The Chicken Hawks Of Pakistan

Feroz R Khan
May 7, 2001



Almost six months have lapsed since announced its offer of a cease-fire and reciprocated that offer to further lower and manage the conflict being waged across the Line of Control (LoC). Whether the original Indian offer for a cessation of hostility was mitigated by a genuine desire for or not will decided once and for all, when the winter snows melt in the high mountain passes along LoC and the activity resumes long the disputed border. On the Pakistani side of the equation, it would seem that had no choice but to respond to the Indian offer or risk being further castigated in the forum of international opinion. In a cynical sense, it would seem from the first blush that both and had exhausted themselves in the endless maneuverings of the Kashmiri problem. Both the countries have slowly resigned themselves to the fact that the parameters of the problem had slowly slipped away from their ability to manage it manage it.

, for the last 50 years, had sought to adjudicate the problem via a solution and had failed miserably in its attempts. , for the last 20 years, had increasingly relied upon a approach to pacify the Kashmiri problem only to be disillusioned, as the Kashmiri problem seemed to defy a solution predicated on a based logic. Having tried the option, both and are reluctantly coming to the realization that is a politically based problem. Hence, its final solution will be a politically acceptable compromise and not a solution. It will be in the diplomatic sphere that will pose the greatest challenge to the foreign mandarins of and . It will be the diplomatic arena, which will prove to be more dangerous and explosive as Islamabad and New grapple with issue of in a serious manner.

As and place more reliance on the usefulness of diplomacy to settle the issue of , they will discover that the “Kashmiri Question” will not be easy to solve. This “Kashmiri Question” will increasingly come to dominate the Indian-Pakistani diplomacy on the resolution and it will be instrumental in deciding how both the protagonists deal with the myriad nuances of the Kashmiri problem. The “Kashmiri Question”, in a very simple sense, is basically how to settle the issue of by simultaneously satisfying the political demands of both and on the issue.

The problem, which emerges within the above mentioned scenario is that is a quad-lateral problem involving , , and the Kashmiris themselves. Even though and are the pre-dominant actors in the Kashmiri drama, holds a very critical position of a political- fulcrum in the Kashmiri problem. The real “wild card” in the Kashmiri crisis are the Kashmiris themselves. Should the Kashmiris opt for independence, the end result would be a fierce power struggle between , and to politically dominate .

Presently is locked in a status quo ante between , and . Should declare its independence, there will emerge a political vacuum that has the potential of disrupting the regional politics to a degree not contemplated. The real threat, which radiates outward from , is who will replace the vacuum of Kashmiri independence. , in its present incarnation, is in no position to politically influence events in to appease its political interests.

cannot emerge as a major consideration in a post-independence unless it manages to its ailing and gets its domestic political situation under some semblance of control. and can opt for a modus vivendi on the issue of , but would be wary of the political situation in , as it would directly pertain to . The biggest unknown question of the Kashmiri independence would be as to what extent will be it dominated by the politics of the Islamic militants/jehadi elements. Whether these elements would be operating on their own or they would be operating on the logic of a Pakistani “wither on the vine” towards and indirectly at .

In any case, is a hot spot for a future - conflict. As its political dynamics gradually gravitate outside the influence of New and Islamabad, there will be a sense of desperation in and . This problem will worsen and is not likely to improve, as time will pass. One of the reasons, which prompt nations to wage , is the perception of a zero-sum reality. Under this rationale, nations opt for not to win a political advantage, but to prevent the status quo ante from being imbalanced in the favor of their adversary.

Consequently, Indian and Pakistani perceptional realities on are motivated by interpretations of emotionalism; an animosity based on a historic sense of treachery; and a domestic political climate, which holds as the sina qua non of its national political and is extremely disinterested in a political compromise over the issue.

is, in a sense, the proverbial “Balkan’s powder keg” of the Indian-Pakistani politics. Unless it is resolved, the normalization of relations between and would be limited to a permanent state of occasionally punctuated by periods of accidental . As the political situation unfolds in , it will be the localized Kashmiri political aspirations for independence, which has the potential for further deteriorating Pakistani-Indian bi-lateral relations. Even though can be considered as a problem affecting and , its regional ramifications are too unsettling, as far as international opinion is concerned, for its to be decided just by the whims of Indian or Pakistani political machinations.

As the west, notably the United States, becomes interested in the rich nations of Central Asian Republics and as it gears its “new cold ” with , United States will have a strategic interest to mollify the issue of and gain entrance into the central Asian republics. If the United States is to engage in a political-economic confrontation, it cannot afford to have teaming with anti-American motivated Islamic/jehadi militants if it wants to use the region as a stepping-stone into the central Asian republics to restraint Russians interests in the region. In this sense, , too, would be interested in limiting the exposure of these groups inciting the Chinese Muslim areas against Beijing’s authority. Also, would be extremely wary of the United States exploiting its domestic woes for Washington’s own political advantage and is desirous in seeking an end to the Islamic jehadi activities in the region.

In this sense, the United States has to co-opt either or to facilitate its political niche into the central Asian republics. As the Union starts to incorporate the former Eastern Bloc nations into its vision of a and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization militarily creeps up to the border of the Russian Federation, Russia will seek a political accommodation with to balance the -American sphere of influence against it. Consequently, the United States will need to re-orient its strategic perspective to prevent a Sino-Russian confluence of political influence, which could dominate Asian politics to the annoyance of the United States’ interests in the region.

Therefore, with this in mind, the United States would be more inclined towards fostering ties with . It would to use the traditionally good relations between Moscow and New to its own advantage against . Since the over ridding interest of the United States would be to limit the Chinese influence, it would be partial towards an American-Russian-Indian axis against . Under these circumstances, it would be logically sound to suggest that would seek a closer relationship with , but it would be wrong to suggest such a scenario. Even though would be inclined towards , it would be hesitant in recruiting ’s help, because of Islamabad’s tacit support to the Islamic/jehadi elements. would be loathe to give Islamabad a diplomatic patronage, which it could use to pursue its policies in , when those policies could have a overall negative impact on ’s own internal security concerns.

With the recent destruction of the Bamyian Buddhist statues by the Taliban the reality that has emerged is that ’s Afghan has failed. By openly resisting pressures from Islamabad to amend their decisions, the Taliban have shown an independent streak, from the concerns of Islamabad. This suggests that the Taliban feel themselves to be politically secure as not to seek ’s diplomatic patronage to perpetuate their rule in . This must be an exasperating reality for Islamabad to accept. With the failure of its Afghan , Islamabad has also proven itself to be incapable of controlling the Islamic militant/jehadi groups within that admire the Taliban as their political role models.

The fact is that most of these groups’ political influence and support is located within . They use Pakistani territory to export their political ideologies externally implies that these groups would be politically independent from Islamabad’s political interests. In toto, these groups present an obvious danger to the internal security of through their creation of defacto political states within the geographic confines of . Pakistani Islamic Taliban like minded groups effectively exercise considerable influence in ’s North-West Frontier Province and with the large Afghan existing in Baluchistan, most western areas of can be accurately described as geographic extensions of . There is no writ of the federal of in these areas. These areas are, for all practical considerations, semi-autonomous political states existing within and owning their allegiance to ’s Taliban and their interpretations of .

In a political sense, has fractured along sectarian and ethnic lines with the provinces of unwilling to exist within a federal confederation. The only binding authority, which has managed to keep the provinces of in the semblance of a nation-state, are the armed forces of . This option itself is not a valid guarantee that will exist as a nation-state in the future. There seems to be a distinct polarization in the armed forces of , notably in the Army, between a liberal segment and an Islamic section. The lower to middle ranks of the Army (from general ranks, non-commissioned officers and from lieutenants to colonels) is pre-dominantly Islamic in their political outlooks. Whereas, the higher flag ranks (brigadiers to lieutenant-generals and higher) are western oriented and more secular in their perceptions.

In many ways, the present leadership of the Pakistani army is the last of the western inclined class of officers. After them next tier of general rank officers will be Islamic in their political convictions. These officers, who started their careers under the fervor of Zia-ul-Haq’s version of an Islamic in , are now poised to assume the leadership of the world’s seventh nuclear-armed army with all of its attendant repercussions. army was, and still is, the last bastion of a western oriented secular class in with political ambitions. With their departure, will be increasingly introverted politically in international relations, as other nations will attempt to isolate and limit its influence in the region.

Given the political behavior of the Taliban, when confronted by a series of international sanctions and being painfully made to realize their in the world, there is ample reason to expect a similar response from the future Islamic leadership of . One can only that the international community has the foresight and the common sense not to push to the proverbial wall, because the jehadi spirit of martyrdom does not exactly understand the fine nuances of realpolitik. Since Pakistani politics are likely to remain chaotic, Pakistani army will be the only well organized political party in , which can effectively manage the politics of in an institutional manner. If army’s political ambitions are combined with an Islamic based ideology then the future of Pakistani polity will be increasingly isolationist internationally and intolerant domestically towards the plurality of differing opinions from the national orthodoxy.

Should this situation transform into reality, it will have dire consequences for ’s future. Presently, is internationally isolated. Its return to the fold of the international opinion is contingent upon three considerations: seek a diplomatic solution to the Kashmiri problem with ; limit its nuclear program and sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty capping ’s potential as an exporter of nuclear to states like or Iran; and to rein in and neutralize the Islamic jehadi groups operating from its soil.

Unfortunately, will find it very difficult to return to the good graces of the international opinion. cannot agree to a mediated settlement on the Kashmiri issue, because the many Islamic/jehadi militant groups that are operating in , with the sotto voce blessing of the army, have a vested interest in the prolongation of the problem. For most of these groups, is the cause celebré of their political identities and without the Kashmiri issue; they will have no political reason to justify their existence.

Even if the army wants to end the Kashmiri conflict and seek a political understanding with , it cannot because without the Pakistani army will find it impossible to justify its dominant influence on the expenditure of the national budget. cannot afford the luxury of a huge defensive drain on its tottering and is the Pakistani armed forces eternal excuse to delay the diversion of funds into the social spheres of civic life to restructure its crumbing infrastructure. Furthermore, is an ideological and not a political issue in . Pakistani army has been traditionally considered as the “defenders of the ideological and geographic frontiers of ”. Thus, Pakistani army will undermine its own arguments to maintain its dominant role in the national political life. Pakistani army cannot justify its existence and continue to be a crippling handicap on the national without the issue of to act as its raison d’ être.

The other condition for ending ’s in world affairs would be signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and concurrently with it initialing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). would be willing to sign the CTBT, because CTBT seeks to limit ’s nuclear program and not end it. Since is ’s “primary target”, ’s nuclear deterrence is predicated on the proposition that it can effectively target key Indian civilian and defensive installations to maintain a credible posture vis-à-vis the Indians.

On the other hand, signing CTBT would release the much-needed international donor monies, which the Pakistani desperately needs to survive without actually slipping into a real default from its present state of a “technical default”. The international community is fully cognizant of the fact that ’s nuclear program is a fait accompli and it cannot be rolled back. It still wants to abide by the CTBT as a sign of ’s diplomatic commitment to obey the behavioral norms of the international nuclear restraint regime. is coming under a severe international pressure urging it to sign the CTBT. The problem, being confronted by the present , is that it has to tread a delicate path in deciding the issue by appeasing the domestic political lobby to maintain its political stability domestically and to pacify the international community in order to receive international aid, which the ailing Pakistani desperately needs to meet its interest payments on its outstanding foreign debt.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is a more pressing concern for , because of its economic compulsions. , for that matter the defense establishment of , i.e. Army, is aware that must have a source of earning hard foreign currency in the future if the present regime of sanctions against , instituted after its May 1998 nuclear tests, continues to in place against .

needs hard currency not to float its , but to maintain and pay for its armed forces and maintain their present “threat postures”. is keenly looking abroad to export arms and though it has refused to proliferate nuclear , would not be averse to the idea if the economic necessity forced it to consider the selling of its nuclear for hard cash on the open market. Therefore, the signing of the NPT would be against the interests of the Pakistani armed forces, because it would make it difficult for the Pakistani armed forces to exist and perpetuate their existence, within a regional and a domestic role.

The last stated condition for ’s return to the international forum would be reining in and stopping the various Islamic/jehadi militant groups from operating from its soil. The irony is that most of these groups are the creation of ’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and are exploited by ISI to fan the flames of the Kashmiri. Should limit its support of these Islamic/jehadi groups, it will risk allowing to re-consolidate its political authority over . does not have the means or the capability to fight for and its use of these groups, to fight a proxy against , is too make it difficult for the Indians to walk away with the historic price of away from .

Secondly, does not have any tangible control over these groups, because they have developed, over the course of years, a vested interest of their own in maintaining the conflict in . Even if were to seek to neutralize their operations, these groups have a considerable base of support in that they can pose a credible threat to the very sovereignty of itself. To rein in these groups is a task for the Pakistani armed forces and given the differing perceptional rifts present in the army, between the Islamists and the secularists, there is a real danger of a civil igniting in over this issue.

Even though the Pakistani army might be interested in limiting the operational scope of these groups, it will be hesitant to do so, because it would invite a state of acrimony within its own ranks. Pakistani army realizes that its strength, as the most well organized and powerful political party in the politics of , stems from its internal cohesion. Consequently, it will not under take a course of action, which risks its internal unity and thus, jeopardizes its future influence in the politics of .

The common theme in all of these conditions for ending ’s international , by the international community, is the desire on the part of the international opinion to limit the role of Pakistani armed forces. The international community holds Pakistani armed forces, mainly the army, as being chiefly responsible for the nuclear tests of 1998. The sanctions against are it attempts to punish the Pakistani armed forces for their act of defiance against the international community. Therefore, the conditions for ending ’s are designed to limit army’s role in domestic and regional politics.

The tacit option given by the international community is that if the Pakistani armed forces want to end ’s international , they would have to limit their own role/influence in the domestic affairs of . The refusal of the Pakistani armed forces to heed the international opinion would imply that the regime of international sanctions against would continue with its disastrous results for ’s future. Under this scenario, the Pakistani armed forces, particularly the army, is faced with a cruel choice. It will have to decide if the future of its institutional influence in Pakistani politics is more important the future of itself.

The interregnum in wants to end the nation’s international and guarantee its own influence in the Pakistani politics for the near foreseeable future. Its hesitancy in the matter, to take bold decisions to affect the desired result, stems from its own unwillingness to take the required steps. The biggest stumbling block in this matter is . One of the international criteria for the ending ’s international is to seek a negotiated settlement on with . In this sense, ’s wish of a third party mediation will be realized, but not in the sense it might have hoped for in resolving the issue.

International mediation often follows an economic rationale to harmonize relations. Given the opportunities of the integration of global economies, any third party decision invariably pursues its own national and security interests. The international community is paying a belated response to the Kashmiri problem, because of its geo-political interests in the region. , with its growing domestic consumer market, has emerged as a “sweet spot” for the western economic interests and if the west is gain a foothold in the Indian market, it will have to reciprocate with a required quid pro quo that will whet the Indian interests in opening up its markets and allowing access to the American and Union firms into . In this sense, a possible third party mediation over will be dictated by the domestic economic compulsions of the mediating country itself and its decision will be formulated to enhance its own political interests in the region.

Consequently, within the logical parameters of this approach, has a distinct advantage, over , in having a third party mediation favoring its position in . By supporting ’s case on the issue, the international community has the potential to gain economically and further its interests in an emerging global market of the future. , with its defunct and a non-existent and a highly unstable political climate does not have the same economic allure as . The international community fully realizes that is in no position to make political demands over and given the precarious nature of its , it will be forced to accept any settlement over in order to ensure the continuation of international aid to prop up its .

Therefore, in a realpolitik sense, will have to forego its calls for a third party mediation and directly deal with if its wants to retain its interests in the matter of . realizes this predicament of ’s weakness. Hence, it is deliberately delaying discussions with on the issue hoping that ’s problems will further weaken its position on the issue. Pakistani response, in reply to the Indian unwillingness to enter discussions with , is ironically forcing to renew its calls for third party mediation to settle the problem. What does not seem to understand is that its traditional position on has been compromised by its own domestic policies of political and economic mismanagement. In realistic terms, has no one to blame, but itself because its has repeatedly weakened its stance by holding it hostage to the whims of its confrontational style of domestic politics and its rampant culture of and financial misconduct, which has created the present circumstances in which has no choice, but to accept a fait accompli on the issue of .

Economic growth, under this assumption, takes on an added urgency for . ’s lack of a viable economic development has emerged as its most potent Achilles’ heel. needs to restructure economically since in the present international parlance, a nation’s foreign is the continuation of its economic interests and a nation’s ability to articulate its foreign is directly proportional to its economic strength. In this sense, the resurrection of ’s failing is crucial if hopes to exercise some influence on the issue of . cannot afford to be politically eclipsed on the issue of , vis-à-vis , and to prevent this from happening; has to drastically revamp its economic fortunes.

After a decade of tough International Monetary Fund and World Bank guidelines for the prolongation of aid, has bitter realized a harsh truth. The lesson, which has learned is that the international financial institutions (IFI), in lending monies, are beholden to the donor nations, which exercise considerable influence on their lending patterns. Though the international financial institutions may be motivated by economic considerations, it is the political interests, which guide the policies of the donor nations. Hence, the IFIs are bound to follow the political wisdom of the donor nations. It is the political interests of the donor nations, which influences the macroeconomic policies of the host nations. In other words, if wants to receive international aid, it will have to pay a political price for it.

In context of this realization, is acutely aware of the fact that if it wants to sustain its , it will need the periodic infusion of international aid to keep its afloat and to prevent a sovereign default on its debt payments. The international community has already spelt out for as to what it needs to do in order to insure the flow of aid to its bankrupt coppers. Recently Japan had hinted at the possibility that if signed the CTBT, the annual Japanese development aid to (amounting some 1 billion dollars) would be resumed.

Many nations, including the Union nations, have suggested a similar course of action for . Given that the Pakistani has grown insipid with each passing day, ’s towards the signing of the CTBT has diminished considerably. Signing of the CTBT is the final “get out of jail card”, which has to prevent an economic meltdown. Given that the Pakistani will worsen in the days to come, instead of getting better, will have no other option, but to capitulate and sign the CTBT.

If, and when, signs the CTBT it would have lost all pretenses to its sovereign independence. Its sovereignty would have been mortgaged to the donor nations and their political interests via the monetary shackles of IFIs. CTBT would only be the beginning of ’s political schadenfreude. It will have to implement the other western demands to end its international segregation. Presently, in international eyes, is a heart beat away from being declared a terrorist sponsoring nation and a rogue state. If wants to avoid the of other such accursed nations, it will have to agree to a settlement on and end the activities of the Islamic/jehadi groups operating from its soil.

All of these actions will entail a severe domestic backlash, specially from the various religious groups that would view Islamabad’s agreement on as a and the capping of ’s nuclear program as a the final victory of the Indian-Zionist conspiracy against . The interregnum is capable of resisting such pressures, but it cannot guarantee that its decisions, to end ’s , will be honored by the next civilian . Whether that civilian can withstand the political pressure to reverse the ’s in agreeing to the international wish list in ending ’s international loneliness, is the greatest cause of concern to the . It is, because of this fear that present regime favors “selection over election” as a pre-condition for the restoration of in .

Therefore, it is with this intention that regime is toying with the idea of amending the of . The wants to revive the Eight Amendment, which gives the president of the powers to dissolve the parliament and remove the sitting and it wants to, via a constitutional amendment, seek the incorporation of a national security council in the politics of . The real purpose of a national security council would be to monitor Pakistani politics and “advise” the civilian governments in critical foreign , defense and economic decisions. In other words, the national security council would be the final political authority in ; it will have the right to “counsel” the president in political matters (telling him to dismiss elected governments) via the presidential right to do so as enshrined in the Eight Amendment of the Pakistani .

Given all these changes, which is currently going through, the tacit realization is that regime in should be prepared for an uncertain political future. The intentions of the present interregnum and its desires to balance its domestic interests with its international aspirations will not be easily achieved. It will have to undertake some harsh decisions. Some of these decisions include a “donor friendly” to appease the IFIs, which are giving large amounts of aid to Islamabad and whose “suggestions” Islamabad cannot afford to ignore.

The down side of this is that it will risk alienating the from the and breeding a deep sense of resentment against it. Everyone in believes sotto voce that the is not above the pale of either and because of this, the is overly concerned about its popularity image in the eyes of its domestic constituency. If the plays towards the popular opinion, it will risk angering the IFIs upon whose generosity it is banking to prolong its rule in .

is another Gordian knot, which this needs to solve, because ’s on has passed beyond the “fail-safe” point and is stating to offer diminishing returns for Islamabad. is the raison d’ être of ’s justification for its monopoly of the national expenditures. In other words, with the issue of resolved, the becomes accountable for its actions and has to adequately explain its privileged position and influence in ’s domestic politics.

The of has to decide its options on these critical decisions, which are increasingly becoming vital to ’s future well being. There is no safe middle ground for it. Neither is there any luxury of time for it to delay and indefinitely postpone this decision. ’s ailing fortunes demand that the in Islamabad swallow the bitter pill of reality and take the requisite decisions in the long-term interests of . This is blessed with the opportunity that it has a chance to rectify the past mistakes of and set the country on the right path. The regime in Islamabad should stop playing the façade of a democratic . It should accept the fact that it is a dictatorship and act accordingly in the strategic interests of .

There is an American term known as “chicken hawk”, which means an action that is composed of both bravery and cowardice at the same time. Pakistani armed forces, the army in general, are the present chicken hawks of , because it wants to desperately implement changes in , but is mortified of their consequences. If the hopes to introduce a new era in Pakistani politics, it can accomplish its intentions, but it will have to be more hawkish than chicken in its actions. The only question is whether it has the courage to over come its fears and take the proper decisions in the long-term interests of ?