Is Jehad Passe’?

Aqil Shah
Dec 21, 2001



Many Pakistani liberals are rejoicing Islamabad's u-turn on its Taliban

. With the international community firmly behind our self-appointed

President, they seems convinced, we are poised to rise from the ashes of the

twin towers as a progressive, liberal and secular state. Sane voices in

, few and far between, have only cautiously welcomed this purported

liquidation of Islamabad's franchise, wary as they are of the societal

dissonance set in motion by the rising influence of rabid Islamic

fundamentalism in the country. But this fundemantalism is now deeply

embedded in the socio-political psyche of sizeable numbers across ethnic,

sectarian and linguistic divides. And the peculiar world-view spawned by

this religious orthodoxy is not only worrying but seems too rigid to lend

itself to sudden shifts.

The state-subsidised radicalization has been a slow, corrosive process

gaining strength in well over two decades. The widespread destitution,

disempowerment and frustration that millions of Pakistanis encounter every

day continue to add fuel to this fire. Can a few million dollars from

's western benefactors affect the day-to-day of this virtually

silent, wretched, disenfranchised majority? Will they say no to fanatical

entrepreneurs who offer them money and a ticket to heaven when the state

will not even provide for their basic human needs? Whether is

further radicalised or liberalised is an open question. But the appeal of

radical , and those who espouse it, could grow before it wanes. As

absorbs the multi-faceted effects of the in , and as

more civilian dead bodies wash ashore, chances are the rising anti-US,

anti-Musharraf sentiment could help Islamic parties garner more public

support.

Does Islamabad's new official posturing augur an actual abrogation of the

use of militant as an instrument of foreign ? In other words, is

really passé?

On the one hand, General Musharraf has consolidated this new shift by

purging 'hard-line' elements from the army's ranks, and by cracking down on

Islamic groups. On the other, the General is still adamant in

his public pronouncements that , in and

sectarianism in are all different phenomena. 'Not to be confused

with each other', as he puts it.

One would certainly that this is nothing more than political

face-saving to stem the growing hard-line perception that by siding with the

US, Musharraf has compromised the freedom struggle in . But old

habits die hard. For years, Islamabad has faced virtual international

diplomatic on account of its 'strategic compulsions.' has

been financially ruined by these skewed national security priorities, but

General Musharraf, much like his illustrious predecessors, insisted until

very recently that is a power to reckon with. Ironically, the

establishment is still betting on 'moderate Taliban,' still holding on to

the that the post-Taliban set up in will be of Islamabad's

choosing (or Islamabad-friendly?). More worrying though are reports that

'' jihadis have been asked to wait in the wings till is up

for liberation again.

It remains to be seen whether this about-face on is a tactical retreat

to tide over the storm or a paradigm shift? For one, the -bashing on

PTV clearly belies Islamabad's purported reversal of its . While

state-fed intellectuals never tire of flaunting Musharraf's earnest desire

for in , two caveats are in order. First, it is critical to

situate the intransigent anti- posture of the establishment in the

context of what political psychologists call the "need for the enemy." For

the establishment, Islamabad's maximalist national security vision is more

than just an operational exigency. Rather, it is a 'win-win' strategic

calculus driven primarily by a desire to keep bleeding, besides

holding the Pakistani nation hostage to the state's threat perception.

Second, requires a fundamental transformation in the mutual

perceptions of the parties in conflict. Any real and sustainable solution to

the conflict in , for example, requires a radical shift in the

's worldview. Real political dialogue with he 'Hindu' enemy may be

anathema to the 's rigid institutional mindset. This argument can

also be situated within the civil- configuration of - that

the Pakistani in fact derives its political legitimacy and

influence from the 'hostility consensus' it continues to build up against

. The "" in is thus only a logical extension of that. To

say the least, the relentless anti- public propaganda campaign is

hardly conducive to regional . Real making begins in the minds of

the public. Public opinion mobilisation is essential if is to be made

acceptable and durable. That is not in sight.

The optimists therefore need to think twice before jumping to any

conclusions. Pakistanis know where the previous 'strategic engagements' with

the US took the country. Where the billions of dollars in American aid have

gone, and where more arms for the have landed .

Dictatorships, at least of the Pakistani variety, are aggressive,

authoritarian and conservative. Totalitarian power wielded by self-appointed

rulers without institutional checks and balances is hardly a recipe for

progressive liberalism, socio-economic progress or . History lessons,

anyone?