Swat: Can the deal work?

It was hoped that peace would come to the once peaceful valley after the peace deal between the Taliban and the government. People thought that normal life would return to the troubled district of Swat. Most of the people in Swat Kohistan, the over 40 kilometers long narrow but scenic valley from Madyan to Kalam, believed that there would be ample number of tourists this summer who would compensate the loss incurred to the people during the last two years. Even the cynics were dead certain that life would again take a turn of normalcy. The peace deal was signed, 'prisoners of war' were released; Taliban got recognition and endorsement but over 90 percent of the hotels in Kalam and Bahrain still present looks of the cruel autumn.

Visiting Swat is comparatively economical by being at a day or less drive from Rawalpndi, Lahore, Peshawar and Mardan. Swat can afford all strata of society by providing a number of varieties in accommodation and food. But now Swat has been turned to a lion's den where nobody dares to come.

It seems that the analysts were true in their skepticism about the results of the peace deal. They believed that it would eventually give ground to the militants to recover and fight back. Their apprehensions were based on certain facts.

First, they felt that neither of the parties seemed sincere in complying with the terms of the deal. On the one hand the Taliban commanders were on the table with the government, on the other girls schools were blown up in Swat and its neighbor district, Dir.

Second, they pointed out the lack of proper homework on the government side. This was evident from the confusion between the federal and provincial governments. When the Taliban and the provincial government delegates were engaged in determining the modalities of the deal the interior ministry czar denounced any deal with the militants.

Third, the observers viewed US as a third party. Being an alley in the counterterrorist efforts, Pakistani government was in no position to deal with the issue ignoring the US government.

Fourth was the provincial government's approach regarding the militancy in Swat. The government argued that the militants in Swat just wanted Sharia imposed in Swat whereas the analysts disagreed to saying that the Taliban leaders in Swat had links with FATA. The government tried to link the last year militants uprising to that of the TNSM's movement in 1994 under Maulana Sufi Mohammad.

The recent militancy in Swat is totally different from the one arisen in 1994. Then it was specific to locals while the prevailing one has elements from outside Swat. Observers even claim that the Taliban militia has commanders from Central Asia as well. The then TNSM's movement was initially restricted to demonstrations only. It did not kill or butchered any policeman or 'spy'. It had no roots outside Swat hence curbed in a short span of time with few casualties. The recent insurgency was of greater force, certainly supported by non local elements and chained with the larger movement of Taliban.

The only similarity of the present and past insurgencies is their common strongholds. Like its predecessor the recent uprising was in its full intensity in the areas of Matta to Kabal. Along the right bank of Swat River, from Baghdehri to Shamozai most of the Khans, village chieftains who possess big lands, are in power. Generally in whole Swat, and particularly in the areas adjacent to Matta, there have been feuds between the land owners in the plains and the formerly nomadic tribe, Gujars, now settled in the mountains. Here the Gujars are usually looked down upon because they do not possess land. The Gujars and the land owners have always been at logger head since long. They have many cases pending in the courts against the land possessors. Hence the militancy always gets intensity in this area. Thus it becomes part of the perpetual strife between the haves and haves-not. The evidence of this aspect is the attacks on the local Khans and their kinships. The local common people who supported Taliban were mostly those who fall in the category of locally oppressed people. Being ignorant of the whole game they did support the militants. But this is only one of the dimensions of the whole story.

It is now well evident the militants and the government are playing fast and loose with each other. Neither side takes the deal seriously as they know it is based in the air. The government is apt to save face ignoring the general well being of the people of Swat. The government has not had any provision for the former tourists' haven in the budget.

The people seem too desperate to trust the deal. No remarkable change has been observed since the signing of the 16 points peace deal. Had people did trust the deal they would have started visiting Swat as they had to face a hot summer with less light in the cities. The roads and hotels in Swat are still deserted as nobody dares to come for a respite from the scorching heat.

And now the feebleness of the deal has exposed by the incidents such as putting fire to PTDC's resort in Malam Jabba and the blowing up of the schools are but signs of the failure of the peace deal.