Implications for India

In his press conference, Gen. Powell has been asked many pointed questions by Andrea Mitchell (NBC, I believe) to probe the nature of his interaction with Pakistan. She seems to have a paradigm that Pakistan has a history of sitting on the fence between OBL / Taliban and the US. Powell refused to indicate anything that may unambiguously be music to the Indian ears, repeating the standard theme that Pakistan has been a friend for long. He did indicate however that there was a list of things that it would be good for Pakistan to comply with.

Some analysis on Peter Jennings' broadcasts envisaged possible (possible, not probable) military action like cruise strikes against Pakistan based terrorist centers should Pakistan refuse to play ball. However, this kind of speculation did not seem widespread at all.

Retired General Norman Schwarzkopf, when interviewed by Tom Brokaw, was more indicative of the thinking in the military camp, where Secretary of State Gen. Powell has his roots. Schwarzkopf said that there were three alternative outcomes. (1) Pakistan may throw its lot with the US (2) Go in the opposite direction and refuse; or (3) Overtly resist American pressure while covertly supporting American actions. Schwarzkopf believed the last scenario was the most likely. ( He did not even list the possibility that Pakistan may only pay lip sympathy to American demands while dragging its feet in terms of concrete support and action. Such continued sitting on the fence will no longer work given the current American mood, and would be considered to be effectively the same as the second alternative. )

Pakistan's foreign policy has in general (the pun is unintended) been opportunistic, and has tried to benefit from world events to improve its stand vis a vis India, regardless of its own long term interests.

Zia milked the Soviet occupation of Afganisthan to the full and got substantial cash, military gear and political support for a decade or so, but was not far sighted enough to visualize the long term negatives for his own country. Musharraf, with his commando upbringing, is said to be more of a tactician than a strategist. If this assessment is correct, then Pakistan will likely use the current mood in the US to bargain for some immediate and material relief to Pakistan in exchange for concessions that may be domestically acceptable, and also in exchange for some continued latitude in its policy vis a vis India. After all, the Pakistani talk of 'strategic depth' that Afganisthan may provide to it against India has been a much touted reason behind the Pakistani policy towards Afganisthan.

I do think that the US administration is serious about a long term and sustained effort in uprooting terrorism from the world, and will do what it takes. But you have to be careful in equating what America accepts as terrorism from what India sees it to be.

I think that over the years, the focus of this professed anti-terrorism policy will significantly change: from one that is geared purely towards uprooting terrorism, to one intended to bring about changes in strategically important countries such as Pakistan, currently not fully compliant with American economic and other interests. The anti-terrorism label will however remain perfectly suitable throughout.

I have great faith in America's managerial ability to bring about fundamental change in the world if and when it sets its mind to it. Just look at how America changed Japan and how it won its ideological war with the Soviet Union. [I still wish it also decides to go metric! :) ]

So, my own feel is that despite the current US pronouncements of going after terrorists and its supporters wherever they exist, the promised long-term sustained effort may not automatically translate into buying Indian arguments of Pakistan being a terrorist state, and seeing a comprehensive purge of the jihadi elements either within Pakistani military or within the Pakistani society.

There would NOT be any major showdown between the US and Pakistan. That is likely to happen only if Pakistan chooses to throw in its lot with the current Afghanistan regime and takes an truly confrontational posture. Pakistan is too smart to do so.

It is for India to protect its interests ON ITS OWN. It should do so in a sustainable and long-term manner, without trying to be blatantly opportunistic. India needs to show maturity in not seeking a zero-sum game with respect to Pakistan, despite all its reservations.

The current situation is therefore only marginally less of a tight-rope walk for India as it is to Pakistan.