India’s Potential Lose-Lose-Lose Scenario

When the United States of America was laying down its plans to attack Afghanistan, a small group of people, including the author, highlighted the fact that USA should have exhausted all international legal options, before moving troops. The voices of this small group were drowned in the understandable feelings of patriotism and revenge that were prevalent everywhere, specifically in North America. The reasons given by the USA for not disclosing its evidence, supporting an all-out war, were based on the risks of exposing its intelligence sources. While this may be a legitimate excuse in a situation where one criminal was being pursued, it does not hold water in a scenario where one country is about to attack another. Which Central Intelligence Agency operative is so important that he/she cannot be exposed to avoid or legitimize a war between two countries?

As time has passed, and more videos have come out, it is now slowly being accepted by everyone, that Osama Bin Ladin was either directly involved with the World Trade Center tragedy, or was definitely an accomplice in some manner or another. However, the USA’s actions, of not completely involving the international legal norms, have had the cascading effect which many of us feared, i.e. it has set a precedent under which any country can now bypass international laws, unilaterally declare another country a terrorist state, and launch a full-fledged military attack against it. This reduces the whole world to the law of the jungle, and the survival of the militarily fittest. Under this New World Order, the only factor protecting any state is its own military strength. This has made the world a more dangerous place, and will further increase every country’s desire to acquire more weaponry, both conventional and nuclear.

It is under the above-described precedent that India is currently threatening Pakistan. If the USA can unilaterally declare war on Afghanistan, then India can do the same against Pakistan, seems to be the legitimizing mantra. There are however six differences between the US actions against Afghanistan and India’s potential actions against Pakistan, which may be setting India up for a, “lose-lose-lose” scenario, i.e. India loses out under all three potential outcomes of the current conflict. These same factors have set up a potential, “lose-win-win” scenario for Pakistan, provided it plays its cards correctly.

The US-Afghanistan conflict was based on the following six factors, which are not present in the current India-Pakistan standoff:

1. The United States was a victim of a massive terrorist attack, unprecedented in the history of the world. Tens of thousands of people were threatened, thousands were killed, and potentially over $100 billion dollars of damage was done. This was orders of magnitude different from the routine and much smaller terrorist attacks that are regularly faced by many countries, including USA, India and Pakistan.

2. The USA itself is not locked into any international conflicts (like Kashmir) due to which it is forced to sideline the United Nations completely. So, while the US did not honor all international legal norms of conflict, it did pursue some of them, relying on an agenda through the United Nations. The United Nations resolutions on terrorism were highlighted, and there existed an open or subtle buy-in from all nations of the Security Council.

3. The United States built an extremely large coalition of friendly nations, which were ready to support USA militarily and/or diplomatically, in its actions against Afghanistan.

4. USA was able to convince the nineteen NATO countries to consider the WTC tragedy an act of war against NATO, and not only against USA.

5. USA’s opponent in this battle was a country, which had absolutely no chance of defending itself against a threatening adversary, the size of USA. In fact, USA was able to destroy the Taliban regime by utilizing less than 1/500th of the total military power available to the USA.

6. A mere three countries in the world recognized the Taliban regime. This regime was extremely unpopular amongst the people of Afghanistan themselves. All of Afghanistan’s neighboring countries united against this regime. Added to this is the fact there was a homegrown opposition of Northern Alliance active within Afghanistan.

India does not enjoy any of the above-described six factors in its stance against Pakistan. Due to this, India may actually be helping Pakistan in the long run, not harming it, with its current war hysteria. India will need to use 80%-100% of its total military force to win a conventional war against Pakistan. It cannot win a war by just utilizing 1/500th of its force, like the USA did in Afghanistan. If India does end up in a scenario, in which it conventionally defeats Pakistan, the war will turn nuclear, in which both countries will be destroyed. This is the first, “lose” in the, “lose-lose-lose” scenario for India.

The current standoff is the first all-out deployment of Indian and Pakistani troops, after both countries became nuclear powers. The results of this standoff will define future balances of power between the two neighbors. If India backs down, after threatening an all out war, it will have accepted the fact it has lost its traditional military advantage vis-à-vis Pakistan. India will have acknowledged it is in a state of Mutual Assured Destruction with Pakistan, and thus cannot threaten Pakistan with military consequences, as it was previously able to do for five decades. This will dilute India’s strength at future negotiating tables with Pakistan. This is the second, “lose” in the, “lose-lose-lose” scenario for India.

The third scenario involves India achieving its objective, i.e. it is able to intimidate Pakistan into backing down, and accepting India’s demands, without the involvement of international organizations like the United Nations. This will result in Pakistan being forced to pursue with even more intensity restrictions against the religious organizations, within Pakistan, that provide support to the Kashmiri freedom fighters. It will also result in Pakistan extraditing certain individuals to India, without any proof or legal recourse for these individuals (this is something not even allowed by the Indian Constitution or legal system).

While the above-described third scenario may seem like a win for India, it will actually be a loss for India, in the long run. It is quite obvious the current thrust of the Indian war hysteria is directed more at neutralizing the Kashmir freedom struggle, than at the actual, “cross-border terrorism,” since civilian Kashmiri lives are not valued too highly in India, to begin with. However, anyone who understands the Kashmiri freedom struggle in detail, outside the Indian (and in some cases international) propaganda, knows that it is indigenous, and not in the control of a few small-time religious politicians in Pakistan.

The actual representatives of the Kashmiris, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (perhaps the most sophisticated and balanced group of leaders in South Asia), only supports attacks against occupying Indian soldiers in Kashmir (these actions are recognized as freedom struggles by Amnesty International). It greatly abhors terrorist attacks against civilians. Such attacks greatly undermine the Kashmiri freedom struggle, and are immediately denounced by the APHC (and by the Pakistan government). The local Kashmiris and the APHC thus consider those extremist religious leaders in Pakistan that do not follow the lead of the APHC to be a liability, not an asset. So much so, that the Kashmiris are now contemplating an option of independent Kashmir, rather than joining Pakistan, due to the actions of Pakistani extreme right wing parties. Neutralizing the leaders of such parties is actually going to strengthen the Kashmiri struggle, not weaken it.

Pakistani intellectuals and common folk have been asking for the sidelining of religious extremists within Pakistan, for a long time. This process has been initiated by the current government, and will only be accelerated if India achieves the third scenario. This is actually a benefit in disguise for Pakistan, and thus a liability for India. The Pakistani society will be ridding itself of this evil. It is in fact these extremist groups, which have allowed the Hindu Nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), until the Gujrat riots, to present itself as a moderate, vis-à-vis Pakistan, to the rest of the world. Once these groups are sidelined, the last complain the international community has against Pakistan will be removed. Pakistan will thus become a stronger adversary for India, not a weaker one.

For Pakistan, the only, “lose” in its potential, “lose-win-win” scenario is the first one. Due to this, it needs to avoid a war with India, under any and all circumstances, while simultaneously keeping its guard up against a possible Indian attack. There should be no threatening statements, no tit-for-tat actions, and no escalation of any sort. Pakistan should not have even banned over-flights of Indian civilian aircraft through Pakistani airspace. Only five out of the approximately two hundred and eighty organizations that have been blacklisted by the United Nations, due to terrorism, are in Pakistan. The offices of these organizations have been closed down. They need to be slowly removed from the social fabric of Pakistan. Nearly all Kashmiris, myself included, actively and whole-heartedly support the Kashmiri freedom struggle, yet have nothing to do with such organizations.

At the same time, under no circumstance, should Pakistan hand over any Pakistani citizen to any other country, without due process of Pakistani law, even if the Indian government demands it. This will set a dangerous precedent of any Pakistani government having the authority to bypass the legal rights of any Pakistani. Pakistan should however be ready to present any Pakistani to the International Court of Justice, provided India initiates a case in that court. Pakistan should however agree to hand over any of the Indian Sikhs and Indian Muslims on the list, to India, if Pakistan has them under custody. Pakistan should also continue to highlight the differences between terrorism and a freedom struggle, inline with the definition provided by Amnesty International.

The Indian government has not provided any evidence in the current Parliament shooting to its own citizens, nor to the international community. It has not provided any evidence, nor agreed to a joint investigation, of the recent terrorist attacks on the Indian bus in Kashmir. It does not allow human rights organizations or the international media access to all its claims of terrorism in Kashmir. It has not agreed to a Pakistani offer of jointly placing international observers on both sides of the Line of Control, to monitor cross-border movements. It has not invoked the UN Resolutions on terrorism, on any issue of terrorism in Kashmir. The famous Indian writer and winner of the Sean McBride prize of the International Peace Bureau, Mr. Praful Bidwai, points to this correctly, “Put simply, the Kaluchak incident does not on present evidence constitute a casus belli, or reason for war. Responsible states do not start wars without establishing serious causal connections between real threats and military action. (News, Pakistan: 23 May, 2002).

Yet the cross section of the Indian society seems to be openly supporting military action against Pakistan. In the potential Indian, “lose-lose-lose” scenario described above, these Indian citizens are actually shooting themselves in the foot. Pakistanis needs to ensure they do not commit the same mistake by escalating the war rhetoric.

About the Author

The author has previously been published on Chowk as a co-author with Omer Rafique on the series titled: "The King's Gambit"