The Salafi Threat

So after the truth, what else can there be, save error? [Quran 10:32]
-- abridged from the book: The ’Wahhabi’ Myth


"The 9-11 tragedy was perpetrated by al Qaida, the vanguard of a violent Muslim revivalist social movement, which I call the Global Salafi Jihad…. The movement has its roots in Egypt. It is the violent culmination of Muslims’ attempts to come to terms with their fallen glory. Western cultural, social and technical achievements have eclipsed past Muslim grandeur and now challenge core Islamic beliefs. Over the past three centuries, revivalist Islamic movements have tried to answer this challenge. One of their answers is to return to pure and authentic Islam, as practiced by the Prophet and his companions. To them, "Islam is the answer" and only a recreation of the practices of the devout ancestors, salaf in Arabic, will bring glory and prominence back to Muslims. Salafists advocate a strict interpretation of the Quran and they view with skepticism any later innovation, for it might be a heretical corruption of the original message."
--- Marc Sageman author of Understanding Terror Networks and adjunct professor of psychology at Penn’s Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict testifying to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.


Since the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan there has been a gradual growth of the Salafists around the globe. They are everywhere enthralling the masses with strains of Islam that are a tempting alternative to the dismal picture of development in their societies.

They promise correcting the current bafflement of the people by taking a route to an ancient form of Islam practiced by the Prophet and the first two generations succeeding him. The Salafis hold the view that the further we move from the time of Prophet Mohammed the more impure Islam has become due to the clever innovations in religious matters. The Salafis reject all schools of law, going a step ahead of even the hardline Wahabbis (who follow the Hanbali school of law).

The Salafis diffuse the landscape in a wide arc from Europe to Algeria to Indonesia preaching hatred for the west, specially the US, and giving calls for arms besides attracting the ire of government forces even in the Islamic states. A few examples:

* Hamed al-Ali, a Salafist preacher in Kuwait calls Osama Bin Laden’s recent tape telecast just before the US election as a timely reminder of the choice Muslims face. Says he, "Just as Mr Bush says that people must be for or against his war on terror, Muslims must be for the jihad or for the "Zionist-crusader enemies of Islam."

* Algerian security sources mounted an air and ground military operation against a stronghold of the Salafist Brigade for Combat and Call in the Babour mountains in eastern Algeria. The sources said the mountain stronghold contains the Salafist leadership. The Algerian military has been pounding Salafist positions since Sept. 12. So far, more than 180 Islamic insurgents have been reported killed in the Satif province in the largest Algerian counter-insurgency operation ever.

* Salafi-Jihadists recently posted a recording by the Islamist Arab fighter Abu-Omar Al-Seif on the Chechen website www.qoqaz.com. Abu-Omar Al-Seif calls for help from Muslims to the Mujahideen in Chechnya in preparation for battle against the Russians following the election of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The message also advised Islamists in Saudi Arabia to direct attacks at American troops in Iraq rather than clashing with the Saudi regime.

* Dyab Abou Jahjah , the Salafi leader of the Dutch-Belgian Arab European League (AEL) has come out in support of killing Dutch troops serving in Iraq. In an interview with Flemish newspaper Het Laatste Nieuws, he says: "I consider every death of an American, British or Dutch soldier as a victory." There are currently 1,376 Dutch soldiers serving on peacekeeping duties in southern Iraq and two have been killed since the mission started in the summer of 2003. The troops are scheduled to return home in March 2005.

*A new radical Islamic organization called the Jam’iya al-Salafiya al-Mujahida has recently joined the opposition forces active against American forces in Iraq. It has many points in common with the Al-Qaeda headed by Bin Laden. It rejects any and every ideology not based on Islam including democratic parties, nationalist parties (Ahzab Wataniya) including Arab nationalists (Qawmiya), communists, Baathists, and socialists. All are viewed as "deviations from Islam".

Al-Salafiya also opposes any Islamic parties that cooperate with regimes that are based on the infidel "religion" of democracy, and considers participation in parliamentary elections as forbidden.

The above is just a sprinkling. In fact, the Salafi movement’s initial indignation was directed against the Islamic regimes themselves for being insufficiently Islamic. Lead by the Egyptian Salafists, Qutb and Faraj their fury is against some Muslim states for refusing to impose Sharia, the strict Quranic law and true Islamic way of life. The leaders of these states, according to the Salafis, deserve death and their regimes deserve a violent overthrow because their repressive nature obstructs the Salafi way. The main concern is to reinstate Islam at home, the "close foe," before defeating the "distant opponent," US-Israel. Subsequently, as this strategy became somewhat controversial as it meant taking on "Muslim Brothers" it evolved into another, the foremost exponent of which became Osma Bin-Laden. Says Sageman: "First proclaimed by Osama bin Laden in his 1996 fatwa.It reverses the previous strategy. Now the priority is fighting the "far enemy," the West and specifically the U.S. and Israel, before turning against the "near enemy," which survive only because of Western support. This strategy has evolved from ending the U.S.’s "occupation" of the Holy Land to engaging it anywhere, as best articulated by Ayman al Zawahiri . The goal is to establish a Muslim state, reinstate the fallen Caliphate and regain its lost glory. As the United States would never allow this to happen, the global jihad must defeat this country."

The Global Salafist ideology, of course, incubated in the conservative Saudi Arabian atmosphere and piggy-backed abroad on Saudi oil money, which no government institution was monitoring. Says Dr. Anthony Cordesman, military analyst for ABC and a Professor of National Security Studies at Georgetown, quotes a US diplomat in a report (Saudi Arabia: Opposition, Islamic Extremism, And Terrorism paper) in GulfWire, "The rulers of Saudi Arabia today do not face major political challenges from domestic progressives, human rights advocates, or democratic reformers—nor from the local versions of socialists, Marxists, ethnic or liberal political groupings that inhabit other Arab landscapes. Saudi ruling challenges come, instead, from an Islamic environment that the rulers themselves have created, shaped, and maintained. It is a remarkable Saudi phenomenon that a regime unrivalled across the Islamic world in its conservatism presides over a body politic that for the most part is even more conservative."

A study conducted by Sageman on 130 members of the Global Salafi Jihad is more instructive. Says Sageman: "They are a heterogeneous group. Three large patterns emerged: about 60% come from core Arab countries, mostly Saudi Arabia and Egypt; 30% from Maghreb Arab countries and 10% from Indonesia. In terms of socio-economic status, two thirds came from solid upper or middle class backgrounds. Most of the rest came from the "excluded" Maghreb immigrants, or second generation in France, as well as Western Christian converts. They came from caring intact families. The Indonesians were uniformly religious as children, 60% of the Core Arab children were, but almost none of the Maghreb Arab children. As a group, the terrorists were relatively well educated with over 60% having some college education. Only the Indonesian group was almost exclusively educated in religious schools.

Most had good occupational training and only a quarter were considered unskilled with few prospects before them. Three quarters were married and the majority had children. I detected no mental illness in this group or any common psychological predisposition for terror."

But, interestingly, a common mindset in the Salafi brigade is an anti-Shia feeling most recently illustrated by the exchange of prisoners between Israel and the Hezbollah on January 29, 2004. The consequent triumphant imagery of Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah, created much resentment in parts of the Arab world, particularly in West Bank and Gaza. The sternest vocal attacks against Hezbollah’s deal, however, emanated amidst Saudi Jihadi-SALAFI elements. The Lebanese Shiite group has never been popular among the Salafi preachers of Global Jihad, given their fundamental hatred towards Shiaism.

The current conflict of interests in Iraq between the Shia majority and the Sunni minority has provided an extra edge to the enmity.

Since the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the installation of the Allawi government in Iraq, Salafi web sites and forums on the Internet have stepped up their attacks against the Shias. There are also severe criticisms of Iran on their websites alongwith growing attempts by Saudi Salafi scholars and laymen to link the Shiites to Jews, both in history, and in present times.

It should be recalled that in the last two decades, with the flowering of extreme strains of Islam there emerged an unhealthy competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia as to which state was ’more’ Islamic. The beef between the Salafis and the Shias also colors the Salafi leadership as personified by groups headed by Zarqawi and Bin Laden.While both men follow the strict code of Salafi Islam, which considers Shias as the spoilers, Bin Laden prides himself on being a figure above the ’fray’ so to speak and has made strategic alliances with Shia groups, meeting several times with Shia militants. Zarqawi, by contrast, favours butchering Shias, calling them "the most evil of mankind . . . the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy, and the penetrating venom". Zarqawi’s terror group is, in fact, the prime suspect for the multiple bombings near the Shia religious shrine in Karbala and also in Baghdad which killed 143 worshippers in March, 2004.

Adds Gilles Kepel, author of The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West, about Zarqawi: "The pamphlets of Abu Musab al–Zarqawi, now circulating in Iraq, similarly view the Ottoman failure to capture Vienna in the siege of 1683 as a crucial setback in the Muslim effort to Islamicise Europe – one they attribute to contemporaneous Shi’a betrayal of the Ottomans in Iraq. For such people, the reconquest of Europe is the completion of a centuries–long task."

But it’s not as if all is lost. There are many positives. The strongest, according to some, coming from the very fact that in a strict religious interpretation religious Salafism itself might be the biggest bulwark against terrorism.

According to a recent report issued by the International Crisis Group (ICG) titled "Why Salafism and Terrorsim mostly do not mix", the strictest Salafis in Indonesia are religious and not political activists. The report lists several Indonesian Salafi organizations like the at-Turath network, the Indonesian Council of Islam Propagation, the Institute for Islamic Sciences and Arabic etc

It also goes onto say that for genuine Salafis it is not allowable to organize a rebellion against a Muslim state, no matter how dictatorial or unjust it may be. It’s because of this that the traditional Salafis are opposed to the so called Salafi movements like the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Darul Islam movement because they split Muslim societies by promoting rebellion against the Indonesian state. They also deflect attention from the actual study of the faith besides indulging in innovative practices like oath-taking to a leader (a practice indulged in by Osama Bin Laden as well) which is considered un-Salafi.

The ICG report says that whereas people like Muklas, one of the Bali bombers, claim to be salafi they don’t belong to a broad based movement and therefore don’t pose the same security risk as they are sometimes said to be.

The ICG goes on to argue: "Pure Salafis are a more potent barrier against jihadis like the JI than pluralist or moderate muslims. If Salafi jihadis believe they are making bombs to destroy the enemies of Islam, strict Salafis may have more success in convincing them, using the same texts, that their interpretation is wrong."

A common trait in all these pseudo-Salafis, to use a much aligned Indian adjective, is to be strict and partial in their interpretation of the Koran—picking quotations which suit them or of which a sufficient ambiguity can be created to gain advantage from.

Even the Salafi-Jihadist ideology of Abu-Omar by failing to adapt to or reconcile differences amongst different ethnic groups and cultures has lead to a rejection of the same by Chechen nationalists. But while the oratory of the Salafis might not attract many people to their world view it is enough to energise young Sunni Iraqis to derail efforts to fostering democracy.

The French muslim reaction to the kidnapping of two French journalists, Christian Chesnot and Georges Malbrunot, in Iraq on 20 August 2004 is also illustrative of some hope. Says Gilles Kepel: "A so–called "Islamist army", after buying them from the group of thugs responsible for their seizure, announced they would behead the journalists unless France rescinded its secular ban on the wearing of the hijab (and other religious apparel) in French schools. The "army" was convinced that this would mobilise the masses of the umma in their favour, and were supported in this expectation by various French Islamists on Arabic–speaking satellite TV. Much to their dismay, French people of Muslim descent – regardless of the degree of their devotion – adamantly denied the kidnappers the right to speak in their name, and affirmed a primary solidarity with the journalists, not to whoever claimed to speak in the name of Islam."

Another resource to be tapped with discretion is Iran. Says Mahan Abedin, editor of Terrorism Monitor, and who is currently researching a book on Iranian intelligence services: "The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 did not come as a surprise to the Iranian intelligence community, primarily because they had been engaged in their own covert war against the Taliban and its international Islamist allies for many years. Indeed, under different political circumstances, Iranian intelligence could have provided valuable help to the U.S. in the war against Salafi Islamist terrorism.

Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence & National Security (VEVAK) and the intelligence directorate of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) arguably have a better understanding of Wahhabi/Salafi terrorist networks and their institutional and ideological roots in Saudi Arabia than most other major intelligence organizations. They have gained such knowledge through the penetration of Wahhabi missionary/terror groups in Pakistan, which has been a priority for Iranian intelligence over the past 20 years. This priority stems not only from Iran’s self-perceived responsibility to protect Pakistan’s Shi’a community, but more importantly from a desire to pre-empt Saudi-sponsored Wahhabi subversion amongst Iran’s tiny Sunni minority."

Abedin goes on to add that even before the emergence of the Taliban, the VEVAK, the Iranian intelligence agency, designated Salafi/Wahhabi terrorism as the primary threat to Iranian national security in 1994 and, contrary to unsubstantiated reports in Arab and western media, has never had any friendly contacts with the al-Qaeda.

Experts also put much hope by the Algerian example where the initial allurement of the people with the Islamists weakened after the accesses of the Salafis. And that this could happen in Iraq as well, eventually. Says Kepel: "The example of Algeria in the 1990s is relevant here. Until 1996, militant Armed Islamic Group (GIA) or Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)movements controlled large parts of Algeria, and the regime seemed doomed; then, for disputed reasons – military security operations, infiltration activities and other provocations, the internal dynamics of the GIA – the Islamists suddenly seemed to have alienated the bulk of the Algerian population.

They even lost support among those who had previously voted for them.

Today in Iraq, there are daily images of hostages being beheaded as traitors, of corpses of policemen in the rivers – a spectacle of horror designed to convince that jihad is on the rise and that the US will never prevail. Yet jihadi Islamism in Iraq can draw on only the 17% of the population who are Sunni Arabs. The Iraqi Kurds and Shi’a are beyond their reach."

On a more operational level, military strategists are in favour of a more pro-active policy than has been forthcoming so far. Says General Abizaid, the second highest ranking US military officer in Iraq: "The key is to treating people who contribute money to the Salafist movement no differently than people who carry out beheadings. The truth of the matter is we have to be bold in our discussion and we need to make liable the people who are financially contributing to this organisation as the criminals they are."

Abizaid goes on to add: "What makes this element so dangerous today I think is really two things that are new to the modern world. Number one is the speed in which information can be transmitted, and the way it can be transmitted without regard to borders. Number two is the potential ability of a movement like this to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Though Al Qaeda and other groups have moved no closer to obtaining weapons of mass destruction, but they would surely use them if they did. It’s a very, very dangerous problem for the entire international community, and that’s why it is so important that people cooperate against it."

Ultimately, however, it’s for progressives in the Arab world to put their views forward more aggressively to counter the Salafi menace.

They have to not only advance a more secular ethos, but also question the vision of Salafi organizations which are resisting of modernity of any kind. We need intellectuals like Dr Amr Isma’il. A progressive Egyptian thinker Dr.Isma’il’s articles are regularly published on the secular Arab website www.rezgar.com. Says he in one of them:

"Why are we the only nations in the world that still use religion, Islam, and the name of Allah in everything - in politics, economics, science, art, and literature. We kill in the name of Allah, blow up cars in the name of Allah, and slit throats in the name of Allah and Islam, and then we protest when others depict the Muslims as terrorists. We do not ask ourselves why no other religious group perpetrates these acts of atrocity, and when a terrorist country like Israel does so, it does not say it is killing in the name of the Lord or in the name of Allah, but claims it is doing so out of self-defense. Why Allah is [held responsible] for our bad deeds and for our desire for revenge... Why don’t we act like [Israel] and say that these acts are for self-defense or for defense of the homeland, without bringing Allah and Islam into it? We have reached a crossroads…….. If we want Islam as a political solution, not as a religion ... we must be strong and admit honestly that Islam - according to the belief of groups of political Islam that follow bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri’s organization - stands in utter contradiction to democracy in its true meaning... Let all the political Islamic groups, and first and foremost the ’Muslim Brotherhood,’ cease their policy of concealing [their real opinions] and show their true faces [and reveal] that they are trying [to bring] an Islamic rule that at best will be no different from Iran, and at worst, [no different] from the Taliban..."

Such an approach might also help in distinguishing between pure religious movements and ones that use religion to chase a demented approach to political change.