Analysis of Stunning Gains by Religious Parties in Pakistan’s Elections

Commenting on the peculiar relationship that exists between U.S. military obtrusion and the political processes in some Muslims countries, Graham E. Fuller, former Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA, once wrote, “A vicious circle exists: dissatisfaction leads to anti-regime actions, which leads to repression, which in turn leads to terrorism, U.S. military intervention, and finally further dissatisfaction.” Many would argue that this week’s stunning showing of religious parties in Pakistan’s much-awaited parliamentary elections epitomizes this “dissatisfaction” among the masses.

The fact that this formidable gain of the coalition of six hard-line Islamic parties called the Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) stands in stark contrast to the historical fact that, prior to this latest election, religious parties have never won any significant number of seats in a national election, further substantiates Graham’s notion of “repression” leading to “dissatisfaction.”
Since abandoning the Taliban under fierce U.S. pressure, General Musharraf has cracked down on extremism. He has arrested thousands of people in this cause and banned several religious and sectarian parties. Needless to say, these steps along with his ostensible determination to modernize Pakistan, do not sit well with hard-line Islamic parties.

But many keen observers of Pakistani politics would disagree with the notion that the U.S. military intervention and Musharaf’s unconditional support of it are the only reasons why MMA did so surprisingly well in Thursday’s elections. They would insist that there could be a number of other rationales to account for this unexpectedly strong showing. Some of those other factors might have been the global resurgence of political Islam, a sign of solidarity of Northern Pakistanis with their brothers in Southern Afghanistan, and the absence of a viable non-religious political leadership, especially in the North West Frontier (NWFP) province.

Whatever the reasons might be, the fact of the matter is that it’s not the popularity of these religious parties that has astounded anyone, but it is this transformation of their general popularity into a strong mandate that has left many dumbfounded, as it is a totally new phenomenon in Pakistan’s limited experience with democracy. It is imperative, for the sake of political stability in the country, to open up a debate not only to discuss potential political as well as social implications of this unforeseen development, but also to evaluate how as a nation Pakistanis should respond to it.
Another interesting aspect of this event is the fact that, other than in NWFP and Balochistan, the provinces bordering Afghanistan, where this coalition of religious parties captured a clear majority, MMA also have won in some of the previously MQM (Mutahida Quami Movement) dominated constituencies in Karachi. It’s assumed that the ethnic makeup of these constituencies might have played a role in some of the unexpected outcomes, but another important reason for this might have been the fiercely violent yet not too productive politics of MQM over the last few years. These victories in Karachi will go a long way in making this largest metropolitan of the country an open and even playing field for all political parties. Another positive outcome of MMA’s success could be the hope that they will use their influence in mainstreaming the fringe factions of their constituencies.


General Musharraf, as well as the majority party in the National Assembly, must find a way to work with MMA, as failure to do so could cause an unnecessary strain on relations between the central government and the province and, if not handled carefully, could also result in an Algeria-like situation. A compromising approach with MMA can also help in the war against terrorism.


Lastly, this registering of a surprise gain by the religious alliance should serve as a strong suggestion to the American policy-makers to reexamine their policies in the war against terrorism, especially in the context of Pakistan, as it is entirely possible that their current strategies in the region might be helping more in breeding extremism than in subduing it.

In July of this year, Congressman Gary Ackerman, the ranking Democrat on the House International Relations subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, made the following statement during the committee hearing on recent development in south Asia: “Those who argue that the alternatives to Musharraf may be someone worse ignore Pakistan’s limited history with elections. Islamist parties have never done well in elections in Pakistan.” It is safe to say now that the Congressman did not only know then how short-lived the validity of his statement would be, but he also didn’t realize that the very house he was addressing, by supporting President Bush’s war on Afghanistan and Musharaf’s regime in Pakistan, might also have helped the Pakistani religious parties in getting a popular mandate.

Arshad Alam can be contacted at arshadala@netscape.net