The Dispatches On War: Part X

The European architects of power and influence had started to converge upon the imperial city of Vienna, in 1814, in hopes of recreating the phoenix of a European monarchy, which had been destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. Napoleon Bonaparte’s disastrous invasion of Russia in 1812 had emboldened the European diplomats, like impatient vultures, to feed off the dying corpse of Napoleonic Europe. Napoleon Bonaparte’s abdication and his imprisonment on the isle of Elba had allowed the European diplomats to think about the face of a post-Napoleonic Europe, which would emerge and based on a common agreement, the diplomats of Europe seemed to show a preference for the old familiar visage of European absolutism. The Concert of Vienna, which was created under the patronage of the Austrian foreign minister, Count Klemens von Metternich, was the personification of the European politics to reject the ideals of constitutionalism and radicalism and revive the traditional precepts of European power; monarchies of royal absolutism.

Metternich, as a young man had been personally horrified by the events of the French Revolution and, being of an aristocrat birth from the Rhineland, was forced into exile in Austria by the advancing French armies. The experiencing of escaping the French ingrained a deep hatred in Metternich for anything associated with the events of 1789. As the most influential member of the Concert of Europe, he was determined to push back the hand of time and revive the nature of the European politics, as it had existed prior to the outbreak of the French Revolution. Metternich was of the opinion that the French Revolution, due to it ideals, had ushered in a sense of uncertainty in Europe’s politics by destroying the institution of monarchy. Monarchies, according to Metternich, stood for tradition, respect for authority and thus, were the proponents of stability in European politics. Metternich personally seemed to blame the French Revolution for the nearly twenty years of European wars and his vision of a post-Napoleonic Europe saw a politically resurgent Austria championing the cause of monarchial power in Europe.

The re-drawing of Europe’s political map immediately commenced, under Metternich’s supervision, once Napoleon Bonaparte had been forced into exile. In this enterprise, Metternich was helped by Britain’s foreign secretary, Lord Castlereagh, who seemed to share Metternich’s distaste for politics of adventurism and change, as seen in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Lord Castlereagh’s reasons for propping up the power of Austria in Europe was motivated in a different context and he was simply following one of the most basic and inviolable commandments of the British foreign policy. From the time of Elizabeth I and Spanish Armada of 1588, England had realized that its physical political surety against an invasion by a European power lay in practicing a policy of divide et imperia. Therefore, England was never in favor of seeing any European power consolidate its power and influence in Europe and in such cases, it always supported any alliance of Europeans resisting the centralization of political power in the continent.

Hence, England supported Metternich not because England favored a monarchial system of power, but because a monarchial system of power was a status quo based idea and it would favor conservative politics. Castlereagh’s political instructions were to help in the creation of a political balance of power, which would allow the re-emergence of the small monarchies in Europe, whose political power and influence would be fractured and would be impotent to affect any significant political changes in Europe. In order to ensure the continued existence of this European balance of power, Britain was quite content to allow guardianship of this political reality to pass to Austria. The sole British interest in supporting Austria in Europe was to guarantee the security of Britain itself and in the process, allow Britain to disengage itself from European politics and allow it to concentrate on its rapidly expanding mercantilist empire. The understanding between London and Vienna was that Austria would not allow the centralization of power in Europe and in return, Britain would not object to Austrian political hegemony in Europe as long as Austria sustained the European balance of power and did not seek to dominate it itself. With this tacit understanding, Britain was willing to allow Metternich to influence European politics.

The first step, which Metternich undertook to place the imprint of Austrian power in Europe and its intentions to revive the pre-1789 nature of European politics, was the re-institution of the Bourbon monarchy in France. Louis XVI, who was the Bourbon king when the revolution broke out in France on July 14, 1789, had been executed by the revolutionaries along with his Austrian wife, Marie Antoinette, and the Dauphin (Louis XVI’s son and hence, the crown prince of France) in 1793. Metternich, not to be deterred by end of the Bourbon dynastic line, selected one of Louis XVI’s relatives and had him placed upon the French throne as Louis XVIII (since the Dauphin would have been Louis XVII had he lived to be the king of France after the death of his father). Louis XVIII, once he became the king, decided to revive the system of French politics, which had been the cause of the revolution and instituted policies designed to erode the political rights granted to the French by the revolution and under Napoleon Bonaparte’s rule. Louis XVIII, who was eager to please Metternich, imposed the most tyrannical regime of absolutism in France and thus, the harshness of his rule would invite a popular backlash against his style of rule. Realizing that he was hated by the majority of the French people, Louis XVIII was pragmatic enough to appreciate that as long as Metternich had confidence in him, he would not lose his throne. Thus, with this in mind, Louis XVIII dutifully implemented Metternich’s policies in France in total disregard of the popular French opinion.

The popular dissatisfaction against Louis XVIII’s rule became so vehement that the news of a brewing rebellion against Louis reached Napoleon in Elba and would convince Napoleon to risk returning to France. Aided by his supporters, Napoleon was smuggled off the isle of Elba and brought back to France to lead and organize a popular revolt against Louis. In the spring of 1815, Napoleon landed on the southern coast of France to take advantage of the situation and regain his power. As Napoleon was marching towards Paris, with a small group of supporters, the news of Napoleon landing in France reached Louis and the French king, not wishing to let Napoleon benefit in any sense, ordered the arrest of Napoleon. Louis seemed to relish the idea of arresting Napoleon and it was Louis’ wish to arrest Napoleon and to charge him with treason and to eventually execute him. Louis’ reason was that Napoleon had committed treason by returning to France and it was also, indirectly, to personally avenge the death of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette. The real and the unstated reason, why Louis XVIII wanted to execute Napoleon Bonaparte was to curry political favor with Metternich and there was no better way to show his loyalty to Metternich and Austria by killing Napoleon and in the process, redeeming the Austrian honor which had been sullied by the French execution of an Austrian princes; Marie Antoinette.

Louis XVIII plans to arrest the former emperor of France seemed to go awry, because Louis had miscalculated the loyalty of the French army towards Napoleon and instead of arresting Napoleon the contingent of the French army, send to arrest him, decided to join forces, with Napoleon and march with him to Paris. Once, Napoleon had the support of the French army, he also had the military wherewithal to wrest political power away from Louis and suddenly, Napoleon seemed to present a creditable threat to Louis and to Metternich’s European dreams. Metternich wanted Napoleon stopped, but before he could ask Louis to resist Napoleon’s advance towards Paris, Louis had already vacated the throne in Paris and had fled to Austria. With the unexpected departure of Louis, there was a power vacuum in France, which Napoleon Bonaparte filled by assuming his old powers. This would place Metternich in a quandary, as Austria did not have the military means to stop a resurgent Bonapartist France, and Louis’ impulsive wish to avoid meeting the same fate as Louis XVI and his abdication of power, had gravely undermined Metternich’s plans.

Metternich would be rescued from his political problems by Britain, which dispatched an army to Europe under the command of Arthur Wesley, the Duke of Wellington. The political opinion in London would be extremely displeased with the turn of events in Europe, because Britain had no desire to re-enter the European politics. The inability of Metternich to deal effectively with the situation of Napoleon’s arrival would make the British start to doubt his ability to maintain a European peace. The British also were having second thoughts on the nature of Metternich’s policies, because the British saw the arrival of Napoleon Bonaparte in Europe as a direct result of Metternich’s political rigidity in compromising, with the French popular opinion by not forcing Louis to moderate his policies. Also, the British realized that the placement of Louis XVIII was a wrong decision and it was a political mistake on the part of Metternich not to take into account the consequences of giving power to Louis. The British were becoming increasingly concerned that if Metternich did not display a sense of political flexibility, there would be a European reaction against the Metternichian system of politics in Europe.

However, these considerations took a secondary importance to stopping Napoleon and the British were keenly interested in preventing Napoleon from regaining his influence in Europe. The British policy decision to send an army into Belgium to fight and stop Napoleon, was not to prevent the destruction of Metternich’s grand political design but to spare Britain the compulsion of fighting an another series of continental wars of political domination in Europe in hopes of protecting the security of the British Isles. The Duke of Wellington established his military headquarters in Brussels and planned to march south towards Paris, but Napoleon, who astutely rationalized that the greatest threat to his power came from the British army in the north and not from the Austrian army to the south-east, decided to march north towards Brussels and offer battle to the British before Wellington could organize his army. Wellington learning of the French army’s approach mobilized the British army and decided to engage Napoleon much earlier than he had anticipated. The British and the French would eventually meet each other on June 15, 1815 near a small Belgian village and fight a bitter battle, which lasted three days.

The Battle of Waterloo, which would finally and convincingly defeat Napoleon Bonaparte and his attempts to regain political power in Europe, would also reconvene the Congress of Vienna to decide the politics of Europe. The European diplomats, who met in Vienna to redraw the map of Europe, confronted a series of problems, which seemed to scuttle the prospects of peace in Europe instead of securing it. The problem, which confronted Metternich was that the European diplomats were more eager to increase their own sphere of influence in Europe and thus, seemed willing to engage in a series of wars to settle their differences. The only way in which Metternich could foist an Austrian political hegemony in Europe, was to compromise with the European demands for a decentralized power, but the issue facing Austria was how to facilitate the competing European demands.

The problems facing the Congress of Vienna were of a multifaceted and acrimonious nature. The most immediate challenge to a post-Napoleonic European peace was made by Prussia, when it made a bid to dominate Mitteleuropa. Prussia had emerged on the political map of Europe in the 1600s, when two duchies on the Baltic coast called Brandenburg and Prussia merged into one large kingdom. Over a period of time, Prussia which was the smaller duchy managed to dominate the larger Brandenburg due to its highly centralized and bureaucratic administration and its highly skilled military forces. Under the effective guidance of the Hohenzollern monarchy and ably aided by its bureaucracy and the military dominated by the land owning nobility called the Junkers, Prussia had devised an efficient structure of political power in Europe. Within half a century, Prussia was a major European power and this reality was recognized by the Europeans at the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, when Brandenburg-Prussia was accepted as a European power. Brandenburg-Prussia, in the next century would add to its territories in Mitteleuropa and in process, would emerge as the strongest central European power. This increased political power of Prussia would eventually force a change of name, whereby the kingdom came to be known as Prussia-Brandenburg and by the time of the French Revolution, Prussia would politically and militarily eclipse Brandenburg to the extent that it would be known only as Prussia.

Prussian ambitions to dominate central Europe was thwarted by Austria which controlled the Holy Roman Empire and the fact that it was physically impossible for Prussia to force the 300 German principalities of Mitteleuropa to accept its authority. Austria saw Prussia as the most logical threat to its power and influence in central Europe and did not wish to allow Prussia to dominate the Holy Roman Empire. The Austrians were confident that Prussia would never be able to establish its political control over the 300 German principalities and in this sense Vienna was correct, but Austria could not foresee the consequences of the French Revolution in central Europe. The factor, which made it feasible for Prussia to seek to dominate central Europe in 1815 and challenge Austrian power in the region, was the political fiat of Napoleon Bonaparte, which abolished the Holy Roman Empire and replaced it with the Confederation of the Rhine in the early 1800s. Napoleon Bonaparte, when he came to power in France wanted to dominate central Europe and bring it under French influence. Napoleon wanted to protect France from invasion from the east by the Russians and from the south-east by Austria. Napoleon realized that the only obstacle to French domination of central Europe was Prussia and not Austria, as Vienna had suffered a string of military defeats at the hands of the French and would not be in any position to stage a threat to French ambitions. However, Prussia was not interested in allowing the French to replace Austria as a major central European power and thus, resisted Napoleon’s plans for Mitteleuropa. In 1806, Napoleon would finally end the Prussian resistance to French aims and in the process, the Prussian political influence in central Europe, by defeating Prussia in the battles of Jena and Auerstad.

The defeat of Prussia meant that it was forced to accept French power in central Europe. With the removal of Prussia, as a major power, France embarked on a political process to consolidate its rule in Mitteleuropa and in order to achieve it Napoleon abolished the Holy Roman Empire, and along with it the Austrian influence in central Europe. To fill the political vacuum left by the demise of the Holy Roman Empire, Napoleon issued an imperial edict known as Reichsdeputationhauptschloss, which amalgamated the 300 German principalities into thirty-six principalities. The French reasons, as rationalized by Napoleon, in doing this were based on political pragmatism since it was easier to dominate an alliance of 36 principalities than 300 principalities. Hence, Napoleon’s attempts to merge the German principalities were undertaken in lieu of French administrative interests in dominating the Confederation of the Rhine. However, to Prussia the revised reality of political power in central Europe implied it could still dominate central Europe and had a better chance of dominating 36 principalities instead of 300, but it would have to remove the French influence from the region and at the same time, not allow the Austrians to re-establish themselves politically in Mitteleuropa.

It was with this political calculus in mind that Prussia allied itself with the Quadruple Alliance, which had formed to defeat Napoleon, under the political leadership of Metternich. By offering the alliance the use of its well trained military, Prussia was hoping to secure a seat on the bargaining table, where the future of the post-Napoleonic Europe would be decided. Prussia was hopeful that Great Britain would support Prussia’s claim to dominate the Confederation of the Rhine and that Great Britain, given its penchant for a politically decentralized Europe, would not prefer to see a powerful Austria in central Europe and thus, would support Prussian claims in central Europe. In this sense, Prussia’s demand had gained additional weight when Prussian troops had reinforced Wellington’s English regiments on the third day of the Battle of Waterloo and had helped in repelling the final French assault. The arrival of the Prussian soldiers had helped to turn the tide of the battle against the French and the Prussians would play a critical role in the defeat of the French army at the Battle of Waterloo.

Therefore, Prussia was quite confident that it would be allowed to dominate central Europe and with this premise, asked that the Confederation of the Rhine should be placed under its political influence. Austria, under Metternich, wished to dominate the Confederation of the Rhine, because the Austrian claim was that since the Confederation of the Rhine had replaced the Holy Roman Empire in central Europe, Austria should be allowed to reclaim its traditional influence in Mitteleuropa and the Confederation of the Rhine should be placed under its authority. Thus, Austria rejected the Prussian demands to dominate the Confederation of the Rhine and Great Britain, instead of supporting Prussia, backed the Austrian claims on the Confederation of the Rhine. The British reasons were in tune, with its traditional interests of keeping political power decentralized in Europe. The reason behind this apparent British diplomatic volte-face was that Great Britain was more apprehensive of Prussian capabilities to dominate central Europe than it was of the Austrian intentions. Great Britain knew that Prussia had the military power to dominate Mitteleuropa, but Austria did not and thus, giving Austria the right to dominate the region would ensure decentralized power as Austria would be competing with Prussia for influence in the region. On the other hand, had Great Britain supported Prussia in its claims to dominate the Confederation of the Rhine, Prussia would have centralized power in Mitteleuropa and that would have created a potential political situation, which would have been antithetical to British interests in Europe.

However, Metternich was mindful that Prussia was quite indignant at the treatment meted out to it at the Congress of Vienna and thus, needed to be appeased if peace in central Europe was to be guaranteed. Prussia, instead of getting the Confederation of the Rhine, was allowed to annex the Duchy of Warsaw. The Duchy of Warsaw had been created by Napoleon Bonaparte from Polish lands and had been given to his ally, the king of Saxony, as a gift. The decision to gift the Duchy of Warsaw to Prussia was resisted by Russia, which claimed that territory rightfully belonged to it. According to the Russian claims, the territory belonged to it under the terms of the Third Partition of Poland in 1792. In 1792, Russia, Austria and Prussia had agreed to divide Poland between them (and in the process, Poland would cease to exist as a nation till 1919, when it would be recreated on the map of Europe by the Treaty of Versailles) and according to Russia, the lands that made up the Duchy of Warsaw were taken away from Russia by Napoleon and thus, should be returned to Russia.

Great Britain was not interested in seeing Russia increase its influence in Europe and wanted to contain Russian influence to Eastern Europe. Therefore, Russian demands on the Duchy of Warsaw were rejected, but Russia was not interested in leaving Vienna empty handed, for as compensation to the loss of the Duchy of Warsaw, Russia asked that it should be allowed the right of passage through the straits of Bosporus and Dardanelles into the Mediterranean Sea. Great Britain was not partial to this Russian demand, because allowing Russia passage through the straits would imply a Russian influence over Constantinople, and even though Ottoman Turkey was a politically impotent power in Europe, Great Britain still required Turkey to act as a bulwark against the Russian expansion southwards into the Mediterranean Sea. Besides, Great Britain did not relish the idea of Russian influence in the Mediterranean Sea, which British considered as “Mare Nostrum” – a term used by the Romans to describe the Mediterranean as “our sea”. After the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, it was a stated policy of Great Britain to dominate the Mediterranean and not allow any European power to challenge the British naval power in the Mediterranean.

Thus, with this consideration, Great Britain supported Turkey against the Russian demand for passage to the Mediterranean Sea and agreed to politically support Turkey against the power of Russia; not to deter a Russian aggression, but to enable Turkey to act as a guardian of British interests in the Mediterranean by preventing the Russians from gaining access to it. Therefore, as a quid pro quo, for British support to Austria on the issue of the Confederation of the Rhine, Austria agreed to support Great Britain on the behalf of Ottoman Turkey against Russia in denying Russia sea passage to the Mediterranean Sea. In this regard, Prussia also supported the British and the Austrians against the Russians, because reward for this meant that Prussia would be able to enlarge its territories in central Europe by taking over the Duchy of Warsaw.

In return for this Austrian show of support, Constantinople was forced to cede its political influence over south-east Europe and the Balkans to Austria, as it was agreed that Austria would be allowed to replace the declining Turkish influence in the region. Another reason behind this decision was that Turkey was a politically spent force in Europe, but it still retained control over large areas in Eastern Europe and these areas had large Slavic populations, who looked to Russia as their political and religious mentor. Hence, there was a fear that the loss of Turkish influence would be replaced by Russia, and the presence of Russia in south-eastern Europe would not only threaten Austria, but it would also allow Russia access to the Mediterranean Sea through the Balkans. Hence, Great Britain and Austria were not willing to trust Turkish power as a viable deterrent against Russian expansion into south-eastern and central Europe. Therefore, Austria was allowed to increase its influence into south-eastern Europe to ward off a possible Russian influence. Since Great Britain was leery of Austria attempting to revive its political influence in central Europe, Great Britain was willing to allow Austria to regain the loss of its influence in the Holy Roman Empire by gaining lands in the south-east at the expanse of Ottoman Turkey.

Another political issue, which was decided by the Congress of Vienna, was the boundaries of France. Since France was a defeated power, its fate was also on the executioner’s block in Vienna, but France was adamant on protecting its national territory and had no wish to see French lands parceled off to victorious European powers. The French argument was that France should be allowed to keep the borders of 1792 and any lands acquired after 1792, could be taken away from France. The reason behind this demand was that according to the French, France did not fight an offensive war in Europe till 1793 and hence, prior to 1793 it was only defending its own territory from attacks by the European powers which had attacked it with the aims of defeating the French Revolution and restoring the Bourbon monarchy. France wanted to preserve the political territorial integrity of its nationhood and it was fully cognizant of the fact that once a territorial division of France had occurred, the Europeans would not be satisfied till the entire state of France was partitioned amongst the various European powers. However, in order to secure the borders of 1792, France agreed to give up its historic claims to northern Italy and renounce any right to the lands in northern Italy. With this, France was spared territorial dismemberments but it also meant that loss of French interest in northern Italy would be replaced by Austria, which now considered northern Italy, and thus by extension the entire Italian peninsula, as an Austrian sphere of influence.

Consequently, this imposition of the Austrian hegemony in Italy was resented by the Italian states, particularly Sardinia which wanted to dominate the Italian peninsula after the removal of French influence. The Austrian influence in Italy was supported by the papacy, which saw the emergence of an Italian nationalism as a threat to its own influence and power in Italy and favored Metternich’s political prescription that politics should be based on the ideas of stability, tradition and respect. The Holy Roman Catholic church wanted to pursue the politics of status quo and for this reason it supported Metternich in denying the Italian arguments that the Italian states should be unified into a nation. Therefore, Austria entered into an alliance with the Vatican to ensure that the Italian states would not merge into a nation, which would threaten the Austrian influence in Italy and in return; Austria supported the right of the church to maintain its influence and political power in Italy.

In reality, the Congress of Vienna would prove to be a failure, because none of the European nations were pleased, with the manner in which Austria had enforced its diktat in Europe. Prussia was still incensed at being denied any role in the Confederation of the Rhine and would leave Vienna determined to challenge the Austrian influence in Mitteleuropa. Prussia still wanted to dominate Mitteleuropa and had arrived at the conclusion that a unification of German principalities under Prussia would only be possible with the removal of Austrian influence from the Confederation of the Rhine. Thus, Prussia was determined to resist and exploit Austrian weakness in Mitteleuropa at every available opportunity.

Russia was disillusioned by the political duplicity of the Europeans and was having second thoughts about abiding by the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna and seemed willing to push its interests in the Mediterranean. Italy, as already noted, was not happy with the Austrian influence and was in a wait for the right moment, when it could make an attempt at removing Austrian influence from Italy. France, though it was defeated, had not entirely renounced its claims on northern Italy and was interested in seeking the end of the Metternichian system of power as a means of advancing French interest in northern Italy. Ottoman Turkey was not happy either at the loss of its political influence in the Balkans and in south-east Europe, but was powerless to challenge the emerging status quo of political power in Europe.

Therefore, the two powers which gained from the collapse of Napoleonic France in Europe were Austria and Great Britain. Great Britain’s political influence in Europe came from its unchallenged domination of the Mediterranean and the ability of the Royal Navy to rule the waves unchallenged and thus, act as the fulcrum upon which the European balance of power was hinged. In 1815, Great Britain had adopted the “two navy standard” and this meant that the British naval strength was consistently pegged to the criteria that the Royal Navy should be strong enough to defeat the navies of two combined European powers. Operating from its bases in Gibraltar and from Malta, Great Britain controlled the entire length and width of the Mediterranean and seemed capable of using its naval power to affect European political calculations.

Austria also benefited in the sense that its influence was imprinted upon the European politics and nothing could happen without the tacit consent of its foreign minister, Count Klemens von Metternich. The key to Austrian influence rested on the creation of the “Concert of Europe”, whereby European powers were balanced in a political arrangement and like a waltz, they could maneuver with different partners but could not break the basic rule of the Congress of Vienna, which stated explicitly that all European issues would be solved diplomatically and the status quo would be strictly observed under Austria’s watchful eyes. In Metternich’s view, the “Concert of Europe” would be played according to Vienna’s political tune and he was determined to enforce the status quo of Austrian power in Europe by straitjacketing the political aspirations of the European states.

However, things did not develop as Metternich might have hoped because in 1819, the first in a series of challenges, Prussia started to explore the possibility of confronting Austrian domination of the Confederation of the Rhine. Four years after the signing of the Treaty of Vienna in 1815, under Prussia’s covert political support a group of German university students in Carlsbad printed a news letter asking for political rights. Metternich’s response to this act of political blasphemy by the German students was swift and harsh. Fearful that this might be the harbinger of another revolution in Europe, which might unravel the balance of power, as created by the Congress of Vienna, Metternich issued a proclamation known as the Carlsbad Decrees. Since Metternich favored the politics of absolutism and hated radical or revolutionary politics, Metternich ordered the seizure of the printing presses and had the students arrested and a strict regime of censorship under Austrian guidance was enforced in Mitteleuropa.

The immediate European reaction was critical of Metternich, who seemed to support a policy of denying political rights to everyone in Europe. There were two perspectives to this European reaction and one of them was that Metternich seemed to be becoming a European autocrat and was willing to use force in order to attain his policy objectives. Within this perception, the Europeans were growing uneasy because it seemed as if Austria had replaced Napoleonic France’s hegemony. Furthermore, in reacting to the events in Carlsbad, Metternich had violated the basic principles of the Congress of Vienna himself; the use of force to settle a political problem. This prompted the Europeans to agitate against the system of Congress of Vienna as it gave credence to the idea that force was still a viable substitute to solve political problems. The second, and the most critical, response to the Austrian actions would come from Great Britain and it cautioned Metternich not to deny political rights to the Europeans. Great Britain was mindful that it was the harsh nature of Louis XVIII’s rule, which had brought Napoleon out of exile and in this context, seemed to think that if Metternich did not show political flexibility, Europe was destined to experience another round of political instability and revolutions.

Metternich, unmindful of the British concerns, created new laws, which were designed to impose Austrian influence in Europe more stringently and started to support a policy of political suppression and denial of political rights in Europe. As the British had feared, there was a violent response to the Austrian policies in the personification of a nationalist revolt in Spain in 1820. Spain, reacting to the harsh nature of Austrian rule demanded that the monarch of Spain, who was ruling the country by the consent of Metternich, should be replaced and that Spain should have a republican government. Metternich reacted by sending French troops to Spain to crush the revolt and the arrival of the French troops only revived the painful memories of French occupation of Spain under Napoleon and thus, what was originally a popular political demand exploded into armed rebellion against Austrian domination of European politics. Despite the deepening crisis in Spain and the open challenge it posed to his rule, Metternich was able to convince the Europeans to support the cause of monarchial power in Europe and thus, fight against the Spanish rebellion. The European answer to Metternich’s plea was more motivated by the prospects of avoiding a general European war than in fighting the Spanish revolt. The Spanish revolt had occurred only five years after the end of nearly twenty years of Napoleonic wars in Europe and thus, though the Europeans were delighted at the political troubles of Metternich; they had no wish to experience political instability in Europe and therefore, supported Austria in ending the Spanish revolt.

The Spanish rebellion would be finally defeated in 1823, but what really destroyed the Austrian influence in Europe was an event, which took place in 1821. Observing the European challenges to Metternich’s status quo in Europe and realizing that there was a sense of general dissatisfaction with Austria in Europe, Greece, which was a colony of the Ottoman Turks, took advantage of this situation and declared its independence from Ottoman Turkey. The immediate European response was in support of Greece, but Metternich’s reaction was to condemn the Greek declaration of independence because Metternich feared that if Greece was allowed to successfully gain its independence, it would open up the political flood-gates in Europe as other nations would demand their independence too. Metternich was horrified by the Greek demand, because Metternich realized that the same arguments could be employed by Prussia and Italy to seek an end to Austrian influence in central Europe and on the Italian peninsula and therefore, he supported the Sublime Porte against the Greek calls for independence.

This Austrian decision to support Ottoman Turkey would prove to be the final parting of ways in Europe, as Europe opposed Austria and openly started to support the Greeks in their fight against the Turks. The European reaction to the Greek cause was primarily colored by the romanticism of the classical Greek history and the fact that Greece was considered as the cradle of the European civilization. It was an emotional empathy, which brought the Europeans to the Greek cause to the extent that even Great Britain, caught up in the fervor of the moment, disagreed with Metternich’s decision to support Turkey and would end its political support of Metternich as a protest in opposition to Austrian support of a non-Christian power against Christians in Europe. Metternich’s counter-argument to the European emotionalism in the favor of the Greeks was that Europe should base its policy towards the Greek-Turkish crisis on a political principle and not on religion and thus, not to support the politics of instability in Europe. According to Metternich this meant a support for Turkey, which stood for stability and order in Europe against Greece, which was threatening the European peace. The Europeans would disregard Metternich’s opinions and would continue to support Greece, which would ultimately win its freedom from Ottoman Turkish rule in 1829 through the Treaty of Adrianiople, which recognized the Greek independence.

The Greek war of independence against the Turks would establish two facts; one was that by openly challenging the Metternichian concept of a balance of power based on the status quo, the Greeks would help in starting the process, which would end in the destruction of the Congress of Vienna. The Greek example would embolden the Prussians to make a revised bid for the mastery of the Confederation of the Rhine and would set in motion events, which would finally pave the way for the unification of Germany in the Hall of Mirrors at the palace of Versailles in 1871. France and Italy would prod the limits of Metternich’s rule and there would be a popular demand for more political rights in the shape of the European revolutions of 1848, which would not only end the Austrian influence in Europe, but would also send Metternich into exile in England.

The second legacy of the Greek independence from Ottoman Turkey was that it was the first time that the Europeans had violated the Treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648, which had rejected the idea of religion influencing European politics. The consequences of this political reality would haunt Europe, but in the euphoria of the Greek success and by implication of the European civilization’s victory over Ottoman Turkey, the European mind would be deaf to the thoughts of future, because ringing loudly in its ears would be the all too familiar cry of the crusader. Europe would recover from the destruction of the Congress of Vienna and it would reformulate its balance of power arrangements, but the secular nature of European politics had been discredited as Europe seemed incapable of rising above its religious prejudices.

Parenthetically speaking, maybe Europe still has the potential to rise above its religious limitations and yet again, maybe it does, but that is a another tale for a different day.