S F Hasnat June 13, 2005

Tags: militancy , Pakistan , Military

href="/tag/Military">Military and bureaucracy) and is not confined only to the non-State actors. On the other hand, when it comes to a violent resentment, it is not restricted to the “Islamic militants” or sectarian fanatics, alone – it is rather a part of more comprehensive phenomena. More than one ideological group, are responsible for disturbing the nonviolent traditions of Pakistan. It is reflected at all levels of societal contacts - a trend which became more prominent as the Pakistani society moved towards the end of the last century. Militancy in Pakistan has many facets – ranging from military coups (including attempted) to sectarian killings. Also included are the ethnic related civil war situations. The society, as a whole has done away with the conflict management mechanisms; which should have been in the fabric of the societal relationships, in laws and in the agendas of the establishment.

The problem of militancy lies in the extended society; the manner in which the State is being governed and the types of relief a citizen is denied, through normal economic, legal and administrative/political methods. This is accompanied by the feeling of deprivation, amongst a large majority of the people. Sponsored and encouraged by the corrupt military and civilian regimes, it has become an accepted norm to look for short cuts, strife for out of turn benefits, and to become wealthy, no matter what it takes. This practice has severely compromised merit and mediocre has replaced excellence and professionalism. All these trends promote militancy as citizens have no customary channels to redress. An understanding of this phenomenon could help us to locate the level and kinds of frustration that is prevalent in the Pakistani society.

On a broader spectrum, it has become a fashion to trace all acts of violent behavior to Islamic community. There is so much rhetoric in this regard that other possible reasons for the rise of militancy in Pakistan, have been set aside. It is also believed as if the militancy is constituted as part of the Pakistani society. This impression is further reinforced by the Greater Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes, which after 9/11 got the opportunity to strengthen their dictatorial rule, by deliberately misinterpreting the unrest in their respective societies. According to this propaganda tool, the element of even genuine dissent and protest is branded as an act of extremism, which is evil and must be crushed, with whatever means the ruling junta has, at its disposal.

Decades of military rule created a way of life, where the real Pakistani values were undermined, which ultimately eroded for the worse. Oppression, intolerance and disregard for law were practiced by the ruling elite, as an accepted model. Taking advantage of the Afghan situation, in the 1980s, General Zia, further inculcated a culture of violence by his deceitful rule. While the Afghan resistance went on, his inapt military administration silently adjusted to the culture of violence and militancy, within the Pakistani society. Regional secular parties were created to protect the narrow objectives of the junta, which as a result undermined nationally acknowledged political entities.
After the Soviet left, the military undertook upon itself an assignment of playing a “role”, in war-torn Afghanistan. Their close ties with the Taliban encouraged the militant Islamist organizations, to go ahead unabated, with their agenda of extremism. The Pakistani governments callously allowed the Talibanization of the Pakistani society, inducting culture of hate and bigotry, which ultimately ruined the centuries of societal balance.

The Generals of Pakistan Army and the Talibans had nothing in common, as far as ideology is concerned – in fact they were poles apart. The Army generals have always been secular in their approach, representing in their habits, style and training a true reminisce of the British colonial rule. While, the Talibans advocated a unique interpretation of Islam – rigid and uncompromising by any standards. However, the interests of the two coincided on such secular matters of mutual interests as narcotics money, kick backs and providing arms and support to the Taliban regime, for financial rewards. The Pakistan Afghan policy had a certain mind-set which continued even after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, although the events had drastically transformed the regional as well as international security perceptions. There was no possibility that in post 9/11 the Pakistani establishment could have wriggled out of the mess, of which it was equally responsible. Even the swiftness, with which the military took a u-turn, could not save the country from the well entrenched effects of violent behavior in the Pakistani society.

In Pakistan, there is a strong linkage between rising religious bigotry/terrorism and poverty and role of dictatorial rule, based on well defined hierarchal pyramid. James C. Davies gives a psychological explanation of why people revolt by explaining a gap that exists between what people want and what people get. His theory explains that when frustration becomes widespread and intense, society seeks violent means and once the frustration becomes focused on the government, the violence becomes coherent and directional. Decades of military oppression, establishment’s greed, chronic illiteracy, high unemployment and callus attitude of the military/bureaucratic alliance inculcate a feeling of despair and dejection in Pakistan. Under the circumstances, the frustrated youth becomes an easy prey for the recruiters of hate and rejection, postured under the brand of religious extremists.

Concluding, we can say that despair and frustration arising from the extended military rule, is directly linked to the unjust socio-economic order and the foreign policy issues, where a strong feeling exists amongst the Islamists, secularists and nationalists alike, that the national interests are being compromised.