Talking to Vajpayee

Like his historic bus journey to Lahore in February 1999, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, in a policy U-turn, has sprung another surprise by inviting the Pakistani Chief Executive to visit India. India had earlier insisted that talks with Pakistan would not resume until "cross-border terrorism" ceases.

What prompted India's change in stance, what can be expected in these proposed talks in light of the historical track record and what are the real roadblocks in Pakistan-India relations?

In 1992, the BJP ideologue, K.R. Malkani, a refugee from Sind, visited Islamabad as part of the Track II process, in which retired generals like the late Chief of Army Staff Sundarji also participated. He said quite categorically that without BJP support, no Indian government could go for a settlement on Kashmir, and he added, "Real progress on Kashmir will only be possible when the BJP is in power". The BJP, which started with 2 seats in the 1984 elections, finally took over in 1998 heading a 23-party coalition.

This line is a throwback to the 1970s when it was said in the United States that only a conservative anti-Communist Republican like Richard Nixon could make a deal with China and the Soviet Union, which he did.

By the same token, it is now being presumed that unless the BJP in India supports and the Army in Pakistan endorses, durable peace between Pakistan and India is not possible. Civilian governments in Pakistan were destabilised on charges of a "sell-out" just for trying to talk to India on Kashmir. It is probably for this reason that while announcing his invitation, Vajpayee too covered his flanks, appeasing his hawkish Hindu constituency, by ending the ceasefire in Kashmir.

The Indian Prime Minister also realised that his policy of trying to bypass Pakistan has failed, and Pakistan's inclusion is a precondition for settling Kashmir.

By inviting the Pakistani military ruler to Delhi, Vajpayee also benefits politically. His government has been crisis-prone of late: rocked by the Tehelka corruption scandal, problems with allies in the ruling coalition, losses in the recent state elections and a 'war of words' following a serious border clash with Bangladesh. Then the Congress and the Communists had been attacking the BJP for not resuming the dialogue with Pakistan. With this one decision, Vajpayee has deflected domestic criticism, regained the political initiative and come across as a 'statesman' before his new found American friends as well, who had been urging him to talk to Pakistan.

Since India is defined as the "enemy" and Kashmir as the single most important issue in foreign policy from day one, relations with India are the corner stone of Pakistan's national security, foreign policy and domestic politics. In fact, our over-arching security concerns are a major reason why a Sword of Damocles has always dangled over the concept of civilian supremacy in Pakistan.

General Ziaul Haq was the first Pakistani leader to have a coherent, consistent and clearly-articulated India policy that, for the most part, outsmarted Indian leaders like Indira Gandhi and Rajiv, and kept them guessing. All through his period in power, he retained the initiative using deft diplomacy, flexibility, and when required, the requisite steel fist, although it remained covered in a velvet glove. He was the architect of Track II diplomacy, initiated way back in 1984, which he used to pressure India through a "peace lobby" of India's leading journalists and columnists, who also served as his "constituency". His legendary public relations skills and his focus on keeping India engaged ensured that while the western front was "hot" with war in Afghanistan, it remained all quiet on the eastern front, with hardly any reference to Kashmir in official pronouncements from Pakistan during this period.

As India's leader, Vajpayee is probably the best bet with which Pakistan can do business. He is an experienced politician who need not look over his shoulder while talking to Pakistan (unlike the 'liberal' Punjabi, I.K. Gujral). His track record shows a certain positive attitude towards Pakistan - as Foreign Minister he came to Pakistan in 1978 and as Prime Minister, when he journeyed to Lahore, he made it a point to pay his respects to the Muslim freedom struggle at the Pakistan Monument. This was his gesture to the people of Pakistan, as if he was seeking to bury the hatchet by turning a new page in relations with Pakistan.

The Vajpayee visit was also substantive, not merely a demonstration of symbolism. During his stay in Lahore, he accepted the disputed status of Kashmir, agreed on an 18-month time frame for its peaceful resolution on the basis of both sides moving beyond their respective stated positions on Kashmir, and they also agreed to coordinate positions on CTBT since both were then facing similar pressures from the United States.

Vajpayee has a somewhat Nixonian sense of history, springing a surprise by making a grand gesture, as he did in February 1999 and again last week. This would lend credence to the view that Vajpayee's initiative is a serious move and he wants substantive talks with the current head of the Pakistan Establishment. Had it been merely a non-serious gesture, he could let his bureaucrats do the talking, say, a meeting of Foreign Secretaries on the sidelines of SAARC, which happens frequently. Even his Lahore bus journey was planned outside the normal bureaucratic channels, where it would normally have got bogged down in the usual nitpicking.

India has also defined the framework for the discussions with Pakistan, which are essentially a follow-up to the Nawaz Sharif-Gujral summit at Male in May 1997. This led to the eight point agenda including an unprecedented agreement by India to discuss Kashmir as a disputed issue through a separate Working Group. The 'bus diplomacy' that followed committed both sides "to intensify efforts for a settlement of the Kashmir issue", as enshrined in the Lahore Declaration.

It is good that the military regime has finally owned up to the Simla Accord and the Lahore Declaration as the basis of the forthcoming Summit. Having made the transition from a subordinate arm of government to running the country, the military regime would now have had the sobering realisation that civilian governments worked hard to promote and protect the national interest, often in adverse circumstances.



Before the summit, the military regime needs to do serious homework, consult the political forces and opinion leaders, formulate its bottom-line and not treat the trip to India as just another joyride.

Given their chequered history, Pakistan-India relations have to be seen as a process, not an event, where all issues are thrashed and settled in one summit. Issues left over from history like Kashmir and Palestine cannot be resolved overnight, as Clinton discovered much to his regret last autumn at Camp David through his abortive bid to force a settlement between Barak and Arafat.

The main issue between India and Pakistan is more of attitude than of policy on a particular issue. An absence of large-heartedness on the part of India manifests itself in petty pursuits at the expense of broader goals. India has demonstrated an inability to give, to concede anything, even where it has nothing to lose. Take the example of its ties with Bangladesh: the 1974 Indira-Mujib Treaty has never been ratified by India, while India's continued illegal occupation of a Bangladeshi enclave sparked the recent conflict.

Vajpayee has demonstrated that he can be different. Will this difference be reflected in Indian attitudes towards Pakistan and the Kashmir question? The answers will be found in the results of the forthcoming summit, undoubtedly the most important for both governments since they assumed office in October 1999.