1971 and Today

If for a moment we accept that separation of East Pakistan was a political failure, we must then ask how? Surely it was the military at the helm of political affairs and therefore must accept the singular responsibility for this surrender. It has been far too long that the military has hid itself behind this smokescreen sometimes blaming Mujeeb and sometimes Bhutto. The fact is that the military came to patrol the society early and will be responsible for even bigger blunders if the march on its own citizens and society is not arrested. It carries a disproportionate bias on national security and views everything through a military periscope. Yet this periscope failed miserably in 1971. It and its elite institutions have failed to comprehend that, ‘national power rises from a relatively stable platform of geography to the fleeting opportunities of national character and morale’ and that military power in itself is a very small contributor in averting rather than fighting wars, so much so that even a nuclear capability has left us feeling more vulnerable. Why this happened and continues to happen is because the military has not metamorphosed through an intellectual revolution. The cadre of elite General Staff has its own periscope, view and perspective of security matters and enforces it as such on all matters related to operational planning and training.

The army learnt to patrol society early by taking over the Kashmir war of 1948, followed by a series of military interventions and conflicts with India and Afghanistan. It developed a mindset where war invariably dictated policy and not vice versa. Hence 1965 was ill planned resulting in back rolling the entire development years of MAP. Similarly, there was not real effort at seeking political solutions in 1971. Kargil was planned and executed in a political vacuum and has shrouded the Kashmir Cause. Now its closest allies are forcing it to fight its own people in its heartland.

Capacity of military strategy and higher direction of war is limited. War is not seen in the realm of a political paradigm, but is assuming that politics must take a back seat when hostilities commence. The Clauewitzian principal of, ‘war as an instrument of policy in concert with other means’ is meant to just mean ‘war an instrument of policy’. Over the years, the army has learnt to study this great philosopher of war through a pathetic essay written by J F C Fuller in his book ‘Conduct of War’. Similarly other cardinal principals like ‘Friction, Centre of Gravity and Trinity’ have neither been understood nor an effort ever made to dilate them.
The General Staff is stuck with clichés like, ‘Defence of East Lies in the West’, ‘Strategic Depth’ and ‘Politico-Economic Corridor’ etc and Andre Baufre’s saying like, ‘Strategy is a dialect of two opposing wills’.

Plagued with such shortcomings in the higher direction, it will continue to blunder as it has done repeatedly in East Pakistan, Afghanistan and now. They will always listen and think; and then feel convinced they are right.

As for BanglaDesh, as I commented in a previous post, separation of East Pakistan was a foregone conclusion 1913, when the UP Lobby disgraced Nawab Salim Ullah of Bengal. Later the Bengalis were excluded in the official language, unicameral 1956 constitution, and 1962 Constitution. Based on the premise of martial race, they were considered bad soldiers but fought a civil war.

It is bad on part of Pakistanis who think that past is pirogue. It remains a very bad chapter of our history and the notion of a united Muslim nation our politicians created immediately after 23March 1940.