Dost Mittar October 26, 2005

Tags: nuclear , policy

href="/tag/Delhi">Delhi’s resolve to deepen its strategic and cultural ties with Tehran despite American frown”. The Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Mani Shankar Aiyer, chimed in, "Our friendship with Iran is civilisational, historical, deep-rooted and multi-faceted and this relationship can’t be compromised for any third party concern". Apparently, these two Nehrvian war-horses from a bye-gone era did not know what was brewing in the Prime Minister’s Office.

When India voted with Germany, Britain and the United States for the resolution to send Iran’s non-cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency to the United Nations if negotiations fail, everyone was shocked. They should not have been. Early signs were available during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to the United States in July. When asked about his views about the Iranian nuclear reactors, Man Mohan Singh told CNN that India expected all countries to honour their international agreements. This was an indication that Manmohan Singh’s thinking on this issue did not coincide with those of his Ministers for External Affairs and Petroleum.

India’s change of policy towards Iran must have been one of the most deliberate, albeit agonizing, decision by the Indian government. The decision to vote for the IAEA resolution has been closely linked to the Indo-US Accord on cooperation in the area of India’s civilian nuclear plants. The Accord is facing stiff opposition in the Unites States Congress from both Republican and Democrat Senators and Congressmen who are rightly worried that the Accord allows India - a non-signatory to the NPT and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - a virtual membership of the recognized nuclear club. They are afraid that this would encourage other countries with nuclear ambitions, especially Iran and Korea, to follow India’s example and flout the ban on nuclear weapons. The task of overcoming this opposition seemed insurmountable after Natwar Singh’s visit to Tehran, which precipitated Senator Lanto’s strong condemnation of Singh’s Tehran comments. The US administration told India in no uncertain terms that its support for the Indo-US Accord in the US Congress would depend upon India’s support for the IAEA resolution against Iran.

In changing its policy towards Iran, India must have carefully weighed the pros and cons of the decision on India’s critical energy needs. Gas imports from Iran and Central Asia, whether in the form of Liquefied Petroleum Gas or through undersea or above ground pipelines have played a central role in India’s long-term energy planning. In voting against Iran, India must have considered the risk that Iran might renege on its earlier commitments of supplying gas to India and/or refuse to enter into new commitments. They presumably decided that this risk was minimal as, after initial shock, Iran would place its commercial interests above other considerations. Moreover, even if Iran refuses, there are other potential sources, such as Bangladesh, Myanmar and Central Asia, not to mention newfound gas discoveries in India’ own Bay of Bengal.
Whereas potential alternatives to Iran exist for Petroleum and Natural Gas, there are no such alternatives for nuclear energy as long as the U.S opposes India’s access to nuclear technology in the Nuclear Supplier Countries’ consortium. The Accord has opened doors for India even before the US Congress has ratified it: France is negotiating with India for the sale of nuclear technology while Canada has given a green light to its Atomic Energy Commission to resume nuclear supplies to India. Russia, another nuclear supplier, has always been keen to sell its nuclear technology to India, as long as it was permitted by the NSG.

But the ramifications of India’s decision go beyond Energy. India had spent considerable diplomatic capital in cultivating its relationship with Iran. Along with Iraq, Iran had steadfastly resisted Pakistan’s attempts to malign India in the Organization of Islamic Countries and had kept them from doing anything other than passing a toothless, pro-forma resolution on Kashmir. It had saved India from extreme embarrassment a few years ago in Geneva when it prevented the United Nations Human Rights Commission from passing strictures against India’s human rights violations in Kashmir. India also has the largest Shia community outside Iran and alienating Iran also means a potential political cost to the Congress Party, especially in the state of Uttar Pradesh.

The decision to vote against Iran shows that the steering of India’s foreign policy has moved from the South Block of the Central Secretariat to the Prime Minister’s Office in the North Block. Man Mohan Singh is now putting his own stamp on both the Kashmir issue as well as in dealings with major powers. The shift in the foreign policy, which was started by Man Mohan’s mentor, Narsimha Rao, after the end of the Cold War, now seems to be complete. India no longer swears by the Non-Align Movement that it once founded. From now on, it will decide each issue based on India’s short and long-term interests and not based on a romantic association to any great moral principle. Non-Align Movement will continue to exist, if for no other reason than that the large bureaucracy that supports it will continue to find a rationale for its survival. But as far as India and Non Alignment Movement is concerned, it is Ram NAM Sat Hai!