Implications of Iraqi Instability

In over two years of conflict nearly 1,600 Americans lost their lives and many more were injured. The Iraqi war-related deaths are calculated from 30,000 to near a million, with many more injured. Even after the capture of Saddam Hussein, the attacks by the Iraqi insurgents continued vigorously. In the presence of 138,000 American troops, the first seventeen days of May witnessed 21 car bombings in Baghdad, while there were a total of 25 in all of the year of 2004. Since the new Iraqi government took over, more than 600 people lost their lives, under the strict U.S. presence and control. At times it seems that the militants were killing at will, targeting the newly recruited armed personnel, who faced heavy causalities. General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint US Chiefs of Staff admitted that “the resistance today is as strong as it was a year ago.” A semi official newspaper of Saudi Arabia commented: “Last year, the Iraqis — and the rest of the world — were led to believe that the violence would subside once the Provisional Coalition Authority had been disbanded and power handed to an interim Iraqi administration. Then it was “once there were elections”; after that, it was “once an elected Iraqi government was in place.” These watersheds have come and gone — but the killing has not stopped”. By any standards, the Iraqi situation is far from stable as violence and uncertainty continues.

In this urbanized warfare, termed as dirty and difficult by the analysts, the US could not wriggle out, from the accusations of the violations of human rights. In a recent Amnesty International Report for 2005, the US government was blamed in these words: “The blatant disregard for international human rights and humanitarian law in the “war on terror” continued to make a mockery of President George Bush’s claims that the USA was the global champion of human rights. Images of detainees in US custody tortured in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq shocked the world. War crimes in Iraq, and mounting evidence of the torture and ill-treatment of detainees in US custody in other countries, sent an unequivocal message to the world that human rights may be sacrificed ostensibly in the name of security.” The U.S. planners had not visualized the gravity of the difficulties that they would confront, to establish a delicate balance, within the Iraqi competing power centers and also upholding a reasonable restrain. In fact, such widespread assault against their authority could not be correctly assessed, by those in command in Washington, D.C.

The Iraqi society has to deal with various worries, ranging from enforcing stability of all forms, to the kind of relations that it is going to embark on with its neighbors. But before it does that, it has to emerge as a cohesive country, with all its ethnic and religious factions having appropriate representation in the government. In other words, it has to be stable and representative at the same time.

The Iraqi society has been constructed, influenced by decades of particular political manners, where brutal authority and compliance was the only norm. It would be a gigantic task requiring appropriate planning, patience and time to mold the political habits of the Iraqi population. Only a representative body composing of all segments of the Iraqi mosaic would create an atmosphere of trust and would encourage leanings towards dialogue, rather than settling the differences through violent means. Provided, that body is seen by the Iraqis as an independent entity, devoid of any foreign influence.

Secondly, the most difficult job remains in the creation of a social balance between varying segments of the Iraqi society. Iraq has a highly complex social order, where the power balance between the Kurds in the North, the Sunni Muslims in the Center and the Shias in the South has been further disturbed. Since 1969, the Baath party ruled with an iron hand, thereby subduing the contradictions between these three main segments of the society. An impression of Iraqi national unity was created, which was never there and therefore an institutional conformity between the people of Iraq could not be formed on permanent basis.

Thirdly, there has to be an infrastructure, based on genuine nationalist economic principle where the Iraqi people could feel the benefits of a “new era”. The main problems like unemployment, and the rehabilitation of those struggling to enter the job market poses a challenging proposition. The Iraqi economy has seen a downward trend, with the failure of the re-building of the infrastructure. As a result, normality amongst the Iraqi people has not returned since the U.S. occupation. The promised U.S. investment of $21 billion for Iraq’s reconstruction efforts is far from taking shape.

Fourthly, accompanied by the above mentioned challenges, is to devise a formula that could put the genuine Iraqi leadership in its proper perspective, replacing the structures of the interim government. The people of Iraq have to be convinced that they are sovereign and that the occupying forces are not to be in charge for an extensive period of time, either directly or through their proxies. An assurance is also to be given that the Americans do not have intensions to manage the financial resources of Iraq either, especially the export of oil. Only that could generate solidity in the political composition of the Iraqi society.

There are two sets of the question, when it comes to the Iraqi chronic instability and where the Americans are unable to present any meaningful optimism for the Iraqi society. One deals with the “real intentions” of the Americans and their long term interests in the country and the region. Secondly, there is no denying in the fact that whatever happens in Iraq has serious repercussions for the wellbeing and security for the regional countries, of varying degrees. That in turn would determine the issues of stability in the region and even beyond.