According to the Pakistan Election Commission’s 2007 electoral rolls, there were a total of 81 million registered voters in Pakistan, out of a total population of around 160 million. Of these 81 million voters, some 34.7 million voters cast their votes on February 18 this year. Voting results showed that the PPP had dominated, with nearly one in every three voters casting their vote for the party (10.6 million). The PMLQ took nearly 8 million votes, the PMLN 6.8 million, and the MQM about 2.5 million.

While there were numerous factors and forces that governed electoral outcomes –traditional anti incumbent voting, the media, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, wheat shortages, and the judicial issue – the presence of President Musharraf was arguably the most polarizing; on all other issues, almost all political parties said more or less the same thing. Hence, the political parties that contested the elections could either be described as pro-Musharraf (implicitly or explicitly) or anti-Musharraf. The former included the PPP, PMLQ, the MQM, the PPP-S, PML-F, while the latter was dominated principally by the PMLN, ANP, Baluchi nationalists, and possibly the JUI. On the basis of the numbers quoted above, some 42% of the electorate voted, with pro Musharraf parties taking 60% of votes cast, and anti-Musharraf parties the remaining 40%. Nonetheless, with the PMLQ unable to retain even half their seats in the national assembly, while several top leaders lost their seats, the results were interpreted as a heavy mandate against the presidency.

Be that as it may, and despite the fact that media development had ensured that voters in the 2008 elections were the best informed compared to any previous elections, the fact remains that 46 million registered voters were not motivated enough to voice their opinions, and 20 million of those who did vote, voted for parties that were either implicitly or explicitly pro Musharraf; about 15 million voted for anti Musharraf parties. In a nut shell then, election data made public is quite opposite to the generally promoted perception that February 18 saw an overwhelming mandate to restore the judiciary and remove Musharraf from the presidency. Far from it, the majority of voters did not care enough about the issues to vote, or were just too disillusioned by the parties contesting the elections. And even those who vote, the majority voted for parties who have, in one way or another, supported the presidency.

The above outcomes are reflective of an electorate which understands the realities associated with this so called movement for the upholding of the law and constitution. Firstly, the fact is that this movement took off after March 09, 2007 when the Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudry was “deposed”. Before March 09, 2007, Pervez Musharraf, the army chief president, had a full free hand to do as he chooses: hire and fire prime ministers, appoint and remove provincial governors and chief ministers, expand or contract the federal cabinet, and set all instruments of economic, foreign, military and other domestic policies. Most important, the army chief president, appointed and swore in Iftikhar Chaudry as the Supreme Court Chief Justice. Were all these actions constitutional? No they were not. Surprisingly though, the Pakistan Bar Council and the Supreme Court Bar Association were absent from the limelight in criticizing these decisions –either because the media did not give them attention, or the councils/association were not as forceful in bringing their viewpoint to the media.

In any case, the lawyer’s movement started when Iftikhar Chaudry was ill-treated and removed. The publicity that followed forced political parties to jump on this bandwagon with the result that the movement became a broader agitation. The involvement of political parties is important since the lawyer’s movement could not have been sustained without their support. This because lawyers in Pakistan, by and large, do not earn much. How would these lawyers have sustained a movement of this size and scope on their own since the cost involved for travel, lodging, food, play cards, phone bills, electricity bills, renting microphones, speakers, carpets, chairs, would be high (and rising because of inflation), at a time when most of them are boycotting courts and hence not earning anything?

Be that as it may, the parties that emerged victorious after the February 18 elections have so far been unable to “restore” the “deposed” judiciary, largely because of a difference of opinion over the “modalities” to be employed in achieving this end. Several leaders of the PMLN have publicly made their point of view: if the government is to utilize a constitutional amendment to restore the judiciary it is tantamount to providing legal indemnity to the unconstitutional actions of November 3, 2007. However, many of these television programs become a match between the anchor suggesting the populist remedy – articulated by the PPP’s Aitzaz Ahsan and towed by the vengeful PMLN – that it would take minutes to reinstate the judiciary, without a constitutional amendment, with a simple executive order. On the other hand, the PPP insists this has to be done with a constitutional amendment, which will reportedly include measures to increase the number of judges in the Supreme Court, reduce the discretionary powers of higher courts, limit justices’ tenures, take away the president’s power to dismiss the assembly, or appoint any of the armed services chiefs and chief election commissioner.

On the face of it, these actions are to strengthen the parliament and ensure its supremacy over the presidency and judiciary. Dig a little deeper and the PPP’s stance could be explained by four significant factors: (a) it does not want to empower Iftikhar Chaudry since that will encourage him to continue his judicial activism once he’s returned to his office. And given that he started intervening in almost every sphere of public policy during his last few months in office, this will make governance extremely difficult for the PPP government. (b) The PPP also recognizes that if it gives in and restores the judiciary exactly how the bar associations/councils, APDM and PMLN are demanding, it will set a precedent that will be hard to break; the next demand will be that the NRO be shot down, the president be impeached, and even tried for treason. Any withdrawal of the NRO could cloud the political future of Asif Ali Zardari, while prosecuting the president could draw a response from the deeper “establishment”. (c) Even before the Bar Association/Councils demand an impeachment of President Musharraf, a reinstated Iftikhar Chaudry may over-rule his election last year as illegal. And while that may be a popular outcome, a new president may be more susceptible to be lured away by the army, or more dangerously, the PMLN. The end game here would become a powerful opposition in the form of the PMLN, possibly still holding on to the province of Punjab (Pakistan’s electoral powerhouse), along with a presidency and judiciary both hell bent on making governance impossible. If this situation leads to fresh elections, the PPP may not do as well since it lacks a popular leader like Benazir Bhutto, and possibly became the state machinery may act against it. That will lead to the PMLN coming to power, assisted by a grateful Supreme Court and conforming presidency. And (d) there is little love lost between the judiciary and Zardari since him, the Bhuttos and the PPP have suffered much more than any other party by way of the hanging of the PPP’s founder, the incarcerations and public punishments meted out to PPP leaders and workers during previous governments, and more recently Zardari’s own last eight year term in prison.

To conclude, despite the resounding defeat of the PMLQ in the February 18 elections, the overwhelming mandate to restore the judiciary and against Pervez Musharraf is simply not the case when one looks at electoral data. It is a fact that 20 million people voted for parties that were either pro or anti Musharraf. Not only does the PPP probably recognize this, but it also has its own reservations of its own in restoring the judiciary without clipping their powers. Hence, unless Zardari can successfully package the 18th amendment to the constitution and market is successfully to the media, PMLN and the lawyers, it is far from likely that Pakistan’s political outlook will be clear.