Bilal Ahmad October 18, 2000

Tags: Policy , Minorities , Development , Elections , Constitution , Government , Military , Dictator , Democracy , Politics , Lahore , India , Pakistan , Regions , Bhutto , Jinnah , Leaders

The people of Pakistan need to ask why Pakistan failed to become a confederation in accordance with the spirit and content of the Lahore resolution.

href="/tag/music">music, and speeches. Ironically, the speeches are predominantly made by the propagators of the so-called Pakistan ideology and/or by pro-establishment sycophants, who rarely, if ever, discuss the actual content of the resolution. The Lahore resolution, which was moved on March 23, 1940 by A. K. Fazul Haq – the Bengal Chief Minister – and approved by the general body, reads as follows:

“. . . Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country [i.e., the British India] or acceptable to [the] Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz. that geographically continuous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the north-western and eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute Independent States, in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign. . . . Adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the Constitution for minorities . . . for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights” (quoted in Ali, 1967: 38).

This resolution unambiguously called for the establishment of the Independent States of East and West Pakistan, while accepting the autonomy and sovereignty of their constituent units. Hence, many Muslim League leaders, particularly from Bengal, interpreted this resolution as a demand for two independent states. Although subsequent attempts by the central command to modify the Lahore resolution in favor of one state met considerable opposition from some Bengali Muslim Leaguers, a convention of Muslim League legislators finally passed a resolution (on April 9, 1946; in Delhi) demanding that the six provinces of Bengal and Assam in the northeast and Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province in the northwest be constituted into a sovereign independent state (Sayeed, 1968: 117). This resolution was a de facto amendment of the Lahore resolution. Some Muslim Leaguers (mainly the Bengalis) questioned the validity of the amendment on the ground that the council had no jurisdiction to amend a resolution that was passed by the general body in an open conference. Hence, the Muslim League leadership, rather than honoring the pluralist mandate of the Lahore resolution, opted for a centralist-assimilative framework that engendered an unnecessary rift within the Muslim League. What responsibility should Jinnah bear for this tension? A detailed critical analysis and interpretation of the South Asian historiography may provide a satisfactory clue.

Callard (1957) observes that Jinnah by nature was “a commander and leader of men [sic]” who never considered the other Muslim League leaders as his colleagues and partners. Jinnah indeed laid the foundation of an autocratic form of governance in Pakistan on August 14, 1947, by becoming not only the Governor General of Pakistan, but the President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and the President of the Pakistan Muslim League. Although Jinnah lead Pakistan for little more than one year, his actions were guided by his relentless desire to assimilate all Pakistanis in unity. It was this centralist-assimilative approach that led him to mistakenly curb dissent. A case in point is his oft-mentioned Dhaka speech of 1948 where he said:

“. . . let me make it clear to you that the State Language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language. Anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan. Without one State Language, no Nation can remain tied up solidly together and function” (Quoted in Jahan, 1972: 37).

It is perplexing why a man of Jinnah’s stature failed to recognize that the mainstream European theories and ideologies of nationalism, nation-states, and national integration were not practicable for the multicultural Pakistani society. It is this failure of Jinnah, and the proponents of the dominant Pakistani national discourse, that has created numerous hurdles for the national integration and development of Pakistan.

The Pakistani political regimes have consistently looked at the crisis of national integration in exogenous terms – particularly the adversarial role of India – and have thus painted the more vocal opposition parties and leaders as secessionists, disloyal Pakistanis, or traitors. One victim of such policy was the Awami League of Shaikh Mujeebur Rahman in East Pakistan. During Ayub Khan’s regime, Governor Monem Khan (who himself was a Bengali) adopted a dual policy to build political support for Ayub Khan in East Pakistan. On one hand, he provided official support and patronage to pro-establishment individuals and groups. On the other, he tightly controlled the press and media, revived a movement propagating that Bengali is a non-Muslim language, undermined the significance of Rabindranath Tagore, victimized intelligentsia, planted pro-establishment student groups in colleges and universities, encroached the autonomy of Dhaka University, and created “the atmosphere of a fascist state” (Jahan, 1972: 165). For example, the ministers in Monem’s regime would simply call the young officials directly and order them to imprison a man for purposes of harassment and the dispersion of his family (The Observer, London, March 23, 1969).

In 1966, the Awami League started the Six-Point Movement. This movement was different from the previous Bengali autonomy demands of 1950 and 1954. The first point in the Six-Point manifesto called for the establishment of a federation on “the basis of the Lahore Resolution and a parliamentary form of government, with supremacy of [the] legislature to be directly elected on the basis of [an] adult franchise” (Jahan, 1972: 167). Unlike the student-literati alliance of the previous movements, this new movement was not so peaceful due to the added participation of workers and street mobs. It involved various expressions of wrath against local symbols of authority, including “raids on police stations, looting of arms, and violent confrontations with the police” (Jahan, 1972, p. 169). Although Mujeebur Rahman made several offers to settle the matter politically, Ayub’s regime chose to adopt a confrontationist approach. Ayub Khan opposed the Awami League vehemently and threatened to use the military force against its allegedly secessionist and (so-called) disruptionist activities. Ayub’s reaction and rhetoric enraged the Bengalis further. As expected, Ayub imprisoned the top Awami League leaders for more than two years. After Ayub’s downfall, Mujeebur Rahman and his compatriots were released to eventually take part in the national elections. The post-release politics, particularly the blood bath in East Pakistan, is a black spot on Pakistan’s national history (see, for example, www. liberationmuseum.org).

Today, Pakistan is once again embroiled in conflicts between Islamabad (and Punjab) and the smaller provinces. In his first address to the nation, Pakistan’s current military dictator and self-appointed Chief Executive, General Musharraf, conceded to the existence of growing tensions between various segments of Pakistan. Hence, an important aspect of his seven-point agenda is to “strengthen the federation, remove interprovincial disharmony and restore national cohesion.” Musharraf seems to believe that one major step in this direction would be through the establishment of true democracy (i.e., the empowerment of common people) and good governance (see Musharraf’s Speech of October 17, 1999). During the past year, the Musharraf regime has prepared a local government plan to devolve power at the district and subdistrict levels. According to this plan, local elections will be held on a nonparty basis. This aspect of the plan (inter alia) has come under severe attack from many noteworthy political parties. The most devastating critique of the devolution plan has developed recently from Mumtaz Bhutto, Chairman of the Sindh National Front (SNF), who views it as a “conspiracy” to impose the One-Unit System once again (Dawn, September 13, 2000). Mumtaz Bhutto argues that equity between various territorial units could only be guaranteed through a confederal system. Is this a call for the dismemberment of Pakistan? How different is this position from (the late) G. M. Syed’s demand for the Sindhu Desh? Should the current regime shrug off this demand in a manner similar to the one adopted for Mujeebur Rahman’s Six-Point Manifesto? These are the kind of questions that need to be addressed in our national discourse immediately.

In contrast to the hardline positions of Mumtaz Bhutto and G. M. Syed, the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM’s) has adopted a more moderate approach. PONM is an alliance of several political parties which, in its Constitutional package, had once proposed the renaming of Pakistan as the “Multinational Federal Democratic Republic of Pakistan” with Baluchistan, Sindh, Seraikistan, NWFP (Pakhtoonkhwa) and Punjab having the status of states (Nation, April 2, 1999). This organization, following the lead/promise of Jinnah, is opposed to a theocratic ideological basis and image of Pakistan. It is important to understand that PONM is a somewhat loose and shaky alliance of political parties and leadership. Hence, it neither is a monolithic voice nor does it represent the wishes and aspirations of the majority of Pakistani people. Nonetheless, we need to assess the demands of the PONM and other dissenting voices on their own merit and in the greater interest of Pakistan’s national unity.

In sum, the people of Pakistan need to ask why Pakistan failed to become a confederation in accordance with the spirit and content of the Lahore resolution. Was it politically necessary and/or wise to replace the Lahore resolution by the less democratic resolution of 1946? Should Pakistan honor the Lahore resolution? Or, should Pakistan honor at least the spirit of the Lahore resolution and work toward the formation of a federation of autonomous administrative units – with a reasonably strong center – through a democratic-political process? Politics entails compromises. Shouldn’t Pakistan engage in a democratic-political process to honorably and amicably achieve the dual objective of ensuring citizenship and human rights and enhancing (multi)national cohesion?

References:

Ali, C. M. (1967). The Emergence of Pakistan. New York: Columbia University Press.

Callard, K. (1957). Pakistan: A Political Study. London: Macmillan.

Jahan, R. (1972). Pakistan: Failure in National Integration. New York: Columbia University Press.

Musharraf’s speech of October 17, 1999 appeared in Dawn (Karachi) and all other leading newspapers on October 18, 1999.

Sayeed, K. B. (1968). Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1948. London: Oxford University Press.