Democracy has long been a "buzzword" in Pakistan. It is also a "Eureka" word for most politicians who want the people of Pakistan to believe that electoral politics is a panacea for most of their problems. Although the Pakistani political system has long been alternating between various forms of electoral politics and dictatorship, nothing seems to have alleviated Pakistan’s chronic difficulties.

Just after his coup, General Musharraf reflected upon the social relations of Pakistani politics as a "sham" democracy and, ironically, purported to establish a "true democracy." He further maintained: "In the past, our governments have ruled the people. It is time now for the governments to serve the people" (Musharraf, October 17, 1999). Although Musharraf’s emphasis on democracy and service is well-placed, true/real democracy is unquestionably much more than providing only goods and services. Let me clarify my position.

The word democracy is derived from two Greek words (demos = the people; kratein = to rule) which literally mean "rule by the people." Democracy may, therefore, be described as a political system in which the people are entitled (through some form of constitutional arrangement) to make the basic determining decisions on important matters of public policy (Holden, 1994). If this description is not ambiguous, then why did Musharraf shy away from clearly declaring that he would establish the rule of people? Part of the problem lies in the fact that democracy is a chaotic concept. Democracy means different things to different people, depending on their position in specific time-space contexts.

The democracy of ancient Greece was "direct," in which the people actually ruled by assembling together and making the basic political decisions directly. In contrast, most modern democracies are relatively young, representative, and predominantly liberal. The modern states, unlike the city-states of Greece, control a much larger territory, where it is virtually impossible to assemble all the people. The people make only a few direct decisions – such as the choice of representatives at the elections – while the rest of the decisions are taken by the elected representatives (Held, 1987; Holden, 1994).

The late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century democratic theories were much influenced by the liberal political philosophy of John Locke (1632-1702). These theories have two major variants. In the conventional liberal democratic theory of James Madison and James S. Mill, the people play a passive role and choose from what the electoral candidates have to offer. Although elected representatives are subordinated to the voters through subsequent elections, in reality they enjoy much discretion. In the radical liberal democratic theory of Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, Jeremy Bentham, and James S. Mill, the people play a positive, initiating role and the candidates respond to the wishes of the people. Even after the elections, the representatives carry out the mandate of the voters as their delegates (Holden, 1988, 1994).

In modern liberal democracies, the notion of liberal normally implies a concern for protecting individual freedoms by limiting the power of government through a constitution or bill of rights. Protagonists of liberal democracy maintain that key liberal freedoms – such as the freedoms of speech, assembly, religion, and so on – are necessary for democracy to exist at all. In most liberal democracies, decisions for the entire population are normally based upon a consensus of the majority. Such collective decisions make much more sense when they entail political compromise and consensus. Nonetheless, the majority rule serves best in situations when the decisions/preferences expressed by individuals are divided and when all other methods of conflict resolution fail (Held, 1987; Holden, 1994). Evidently, the majority rule is not without some ugly consequences. One extreme, blatant, and painful example of the (mis)use of majority rule is the Partition of India in 1947. In Pakistan, we have yet to demonstrate that the Partition was in the greater interest of the so-called imagined community of the South Asian Muslims.

In a well-received article, Fareed Zakaria (1998) belittles the word democracy by restricting it to only electoral politics. Zakaria fancies a liberal conception of democracy instead. Why? Because liberal democracy, as he rightly points out, encompasses both electoral politics and constitutional liberalism (i.e., the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property). Zakaria, however, maintains that liberal democracy transforms into illiberal democracy when the democratically elected regimes routinely ignore constitutional limits on their power and deprive their citizens of basic rights and freedoms. In Zakaria’s assessment, not only half of the democratizing countries are currently illiberal democracies but the phenomenon of illiberalism has gained considerable ground in many parts of the world, including Pakistan.

Some people argue that democracy (liberal or otherwise) is not suited to the sensibilities of the people in Pakistan. Some others argue that education and economic development are prerequisites for the establishment of a democratic polity. Still some others reject democracy as simply a Western notion which has no place within an Islamic society. Irrespective of the power of these views, one needs to explore the meaning of democracy for a country like Pakistan. Can ideas developed in the West fruitfully hybridize with ideas of non-Western cultures? A recent collection of articles on the politics of human rights suggests that it is highly possible (Savic, 1999). This book, while accepting the advantages of a legalist model in globalizing the issue of human rights, recognizes that:

" . . . Western insistence on universality of the concept can function as a diplomatic cover for post-colonial intervention. [This book] insists that the campaign for human rights must take into account the varied social and economic environments in different nation states that affect the ways such demands can be implemented. Above all, it argues that the best way of promoting a universal concept of human rights is to demonstrate international solidarity with those many individuals around the world whose basic rights are jeopardized or denied" (Savic, 1999; from the inner dust cover).

Of particular interest, in this book, is an article by Robert Dahl on "Democracy and Human Rights under Different Conditions of Development" (pp. 166-80). Dahl argues that a democratic country is one that ensures certain political rights and liberties in a realistic sense and at a comparatively high level. These rights and liberties are necessary to the functioning of the institutions that, taken as a whole, distinguish modern democracy from other kinds of political orders. These institutions are: (1) a written or unwritten constitutional system that vests control over government decisions about policy in elected officials; (2) a selection of elected officials in frequent and fairly conducted elections; (3) an inclusive right to vote and/or contests for elective office in these elections; (4) a broadly defined and effectively protected right to freedom of expression; (5) an existence of alternative and independent sources of information that are accessible to the citizens; and (6) a right for citizens to form relatively independent organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups (p. 166). Dahl, in sum, argues that the range of rights and liberties available to citizens in democratic countries goes well beyond what is strictly required for the existence of democracy itself. Why is this so? Because the people have traditionally struggled to establish and sustain a culture in which they place "more than trivial value on such qualities as personal freedom, fairness, legality, due process and the like" (Dahl, 1999; see also Dawley, 1991).

Let us briefly examine the efforts of the Musharraf regime for the restoration of democracy on the basis of Dahl’s institutional requirements. First, the constitution is still suspended, and it is replaced by a provisional constitutional ordinance (PCO). The PCO has vested control over government decisions about policy in the military dictatorship. Elected officials have no place in this process. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, constituted by its allegiance to the PCO, has given a three-year lease of life to the military government. Would the military regime handover power to the civilians once this period expires? Perhaps yes, if it were able to lure some politicians to form a new alliance which also accedes to the institutionalization of the military’s expanded role in governmental decision-making. Second, the process for the selection of elected officials is about to begin at the so-called grassroots level only. It is difficult to say whether the local body elections would be conducted fairly in a strict sense. Third, adults (18 years and above) will have the right to vote in the forthcoming local body elections, though the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) has imposed some qualifying requirements to contest for elective office. Fourth, the right to freedom of expression is neither broadly defined nor effectively protected. Although the newspapers apparently continue to enjoy at least a minimum level of freedom of expression, there are some serious restrictions on public speaking and political activism. Access to alternative and independent sources of information does not seem to be a problem for the tiny fraction of people who can afford the information technology. Fifth, and finally, there is no apparent restriction on the citizens to form relatively independent organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups.

Democracy (as electoral politics) will soon be established in Pakistan. The positive effects of electoral politics or the current dictatorship are most likely to evaporate in thin air if they are not rooted strongly in the language and practice of rights and liberties of the people. A casual browsing of Pakistani newspapers suggests that neither the state nor the civil society places much value upon personal freedom, fairness, legality, due process and the like. What steps are needed to deal with this problem? Dahl wants international opinion, information and policy to fundamentally affect the attainment of "prior rights and liberties necessary for democracy" around the world (Dahl, 1999). All future international or top-down domestic interventions for democratization would fail to bring desired results unless the people themselves speak for their rights and liberties. In short, Pakistani people need to engage in a public discourse and a struggle to: (1) cultivate a culture of democracy; and (2) stress that liberal democracy is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for the creation and sustenance of a healthy and cohesive political community in a culturally diverse Pakistan.



References:

Dahl, R. (1999). "Democracy and Human Rights under Different Conditions of Development." In Savic, O. (1999), ed. "The Politics of Human Rights." London: Verso. Pp. 116-180.

Dawley, A. (1991). "Struggles for Justice: Social Responsibility and the Liberal State." Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Held, D. (1987). "Models of Democracy." Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Holden, B. (1988). "Understanding Liberal Democracy." Oxford: Philip Allan.

Holden, B. (1994). "Democracy" In Outhwaite, W. and Bottomore, T. (eds.). "The Blackwell Dictionary of Twenthieth-Century Social Thought. Oxford: Blackwell. Pp. 142-44.

Musharraf, October 17, 1999. Musharraf’s speech appeared in Dawn (Karachi) and all other leading newspapers on October 18, 1999.

Savic, O. (1999), ed. "The Politics of Human Rights." London: Verso.

Zakaria, F. (1997). "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy." Foreign Affairs (available at http:/www.usis-israel.org.il/publish/civic/archive/1998/zaka ria.html).