After several sessions and all-night meetings among crafty drafters, the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)has given its blessings to the controversial India-specific nuclear safeguards agreement reached between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for generating nuclear power for civil purposes. This effectively brings to culmination the on-now/off-now nuclear deal that the Manmohan Singh government has been seeking for three years now. The irony of the NSG, which was formed as a reaction against India’s first nuclear explosion in 1974, giving specific exemptions from its nuclear control regime to the same country cannot be missed.

The Indo-US nuclear deal, which set this nuclear ball rolling, has yet to clear its final hurdle, namely, the clearance by the US Congress. It is thought that since the Bush administration gives a high priority to this deal and considers it as one of its few successful legacies in the international policy arena, it will therefore make every effort to push it through the US Congress’s last session starting next week. Without this approval, the Indo-US deal cannot be operationalised. However, regardless of the final approval by the US Congress, it would appear that India is now home free as far as seeking Uranium and other nuclear supplies and technology from Non-US suppliers is concerned: a non-approval or a delayed approval by the US Congress would only put the US suppliers at a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis Russian, French, Canadian and other nuclear suppliers.

The Manmohan Singh government placed a very high priority on this nuclear deal and made it a centre-piece of its four year governance. It staked its survival on this deal when some of its key supporters, the Left group, broke ranks with the government over their opposition to the deal, forcing the government to face a no-confidence motion , which it survived only after a good deal of horse trading with its former opponents. Manmohan Singh has hailed the NSG approval by saying "It marks the end of India's long isolation from the nuclear mainstream and of technology denial regime�; his opponents have called in a Black Day for India.

To obtain this nuclear deal, India had to accept significant constraints on its nuclear freedom. There have been rumours that Indian scientists are not fully satisfied with the results of the 1998 nuclear tests and would have liked to conduct some more tests; it would now be virtually impossible for Indians to conduct further tests as the waiver stipulates certain unspecified actions by nuclear suppliers if India conducts another nuclear test, even though attempts by some countries to mention specific retaliatory measures, such as trading ban have not been included.

India is badly in need of new power plants and even its old plants are running out of their supplies of uranium, which it is now unable to obtain from the international markets. More importantly, the accord will make it possible for the Indians to obtain dual purpose high technology, which is currently inaccessible to it. India’s economic growth is generating a voracious appetite for energy and, to the extent that nuclear power can satisfy part of India’s energy requirements, it will also reduce its demand for fossil-fuel generated power. A reduction in the demand for fossil fuel will, in turn, reduce some pressure on the world demand for petrol and changes in global climate.

The deal represents a setback for the world non-proliferation regime carefully built over decades. It is almost certain that Pakistan will demand the same exemptions that have been given to India. This may not be possible in the current environment of suspicions about Pakistani nuclear establishments, following the activities of the A. Q. Khan’s nuclear network in supplying nuclear technology to Iran and Libya. In the long run, however, it will be difficult to ignore Pakistan’s demand for a similar deal once it establishes a clean record of nuclear safety and non-proliferation. The deal weakens the position of the US and western countries trying to curtail Iran’s activities relating to enrichment of Uranium in its nuclear facilities. It may also spur into nuclear action other countries like Brazil and South Africa which have the technical ability to make nuclear weapons but had been persuaded to give up their nuclear ambitions and sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to control nuclear proliferation.

The silver lining from the international non-proliferation viewpoint is that the deal brings a large number of Indian nuclear plants within the purview of international safety standards and controls. It will also act as a curb on the five established members of the nuclear club against conducting further nuclear testing because if they, especially China, engage in further testing, they will be in a weak position to stop India from doing the same.