F-16s to Pakistan—Why Now?

There is good reason for the Musharraf regime to feel elated at Washington’s belated decision to relent on the sale of F-16s to Pakistan that every successive government in Pakistan had set its heart on since the late 80s.

Conventional wisdom says it’s a ‘reward’ for General Musharraf’s loyalty to George W. Bush’s ‘cause’ in this part of the world. The question is why now? General Musharraf has been loyal and steadfast to Bush’s open-ended war in Afghanistan and elsewhere from day one. Logic suggests that he should have been rewarded for his commitment early in the stint in order to pre-empt those lampooning him for getting not much in return for his services. Why delay the ‘reward’ for so long?

The answer to this question is both simple and difficult.

The simple answer is that Washington has tested General Musharraf long enough, found him unwavering in his commitment to the Bush agenda and, finally, decided that it was time to put a tangible reward like F-16s where their mouth has been for such a long time.

But the ‘reward’ theory loses all its thrust of argument when put against the other half of the Bush administration’s decision to give much more to India to balance its reward to Pakistan. India is not a front line soldier in Bush’s war on terrorism the way Pakistan has been for so long; why should Bush, then, be so munificent in promising not only advanced weaponry but sophisticated technology and state-of-the-art military industrial manufacturing know-how to India?

The bottom falls out of the reward barrel when what Pakistan is going to get is placed against what India is being offered in the realms of defence co-operation, defence-production and transfer of technology. You don’t reward a loyal and steadfast ally and, simultaneously, beef up, manifold, the defence potential of the adversary against whom Pakistan’s award-winning F-16s are most likely to be deployed?

The truth of the matter is that it is no reward to Pakistan. None whatsoever.

The other half of the equation is that much as the current administration, like the Clinton administration before it, may claim to the contrary, it continues to follow a hyphenated policy vis-à-vis India and Pakistan.

The reward, if any, is for India.

The hyphenated policy in regard to India and Pakistan demanded that Pakistan’s pot be sweetened before stocking the larder for India.

The chronology of events surrounding the announcements of weapons for Pakistan and India gives a categorical clue to it..

The White House first made the announcement for lifting the ban on Pakistan’s quest for F-16s and then Bush spoke, quick on its heels, to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to assure him that he wasn’t going to ignore India’s defence requirements in the wake of Pakistan getting its coveted F-16s.

Bush’s sensitivity to any feeling of hurt on Manmohan’s part stands out in sharp contrast to a total lack of perception as to how Pakistan might feel about Washington entering into a long term strategic partnership with arch-rival India. Which gives ample grist to the critique that Washington takes Islamabad for granted. Silence from Islamabad on how Bush and company are doting on India reinforces this argument.

Just look at what is on offer from Washington to Delhi to turn their relationship into a powerhouse of global implications in the 21st century. According to the Indian Express, Bush is offering “three big- ticket items” to India—“ long term defence industrial partnership, lifting the three-decade-old nuclear blockade and greater role for New Delhi in global institutions.”

Condoleezza Rice, the latest messenger of glad tidings from Bush to his loyal friends in Pakistan, went on record before the world community that the Bush administration was sworn to assisting “India become a major world power in the 21st century.”

There is not a speck of doubt that all these ‘big-ticket’ items on Washington’s list of goodies for India are designed to boost its claim to fame and greatness in a global framework.

What should be a source of concern to the policy planners in Islamabad is that India’s quest for great power status is not a cry in wilderness; it has a welcome echo in Washington because the imperialists there find it in tandem with their own global agenda.

That the neo cons calling the shots in the Bush administration have imperialist dreams has never been in doubt. They have been going about it with a ruthless and single-minded determination. Iraq was the first salvo in their empire-building strategy: Iran, Syria, Lebanon and who knows which other country may be next.

But the imperialists know that despite their grandiose dreams of global domination they can’t do it all by themselves; they need regional satraps and surrogates to partake of some of their burden. Israel is one, and will remain a fulcrum of American expansionism in ME. India has all the potential of becoming another.

What India has to offer the imperialists in Washington’s establishment, intelligentsia and academia is exactly what they covet to head off what they regard as the impending challenge to U.S. monopoly of world domination from China.

The only plausible counter-weight to a China already slated to overtake U.S. in economic power over the next two decades is neither Japan, nor Korea, nor Australia or any other country; India alone comes up to the bar. No wonder the neo cons are so enamoured of India.

What is, for sure, the most powerful argument going in favour of a confluence between Washington and Delhi is that of all the countries in China’s neighbourhood, it is India only that nurtures an ambition to challenge China on its turf in Asia. India’s irrepressible ambition to become not only a regional super-power but also a global power is what appeals most to the imperialist ‘visionaries’ in Washington. Ambition for global domination is what drives them and they see a reprise of it in Delhi.

Of course, a potential rivalry between U.S. and India down the global domination lane cannot be ruled out. But the neo cons think that would come, if at all, after India and China will have sorted out each other, and whoever emerges victorious from that encounter shouldn’t have the power left to stand up to U.S.

Till that juncture comes to pass, India is the one country closest to the heart of the neo cons and worthy of being courted by them. So they would like to lend a helping hand to India to acquire the perks and pretensions of a major global player.

Boosting India’s military capabilities and making it a world- class power is on top of the neo con checklist; a permanent seat on the UN Security Council is another. Ego is a great lubricant for the neo cons themselves, and giving India an ego massage is part of their agenda for the 21st century.

The denizens of Islamabad’s corridors of power ought never to overlook the fundamental difference in the U.S. perceptions of India and Pakistan in the context of the neo con agenda of global hegemony: India is seen and courted as a strategic partner in the global scheme of domination; Pakistan is only a tactical ally with a limited efficacy and utility.

The establishment and oligarchy in Islamabad is entitled to its moment of glory but jubilation shouldn’t dull their sense of a reality check.

The offer to Islamabad is, as yet, of an unspecified number of F-16s for which Pakistan is expected to find its own money. At the same time, to assuage India, there are indications that the number of jets given to Islamabad may not be too large to cause too much disquiet to Delhi.

The somewhat tepid and pro forma expression of concern and displeasure from Delhi is reflective of a sense of smug confidence that the injection of these new aircrafts is not, really, going to make such a big difference in the balance of power between India and Pakistan.

India already has a 3 to 1 superiority over Pakistan in the number of combat aircraft. And the number game, to be honest, has lost its relevance and importance in the balance between the two South Asian rivals. What matters now, since both became nuclear powers, is the balance of terror between them; conventional weapons have ceased to have the punch they used to have before 1998.

There is, on top of it, the added comfort for India that U.S. is prepared to sell it a more sophisticated and versatile aircraft—F-18—than what is being offered to Islamabad. The icing on the cake for India is that it will be making these aircrafts under license and will not be dependent for spares on Washington. Islamabad, on the other hand, will not be able to evade the supplier-client dragnet that had sapped all the thunder out of its earlier-vintage F-16s. There are no guarantees that Islamabad will not have to scrounge for spares for the new-age F-16s, as it was made to for the old ones.

Gloat they might at their hard won victory of sorts. But even in their moment of festivity, the power barons in Islamabad ought to factor in the cold realities of the age ready to dawn at their door-step. India is the long-term, strategic, partner sought by Washington in our part of the world. Bush has stated it in his own typically perfunctory and equivocal style.