A Different Story

Feroz R Khan
Oct 27, 2000
The winds of change are slowly whispering their way across the South Asian sub-continent



The winds of change are slowly whispering their way across the South Asian sub-continent and are heralding unforeseen amendments to the existing political climate of . The South Asian politics underwent a drastic reality based transformation with the advent of Indian and Pakistani nuclear accreditations. For the first time since the partition of British a collective realization has dawned on both Islamabad and New that their options of resolving their historic bêté noir of are limited only to and within a mutually agreed upon diplomatic solution. has emerged as a focal point of Indian and Pakistani disagreement, aspiring to a nuclear altercation, because there is a perceptible understanding in both the nations that has assumed an intractable dimension in the Indian-Pakistani bi-lateral relations.

Given the historic pretensions of both the claimants to the territorial possession of , the ironic fait accompli is that neither or can politically afford to gamble with ’s future, as determined within their own traditionally ordained political calculations, and lose, because in the process they would have invalidated their own diplomatic raison d’ états. In a political and a strategic sense, it will be the political rationales of New and Islamabad, which will prove to be a more formidable obstacle to the effective resolution of the Kashmiri dilemma than the periphery arguments, of cross border or holding plebiscites, which have been the hallmark of the present debate on . The lack of an effective resolution to the Kashmiri problem does not reside in the absence of a political will, on the part of and to address this issue, but rather in their perceptional concerns of justifying a final solution of the Kashmiri issue to their respective domestic political constituencies.

The singularly paramount question, which and will have to answer, domestically, will be how to sanctify their penultimate decision on the issue of and how to explain and legitimize a political , in and , which will not include as a domestic political issue. It is at this stage that the Kashmiri question takes on parallel dichotomies, which have gradually erased the distinct delineations of the problem as defined within an internal and an external debate on the issue. This is an extremely important and influential caveat in the debate over ’s final settlement, because the external debate (- bi-lateral relations) is diametrically opposed to the internal debate ( as a domestic consideration). In simplified terms, there are two debates concurrently evolving on the topic of in and they are in disagreement with each other on how to resolve the issue of in the context of Pakistani-Indian politics.

On the external front, the Indian and Pakistani bi-lateral relationship has been more accommodating and more conducive towards endorsing a just solution to the Kashmiri problem. The Indian-Pakistani bi-lateral discourse has been marked, despite the occasional lapses of reason, by an acute sense of practicality and pragmatic certainty. This sense of realism, which has characterized the Pakistani and Indian approaches, has continually sought to arrive at an appreciative compromise over a politically feasible declaration ending the state of Indian and Pakistani animosities over the matter of . The underlying reality, which was propelling this , was the implicit acknowledgement that the political division of was a reality and could not be reversed and thus, should be accepted as a sine qua non of an Indian and a Pakistani agreement facilitating a normalization of bi-lateral relations between Islamabad and New . It is a historical fact, amply documented, that Indian and Pakistani bi-lateral agreements over have traditionally inclined towards an effective resolution of the crisis and this process can be easily seen in the historic chronology of those agreements themselves and in their intentions.

The first emerging indications of this factual reality, that was heading towards a formalized status quo ante, could be seen in the aftermath of September 1965 Indo- . Many knowledgeable Pakistani and Indian political observers saw the 1965 conflict as a stalemate. Though the reason for its inception was , it had failed to significantly alter the reality of the Kashmiri status quo either in Islamabad or in New ’s favor through any pre-determined applicable force.

The recently released official Indian history of the 1965 conflict proves the assertion that in the 1965 did not gain any or political advantage over , which could have been leveraged to elicit a favorable Indian disposition in regards to . Similarly, for the 1965 was a case of failed opportunities. ’s intentions were to use armed force, via Operation Gibraltar, which sought to instigate a popular rebellion in Indian-held , to seek a solution to the problem by ending it in Islamabad’s favor. The fact that Operation Gibraltar ended up provoking an Indian attack on effectively mooted Pakistani attempts to tilt the balance of the Kashmiri status quo in its favor just as ’s failure to seek a ascendancy that could have been translated into a political decision on , against , made sure that the status quo of could remain unchanged.

In a painfully realistic sense, the Kashmiri question had assumed the personification of a status quo in the immediate aftermath of the first Indo-Pak over (-48). That , which was fought to determine ’s political inclusion in either or , ended with a ’ ceasefire and a promise to deliberate on the problem in hopes of resolving it amicably. The status quo that had resulted from that , being effectively divided into a Pakistani administrated zone of influence and an Indian administrated zone of influence, would remain in place till 1965 when the results of -48 would be challenged. The failure of 1965 to alter the reality of -48 would convince both the Indians and the Pakistani foreign establishments that status quo, considered as an artificial creation of , had become a irredentist problem, which could not be solved without jeopardizing the status quo upon which hinged the of Indian and Pakistani political relations.

It is in this sense that the Tashkent Declaration ending the in 1965 and later, appended through the Simla Agreement, ending the Indo-Pak , needs to be viewed and understood as to why the Kashmiri problem has resisted all attempts to settle it peacefully. In diplomatic terms both the Tashkent and Simla agreements have the same intent and that is to accept the divided status quo of . Tashkent ended the 1965 fought with the express purpose to change the status quo and Simla was merely a formalization of that intent to accept the status quo, as it existed in . Even though Simla was signed to end the , its real intent was to arrive at an understanding over and to prevent any future wars from erupting as a result of attempts at varying the agreed upon delimitations of the status quo. The Simla Agreement, more than any other - agreement, sanctified the division of by turning the original ’ ceasefire line into a line of control and thereby, effectively and politically divided into two separate zones of control.

The implicit realization in turning the ’ ceasefire line into an Indian and Pakistani administrated line of control was the growing awareness, in Islamabad and New , that the resolutions on seeking a plebiscite were a moot point. Neither nor had any that the could resolve the issue given the political context of the issue as it was subordinated to the exigencies of the Cold . Also, the Indian and Pakistani mutation of the ’ ceasefire line into a Indo-Pak line of control was undertaken without the requisite approval of the ’ security council, which had mandated the very ceasefire, in -48, that had frozen the status quo of as an Indian and a Pakistani zone of . The fact that and agreed to accept the division of by formalizing the ’ sponsored status quo indicated, in a political sense, that they held no illusions of the situation reverting back to the pre -48 situation or the present realities of Kashmiri status quo ante being radically altered in either nations’ favor.

An even more crucial determination in this matter, suggesting support for the Kashmiri problem being resolved on the basis of the status quo, was the ’ tacit acceptance of the Indian and Pakistani agreement signed at Simla. The muted diplomatic response of the ’ to the revocation of its mandate at Simla suggested that the ’ was prepared to accept the political division of as the final settlement of the problem. Consequently, the Kashmiri problem has already been resolved, in practical terms, on the basis of the existing status quo ante and this division of has been accepted by the ’, and in toto the international community, as the de jure settlement of the Kashmiri problem in Indo-Pak relations.

and having diplomatically agreed to the resolution of the Kashmiri problem on the basis of the existing status quo ante have only managed to reward themselves with a Herculean task, which neither seems capable of fulfilling. The impossible task, which and find themselves confronted with, is to politically convince their domestic political constituencies of the fait accompli, which their foreign has interjected into their respective domestic debates over .

The Indian and Pakistani domestic debate over hinges on each nation’s perceptions that is an integral part of its national and that as a nation, it is incomplete until the Kashmiri question is finally decided in its favor. For this very raison d’ état, the nature of the Kashmiri debate in terms of domestic political considerations is inflexible, strident, and above all, irredentist in its articulations in both Indian and Pakistani domestic political discourse.

For , its domestic Kashmiri debate is based on the political theme that should be given the option of deciding whether it wants to join or , because Pakistani public opinion is quite confident that given the majority of the Muslims residing in , they would opt to join over if a ’ plebiscite were held on the issue. Hence, the Pakistani domestic vocalization that the Kashmiri issue be settled on the basis of a vote of self-determination under the auspices of the . On the other hand, the Indian domestic argument on is that it is a part of the Indian political union, having agreed to seek inclusion into after the partition and thus, the only adjustment of the Kashmiri status quo, which needs to be discussed is the Pakistani held portion of and how to finalize its eventual incorporation into the Indian union. In a similar sense, the Indian domestic debate over , like its Pakistani counter-parts, refuses to recognize the present political reality of , which it considers as an artificial aberration awaiting a final solution.

Thus, there is a distinct difference of opinions on the Kashmiri problem within each country, because there exists a palpable conflict of interest in how each nation’s foreign is at odds with its domestic political perceptions over . The reason why there are presently two different sets of policies evolving on , within and , is simply because both the Indian and the Pakistani foreign establishments are wary of informing their respective domestic opinions as to what the actual reality of the Kashmiri situation is. This is, because given the context of the domestic Indian and Pakistani debates and how they have been structured, such a revelation, if exposed, will be considered nothing short of an act of in the domestic circles of and .

In other words, the Pakistani foreign apparatchiks cannot tell their domestic political opinion that there will be no ’ plebiscite over , because under the Simla Agreement gave up the option of a third party mediation and agreed to settle the issue bi-laterally with . They cannot admit the reality, to the domestic public opinion in , that the Kashmiri problem has been settled as the formalization of status quo ante and that has accepted the political division of as the final settlement of the problem. They cannot openly admit that will never agree to a vote on the issue of and consequently, they cannot tell the Pakistani public that the inclusion of , in its geographic entirety, in is no longer a viable option.

In a similar sense, the Indian foreign pundits cannot admit to their domestic political constituency that when and signed the Simla Agreement, by agreeing to the division of , at the line of control, also gave up it to seek the return of the Pakistani administrated into the Indian political union. They cannot admit that having accepted the Simla Agreement, agreed, with , not seek to change the status quo of the line of control. They cannot admit that is politically unwilling to risk a vote on the issue of , not because the Kashmiris will join , but rather the Kashmiris might favor an independent state of their own outside of the Indian, as well as a Pakistani political, orbit.

The underlying reason for this political hesitancy, on the part of the Indian and foreign concerns, to inform their respective public opinions about the reality of is, because they do not trust their own domestic public opinions to understand the realpolitik nature of the resolution of the Kashmiri problem! Both the Indian and Pakistani foreign offices cannot justify the fact that they have continually deceived their domestic public opinions on for politically expedient reasons. Also, by encouraging a false impression on , that the issue is still be to be decided, the Indian and Pakistani acquiescent understanding on , agreeing to its divided status quo ante as the final settlement, is difficult to rationalize, because they have presented their domestic public opinion, over , with a fiat: is settled and its settlement cannot be reversed to accommodate the domestic public opinion!

This South Asian political inability to trust the public opinion with the truth is endemic to both Indian and Pakistani political mandarins. The political elites, in both and , do not trust their domestic public opinions to furnish them the unvarnished truth and have endeavored, continually, to mislead them away from the political realities, which shape their daily existence by urging them to engage in a speculative moot debate, which has been already decided. This lack of to trust the public with the truth can be seen in the Pakistani ’s attempts to curtail the publication of Hamoodur Rehman Report or for that matter any report, because it feels more secure in propagating lies in the domestic political arenas than in answering hard political questions. Indian did not tell its public about the true nature of the Indian operations during the 1965 with , because it felt that the truth would have conflicted with the popular myth, which had put a romantic gloss over the Indian ’s battlefield achievements. It would be difficult to explain to the Indian public, the Indian political pundits’ reasoning was, that the had deliberately encouraged the systemic distortion of the truth for nearly 35 years about 1965 with .

It is this selective parsing of the truth, which is a primary root cause of the conflicting asymmetries of reality and perceptions in South Asian politics. In both the countries, and , the Kashmiri is designed to appease the domestic political pressure groups by advocating a state of animosity to perpetually exist in Indo- relations and it is this sense of nationalistic confrontation, which determines the parameters of the debate. In this sense, is not a bi-lateral issue; it is a domestic issue. The Kashmiri problem’s final resolution does not reside in the purview of Pakistani and Indian diplomatic maneuverings, but it rests on the ability of and to facilitate and harmonize a domestic political consensus based on the notions of compromise, which could be mutually agreed to by the Kashmiri lobby in Indian and Pakistani politics. As long as this divide, between external foreign understandings and objectives and, to a greater extent, the political dynamics of the domestic debate, continues unabated, there can be no effective reconciliation of the divergent political intentions over this issue to coherently rationalize a viable agreement on the issue of in Indo-Pak relations.

It is at this juncture, that the so called “track-two diplomacy”, or as it is better known by its American nom d’ plume, “back door channels”, takes on an added significance in terms of Indian and Pakistani attempts to crisis-manage the Kashmiri problem. The “track two diplomacy” has been quite successful in the past in diffusing tensions, over , because it very effectively marginalizes the domestic opinion by concentrating exclusively on the diplomatic aspects of the crisis. In an oblique sense, the reason that back channel links have been quite successful in dealing with and limiting the scope of any nascent crisis is, because they seek to arrive at a diplomatic consensus to the problem and both the countries, Indians and Pakistanis, have tacitly realized that Kashmiri problem demands a diplomatic-political settlement that can be best accommodated if the influence of the domestic pressure groups is isolated and they are forced to react to diplomatic fait accomplish instead of issuing fiats on the issue of .

It is the political power of the Kashmiri lobby, in both and , to set the tone and of the Kashmiri debate, which is the biggest hurdle towards an effective settlement of the problem. Both the Indian and Pakistani Kashmiri groups view the “track two” diplomatic endeavors as being antithetical to their interests and since is, generally speaking, the Achilles’ Heel of Indian and Pakistani governments, they do exert a considerable influence on the formulation of each nation’s Kashmiri . It is the ability of the Kashmiri lobby to define the debate on the problem of and the inability of either Islamabad or New to moderate their inflexibility, which is the primary reason why the issue of is assuming an intractable reality.

This ability of the pro- groups, in both and , to monopolize the debate is slowly alienating the moderate mainstream elements in both countries, which seek a diplomatic resolution of the problem instead of a solution. The prime impetus for engaging in back door diplomacy stems from the realization that is the biggest obstacle in the improvement of Indo- relations and that if the problem is allowed to fester anymore, its immediate manifestation would be a political crisis, which could prove to be quite untenable vis-à-vis each nation’s stated position on the issue. Given the fact that both and have nuclear capability and that there is a strong possibility of an accidental nuclear over , there is a growing consensus, in both Islamabad and New , that needs to be settled politically and not militarily. The only problem to this rationalization is that it conflicts with the domestic perceptions of the pro-Kashmiri lobbies in both and and the governments, in and , are unwilling to risk alienating this domestic support, because they derive their legitimacy to rule from the political consent of the Kashmiri lobby and cannot exist without its political support.

The Indian and Pakistani governments are incapable of standing up to their domestic pressure groups, over the issue of , because it would amount to a political if they ever decide to confront their Kashmiri lobbies on this issue. The refusal of the makers in either Islamabad or New to boldly tackle their domestic lobby is slowly forcing a new dynamics into the traditional parameters of the debate, which has a potential of undermining each nation’s raison d’ état over . The polarization of the debate into an extremist dialogue will, if allowed to proceed, ironically cause the dilution of the Indian and Pakistani pro-Kashmiri groups influence.

Both and are suffering, politically, due to their Kashmiri policies and there is a growing awareness in both nations that the problem has entered a realm of diminishing returns and needs to be resolved before it causes a domestic political implosion. The emerging reality, which would suggest that both and are headed for a domestic crisis over the issue can discerned from the fact that there is a growing sense of disenchantment in and over the manner in which the problem is being mishandled. It is in this sense that the pro- lobbies, in each nation, will see a lessening of their influence if they do not amend their political rhetoric from an extremist position to one of moderation on , because the domestic political exigencies of Indian and Pakistani politics are more inclined towards a compromise over the issue instead of confrontation.

Hence, the task before New and Islamabad is to not to accuse each other for breaking their diplomatic promises, but to restrict their domestic Kashmiri lobbies from derailing the prospects of in . As mentioned earlier, is not a bi-lateral issue, but a domestic issue and the sooner this reality is conveyed to the Pakistani and Indian public, the better it will be for all concerned. The long-term solution to the Kashmiri problem does not lie in either or reaching a compromise over the issue, but in the ability of Indian or Pakistani to reach an understanding with their domestic groups over the issue. The problem of will be solved, if it is to be solved, when there is a domestic consensus in and over the issue, which mirror the diplomatic reality of and does not seek to change the existing status quo for reasons of its own irredentist rhetoric.