Please back off, Benazir!

There is a tendency among the army coup leaders in Pakistan that after a certain period of time in power; they are convinced that they are indispensable. They begin to believe that neither the country nor the West could do any thing in the area without their help and presence at the helm in Pakistan. They start brushing people aside and a distinct swagger in stride is evident. They ignore the civilian advisors and often fail to take the US advice or go against the US advice. In a nutshell, no accountability and unchecked power begins to go to the head. Musharaf is no exception. Musharaf became US ally at a very distressful juncture in the US history. His support, no matter how easily engineered, was crucial for the US administration to combat US enemies. He was given a long leash, accorded utmost respect and treated with kid gloves when he disagreed with some of the proposed US actions in the Tribal areas of Pakistan.

Just a year ago, around this time, no one thought that political scene in Pakistan would turn on its head. The start of the year saw Saudi Arabia moving slightly away from the US on the Iran situation. The bold statement from the Saudis calling the US occupation of Iraq illegal was against the run. Saudi Arabia is the strongest US ally in the area and this break was inexplicable. It turned out that the Saudis were not happy with the US on Iran and felt that any military strike on Iran would cause internal problems in Saudi Arabia, considering that Israel was supposed to provide a helping hand to the US forces in Iran.

The Saudis turned to Pakistan to garner support. Gen. Musharaf met the Saudi King and announced a conference of all gulf countries excluding Iran in Islamabad. The conference ended on February 13th in Islamabad. Initially, Iran protested to Pakistan about its exclusion from a Gulf States conference and felt that Musharaf had called for the conference to promote the US agenda. The conference ended up warning the US against any action against Iran. All Gulf States around Iran have strong relations with the US, that announcement was a shocker and a major blow to the US diplomacy in the area. Musharaf’s lead on this issue was not taken kindly in the White House. Since the day after the 9/11, the White House and the Pentagon have been Musharaf’s staunchest supporters in Washington. Musharaf’s attempt to unite the gulf countries against the US was considered an act of belligerence and some in the US administration thought that Musharaf has stepped out of bound and should be controlled lest he ends up at the wrong side of the fence when the US moves against Iran.

There were some more instances that had warning signs written all over them. First, a Musharaf and Karzai blow out in the White House, then his public displeasure of Karzai in Peshawar and lastly, an increase in the Taliban activities in Afghanistan were seen as signs that Musharaf would perhaps move towards non cooperation in Afghanistan, if he was not controlled.

In the first couple of months of 2007, things began to stack up against Musharaf. The honchos in the State department and the CIA were never comfortable with Musharaf’s authoritarian rule especially when the US was professing to promote democracy in the region. The State department or the CIA were never able to override the Pentagon support of Musharaf but after Rumsfeld’s departure, Musharaf support was not strong enough to hold the CIA and the State Dept down for long.

Internally, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who was firmly in Musharaf’s camp for years, had taken some decisions that were considered adversarial by the Musharaf administration. The Chief Justice inexplicably became even more aggressive in February and in early March things came to a head.

On March 9th an announcement from the President office regarding the Chief Justice’s status, unleashed the forces that were holding back for a long time for an opportune moment.

During the last few months, many changes have occurred in the Pakistani political scene. A lot of credit goes to the US for shaking things up and forcing the political pugilist face off. The US being the major beneficiary of whatever happens in Pakistan, is both the referee and the judge in this brutal struggle for power in which many will not bet on Musharaf to survive a bloody pounding. Still, he holds the keys for many doors at this time.

The two contenders, Nawaz and Benazir, are playing their cards with utmost care however; they don’t hold all the aces. The US is the ultimate decider. Benazir with her considerable name recognition and immaculate pro west credentials was an early favorite and it seemed that she would win the contest and remove Musharaf with ease.

Benazir hit the deck running but stumbled badly when her meeting with Musharaf was disclosed. After initially not admitting any such meeting, she ended up not only disclosing it but also outlined the deal she made with Musharaf. Apparently, when Musharaf brought that deal back to his Army colleagues he met with tremendous amount of opposition.

The Bhuttos are not particularly popular in the army officers. The elder Bhutto despite his many efforts to reconcile with the army was never able to gain the young officers trust. The army generals from his era and from the Ayub days were not fond of him. When Zulfiqar Bhutto was Prime Minister there were at least two known failed coup attempts and the third one led by Zia succeeded with help from the Islamic Parties in Pakistan.

After Zia’s death, Benazir was grudgingly allowed to take over the office but was removed very quickly. Her second tenure also ended by another putsch engineered by the army. The Pakistani army elite disliked her so much that even the Supreme Court judges were reluctant to restore her despite the illegal removal from the office of the PM. Nawaz Sharif never invoked such strong resentment in the Army bureaucracy and he won the Judgment from the Supreme Court against his removal.

As Benazir’s situation unraveled, the interested parties begin to back up Nawaz Sharif and now the Supreme Court’s decision has opened the playing field for a three way contest. There are still some major stumbling blocks in the way of all the contenders.

Benazir in the face of her growing negatives in the Army has the full confidence of the US administration. She has a national appeal, a broad electoral support in three provinces and a political base in Sindh. She perhaps is the only political leader in Pakistan who can compete well with the Islamic hardliners in NWFP and with help from ANP could possibly remove them from the power. Her political appeal in the Hazara, Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan districts can swing the votes away from the Islamic alliance. In Punjab and Sindh, she would be the likely winner in the rural areas.

Nawaz Sharif is primarily a provincial leader. Most of his support is in the urban Punjab he can get some support in Sindh if Pir Pagara agrees to help him there. His need to create a broad alliance with MMA would be a hurdle for him to win the US nod of approval. For the last four years, Nawaz Sharif emissaries have been all over Pakistan contacting the Trade Unions, Student Organizations and the Nationalists forces in the smaller provinces for a broad alliance. He has been promising new economic policies, better labor laws and a strong support for the provincial rights. The Baloch and Sindhi Nationalists currently would prefer Nawaz over Benazir.

All these speculations, hypothetical analysis, electoral and political support would not result in a smooth transfer of power in Pakistan. For that, both contenders have to find a way to either make a deal with Musharaf or go around him to appeal to other Generals. This is one area where even the US would not be of great help.

Benazir feels that she would be better off making a deal with Musharaf as she has no sphere of influence or constituency in the army. The US has strong influence in the Army and can force the Generals to accept Benazir but cannot ensure that the relationship would last long.

Whatever the outcome the new government in Pakistan would face three issues:

1. A growing insurgency in the Tribal areas.

2. Militant religious groups, lacking the public support are now relying on Suicide bombers to harass the State into subjugation.

3. The situation in Baluchistan and the provincial rights.


The US has an enormous interest in the growing unrest in the Tribal areas. No matter who finally comes to power in Pakistan, he/she will have to deal with an impatient US administration. Wheels are falling off the Bush wagon quickly. The Iraqi situation is pretty much unredeemable and the US would not like to see another political blow in a region where its primary foe is believed to have taken the refuge.

Can a civilian administration in Pakistan deal with these issues on its own? How much cooperation from the army and other army controlled paramilitary forces would be required and forthcoming to deal with these immediate problems? Would the army continue its operations in the tribal areas, if the uniform is not ruling the country?

Musharaf without the uniform has no ability to guarantee or even ensure support from the army. So his presence on the scene without the uniform is pretty much useless. On the other hand, if the civilians reach the power without some agreement with the army, their presence in the Parliament and the Prime Minister House would be just ceremonial.

Pakistan is at a point where the civilians and the army will have to work together to make progress in the areas of vital national interests. The source of problems in Pakistan is the presence of the army in a pivotal position. The army can easily make or break any civilian administration either from the inside or the outside.

The need for an alliance between the army and the politicians is important but could be illusive. The situation may require a high level of cooperation but the reality check would confirm that any future civilian administration in Pakistan which is headed by Benazir Bhutto will not have a complete support from the army and at some point and that may happen very quickly, the differences would reach an impasse and that might send the army back into the begging arms of the Islamists.

In a Benazir admin, instead of watching the army clean up some more Lal Mosque and the Jamia Hafsa stables from the capital, Pakistani might see the army trucks hauling the uncouth back in the capital from the tribal areas. With the army encouragement, the militant groups may cordon off the civilian admin and that might lead to a small scale civil war in Pakistan. In the presence of a hostile army, the Benazir admin might end up seeking help from the US and the NATO armies thus opening up the Pakistani territories for a large scale confrontation between the Pak army and the US forces.

Nawaz Sharif ‘s stock rises enormously when the army generals look at Benazir’s negatives. His support in the Punjabi middle class ensures that he has a large segment in the army supporting him. He is generally an acceptable figure for the army and can develop a working relationship with the army. His insistence that Musharaf should be out of the political process completely may have some support in some army quarters.

With Nawaz Sharif in the reckoning, the need for Musharaf in uniform or in civvies can be completely eliminated and that will also close one sour chapter in the Pakistani History. Musharaf’s removal is required for Pakistan to make a fresh start.

Unfortunately, Benazir at this time lacks the political and diplomatic ability to remove Musharaf from the scene entirely. Her alliance with Musharaf cannot last long and the personality clash would be inevitable.

At this juncture, Benazir has to back off and let Nawaz take the lead.