The pressure continues to build on the Bush government to at least present an aggressive US troop withdrawal plan, if not a complete near-term pullout. My last posting on Chowk that put forward some of the dangers posed by an immediate withdrawal, from all perspectives, got heated discussion activity from the members. Looking through the rear view mirror, critiquing the decision to invade and occupy Iraq is a relatively straightforward argument. Let’s now look at a few scenarios that the Bush government can choose and the possible impacts from the American, Iraqi and Al-Qaeda perspectives.

Before we delve any further, a couple disclaimers must be put forward. First, in order to keep the discussion brief, some simplifications will need to be made which may make the argument a little removed from the ground reality. Second, I will only present a few options, since there are many more that readily come to mind. The objective(s) that are in consideration are to reduce American troop casualties, leave behind a somewhat stable Iraq and ensure that Al-Qaeda doesn’t gain any ground upon withdrawal. Again, there are additional considerations that we will leave off the table for now.

The popular, majority opinion in the United States now is to withdraw immediately or in the next six months. This seems like the obvious choice to stem the rising number of American casualties in Iraq. However, the goal of leaving behind a stable Iraqi government will not be achieved in this timeframe. In the December edition of The Atlantic Monthly, James Fallows has reported that based on American military estimates, only 3 out of 115 Iraqi police and military divisions are capable of operating independently at the command, control and deployment level. Over two-thirds are at the militia capabilities or below.

Based on these estimates, there are about 2,000 qualified Iraqi troops, as compared to the 500,000 regulars that Saddam had actively deployed to keep things under control. The political future of Iraq subsequent to a near-term withdrawal cannot be predicted, and can range from a heightened civil war between the three factions – Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish – a higher influence for Iran, domination of Shiites over the others or even a breakup of the country. For the reasons stated here and previously, this is going to be very costly in the long-run, causing a "blowback" of proportions much larger than the one after the Afghan disengagement in the late 80s.

Another option which cannot be discussed much publicly is to stay the course as the Americans did in Vietnam. Public mention of this option will cause an outrage that could be strong enough to topple the government, which is why this option will probably not leave the White House walls. While resulting in higher monetary and human cost for the Americans (the human toll for Iraqis will be high regardless of whether the Americans move out or stay), this option will show a dogged mentality to Iran, Syria, Iraqi factions and Al-Qaeda, all important stakeholders in the future of Iraq.

As more Iraqi troops are trained, the capabilities of the combined US / Iraqi forces can allow for greater stability and ability to run down and wear out the Al-Qaeda camps, while keeping Syria and Iran on alert. This option can however backfire if Al-Qaeda’s currently successful recruitment strategy gains strength from the prolonged American presence in Iraq. While the Iraqi public approval for this option is close to non-existent, their safety amongst the other options is not much better unfortunately.

A seemingly radical option can be covertly transition Iraq back to Baathist elements over the next year or two and move out. The Baathists had crafted and maintained a force strong enough to keep control over Iraq. The majority of Saddam’s army survived the war and, along with the mid-level leadership, can reemerge as a quick security-keeping solution. However, they no longer have the infrastructure or the weaponry at their disposal, without which the advantage when dealing with militias is lost.

This option bears the risk for the United States in looking like complete fools, especially if as a result of such a strategy Saddam is freed or regains a position of overt influence. Washington will also inherit the intense hatred of the two factions it is relatively at peace with currently, the Kurds and the Shiites.

Yet another option to consider could be to move out of Iraq (probably within striking distance) and manage the operation through increased CIA operations. This would have a positive effect at home and in Iraq, in that the casualty numbers should dramatically decrease and reduce visibility with the Iraqi civilians. Staying with close proximity will leave the ability to intervene open and should allow for better CIA movements as well. Given all the considerations, this or a version of this option is the more likely scenario.

The predicament is most dire for the general Iraqi population, as none of the scenarios dramatically increase the likelihood for sweeping peace that leads to a stable infrastructure that can help them get their lives in order. Keeping the Americans actively engaged is probably better overall for Iraq, as the costs and pressure on Washington will force it to contemplate a roadmap in which the Iraqis may be better off as well.