It is widely believed that the world came closer to a nuclear exchange during the recent standoff between India and Pakistan than at any time since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. As that fateful episode from 1962 often serves as a benchmark while gauging the gravity of military crisis of far-reaching global repercussions, it would be highly appropriate to have some acquaintance with the subject matter.

For that purpose, an American movie “Thirteen Days” from 2001, featuring the Cuban missile crises can be recommended as a convenient shortcut for laymen. The film, not only depicts the momentous chain of events in an impressive manner, it offers some frightening glimpses of the standard military frame of mind as well.

Amusingly, its conclusions can also be aptly correlated to our own debacles/dilemmas, right from the Operation Gibraltar, the East Pakistan tragedy and the Kargil adventure down to the ongoing [vital] discussion in the print media about the role of the armed forces in the political configuration of Pakistan.

To elaborate further, it would be pertinent to quote, for the readers in general and the admirers of military governments in particular, the following [thought-provoking and self-explanatory] excerpts from the book:

Thirteen days / A memoir of the Cuban missile crisis (1969)
By Robert F Kennedy
[Brother of the President J F Kennedy and a senior cabinet minister in his government]

…“One member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, argued that we could use nuclear weapons, on the basis that our adversaries would use theirs against us in an attack. I thought, as I listened, of the many times that I had heard the military take positions which, if wrong, had the advantage that no one would be around at the end to know.”

… “ I remember an earlier meeting on Laos, in 1961, when the military unanimously recommended sending in substantial numbers of U.S. troops to stabilize the country. They were to be brought in through two airports with limited capability. Someone questioned what would we do if only a limited number landed and then the Communist Pathet Lao knocked out the airports and proceeded to attack our troops, limited in number and not completely equipped. The representatives of the military said we would then have to destroy Hanoi and possibly use nuclear weapons. President Kennedy did not send in the troops and concentrated on diplomatic steps to protect our interests.”

… “President Kennedy was disturbed by this inability to look beyond the limited military field. When we talked about this later, he said we have to remember that they were trained to fight and to wage war – that was their life. Perhaps we would feel even more concerned if they were always opposed to using arms or military means – for if they would not b e willing, who would be? But this experience pointed out for us all the importance of civilian direction and control and the importance of raising probing questions to military recommendations.”

Actually, it doesn’t require much insight to deduce the horrendous cost of the army’s supervening role in any civil society. The [perilous] consequences of the complete absence of the final authority of the political leadership in governing and/or veto power of the brass on policy matters are abundantly obvious, provided one doesn’t persist to deny the irrefutable realities. The views of Theodore (Ted) Sorensen, a special counsel to John F. Kennedy, about the film and the handling of the crisis [extracted from Newsweek’s Web exclusive review] put it bluntly:

“A clear lesson, in addition to all the other lessons that came out of those 13 days, was the reminder of the importance of the tradition of civilian supremacy in this country, of civilian control of the military. If the military had had their way, I think it’s quite clear now that there would have been a nuclear war”.

Thus, one of the most extraordinary events of the cold war era vividly illustrates that letting military independently determine the course of action, even during war, is outright suicidal. [Perhaps a slight solace: Pakistani top brass doesn’t outsmart its counterparts in ludicrousness, the military officers are equally inane, the world over.]

While aspiring nations don’t allow the military to trespass the political arena, thus minimizing their detrimental impact on the society, Pakistan, on the other hand, is thoroughly shackled by the self-styled, khaki-clad messiahs. In specific terms, the myopic manipulation of the political process, creating and discarding leaders by the army has done much more harm to Pakistan than any other single factor. The absurd conviction of the khakis to be able and (even worse) authorised to define and dictate national interests has shattered the basics of the social and political fabrics of the nation.

The precarious misconception of the GHQ, since day one, that it can single-handedly take care of all problems being faced by the country has already brought about a total collapse of civic institutions. And if that was not enough, the [lethal] insistence to enforce the garrison’s perceptions in all spheres of life will now definitely tear us apart even socially, culturally and economically.

The myth and fairy tales of army’s efficiency and (I am really sorry to say) even divine patriotism must be laid to rest, once for all. In fact, it was exactly this deadly blend of arrogance, mala fide intent and ineptitude, of the military that led to the disintegration of the country once.

Let me clarify that every patriotic Pakistani wants armed forces to be strong, capable of delivering formidable punishment to any aggressor. Yeah, strong enough to defend the motherland – not stronger than the state itself, always enticed to conquer those they are meant to defend.

The venom military itself have been injecting into the society for last fifty years has poisoned the very roots of our social and political life by now. This curse cannot be cured overnight, and least of all through manipulation and deceit. Unconstitutional infringements and ad-hoc measures might work for a while but can never be a panacea for deep-rooted ills.

Our great generals must try to appreciate the versatility of a democratic set-up. Instead of pronouncing every deviating and dissenting element traitor, security risk or Indian agent they should kindly mind their own business and confine themselves to military affairs.

Far greater service to this unfortunate nation will be if khakis allow socio-political actors to nourish and flourish by their own without any external meddling. No institution should be allowed to flout the will of people and promote its own “patriotic” agenda under the pretext “supreme national interests” or “defending country’s geographical as well as ideological frontiers”, at any cost.

Not a single example where a nation achieved long-lasting prosperity under military rule can be mentioned. How many pernicious experiments and disastrous failures our grand army need to realise that instead of serving the national interests they are playing havoc with the country by their omnipotent attitude is anyone’s guess.

Trying to transmute might and fire-power into right is absurd, to say the least. Top brass should try to understand the growing disillusionment among general public and feel the brewing revulsion against the only remaining viable and respected organ of the state, before it gets too late.

To wind up, I am tempted to quote Mirabeau, one of the fathers of the French revolution here: “Prussia is not a state with an army, but an army with a state.” Alas, Pakistan is not too far from that disconcerting distinction either. And it is our duty to find the testicular fortitude to prevent it from happening.

Footnote:
Expressing regrets for the “excess” committed by the Pak Army in former East Pakistan is a courageous, commendable and long due act. We owed a sincere apology to our Bengali brethren. General Musharraf deserves appreciation, particularly as a Chief of Pak Army, for confessing the misdeeds (and repenting) the atrocities committed by his nefarious predecessors.