Why An Interim Civilian Government will Fail

International reaction to last Tuesday's coup has, predictably, been negative. The European Union, Canada, and several other countries have outrightly condemned it. The UN Secretary General has deplored it, and the IMF director has
declared that loans to Pakistan will be suspended until democracy is restored. Faced by a hostile international environment, and with its lifeline of foreign loans and aid in serious jeopardy, Pakistan's military rulers appear inclined towards appointing an interim government to be followed by general elections. While this seems to be what the rest of the world wants, it actually amounts to a recipe for continued instability that shall further deepen the crisis of state and society in Pakistan.

While the motives for demanding an immediate return to democracy are perfectly understandable and laudable, this demand is based on an inadequate recognition of one fact so important that it overshadows all else. State power in Pakistan has always been distributed so that key goals have been set and prioritized by the military, and civilian governments have had the job of implementing them. This unnatural separation between goal making and execution makes for a system that has crashed frequently in the past, and is destined to keep crashing in the future. The military has sometimes been invisible, and at other times visible, but has been ever-present as the hand behind the system. At this
critical juncture of Pakistan's history it needs to accept responsibility for having contributed to the country's present political and economic situation, and be permitted to lead it out of the morass.

My contention is that setting up a caretaker government will be a fruitless endeavour doomed to fail. Selected by the military from a fractious lot of political aspirants with generally dubious credentials and no credible program of action, it will have no mandate or authority to address issues of real national significance. In 1967, Field Marshal Ayub Khan had written disparagingly of the Combined Opposition Parties as being like "nine cats with their tails tied together". Since his time the countrywide population of
these prolific felines has almost doubled; there are at least sixteen in the Grand Democratic Alliance. When their tails were untied on Tuesday, the free-for-all race began.

The fundamental problem is that, for all past civilian governments, three critical areas have remained wholly or largely closed to intervention, and to an extent even inspection. These are, in order of increasing opacity, the
economy, foreign policy, and nuclear and defence affairs. Let us examine each in turn.

Nuclear and defence matters have always been closely controlled by the military while civilian governments have played a supportive role. However, their power to make decisions of substance has been very limited. In fact, it is
doubtful if such governments would, if they had demanded it, have had access to critical information such as the number and location of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, the detailed chain of command, fissile material inventories and production rates, future plans, and so forth. Benazir
Bhutto has admitted that, during the years of her tenure, she was at the very margins and far away from where the real decisions were being made. Nawaz Sharif appears to have been only somewhat more knowledgeable because of his greater acceptability (at one time) to the army. However, officials of the Foreign Ministry -- even the ones who need to know -- appear to have little information on subjects that they are supposed to be experts in.

The implications of this are considerable. Whether in Delhi, Geneva, or Washington, no civilian Pakistan government can engage in meaningful negotiations whether on the CTBT, fissile materials cutoff treaty, limits to weaponization or deployment, etc. It is neither empowered to take significant
decisions by itself without consultation and clearance from the "higher" authority, nor even adequately knowledgeable. Hence, in the past little has been gained from protracted, expensive conferences and meetings.

The second key area is Pakistan's foreign policy. For 52 years nothing has occupied our energy, time, resources and emotions more than relations with India. Three wars (unless Kargil can be called the fourth), punctuated with only brief periods of cooperation and coexistence, have hardened attitudes on Kashmir on both sides. Brutal suppression of Kashmiri human rights by Indian security forces, and a guerilla war waged by heavily armed mujahideen trained in
camps across the border, has established a tragic pattern that has inflicted enormous suffering and claimed tens of thousands of lives.

It is far from clear how and when the stalemate can ever be broken. What is perfectly clear, however, is that any accommodation on Kashmir with India, though far from a final resolution, must be negotiated directly with the Pakistan military and not a civilian government. No civilian government can dare close down the offices or training camps of any mujahideen group. On the other hand, the mujahideen withdrawal from Kargil at the orders of the military has conclusively established the extent of control that the military exercises upon them.

Negotiating with the military is likely to be tough because it is committed to the liberation of Kashmir as its highest priority goal. There is also a general belief, articulated repeatedly by many retired Pakistani military chiefs, that
India can be bled in Kashmir at little expense to Pakistan. These are admittedly impediments, but there are two reasons why India, and the Western countries, must recognize this reality. First, negotiating a major change in Pakistan-India relations with any party other than the military is futile
and possibly dangerous. The Lahore Declaration, because it lacked army support, in the final analysis proved to be a step backward rather than forward. A majority in India thinks that, after being deceived in Lahore, negotiations
with Pakistan are fruitless. Second, if one strips away the rhetoric, a strong residue of pragmatism is evident within the military. There is considerable evidence of this; agreeing to withdraw from Kargil in order to avert a full-scale war, the hesitation in imposing martial law because of the anticipated international reaction, and the successful use of some confidence building measures such as hotlines even at a time of conflict.

A very similar argument applies to Pakistan's role in Afghanistan. By and large, there is a feeling of pride in the military in having successfully established a client state on the western border. While certain aspects of the
relationship are problematic, such as the sharp decline in Pakistan-Iran relations and possible involvement of Afghanistan based groups in the murders of Shias in Pakistan, making an overtly anti-Indian and largely unified
state in post-Soviet Afghanistan is considered as a great strategic achievement. In these circumstances meaningless and contradictory utterances on these issues, like those of former foreign minister Sartaj Aziz, are all that can be expected from any civilian government. Action on Afghanistan requires dealing with those who have the capacity to affect developments.

Thirdly, and finally, is the question of economic rescue. Pakistan's current budget is split between debt servicing and defence, with barely 20% left for all else. Yet, in spite of its preeminent size, defence spending is a simple
one-liner. The Economic Survey of Pakistan, the official document of the ministry of finance, lists only the total amount. One presumes that reasons of national security are supposedly responsible for this total opacity. But how is a rational allocation of expenditures possible in such circumstances?

Once again, this becomes an argument for directly dealing with the military on an issue of the greatest importance, on which civilian governments are unable to deal effectively. It assumes special significance given that foreign aid and
loans are increasingly being linked to defence spending. Given that the country is teetering on the brink of default, hence economic collapse, this needs fast thinking and the capacity to act decisively. The Nawaz and Bhutto governments
failed in collecting taxes rightfully due to the state, retained and strengthened feudalism and tribalism, and led the country to its present economic predicament. Only the army has the power to voluntarily decrease its own expenditures and the strength to confront tax-evaders and loan defaulters. The question is: will it?

For better or for worse, the military has broken an 11-year old taboo of directly intervening in national politics by having dismissed a corrupt and dictatorial, but democratically elected leader. As yet no restrictions on
civil liberties have been imposed, nor have the dreaded military courts been imposed. There is no justification for these. But now, instead of resorting to back-seat driving once again, the Pakistan military must take full responsibility in steering Pakistan out of its present state of crisis, a crisis for which it also bears much responsibility. Putting up a front government will achieve simply nothing.