At any given instant
All solids dissolve, no wheels revolve,
And facts have no endurance --
And who knows if it is by design or pure advertence
That the Present destroys its inherited self-importance?
- Auden, "For the Time Being" (1944)


May the 12th 2007 will likely go down in Pakistans political history as the moment when things changed. Without disrespecting those who have suffered, it can be argued that the leadership and activists of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) will remember the 12th of May as the moment a 10 year policy of the party came crashing down.

The MQM, first declared itself as a political party in March 1984, shortly afterwards it made a spectacular debut in the local bodies elections at the expense of the religo-political parties. The MQM is a product of an educated lower middle class background, it’s political ideology crafted around a multitude of grievances ranging from the Urdu speaking “Mohajirs” marginalisation from the establishment that started with Ayub Khan’s martial law and culminated in Zia-ul Haq’s rule, to issues like the increasing influx of migrants and refugees, to increasing unemployment amongst locals and the collapse of Karachis infrastructure.

The MQM’s evolution immediately after it’s creation is a bit of the topic of this article, however it can be neatly divided into three phases. The first phase (1986-1992) was marked by its increasing assertion onto Karachi politics and confrontation with the Pashtuns and Sindhis. The second is when it faced the establishment (1992-1997), and the Army was deployed. The most recent phase period started during and after the 1993 elections and was marked by a change in tactics by both the military establishment and the party itself. From the establishments side, the first was the pressure to make the MQM politically irrelevant by creating a split that led to the creation of the MQM-H and the second was the Army’s failure to clean up (pun intended) the mess, leading to it's turning to the PPP and under Naseerullah Babar as interior minister, his use of a hybrid of paramilitary forces and intelligence agencies to break the party.

This achieved considerable success against MQM militants, but at a great human cost to the people of Karachi and the concept of due process. From the MQM’s side, this phase was marked by several realisations were made and one flawed assumption, firstly it realised the effectiveness of using public strikes as a way of forcing the federal government to take notice. The second was the use of the media and the nascent Internet in documenting human rights abuses and damaging the government’s credibility.

However the assumption made, was it’s lack of realisation of the vacuum that was created by it's 1993 election boycott.

The MQM’s methods at that time have been compared at the height of the violence in Karachi, by Eqbal Ahmed to something akin to the Irish Republican Army where an “ethnic group had both a political and militant wing, both sides co-ordinating with each other but existing independently."

By 1997, the now renamed Muttahida Quami Movement began it’s more recent period of transformation, this period was marked by serious efforts to broaden it’s appeal. It began to market itself as a secular and a non-feudal alternative to the religo-political parties. A more inclusive party accepting other ethnic groups into it, something that perhaps was done to take into account the rapidly changing demographics of Karachi. It also become increasingly adept at playing the political game. Initially it preferred to forge alliances with the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz, later on it branched out after 1998 to form alliances with the Sindh Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz party as well Baluch and Pashtun nationalist parties. However the MQM, despite serious efforts failed to enter the nationalist alliance Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement. Despite this failure, it continued to cultivate support in the smaller provinces with it’s consistent demands for greater provincial autonomy and it’s opposition to the Kalabagh dam.

As a result of these new alliances and tacit support for some of Pervaiz Musharrafs policies, political violence in Karachi hit a low after 2000 and began to decline in the years afterwards. At the same time, the party again made the error of boycotting the local elections in 2001, this time it’s boycott had far more serious repercussions, as the Jamaat-e-Islami took over the administration of the city and launched an all out campaign to improve it’s image amongst traditional MQM voters.

However the full effects of the 2001 local elections were avoided when events turned in the MQM’s favour again, after the 2002 elections the party suddenly became a potential kingmaker in both Sindh and Islamabad. In exchange for it’s support to the establishment backed PML-Q, the party won crucial concessions that an opposition government was unlikely to be able to deliver. The offer of the Governorship of Sindh to exiled party worker Isharatul-Ebad, the dismantling of the no-go areas that were under MQM-H control, key federal ministries, veto over the Kalabagh dam and a carte blanche over Karachi.

This strategy proved successful, till the events of May led to it crashing down like a house of cards. Since that time, the MQM has been on the receiving end of public criticism on a scale quite unprecedented and has seen the collapse of a 20-year peace agreement between the Pashtun activists of the Awami National Party and the MQM.

Despite these mistakes it is wrong that some people and groups openly support the banning of the MQM. In the end, it is a genuine political force that was forged amidst legitimate grievances by the local Urdu speaking Karachiites.

It can be argued by some that the establishment exploited the MQM in order to prevent the Chief Justices movement from gathering any further momentum. As has been shown in western newspapers profiles on the MQM, Altaf Hussain was in close contact with Pervaiz Musharraf throughout and probably preceding the clashes. What is more likely to have happened was that the MQM had become increasingly concerned that Musharraf would seek other allies if he did not have sufficient support.

So what is next for the MQM? To date the consequences of May have been dire: it's previous ambiguous policy of to use an old cliché, hunting with the foxes and running with hares has come crashing down.

It's options, are limited, there is off course the unstable status quo or the option of joining the opposition. The latter is doubtful, as the MQM’s presence will be seen as an electoral and political liability that few in the short term will be willing to take on.

The Military establsiment under Musharraf has also been hit hard. Musharraf’s close advisers both domestic and foreign who dreamt of a grand secular alliance to take on the religious right have seen the idea fall apart.

But for the MQM the cost has been far worse, it’s attempts at forging a national base lay in ruins; it’s workers dead, it has been stung by criticism from the media and now it faces potential court cases in the United Kingdom.

While the MQM with it’s formidable vote bank and organisation cannot be discounted in the long term. One thing is for certain; the MQM’s power at this moment has been eclipsed.