Tantia Topi-Alas there was only one Tantia Topi-Tantia Topi Zindabad-Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 Reinterpreted-1857-Tantia Topi-Ghadr-A.H Amin-Agha Humayun Amin

Tantia Topi-Alas there was only one Tantia Topi

A.H Amin

Specifically Military Weaknesses

The sepoys committed various blunders which were specifically tactical as well as strategic. Some of these were:-

a) Failure to organise as brigades or division.
b) Failure to effectively threaten the British line of communication.
c) Failure to launch timely counter-attacks.
d) Failure to use cavalry to protect flanks.
e) Failure to have contingency plans in case of unforeseen enemy movement.
f) Failure to resort to manoeuvre warfare.
The sepoys fought as a regiment or maximum as a brigade in case of Bareilly, Nimach or Indore Brigades. The Gwalior contingent was ably led by Tantia Topi. But being a civilian he was not really effective in prevailing upon the sepoys. The sepoys cannot be blamed for not having organised themselves as brigades or divisions. They were commanded by JCOs (Junior Commissioned Officers) who had never commanded anything larger than platoons. These were mostly of men between 50 and 60 years of age who had no formal military education or training in handling large troop formations. It was an age when despite having imported European tactics and European weapons native states had repeatedly failed in defeating much smaller forces commanded by European officers. No nation or race of the region was an exception to this rule. The Afghans, Gurkhas, Persians, Mahrattas, Sikhs all had been defeated as convincingly as the sepoy rebels of 1857. Leadership and not race seems to have been a core factor since even in the British force at Delhi out of a total of some 7,794 men on the effective strength as on 11 Sept 1857 some 4,608 were natives560. Out of some 1,012 men killed about 440 were natives561. The greatest force multiplier in the whole affair was the British officer who by virtue of vigorous and aggressive leadership turned numerical inferiority into moral superiority. Having served in the Pakistan Army and having observed the Pakistani officer cadre it is my personal opinion based on a study of the performance of the Indian Army before 1947 that the British officers provided relatively superior leadership as compared to the Pakistani or Indian officers. I am speaking of small unit leadership or maximum till battalion level; beyond which British leadership also was quite thick headed!

Failure to make a deliberate offensive move and threaten the British line of communications were major sepoy military failures not only at Delhi but also at Lucknow and Cawnpore. In Delhi the situation was not as simple as it appears on the first sight. The right flank of the British was protected by the Western Jumna canal which flows north to south and from 5 to 15 miles west of the Delhi —Karnal Road. The Jind and Patiala troops numbering between 5,000 to 6,000 and armed retainers of Nawab of Karnal de jure grandfather of Liaqat Ali Khan the first Prime Minister of Pakistan; played an important part in protecting the line of communication between Karnal and Delhi. In addition the British had more cavalry than the Delhi sepoys. Intelligence was another major failure in ensuring that every serious move that the sepoys made against the British line of communication failed. Although the Northwest provinces and Oudh were most actively anti-British, there were always too many volunteers who wanted to do some good business by selling information to the British. The society was too much divided and there were simply too many people in every region who wanted to sell information. Too many far-sighted pragmatic people whose descendants were to subsequently secure their position in the ranks of the Indo-Pak aristocracy which led the Muslim league in particular and had a representation to a lesser degree in the Indian National Congress. Thus, every move that the sepoys made was leaked out to the British at the Ridge or at Lucknow and as they say “forewarned is forearmed” the EEIC was always one week ahead of the sepoys in information. The Indo-Pak sub-continent is a big hotch potch of races and religions and castes. To call it a country or a nation is an apology of a nation. This strange mixture of races and castes and religions and sects makes it an easier place to rule and amply explains why foreigners from Afghanistan or Central Asia or Britain came here and so confidently knocked its people and ruled it entirely at their own convenience! India was always conquered by intrigue and treachery!

Failure to launch timely counter- attacks was another major sepoy military failure. We have seen that at Delhi the British position was highly vulnerable and the British commander was seriously contemplating withdrawal. Had the sepoys launched a serious and determined counter-attack on 15/16 or 17 September, it was quite possible that the British would have been defeated or at least repulsed. If the Hindu Jats could do it at Bhurtpore and the Sikh Jat at Chillanwalla it was possible for the sepoys to do it at Delhi. Yet it is an irony of Indo-Pak history that they failed to do so. It is also an irony of intellectual slavery that the so-called educated people of Indo-Pak think that sepoy defeat in 1857 was inevitable.

Failure to effectively use cavalry to protect their flanks was another major sepoy failure. Thus repeatedly they were outflanked at Badli Ki Serai, at Aherwa, at Lucknow in November 1857 and March 1858, at Cawnpore in December 1857. Once in the danger of being outflanked the sepoys miserably failed to change front or to use an additional reserve force to refuse a flank.

Here the pre-1857 EEIC policy of not allowing natives to become officers seems to have paid rich dividends. The Indian Army was not to have natives as officers till 1919. It seems that even after 79 years of training our officer cadre is not really upto the mark! The conduct of 1965 and 1971 wars amply proves that we have too many Hewitts and Archdale Wilsons and very few Nicholsons! This is true for both the armies since racially there is not much difference between Indians and Pakistanis.

Failure to have a reserve to meet unforeseen enemy manoeuvres was another major sepoy failure. Their initial plans to meet a British advance were normally reasonable, but their plans always lacked flexibility and any enemy action contrary to their expectations seriously disrupted their defensive posture. Thus when the British used Outram’s force to cross Gumti and threaten the sepoy line of communication from the north, the sepoys were unable to read just their positions since they did not plan against any force which could cross the Gumti and threaten their rear from north of the river.

Failure to resort to manoeuvre was a major sepoy failure. They always thought and planned in a defensive manner and left all the initiative to the enemy. Tantia Topi’s attack on Cawnpore in December 1857 was the only worthwhile example of a significant “Sepoy” offensive plan to sever the British line of communication. Also there was only one Tantia Topi on the sepoy side. The sepoys were, however, lucky that there was only one Nicholson on the British side and that Nicholson died in September 1857! Once I praise British leadership it is British small unit leadership because it was very offensive and resolute. British leadership at higher level except Nicholson was timid and highly unimaginative as it has been in most of the wars of the British Army! But comparatively speaking in Asia the British were the one eyed Kings in a land of blind!