembly Elections are held. Nov. 2002, PML-Q forms government with a slim majority. Dec. 2003: controversial LFO is enshrined in the 1973 constitution as the 17th Amendment with assistance of MMA (alliance of six right wing parties).

“Real World Rule: It’s infinitely smarter to follow a pioneer than waste energy in attempting to be the pioneer…” —Robert J. Ringer

So the latest (although it’s already pretty late now) General cum President chose to be smarter: we see a definite historical pattern in the way President Musharraf operated to retain and legitimize his assumption of power via coup de’tat on Oct. 12th 1999. Much has been written about Musharraf and his democracy, but if we are to tackle any military-politics issue, I think, the starting point must be basic and essential: why does military intervenes in the political system of Pakistan. Is it because people and the politicians are incapable and incompetent in Pakistan? Or does the country needs the well-organized and honest institution like the military to run it? Or simply democracy is not the right political system for Pakistan?

There has been voluminous research on this issue, and personally, there are three most important internal factors that account for army’s intervention in the political system:
· Political parties’ inability to organize and mobilize the masses; and
· Legitimacy and integrity of the elected
· Vested interests of the military

A close observation of Pakistan’s fifty-seven year political record will reveal that, with the exception of a single government i.e. PPP in 1972, there have been no civilian government that has enjoyed a strong voter base and popular support. Democratic credentials have always been the weakest point of Pakistani politics and skepticism about the legitimacy of the elected has always pervaded the general public outlook.

Secondly, Pakistan since its inception has been plagued by unprincipled and corrupt leadership. Even the democratically elected leaders have shown absolute apathy towards democratic and parliamentary principles and customs. This has led to the undermining of the ability of the leaders to effectively assert their leadership. Bhutto’s performance can serve as an ideal example. After getting elected with a phenomenal majority in 1972, he had the mandate and support to lay tough foundations for a democratic Pakistan, but by 1977 he had lost all that he stood on in the previous elections—he was left to the support of the feudals and the state. This gap of legitimacy has been continually exploited by the military to find justification in their takeovers of the government.

In addition, the integrity and performance of the successive elected governments have been dismal. The all too famous cases from Benazir’s SGS commission and $54 million property of Surrey Palace to Zardari’s starring role as ‘Mr. 10 Percent’ to Nawaz Sharif’s charges of over a $100 million in money laundering, tax-evasion and misappropriation of public funds are widely known. This gives the much needed impetus to the otherwise illegal military takeovers.

“Not only have all the institutions been played around with, and systematically destroyed, the economy too is in a state of collapse. We are also aware of the self-serving policies being followed, which have rocked the very foundation of the Federation of Pakistan.”
— General Pervaiz Musharraf [address to the Nation after the coup de’tat Oct. 12, 1999]

Another crucial and mostly overlooked factor behind army interventions in politics is direct economic and financial interests of military due to its huge capital enterprises. The real irony is that this factor, although being as important as the above two, has always been downplayed and overlooked by both the general public and media (with the exception of a few like the Herald and the banned website satribune.com*). According to Owen Bennet-Jones, in his book, “Pakistan: Eye of the Storm”, the military's enterprises account for nearly 3% of Pakistan's GDP. Fauji Foundation, the largest military enterprise, controlled by the Ministry of Defence, has assets worth nearly US $ 2 billion. The second largest military business is one billion dollar Army Welfare Trust (AWT). It is controlled by the adjunct general of the Pakistan army based in GHQ. Originally meant for a ‘cover’ for the widows of the army personnel, currently the AWT does not run any charitable projects: all its profits are sent to GHQ.

And then the more obvious external factors which include the continual acceptance and encouragement of military dictators especially by the United States. It has continually armed and supported ruthless dictatorships in Pakistan whenever these suited its strategic interests. From General Ayub to General Zia to General Musharraf: democracy has been has been brushed aside in favor of more important issues e.g. tackling Soviet Union or the War on Terror.

Now the stage is set for the real issue. Musharraf and his real democracy, is it really real or just another hoax to occupy ‘the seat’ and further the interests of the military? Let’s briefly examine his policies, one by one.

Devolution of Power— the real democracy
A clear revival of the Ayubian ‘Basic Democracies’ and Zia-ul-Haq’s Non-Parties Parliament, that sought to quench the thirst of political participation of the masses via façade of ‘real democracy’. By divorcing local power from mainstream political process (since Nazims cannot join a political party), military successfully increased the ineffectiveness of political parties and hence undermined democracy on the grass-roots level. Musharraf via the 17th Amendment has ensured the Nazim system’s place for the next six years.

National Security Council— because the parliament is supreme
Musharraf has been able to get an NSC approved by the parliament. By bringing officials like the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the chiefs of staff of the Pakistan Army, Navy and Pakistan Air Force in NSC in a body that’s essentially supra-parliamentary, it is a step to ensure that civilians and civil institutions don’t overshadow the military; something similar to what Zia proposed in 1985: 11 power holders, of whom five were to be military men, himself included. (Idris)

The referendum— hassle-free democracy
Musharraf, like all his military predecessors, understood very well that he cannot forever rely on his entrance ticket i.e. the ‘doctrine of necessity’ and will require some popular support to legitimize his rule. So, “…rivers of cash flowed from state coffers to rent crowds for his public rallies and for hauling voters to polling stations” (Shah, 26). And hence, like Field Marshal Ayub Khan held his referendum about two years after his coup; General Zia-ul-Haq in December, 1984, seven years after his coup and Musharraf followed suit after two-and-a-half years of his coup. Mission Accomplished: legitimacy gained and that also— democratically.

Political Parties— Custom-built: available in all shapes, sizes and colors
Then there was a continuum of the tradition of divide and rule: neutralize any political parties that might pose a significant threat and hence the ban on political activity right after October ‘99 coup. There has also been a general trend towards custom-made parties: Ayub brought about Conventional Muslim League, while Zia encouraged the Islamist parties, MQM and IJI to tackle the PPP threat and now Musharraf has MMA and PML-Q to his credit. In the ‘controlled-elections’ of October 2002, mainstream political parties were marginalized using the state machinery. Restrictions were placed on the nomination of candidates; the enactment of legislation of bachelor’s degree (whose legality is questionable, because it violates the basic democratic right: every individual who can vote also has a right to stand for elections). This was clearly designed to prevent certain candidates from standing in the election while systematically leaving Islamists unaffected, whose medderssah qualification was deemed equivalent to B.A. The European Union Election Observation Mission to Pakistan criticized the run-up to and actual conduct of the voting as “deeply-flawed”. The local and international human rights agencies condemned the rigging of the elections and labeled them as being “seriously flawed”. (Shah, 27)

Constitutional Amendments— Checks and Balances
Zia was the pioneer of the idea of a ‘supreme president’. Via the Eighth Amendment of the 1973 constitution, he gave himself powers to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and the provincial governors and could dissolve both the national and the provincial assemblies. This was annulled by the PML government in 1997. However, Musharraf has restored these prerogatives via 17th Amendment—of course, to keep a check on the corrupt democratically elected governments. So that they cannot encroach military’s divine right of pillaging the country.

Judiciary— Guardians of Constitution
In a manner of striking similarity to that of Ayub and Zia, judiciary via same derided token of “doctrine of necessity” legitimized Musharraf’s coup. Judiciary in fact, has played an important role in approving the military takeovers, and bending the rules to suit the needs. It must be noted however, that the Chief Justice, five other Supreme Court judges and nine Provincial High Court judges resigned in protest, which is laudable.

Conclusion:
From above it is clear that Musharraf’s ‘real’ democracy is no more real than that of Ayub or for that matter, Zia’s. But the essential question remains? What is to be done and by whom?

If asked to point out the root of the problem, I would point my finger towards the internal dynamics of the political system: political culture, political parties, etc. In a country where “popular image of the government is little more than a game played by self-seeking leaders” (Weinbaum); where politics is synonymous with corruption, hypocrisy and opportunism; where elections means trying a newbie and hope that he turns out to be a lesser thief; where coups or elections: any and everything is legitimized because the masses have turned indifferent, apathetic; where the population has been systematically depoliticized by the successive governments and where there is no effort at politically educating the masses; in such state of affairs, military cannot be the only one to be blamed (although this does not mean that they have any right to violate or undermine democratic principles). But personally I believe that the military, since it monopolizes means of violence and in itself is a well-organized institution, is a human form of a virus. Sadly, there are no shortcuts or ready-made cures. The only remedy is to develop a strong immunity. Military will continue to act as a menace until concrete steps are taken by the political parties to instill in the people confidence in the political system, government, democratic values, etc. Political parties will have to compete with each other on a democratic platform (and not request a military intervention in the incidence of the opposing party coming to power). Until or unless political parties assume and accept their role as a vanguard of democracy, this staged drama, produced by the military, directed by the military, run and maintained by the military will continue indefinitely— it’s a virus after all.

“Dear brothers and sisters, your armed forces have never and shall never let you down, INSHALLAH. We shall preserve the integrity and sovereignty of our country to the last drop of our blood. I request you all, to remain calm and support your armed forces in the re-establishment of order to pave the way for a prosperous future for Pakistan.”

— General Pervaiz Musharraf [address to the Nation after the coup de’tat Oct. 12, 1999]






Bibliography
· Bennet-Jones, Owen. Pakistan: Eye of the Storm. N.p.: Vanguard, 2002.
· Bennett-Jones, Owen . BBC News. 5 Apr. 2002. 30 Jan. 2004 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1913990.stm
· I dris, Dr. Iffat . "http://www.dawn.com/2004/01/08/fea.htm." Online posting.
· Marvin Weinbaum, 'Civic Culture and Democracy in Pakistan' Asian Survey (36, 7, July 1996), pp.639-654.
· Minhas, Shandana. Chowk.com: Another One Bites The Dust. 30 Apr. 2002. http://chowk.com/show_article.cgi?aid=0000129 5&channel=gulberg.
· Ousted Pakistani PM accused of corruption. Reuters. http://www.metimes.com/issue99-43/reg/ousted_pakistani_pm.ht m
· Shah, Aqil. Chowk.com: Whither Democracy?. 2 Dec. 2001. 30 Jan. 2004 http://chowk.com/show_article.cgi?aid=0000117 6&channel=civic%20center.
· Shah, Aqil. "Pakistan's 'Armored' Democracy." Journal of Democracy Oct. 2003: 26-40.
· The European Union Election Observation Mission to Pakistan (EUEOM). EU Election Observation Mission Parliamentary Elections Pakistan 2002 . http://eueom.org.pk/finalreport.asp