Dialogue, State and Utopia

’Dialogue’ will have no meaning unless all sides are willing to break through the settlements of history (in South Asia) that have produced the current impasse.

The prospects for an improvement in relations between India and Pakistan are limited by the fact that ’dialogue’ is the most unmeaning word in the lexicon of South Asian politics. A genuine dialogue requires at least two things: an element of trust that both sides are sincere in their search for solutions and the possibility that both sides have something to offer each other.

Pakistan’s behaviour over the last decade and the shadow of the Lahore and Agra summits make India unlikely to trust Pakistan. Pakistan, for its part, finds it difficult to believe that India could ever reconcile to what Pakistan takes to be its well-being. Elaborate third-party intervention and effective mechanisms of monitoring each other’s actions may help overcome mistrust; but these are unlikely to be in place in the short run. Trust is very difficult to achieve and incredibly easy to fritter away. Even if the current de-escalation continues, the most minor of incidents could jeopardise a fragile peace.

The second condition, that the two sides offer each other something tangible, is even more difficult to realise. Both sides have considerable common interests. Both would gain immeasurably if the constant military brinkmanship no longer exacted high costs from them; both would gain in a larger sense if trade were enhanced and cultural ties restored. But, genuine military de-escalation will require a measure of trust that seems difficult to attain. Trade, cultural and civil society links are what India can most easily offer, but Pakistan finds difficult to take those without feeling threatened. So, the onus of compromise falls on the Kashmir issue. India’s officially stated position is that there is nothing to discuss on Kashmir. It is an integral part of India, the discontent of the Kashmiris can be solved within the possibilities of the Indian Union and that is that. Pakistan continues to insist that India continues to occupy Kashmir illegally. Both have thought of Kashmir as being important to their identities. Such simple logic has produced a stalemate for two decades, if not longer. India and Pakistan will talk at each other, but not to each other. What will we talk about? What does dialogue mean?

It should be obvious to all but the most obtuse who desire a ’dialogue’ that breaking this stalemate will require unsettling some the basic parameters of South Asian politics. L. K. Advani had recently claimed that a confederation is possible in South Asia. What Mr. Advani has in mind is not quite clear and, it is somewhat ironic that this possibility is articulated by a member of a party that has done its utmost to make the minorities feel insecure. But there is a large element of truth in this aspiration. For the region to move away from the shadow of war, terrorism, insurgency and mistrust, the current interpretations of sovereignty and nationhood will have to be drastically modified. But isn’t it wishful thinking to suppose that two sides that can’t even play cricket matches will seriously contemplate a confederation?

It is important to realise that at this juncture this argument needs to be turned on its head. Unless we are willing to change our investments in sovereignty and nationhood there will be no way out of this impasse. A confederation may be far-fetched, but it seems that South Asia as whole and not just India and Pakistan needs regional arrangements that can do at least three things: provide for a mechanism to stabilise security concerns, have an arrangement that can monitor human rights and the rights of minorities and minorities within minorities, and promote genuine civil society exchange. Most of the world, except for South Asia, is beginning to experiment with such arrangements. In the context of South Asia, there is, however, an insurmountable obstacle: India is seen as so much the dominant power in the region that such regional institutions, even calls for free trade, are often seen as a design by India to gobble up its neighbours. On trade, for instance, even Bangladesh will not sell natural gas to India directly. Fear of trade is widespread and deep-rooted in South Asia, but it rests on a fundamental fallacy. This fear does not recognise that strong trading links make parties inter-dependent and can be used to exercise leverage. This is the source of China’s clout in the world and India has at long last learnt that autarky is not the same thing as power. Unless trade is seen as beneficial it will be impossible to weave South Asia into a network of inter-dependence. India is right to insist that a meaningful dialogue has to start here.

Pakistan is correct in arguing that Kashmir is the central issue, perhaps even in more ways than its rulers recognise. In a way, Kashmir might even be central to altering the domestic dynamics of Pakistani politics. In a long-range perspective, the internal dynamics of Pakistani politics will have to alter significantly for anti-India sentiment to abate. Pakistan’s internal politics will remain unhealthily distorted till the Kashmir issue remains a significant rallying cry for its rulers. And the security syndromes of India cannot be adequately addressed unless Kashmir is resolved. But for a genuine dialogue to be possible the entire discourse on Kashmir will have to change: both sides will have to see the issue as a non-zero sum game, that is look for a resolution where both can win. Only in such circumstances can any settlement be made politically viable in each country. It seems that the only framework within which Kashmir can become a non-zero sum issue is the framework of some kind of a settlement under the auspices of a regional authority that liberates the region from the competitive discourse of sovereignty. India has to recognise that Kashmir has not effectively been ours for sometime now. A new kind of autonomy arrangement that, say, guaranteed trade and investment, human rights, including the right of Kashmiri Pandits to return, and free access to citizens of both India and Pakistan, and addressed our security requirements, might be worth more than a sovereignty upheld by half a million troops. The fear that a compromise on Kashmir will lead to a domino effect is overstated. It will lead to a demand for some renegotiations, but if the outcome of these is a looser but a more genuinely inter-dependent region, this may not be such a bad thing. It could lay the framework for truly integrating South Asia while giving its constituent units autonomy. As Europe has recognised, regional integration and devolution are two sides of the same coin.

Thinking along these lines is utopian. But that is the point. ’Dialogue’ will have no meaning unless all sides are willing to break through the settlements of history that have produced the current impasse. To not contemplate such possibilities is an act of bad faith, condemned to keeping the subcontinent forever insecure. A Spanish proverb says, "traveller, there are no roads, roads are made by walking".