Whither Democracy?

Aqil Shah
Nov 2, 2001



Following the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US, Islamabad's volte

face on its Afghan -withdrawing support from the Taliban-is

understandable in the face of relentless US and international pressure. The

decision also puts in the frontline of the US campaign

against . Given historical parallels, what could this mean for

the regime and the future of in ?

By playing ball with the US, Musharraf appears to have killed two birds with

one stone. He has secured international acceptance for the 1999 and he

can now draw succour from the removal of US sanctions and the provision of

international financial assistance which his handpicked managers badly need

to resurrect 's crumbling . has also outmanoeuvred

, the regime believes, and ensconsed itself firmly in the exalted role

of a U.S. ally. In Musharraf's close circles, there is also a sense of

respite as the overwhelming international pressure on the regime to mend

fences with has given way to more pressing issues for the US.

But this newly found glory comes with grave risks, a fact the General should

know only too well. These range from the possible decimation of the Taliban

to the ascension of the unfriendly Northern Alliance to the throne in Kabul.

Not too far on the horizon is the American pressure on to end

support to -based jihadi groups that sustain Islamabad's proxy

in . The Bush administration's decision to freeze the assets of three

-based organizations, Harkatul Mujahideen, Al-Rashid Trust and

Jaish-e-Mohammad, are an indication of this looming threat. On the domestic

front, chickens have come home to roost and the authorities face

the anger of religious fanatics opposed to the U.S. led attack on

. A host of factors can turn this anger into a serious threat.

But leaving other factors aside, sustained American support for the

Musharraf regime will seriously impact any future political process in the

country. Direct American backing will further embolden the in its

desire to extend its illegitimate hold on civilian affairs and undermine the

political opposition. With the even token international pressure for the

restoration of taking a back seat in the face of the urgent needs

of a 'just' , the 's manipulation of the political process could

become more brazen, providing it the opportunity to institutionalise its

role in Pakistani politics. Much to Musharraf's pleasure, his so-called

"roadmap" to could now lead straight to autocracy a la General

Zia. With Musharraf ensconsed as President and COAS, while playing to the

international gallery, a lame duck Prime Minister and a hung parliament

could hardly raise a voice that is not deemed against the "national interest

Perhaps it is untimely to look to Washington when American national

interests must take precedence over such trivia as the long-term impact of

its support for authoritarian rule. But President Bush's repeated assurances

to General Musharraf that America and its allies will make sure that his

remains stable leaves should make Pakistanis nervous. "There

should be no question in any world leader's mind that the most essential

ingredient for success in this 21st century is a free people and a

that derives its right to govern from the consent of such [a]

people," the then Secretary of State-elect Colin Powell proudly claimed in

January 2001, "...a guiding principle of President-elect Bush's foreign

will be that America stands ready to help any country that wishes to

join the democratic world."

However, as most Pakistanis know through bitter experience, Washington only

talks the talk. The US has armed ruthless dictatorships in

whenever these suited its strategic interests. From General Ayub in

the 1960s to General Zia in the 1980s, has never been high on the

American agenda for its 'most allied ally'. And not without a reason either.

The Bush administration, like its predecessors, is more than glad to have a

'stable presidency' in Islamabad at its beck and call. An 'insecure' Prime

Minister would have wavered, weighed his or her political options, perhaps

even consulted political partners and gauged public opinion before taking

such an important decision. No wonder then that the unwritten

American political doctrine for many 'uncivilised' countries rests on the

self-serving assumption that civilian rulers are inept and corrupt while

dictators are clean, honest and reliable. That is messy,

fraught with risks and instability, while authoritarianism offers a

sure-fire recipe for stability.

But Washington's 'strategic engagement' with Pakistani dictators has

achieved much more than just the emasculation of democratic institutions in

. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to understand the connection

between the growing radicalisation of an otherwise moderate Pakistani

society and the intransigent and policies of a national

security establishment that has run amok in the absence of firm civilian

control. Since the early 1980s, the national security apparatus, often with

Washington's blessings, has extended unlimited patronage to militant Islamic

outfits for fulfilling its political and strategic goals. Consumed by these

misdirected national security priorities, the state has consistently failed

to provide basic , and security to its . This has

fuelled public disillusionment and alienated a vast majority of poor

Pakistanis who now rely on Islamic madrassahs to feed and educate their

. The virtual absence of legitimate political mechanisms to

articulate and aggregate collective interests in a deeply polarised society

has also provided a fertile ground for the growth of militant politics in

the country.

America and its ' loving' allies should make no mistake in

recognising that the long-term and stability of the 'most dangerous

flashpoint in the world' requires sustained investment in healthy and

secular democracies, not stable dictatorships. And the sooner they realize

this bitter truth, the better.



This article was published under a different heading in the Friday Times,

(), 18 October 2001.