What Pakistan’s Bomb Could Not Buy
Pervez Hoodbhoy May 29, 2006
#141 Posted by teshah on June 2, 2006 7:08:49 pm
Hood Bhai
A good article as usual by Hood Bhai. In fact, this was all due to Bhutto. He rose on the slogan of `Roti, Kapra and Makan` and ended by giving two bombs to the Paki nation, one of `Fatwae Kufr` and the other `A.Q. Khan`. Neither could save themselves. How can they save others.
BTW, no body has done so far the accounting of the atom bomb manufacturing and the recurring expenditure being incurred on its maintenance and upkeep. Will those who are responsible for doing this come up and let the nation know the exact position in this regard? I am afraid many skeletons like AQ will be found in this cupboard also.
A good article as usual by Hood Bhai. In fact, this was all due to Bhutto. He rose on the slogan of `Roti, Kapra and Makan` and ended by giving two bombs to the Paki nation, one of `Fatwae Kufr` and the other `A.Q. Khan`. Neither could save themselves. How can they save others.
BTW, no body has done so far the accounting of the atom bomb manufacturing and the recurring expenditure being incurred on its maintenance and upkeep. Will those who are responsible for doing this come up and let the nation know the exact position in this regard? I am afraid many skeletons like AQ will be found in this cupboard also.
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#140 Posted by InYourFace on June 1, 2006 4:30:43 am
WOW! Did any of you watch the Geography Bee? Indian Kids were everywhere. Even the chinese looking kid was `Sunil`!
#139 Posted by bt on June 1, 2006 1:54:21 am
I do agree with Professor Hoodbhoy. But at the end of the day, there is little to suggest that disarmament is anything but an ethical stand. And in the realm of foreign policy, ethical stands end up as disasters.
Here`s an article by one of Pakistan`s leading opinion-makers on nuclear policy. He is, according to himself, `a detterent optimist`.
Idealism Vs. Realism:
Pugwash`s Catch-22
April 27-May 3, 2001
The Friday Times (Lahore)
Vol. XIII, No. 9
By Ejaz Haider
Ejaz Haider looks at the complexities involved in the issue of nuclear disarmament - brought to the fore, yet again, not only the problems of nuclear disarmament but also the dilemma faced by Pugwash itself.
A quick run-through would perhaps help set the premise. The NNPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) was never pegged to (complete) nuclear disarmament. This, despite the pious intentions of article VI, since amended further to purge it of any ambiguity. The treaty was, and remains, the corner stone of nonproliferation efforts, legitimising the possession of nuclear weapons by five powers while denying the capability altogether to every other state (at least until such hypothetical moment in history when the five nuclear weapon states decide to go non-nuclear). The Five-Vs-the-Rest formula is therefore at the core of nonproliferation. The other plank relates to the nuclear arms control measures.
Arms control moved bilaterally between the United States and the Soviet Union from arms limitation to arms reduction during the cold war and has continued between the US and the Russian Federation. There have also been unilateral measures taken by the five nuclear weapons states to cut down on the numbers of weapons and reduce the operational salience of such weapons or, retain the capability at lower levels. However, at no point has any of the NWSs shown any inclination to move towards the abolition of nuclear weapons. The situation is complex. Indeed, far from achieving the ideal of complete disarmament, as the 2000 NPT Review Conference envisages, even the (discriminatory) nonproliferation regime is today under threat of unraveling. South Asia is overtly nuclear; missile proliferation is a reality and the US is very likely to push ahead with some form of missile defence. While it may achieve this by cutting down on offensive nuclear weapons and bolstering its defensive capability (passing that off as an arms reduction measure itself), it will definitely result in China - and Russia - putting more premium on nuclear weapons and modernising its offensive nuclear weapons. Not only would such a development put paid to arms reduction but it would also unravel the nonproliferation agenda. Together, these developments would take the world further away from conditions congenial for complete disarmament, if such conditions could ever exist, a questionable proposition in itself.
A further problem is presented by the regional nuclear weapons states, their ambitions, their security dilemmas etc. In most cases, their threat perceptions relate to ongoing regional conflicts. India may harp on the ideal of disarmament before it would agree to abolition of its own capability, but the operational reality of its capability relates to Pakistan, a perceived threat from China and the perceived nexus between China and Pakistan. Pakistan, for its part, sees India as its biggest security threat. Israel looks at its nuclear capability in view of its fear of obliteration. None of these countries, and they are by no means the only ones in the game, are likely in the foreseeable future to roll back their respective nuclear capabilities. In fact, if anything, the regional scenario would probably require, as one moves further into the new century, a different paradigm, one with greater emphasis on managing nuclear weapons sans overt deployments, rather than abolishing them. In fact, the non-deployment scenario itself presupposes that the goalposts will remain the same and the US missile defence will not result in changing the nature and hue of the game.
Not surprisingly, Pugwash faces the fallout of these developments. At the very top of the movement there is tension between the idealist and the realist approaches. It came through clearly in the two background papers by Sir Joseph Rotblat (idealist) and Prof George Rathjens (realist). Rathjens, the secretary general of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, put across four propositions: Why do states go nuclear and stay nuclear? Can states be de-motivated in regard to possessing nuclear weapons? If so, would that require extending security guarantees, and by whom? Rathjen`s proposition here seems to imply the existence of some nuclear weapons possessed by a certain state which could conceivably extend security guarantees to other state(s) to dissuade them from going nuclear or rolling back their programmes. This implication comes through in his second proposition. If the US gives up its nuclear weapons, would that not reduce its credibility as a guarantor of the security of, say Japan or South Korea, forcing these countries to develop their own nuclear capabilities? Even if it were accepted that a nuclear weapons free world is possible, how would we, in the short term, deal with any holdout states? Would we need to use multi-national forces to attack and destroy the capabilities of such states? If so, by whose authorisation and under whose command? The proposition again presumes the existence - at least until such time that the holdout states are purged - of nuclear forces even if within a multi-national framework. But could the holdouts not argue that they are holding out precisely because some states, individually or as conglomerates, still possess operational nuclear forces? After all, the perceived or real strategic compulsions of one state cannot be considered holier than those of another. Also, what is the guarantee that after the holdout state(s) has been purged of its capability that the hypothetical multi-national force - or some elements within that conglomeration - will voluntarily give up its nuclear weapons?While Pugwash plays down the difference between the idealist and the realist viewpoints as one relating more to approach than substance, it should be clear from the propositions listed above and the possibilities and questions implicit in them, that the two approaches may in fact be mutually exclusive.
Rotblat debunks the theory of deterrence. He looks at the ethical dimension of the issue, talks of a comprehensive no-first-use treaty, a verification mechanism for nuclear disarmament and strengthening and extending nuclear weapons free zones. He also rejects the bomb-in-the-basement and the breakout arguments even as he concedes that no verification mechanism can be fail-safe. His approach is essentially informed by ethics. Unfortunately, states` possession of nuclear weapons is pegged to factors other than ethics. agenda. The movement`s strength lay in the past in doing the doable; or getting things done. That is why it, and Sir Joseph Rotblat himself, earned the Nobel Peace prize in 1995. But it is precisely at this point that Pugwash`s dilemma begins. It could do what it brilliantly did until the agenda was pegged to nonproliferation and arms control; until the US and other nuclear powers wanted it to provide them a forum where they could not only reach out to each other but also take steps to get other states to agree to nonproliferation. Now it has to contend with the nuclear weapon states. How does it go about convincing them to completely disarm? Suddenly, there are no buyers for the idealist approach.But neither does the problem end here. The realist approach itself is likely to end up providing an underpinning to the nuclear weapon states` security agenda by emphasising management rather than abolition of nuclear weapons, precisely the outcome that Pugwash wants to avoid. It faces a catch-22.
© 2001 - The Friday Times
Here`s an article by one of Pakistan`s leading opinion-makers on nuclear policy. He is, according to himself, `a detterent optimist`.
Idealism Vs. Realism:
Pugwash`s Catch-22
April 27-May 3, 2001
The Friday Times (Lahore)
Vol. XIII, No. 9
By Ejaz Haider
Ejaz Haider looks at the complexities involved in the issue of nuclear disarmament - brought to the fore, yet again, not only the problems of nuclear disarmament but also the dilemma faced by Pugwash itself.
A quick run-through would perhaps help set the premise. The NNPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) was never pegged to (complete) nuclear disarmament. This, despite the pious intentions of article VI, since amended further to purge it of any ambiguity. The treaty was, and remains, the corner stone of nonproliferation efforts, legitimising the possession of nuclear weapons by five powers while denying the capability altogether to every other state (at least until such hypothetical moment in history when the five nuclear weapon states decide to go non-nuclear). The Five-Vs-the-Rest formula is therefore at the core of nonproliferation. The other plank relates to the nuclear arms control measures.
Arms control moved bilaterally between the United States and the Soviet Union from arms limitation to arms reduction during the cold war and has continued between the US and the Russian Federation. There have also been unilateral measures taken by the five nuclear weapons states to cut down on the numbers of weapons and reduce the operational salience of such weapons or, retain the capability at lower levels. However, at no point has any of the NWSs shown any inclination to move towards the abolition of nuclear weapons. The situation is complex. Indeed, far from achieving the ideal of complete disarmament, as the 2000 NPT Review Conference envisages, even the (discriminatory) nonproliferation regime is today under threat of unraveling. South Asia is overtly nuclear; missile proliferation is a reality and the US is very likely to push ahead with some form of missile defence. While it may achieve this by cutting down on offensive nuclear weapons and bolstering its defensive capability (passing that off as an arms reduction measure itself), it will definitely result in China - and Russia - putting more premium on nuclear weapons and modernising its offensive nuclear weapons. Not only would such a development put paid to arms reduction but it would also unravel the nonproliferation agenda. Together, these developments would take the world further away from conditions congenial for complete disarmament, if such conditions could ever exist, a questionable proposition in itself.
A further problem is presented by the regional nuclear weapons states, their ambitions, their security dilemmas etc. In most cases, their threat perceptions relate to ongoing regional conflicts. India may harp on the ideal of disarmament before it would agree to abolition of its own capability, but the operational reality of its capability relates to Pakistan, a perceived threat from China and the perceived nexus between China and Pakistan. Pakistan, for its part, sees India as its biggest security threat. Israel looks at its nuclear capability in view of its fear of obliteration. None of these countries, and they are by no means the only ones in the game, are likely in the foreseeable future to roll back their respective nuclear capabilities. In fact, if anything, the regional scenario would probably require, as one moves further into the new century, a different paradigm, one with greater emphasis on managing nuclear weapons sans overt deployments, rather than abolishing them. In fact, the non-deployment scenario itself presupposes that the goalposts will remain the same and the US missile defence will not result in changing the nature and hue of the game.
Not surprisingly, Pugwash faces the fallout of these developments. At the very top of the movement there is tension between the idealist and the realist approaches. It came through clearly in the two background papers by Sir Joseph Rotblat (idealist) and Prof George Rathjens (realist). Rathjens, the secretary general of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, put across four propositions: Why do states go nuclear and stay nuclear? Can states be de-motivated in regard to possessing nuclear weapons? If so, would that require extending security guarantees, and by whom? Rathjen`s proposition here seems to imply the existence of some nuclear weapons possessed by a certain state which could conceivably extend security guarantees to other state(s) to dissuade them from going nuclear or rolling back their programmes. This implication comes through in his second proposition. If the US gives up its nuclear weapons, would that not reduce its credibility as a guarantor of the security of, say Japan or South Korea, forcing these countries to develop their own nuclear capabilities? Even if it were accepted that a nuclear weapons free world is possible, how would we, in the short term, deal with any holdout states? Would we need to use multi-national forces to attack and destroy the capabilities of such states? If so, by whose authorisation and under whose command? The proposition again presumes the existence - at least until such time that the holdout states are purged - of nuclear forces even if within a multi-national framework. But could the holdouts not argue that they are holding out precisely because some states, individually or as conglomerates, still possess operational nuclear forces? After all, the perceived or real strategic compulsions of one state cannot be considered holier than those of another. Also, what is the guarantee that after the holdout state(s) has been purged of its capability that the hypothetical multi-national force - or some elements within that conglomeration - will voluntarily give up its nuclear weapons?While Pugwash plays down the difference between the idealist and the realist viewpoints as one relating more to approach than substance, it should be clear from the propositions listed above and the possibilities and questions implicit in them, that the two approaches may in fact be mutually exclusive.
Rotblat debunks the theory of deterrence. He looks at the ethical dimension of the issue, talks of a comprehensive no-first-use treaty, a verification mechanism for nuclear disarmament and strengthening and extending nuclear weapons free zones. He also rejects the bomb-in-the-basement and the breakout arguments even as he concedes that no verification mechanism can be fail-safe. His approach is essentially informed by ethics. Unfortunately, states` possession of nuclear weapons is pegged to factors other than ethics. agenda. The movement`s strength lay in the past in doing the doable; or getting things done. That is why it, and Sir Joseph Rotblat himself, earned the Nobel Peace prize in 1995. But it is precisely at this point that Pugwash`s dilemma begins. It could do what it brilliantly did until the agenda was pegged to nonproliferation and arms control; until the US and other nuclear powers wanted it to provide them a forum where they could not only reach out to each other but also take steps to get other states to agree to nonproliferation. Now it has to contend with the nuclear weapon states. How does it go about convincing them to completely disarm? Suddenly, there are no buyers for the idealist approach.But neither does the problem end here. The realist approach itself is likely to end up providing an underpinning to the nuclear weapon states` security agenda by emphasising management rather than abolition of nuclear weapons, precisely the outcome that Pugwash wants to avoid. It faces a catch-22.
© 2001 - The Friday Times
#138 Posted by sanjay on May 31, 2006 11:23:13 pm
#115 KEDARNATHJI
To all Indians like Nasah, Sanjay, et al who are criticizing India going nuclear. Could you please tell me how in the long run India should be ready to deal with nuclear armed US, Russia and China. Since the end of WW2:
Kedarnathji, I may be limited in my knowledge but what I want to say,in short, is :-
Nulcear Proliferation is a sensitive issue in international diplomacy. India has exploded the Bomb and you say it is essential to counter the hegemony of USA, Russia, China etc. Being Nuclear is not a big deal today. Atleast a dozen countries namely Israel, Japan, Australia, South Africa, Germany, Canada, Holland, Brazil, Sweden and (probably even) Saudi Arabia can explode Nuclear Bombs today, if they so wish. But they dont do because they are tied to agreements/ treaties with the powerful nations like USA/UK/France etc. and they have put their economic priorities on a higher ground than their military priorities. India (as well as Pakistan) need to learn from these dozen countries and not with P-5. Thats one point.
As far as the Nuclear Programs of India and Pakistan are concerned, the Indian Program has the backing of 3 P-5s countries namely UK, France and Russia. China is opposed to it. US was once opposed to it, then it became mum, now it is supporting provided Indian Program is controlled and under international supervision. Indians believe that with little more pursuasion, US will ultimately agree for it. Pakistan has no backers at all and its program is scoffed at by the world. Through AQ Khan, it is considered as a Nuclear Cheat and Charlatan(please dont mind the words). With negotiations on Nuclear Deal on, we Indians have to keep in mind and be ready for it, that in case we want to see ourselves in the select group of countries who shape the world, somewhere we have to compromise on our Nuclear program i.e. either sign the NPT or negotiate with the world to amend the NPT in such a way that we can sign it. Otherwise we should be ready for international isolation and be happy with our hypernation with Pakistan. There is no way out. The reason being that the D-12 countries which form an important part of the western alliance will always be asking why preferential treatment is being given to India as far as Nuclear issue is concerned.
So the choice is ours and we have to decide it in the very near future what do we want. Remain in emotional jingoism of being a self-proclaimed nuclear power or join the western alliance to boost trade and economy and be a partner in shaping the world`s future.
We are not going to get both the birds thats for sure. So in my mind, the government(of India) has to conduct a public debate on our nuclear future and see whether we can sign the NPT ,in its original or modified form, or not.
I have been criticising India Nuclear Program because I fell we did not get anything out it. Neither we have been declared as a Nuclear Power for enjoying its status as such nor we have been benefitted in trade and economics particularly by the western world by not becoming one. In short , Hum hain waheen, hum they jehan.
To all Indians like Nasah, Sanjay, et al who are criticizing India going nuclear. Could you please tell me how in the long run India should be ready to deal with nuclear armed US, Russia and China. Since the end of WW2:
Kedarnathji, I may be limited in my knowledge but what I want to say,in short, is :-
Nulcear Proliferation is a sensitive issue in international diplomacy. India has exploded the Bomb and you say it is essential to counter the hegemony of USA, Russia, China etc. Being Nuclear is not a big deal today. Atleast a dozen countries namely Israel, Japan, Australia, South Africa, Germany, Canada, Holland, Brazil, Sweden and (probably even) Saudi Arabia can explode Nuclear Bombs today, if they so wish. But they dont do because they are tied to agreements/ treaties with the powerful nations like USA/UK/France etc. and they have put their economic priorities on a higher ground than their military priorities. India (as well as Pakistan) need to learn from these dozen countries and not with P-5. Thats one point.
As far as the Nuclear Programs of India and Pakistan are concerned, the Indian Program has the backing of 3 P-5s countries namely UK, France and Russia. China is opposed to it. US was once opposed to it, then it became mum, now it is supporting provided Indian Program is controlled and under international supervision. Indians believe that with little more pursuasion, US will ultimately agree for it. Pakistan has no backers at all and its program is scoffed at by the world. Through AQ Khan, it is considered as a Nuclear Cheat and Charlatan(please dont mind the words). With negotiations on Nuclear Deal on, we Indians have to keep in mind and be ready for it, that in case we want to see ourselves in the select group of countries who shape the world, somewhere we have to compromise on our Nuclear program i.e. either sign the NPT or negotiate with the world to amend the NPT in such a way that we can sign it. Otherwise we should be ready for international isolation and be happy with our hypernation with Pakistan. There is no way out. The reason being that the D-12 countries which form an important part of the western alliance will always be asking why preferential treatment is being given to India as far as Nuclear issue is concerned.
So the choice is ours and we have to decide it in the very near future what do we want. Remain in emotional jingoism of being a self-proclaimed nuclear power or join the western alliance to boost trade and economy and be a partner in shaping the world`s future.
We are not going to get both the birds thats for sure. So in my mind, the government(of India) has to conduct a public debate on our nuclear future and see whether we can sign the NPT ,in its original or modified form, or not.
I have been criticising India Nuclear Program because I fell we did not get anything out it. Neither we have been declared as a Nuclear Power for enjoying its status as such nor we have been benefitted in trade and economics particularly by the western world by not becoming one. In short , Hum hain waheen, hum they jehan.
#137 Posted by sanjay on May 31, 2006 10:56:56 pm
#106 VIEWER
Are you sure that America will remain a superpower for the next 100 years or so. To tell the truth, I donot see America assuming that role for more than 15 years.
Seriously speaking, the trends as avialable today show than no other country will be able to match USA atleast in this century--the hype and hoopla in favour of China notwithstanding.
China has too many chinks in its armour and due to its overzealousness for growth, has put on shelf many basic principles of development, trade and business. China is heading for a future worse than USSR. Just keep on watching.
Are you sure that America will remain a superpower for the next 100 years or so. To tell the truth, I donot see America assuming that role for more than 15 years.
Seriously speaking, the trends as avialable today show than no other country will be able to match USA atleast in this century--the hype and hoopla in favour of China notwithstanding.
China has too many chinks in its armour and due to its overzealousness for growth, has put on shelf many basic principles of development, trade and business. China is heading for a future worse than USSR. Just keep on watching.
#136 Posted by VRV on May 31, 2006 6:23:03 pm
Re: # 122
HP,
It doesn`t need a report or the US source to know that India is a home for many poor people in the world. India is still a poor country but we are coming out of poverty slowly but surely.
Having said that, poverty is not a sin. That was bequeathed to us by the years of slavery and plunder. Being poor is better than being a source of hatred.
Recently I saw a new kind of map (New Scientist Apr `06 issue, week I forgot) of 1500 AD. It showed the GDP sizes of all countries in the world. Only China and India were the largest/richest countries in the world then. Tables turned in these years and India is now looking smaller. Wait for some time. She`s looking up and the future is bright, despite the odd hickups.
If we go back in history, the people of Europe clamoured to reach India and find her riches. They all formed East India Companies- Dutch had it, France had it, English had it and Portuguease and Spaniards had it. They all competed to find sea routes to India and find her riches and buy diverse kinds of goods and sell them for profit in Europe! Though China was equally famous they had no China Companies. So that makes it clear as to how inportant India was in those days, coz it was rich and famous. Every place around India was named after her.You have Indian Ocean, Indonesia, Indo-China (Vietnam), East Indies (Malaysia and the the chain of islands along Malacca Straits) even the far away Caribbean islands are called as West Indies (thinking that they are closer to India ergo, America).
Unfortunately the heart of India - the land of river Indus - was lost to some religious bigots...
Colombus want to go to India and instead went westwards (via Azores) and reached India of his dreams but that came out to be America. That`s how the natives of Americas are still being called Indians. Another Portuguese mariner Vasco De Gama came here and later followed the rest of Europeans. Starting with the Moghul court of Jalabdim Echebar (Jalaluddin Akber or Akber the Great was referred to by the English King like that) these westerners prostrated before us to gain access to Indian markets and goods.
Even in ancient India, there were world famous ports like Karachi, Cambay, Barooch, Surat and famour Malabar/Calicut. India had a fully developed civilisation since 2500 BC. Mohd Bin Qasim had a tiff with local merchants in Sind and he took revenge and did something historic... It`s a lesson how petty things sometimes create history.
Poverty is man made and in the case of India it`s just a passing cloud.
On the other side, India in a way celebrated poverty. One of the Maurya emperors gave up his throne and starved to death in true Jaina fashion. Even now you`ll find some diamond traders in western India throw away their diamonds and become monks and live like paupers seeking alms. Buddha did it and many Buddhist monks still follow that tradition.
May be we need 20-30 years to say with pride that poverty is a matter of past....
HP,
It doesn`t need a report or the US source to know that India is a home for many poor people in the world. India is still a poor country but we are coming out of poverty slowly but surely.
Having said that, poverty is not a sin. That was bequeathed to us by the years of slavery and plunder. Being poor is better than being a source of hatred.
Recently I saw a new kind of map (New Scientist Apr `06 issue, week I forgot) of 1500 AD. It showed the GDP sizes of all countries in the world. Only China and India were the largest/richest countries in the world then. Tables turned in these years and India is now looking smaller. Wait for some time. She`s looking up and the future is bright, despite the odd hickups.
If we go back in history, the people of Europe clamoured to reach India and find her riches. They all formed East India Companies- Dutch had it, France had it, English had it and Portuguease and Spaniards had it. They all competed to find sea routes to India and find her riches and buy diverse kinds of goods and sell them for profit in Europe! Though China was equally famous they had no China Companies. So that makes it clear as to how inportant India was in those days, coz it was rich and famous. Every place around India was named after her.You have Indian Ocean, Indonesia, Indo-China (Vietnam), East Indies (Malaysia and the the chain of islands along Malacca Straits) even the far away Caribbean islands are called as West Indies (thinking that they are closer to India ergo, America).
Unfortunately the heart of India - the land of river Indus - was lost to some religious bigots...
Colombus want to go to India and instead went westwards (via Azores) and reached India of his dreams but that came out to be America. That`s how the natives of Americas are still being called Indians. Another Portuguese mariner Vasco De Gama came here and later followed the rest of Europeans. Starting with the Moghul court of Jalabdim Echebar (Jalaluddin Akber or Akber the Great was referred to by the English King like that) these westerners prostrated before us to gain access to Indian markets and goods.
Even in ancient India, there were world famous ports like Karachi, Cambay, Barooch, Surat and famour Malabar/Calicut. India had a fully developed civilisation since 2500 BC. Mohd Bin Qasim had a tiff with local merchants in Sind and he took revenge and did something historic... It`s a lesson how petty things sometimes create history.
Poverty is man made and in the case of India it`s just a passing cloud.
On the other side, India in a way celebrated poverty. One of the Maurya emperors gave up his throne and starved to death in true Jaina fashion. Even now you`ll find some diamond traders in western India throw away their diamonds and become monks and live like paupers seeking alms. Buddha did it and many Buddhist monks still follow that tradition.
May be we need 20-30 years to say with pride that poverty is a matter of past....
#135 Posted by Simon_Templar on May 31, 2006 2:42:10 pm
I have long maintained, and it has never been truer today,
that Pervaiz is irrelevant to any discussion outside his field
of physics.
that Pervaiz is irrelevant to any discussion outside his field
of physics.
#134 Posted by tahmed32 on May 31, 2006 2:28:21 pm
#133 That is wonderful. 8.4%. As Finance Minister of India, you must be really proud of this achievement on your part. My congratulations to you and to the Indian Prime Minister.
#133 Posted by arjun_m on May 31, 2006 2:24:44 pm
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#132 Posted by tahmed32 on May 31, 2006 1:58:28 pm
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#131 Posted by arjun_m on May 31, 2006 12:31:17 pm
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#130 Posted by arjun_m on May 31, 2006 12:25:58 pm
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#129 Posted by bharath on May 31, 2006 11:51:03 am
Yaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaawnnnnnnnnnn!
And in November after US congress approves the deal ...............
what should we hear from Hate Pot?
``MEOW``..........
the same thing that him and his el-presidente say when a few cruise missiles land in Pukiland......:-)))
And in November after US congress approves the deal ...............
what should we hear from Hate Pot?
``MEOW``..........
the same thing that him and his el-presidente say when a few cruise missiles land in Pukiland......:-)))
#128 Posted by HP on May 31, 2006 11:45:41 am
And now from the Indian papers...
It is not going to happen....Ha ha...all that bluster down the drain....
http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1690362,001301790001.htm
The landmark Indo-US civilian nuclear deal is unlikely to be approved by the US Congress before its mid-term election in November.
This view was expressed by members of the Congressional Caucus on India during their meeting with visiting Indian Members of Parliament.
The caucus members felt that the agreement was not discussed but thrust on the legislature, according to sources in the delegation.
The members said lawmakers were not consulted before pushing the deal on the table. ``It is like a bride in the room without the consent of the groom,`` they said.
India=Worst than sub saharan africa and now no deal....
#127 Posted by HP on May 31, 2006 11:32:39 am
What is doubly worst than the sub saharan africa?
India, of course...
See the report here.
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-ft-india29may29,1,2822578.story?ctrack=1&cset=true
#126 Posted by arjun_m on May 31, 2006 11:26:09 am
aww..paki cab driver got pissed cos I rained in on his self-delusion parade....
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