Musharraf’s Radical Kashmir Proposals

President General Pervez Musharraf recently offered three unprecedented proposals to resolve the dispute with India over Kashmir. The suggestions, announced at a gathering of editors and senior journalists on Oct 25, were: the de-militarization of Kashmir and granting the area autonomous status; putting the disputed region under the joint control of Islamabad and New Delhi; and dividing certain parts of the territory between the two states and allowing the Kashmir Valley to either become autonomous or be put under U.N. supervision. Musharraf’s proposals prompted a cool response from Indian officials who stated that resolutions to the Kashmir issue should be discussed through bilateral channels instead of in the media. The following day, India test-fired a short-range, nuclear-capable ballistic missile from an underwater platform.

Ever since the Indo-Pak peace process began, Musharraf has made many statements calling for an early resolution of the dispute over Kashmir, and each time the statements have been bolder. What makes the Musharraf model so revolutionary? Essentially, the idea that all parts of the original pre-1947 Jammu and Kashmir state, should be demilitarized and their status changed in such a way that they do not belong to either India or Pakistan. It also clearly implies that, Pakistan has accepted the independence option for Kashmir without actually putting it in those terms.

Pakistan has traditionally demanded the implementation of the UN resolutions of 1948 and 1949, which could not be implemented because of India’s obduracy. These resolutions envisioned the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to either India or Pakistan, as per the wishes of the people to be ascertained in a plebiscite. Pakistan was never agreeable to the demand by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front that independence from both countries be included in the options at the time of plebiscite. India, on the other hand considers the UN resolutions obsolete.

The Musharraf model appears to take away the option of accession to any of the two warring states altogether and offers different degrees and forms of autonomy or independence, though it doesn’t quite stipulate that in so many words. Musharraf is proposing to "identify the region, demilitarize the region forever and change its status. [Which can then have] independence, condominium where there can be a joint [India-Pakistan] control or there can be a UN mandate."

Obviously this implies that even Gilgil and Baltistan in the Northern Areas of Pakistan will either have independence or joint India-Pakistan control or a UN mandate, if the Musharraf model is to be followed. The option of any country controlling any territory independently is just not there.

But mistrust of Musharraf is so high in India’s strategic community that most analysts are not even prepared to give deep thought to any of his proposals before rejecting them. But for this, Musharraf might have done precisely what Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh asked him to do - think outside of the box.

Indian analysts have mostly focused on Musharraf dividing Kashmir state into seven parts, two on the Pakistani side and five on Indian side, even though generally Kashmir is understood to have five regions: the Northern Areas, the so-called Azad Kashmir, Kashmir Valley, Jammu and Ladakh. For them, this merely smacks of a narrow-minded regional and communal approach, though it can also be interpreted as encouraging ethnic and linguistic minorities in the state to have their say in the final solution of the long-festering dispute.

The most radical feature of the Musharraf model is that it apparently, finally bury the argument that Jammu and Kashmir should be a part of Pakistan, by virtue of its overwhelming Muslim majority. It also for the first time opens up the possibility of the status of the Northern Areas - Gilgit, Skardu and Baltistan - to be determined afresh.

Musharraf divides the state into seven regions: Buddhist-dominated Leh; Shi’ite-dominated Kargil; the Kashmir Valley; Hindu-dominated Jammu, Kathua and parts of Udhampur districts; Muslim-dominated Rajouri, Poonch and Doda districts; Pakistan-occupied "Azad" Kashmir and the Northern Areas of Gilgit and Baltistan.

These divisions, however, are not so neat on the ground. People living in Rajouri and Poonch, for instance, have linguistic and ethnic links with the people across the LoC. Similarly, the people of Karnah in north Kashmir’s Kupwara district share similar bonds with the people living across the Neelum Valley. Some villages, even houses lie divided across the LoC, causing untold misery to a number of people.

Not unexpectedly, Musharraf’s enunciation has raised a political storm in Pakistan. Not only have al-Qaeda and its allied groups in Pakistan made it clear they seek to eliminate Musharraf, a deal on Kashmir could anger one or more of the Kashmiri militant groups who until now have remained in Islamabad’s geopolitical orbit on the issue. Groups such as Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) might not take too kindly to the prospects of compromise on their objectives of self-determination for Kashmiri Muslims on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC).

If and when HM and other such groups go against Musharraf, this would not be the first time Islamabad’s chickens came home to roost. Several other groups and individuals who were cultivated by the Inter-Services Intelligence, to promote its erstwhile policy regarding India and Afghanistan (e.g., Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taibah and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen) have gone rogue.
It is not just the jihadists who have voiced opposition to Musharraf’s latest moves on Kashmir. Mainstream political parties -- both Islamist and secular -- also have joined the fray. The fundamentalist opposition in Pakistan has denounced it as a U-turn on Kashmir comparable to Pakistan’s U-turn on the Taliban in Afghanistan following September 11, 2001.

There are also rumblings against Musharraf’s proposals within the government in Azad Kashmir too. Moreover, the radical faction of the main separatist alliance -- the All Parties Hurriyet Conference (APHC) -- across the LoC in the Indian-occupied part of Kashmir, has vowed to continue its struggle for self-determination. The moderates in the APHC, however, have welcomed Musharraf’s ideas. Some top functionaries of the moderate faction has described them as "path-breaking" and "positive". They are reported to have had an inkling of the formula being presented beforehand, as Pakistan’s foreign minister had sought their opinion on the issue in his meetings with them during his trips to New Delhi for talks with the Indian officials in the last months.

Elements within the Pakistani establishment might also be worried about the direction of Musharraf’s peace initiative with India. The unification of Kashmir under Pakistani rule has been one of the cardinal objectives, which has enjoyed a national consensus among the Pakistani masses – up till now. Not only does the Kashmir issue strikes an emotive chord across the cross-section pf populace; given its geostrategic location on Pakistan’s northeastern border with India, Kashmir also provides strategic depth and security to Pakistan.

There appears to be no substantial international pressure on Musharraf to continue to push for a resolution on Kashmir. India, for one, is content with the current pace of negotiations and the ongoing process of normalizing relations with its western neighbor. The United States -- another player in the game -- is preoccupied with the elections at home, Iraq and the war on terrorism.

Musharraf might be issuing such statements to rally the troops and placate the officers around him by showing he has a plan and is not gambling with a major national security issue. However, Musharraf’s recent stacking of the military deck -- undoubtedly with officers who agree with him on all issues -- and the nature of his statements precludes this as the only reason behind his latest moves.

The Indian reaction, if nothing else, has demonstrated that Musharraf’s call to both sides to "think outside the box" has not amused New Delhi. On its part New Delhi -- especially under a Congress-led administration -- will be wary to make any deals with a military regime in Pakistan. Despite Musharraf’s comfortable position at the helm in Islamabad, New Delhi’s reluctance is likely to remain a factor. It is not as if Islamabad is unaware that no Indian government in which the ruling party lacks a significant majority in the parliament would have the political will to cut a deal on Kashmir -- an issue of immense national interest.

Musharraf also could be trying to live up to the perception in many quarters both at home and abroad that he is a "true statesman." He could be trying to promote his allies’ argument that democracy in Pakistan might be suffering, but no one besides Musharraf can steer Pakistan to safer waters in the current torrential international climate.

In this context, Musharraf’s latest Kashmir initiative also could be part of his efforts to radically alter Pakistan’s geopolitical landscape and get the country moving in a different direction. In this sense, Musharraf’s motives might not be different from Sadat’s reasons for pursuing peace with Israel. Like Sadat did with the Middle East, Musharraf might be trying to reshape the strategic realities of South Asia.

While New Delhi might not be amenable to cutting what would be a historic agreement on the issue with a military regime in Pakistan, ironically, the men in uniform in Pakistan represent the only force with the political will to ink such an accord.

At a bare minimum, Musharraf might be trying to prod India into making the next move.

The international response to Musharraf’s proposals has, however, been so positive that New Delhi is finding it difficult to ignore. The international press has described him consummate politician, who has scored something of a diplomatic coup, forcing India to scramble for its own counter-proposals.