Musharraf Spilling the Beans—Why Now?

#486 Bhand-Macacus-ignoramus,

...the Indians had to accomplish the twin feats of climbing 90-degree gradients and brave volleys of gunfire...

LoL .. you can`t be serious. It was at gunpoint that macacas climbed as anyone who turned back was shot by their own seniors and anyone who did was shot by the Paks on top. But the Indians fought by attrition regardless of the fact they were killed like flies till Paks ran out of ammunition and supplies.

How many Paks were there in the first place? Answer: Max 5,000. How many Indians? The entire available army PLUS airforce. And what happened? They were scared to cross the LOC all that while .. even after Pak withdrew....

A full account underneath by your R. Sukumaran (from Indian point of view):

The 1999 Kargil Conflict
The Kargil conflict of 1999 bears some parallels to the 1962 experience in Indian attitudes to the use of air power, though the prohibition this time on the use of offensive air power was not as absolute.

The Plan

Pakistan`s Kargil operations were apparently planned sometime in November 1998. In an article titled ``Analysis of the Kargil Conflict 1999`` in the April 2002 issue of the RUSI Journal, Brig Shaukat Qadir (retd.), states that the plan was formulated by Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed, then commanding 10 Corps, and Maj Gen Javed Hassan, then GOC, Frontier Constabulary of the Northern Areas (FCNA). It was forwarded to the COAS, Gen Pervez Musharraf by the CGS, Lt Gen Muhammed Aziz. The idea was to exploit the large gaps that existed in the Kargil sector to cut the Leh-Srinagar highway and thereby prevent re-supply in the Ladakh area. The plan also dictated the capture of certain key heights in the Batalik and Turtok areas in order to cut off the Siachen glacier and force India out of Siachen. The plan was approved and preparations commenced.

The plan was actually far more wide ranging. The conventional force ratio of 2.25:1 was in India`s favour. To counter the intrusion in Kargil, India was expected to rush troops into Jammu and Kashmir, thus depleting its forces elsewhere. Mujahideen would step up their activities in the depleted rear areas, cutting lines of communication at selected points, to form isolated pockets. When Indian troops were rushed in, the forces in Kargil could push forward. This would result in forcing India to the negotiating table. Pakistan would be able to hold on to its gains and strengthen its bargaining position. Conventional war was ruled out because India would not have the strength of forces needed to carry out an offensive, due to the need to stem the gaps in J&K. If war did occur, it would end in stalemate, thus stabilising the situation in Pakistan`s favour. In any case, India was not expected to start a nuclear war.

In Kargil 1999 — Pakistan`s Fourth War for Kashmir, Air Cmde (retd) Jasjit Singh quotes Altaf Gauhar, once President Ayub Khan`s information adviser, as saying that the plan dated back to 1987 and formed part of General Zia-ul-Haq`s `Op Topac`. 40 It had then been shelved following strong objections raised by Foreign Minister Sahebzada Yakub Khan, who had cast doubts on the Army`s ability to sustain operations. Revived in 1996, exercises based on the plan were held in 1997 by 10 Corps, then commanded by Maj. Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Gen. Jehangir Karamat`s objections possibly contributed to his removal from the post of COAS.

Execution

By November 1998, Pakistani regulars had started infiltrating the area in small bands. The troops were inserted in winter, when Indian troops normally withdrew from the heights. When the Indians returned, it would be to find Pakistani troops already well entrenched in their former positions. Up to 1,000 well-equipped regular soldiers occupied the heights, ostensibly camouflaged as mujahideen. Four times as many troops were used to provide logistical support to these soldiers.

For the past several years, the Indian Army had been occupied in counter-insurgency operations. This had involved deployment well away from the LoC, mainly to block likely infiltration routes along valleys and approaches to the towns and villages where these routes converged. Foot patrols and air reconnaissance sorties along the LoC were the exception rather than the rule. The intrusions were thus not detected till early May.
On May 03, 1999, local shepherds reported seeing strangers digging in on the heights. Over the next few days, three Army patrols were sent out. All were repulsed with casualties. Lack of intelligence on the extent of the infiltration and other details made planning difficult. The Army now launched, Operation Vijay, to evict the intruders. However, carefully directed enemy artillery fire resulted in the destruction of the Army`s main artillery dump on May 09. Over the next few days, Army casualties mounted.
The number of intruders, initially assessed byt the Army Headquarters as being between 80 to 100 by May 18, continued to be revised upwards, finally being estimated as between 1600 and 2500. Initially, however, local commanders were quick to downgrade the scale of the intrusion; it iis safe to say that the Army was in denial. This delayed any request for air support that could have been made.

Army Requests for Offensive Air Support and IAF Reaction

The Air Headquarters first received a request for armed helicopter support against intruders in the Batalik sector on May 07, 1999. The Army was advised to use artillery first and only then ask for air power. On May 11, the Army again asked for attack helicopters. The Air Headquarters asked for a fuller picture of the situation. It stated that attack helicopters could not be used at those altitudes. The Mi-17 armed helicopters would be more suitable. Attack helicopters like the Mi-35 would be vulnerable to surface air defences and would also require fighter escort, in case of enemy reaction. It was therefore felt that fighters would be preferable to helicopters. In any case, the Air Force desired Government sanction, because of the danger of escalation.

By May 18, the extent and depth of the intrusion had become clear. With the COAS, Gen. V. P. Malik away on a visit to Poland, the VCOAS, Lt. Gen. Chandrasekhar requested the use of offensive air power. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) discussed the matter on May 20. The Army once again called for attack helicopters. It did not see why these could not be used when Army Aviation helicopters were flying in the area. The CAS, Air Chief Marshal A. Y. Tipnis, was of the view that the use of air power close to the LoC could result in escalation. The IAF proposed the destruction of enemy logistics bases in the vicinity of the LoC initially, and then, subsequently, those in the middle distance, using fighters. However, there was a danger of fighters crossing the LoC. As the Government had not yet decided on the advisability of crossing the LoC, the use of air power was again deferred.

Clearance for Use of Airpower

The COAS returned to India on May 21 and visited the forward areas on May 23. He felt that it was unlikely that the intruders could be evicted before winter, without the use of air power. On May 24, he discussed the situation with the CAS. The next day, they made their presentations to the CCS. The CCS then authorised the Armed Forces to take any necessary action to evict the intruders, with the binding stipulation that the LoC not be crossed.

IAF Operations

The IAF rules of engagement for `Operation Safed Sagar` stressed the CCS stipulation that the LoC was on no account to be crossed. Between May 27 and 28 the IAF lost three aircraft, a MiG-21, a MiG-27 and a Mi-17. The MiG-27 developed mechanical trouble forcing the pilot to eject. The MiG-21 pilot, orbiting in the area to look for the ejectee, ventured too low and was shot down by a man-portable SAM. The Mi-17 was also lost to a SAM, possibly due to the lack of a flare dispenser.

Earlier, on May 21 a Canberra reconnaissance aircraft operating in the Kargil sector, had got one engine damaged by a SAM. It was clear that the intruders had access to man-portable missiles, hitherto not used in the valley. The subsequent use of SAMs should not, therefore, have come as a surprise. This also pointed to the possibility that regular forces were probably involved, since SAMs have never been used by the militants in Kashmir.

Change of Tactics

The losses resulted in a change of tactics. Fighter operations stayed well above the ridgelines, using high-level bombing and laser-guided bombs. Mirage fighters were used to lob laser-guided weapons at the bunkersan expensive way to fight infantry. However, no more aircraft were lost. Eventually, a combination of air power, determined infantry assault, and artillery bombardment resulted in the Pakistani forces retreating across the LoC. The turning point was the encirclement and then the successful air attack on the Muntho Dalo base camp, a logistics hub. The destruction of the camp resulted in the intruders` supply line being cut. Their positions having become untenable, they were forced to withdraw.

LoL!

#484 by zeemacaca

So what`s your point? I doubt if you know yourself what exactly you`re getting at.

Abay Zeemacaca...the point is that the excuse that you guys got your butts handed because there were only 30,000 Paki troops is spurious, because no war is fought on equal terms, it`s not a Cricket or Soccer match where sides are equally numbered.

But for Muktis joining Indians into Mitro Bahini, Pak wouldn`t have lost that war even with 30,000 troops against the Indians alone if the locals weren`t against them.

What would have happened is hypothetical and there is no way you or I can prove anything, but if your argument is that Paki troops are superior, let`s take another conflict, the Kargil war, where there were no locals to aid Indian troops and you had occupied the commanding heights and the Indians had to accomplish the twin feats of climbing 90-degree gradients and brave volleys of gunfire, how come you still lost?

Pirates of the Mediterranean

By ROBERT HARRIS
September 30, 2006


IN the autumn of 68 B.C. the world’s only military superpower was dealt a profound psychological blow by a daring terrorist attack on its very heart. Rome’s port at Ostia was set on fire, the consular war fleet destroyed, and two prominent senators, together with their bodyguards and staff, kidnapped.

The incident, dramatic though it was, has not attracted much attention from modern historians. But history is mutable. An event that was merely a footnote five years ago has now, in our post-9/11 world, assumed a fresh and ominous significance. For in the panicky aftermath of the attack, the Roman people made decisions that set them on the path to the destruction of their Constitution, their democracy and their liberty. One cannot help wondering if history is repeating itself.

Consider the parallels. The perpetrators of this spectacular assault were not in the pay of any foreign power: no nation would have dared to attack Rome so provocatively. They were, rather, the disaffected of the earth: “The ruined men of all nations,” in the words of the great 19th-century German historian Theodor Mommsen, “a piratical state with a peculiar esprit de corps.”

Like Al Qaeda, these pirates were loosely organized, but able to spread a disproportionate amount of fear among citizens who had believed themselves immune from attack. To quote Mommsen again: “The Latin husbandman, the traveler on the Appian highway, the genteel bathing visitor at the terrestrial paradise of Baiae were no longer secure of their property or their life for a single moment.”

What was to be done? Over the preceding centuries, the Constitution of ancient Rome had developed an intricate series of checks and balances intended to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of a single individual. The consulship, elected annually, was jointly held by two men. Military commands were of limited duration and subject to regular renewal. Ordinary citizens were accustomed to a remarkable degree of liberty: the cry of “Civis Romanus sum” — “I am a Roman citizen” — was a guarantee of safety throughout the world.

But such was the panic that ensued after Ostia that the people were willing to compromise these rights. The greatest soldier in Rome, the 38-year-old Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (better known to posterity as Pompey the Great) arranged for a lieutenant of his, the tribune Aulus Gabinius, to rise in the Roman Forum and propose an astonishing new law.

“Pompey was to be given not only the supreme naval command but what amounted in fact to an absolute authority and uncontrolled power over everyone,” the Greek historian Plutarch wrote. “There were not many places in the Roman world that were not included within these limits.”

Pompey eventually received almost the entire contents of the Roman Treasury — 144 million sesterces — to pay for his “war on terror,” which included building a fleet of 500 ships and raising an army of 120,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. Such an accumulation of power was unprecedented, and there was literally a riot in the Senate when the bill was debated.

Nevertheless, at a tumultuous mass meeting in the center of Rome, Pompey’s opponents were cowed into submission, the Lex Gabinia passed (illegally), and he was given his power. In the end, once he put to sea, it took less than three months to sweep the pirates from the entire Mediterranean. Even allowing for Pompey’s genius as a military strategist, the suspicion arises that if the pirates could be defeated so swiftly, they could hardly have been such a grievous threat in the first place.

But it was too late to raise such questions. By the oldest trick in the political book — the whipping up of a panic, in which any dissenting voice could be dismissed as “soft” or even “traitorous” — powers had been ceded by the people that would never be returned. Pompey stayed in the Middle East for six years, establishing puppet regimes throughout the region, and turning himself into the richest man in the empire.

Those of us who are not Americans can only look on in wonder at the similar ease with which the ancient rights and liberties of the individual are being surrendered in the United States in the wake of 9/11. The vote by the Senate on Thursday to suspend the right of habeas corpus for terrorism detainees, denying them their right to challenge their detention in court; the careful wording about torture, which forbids only the inducement of “serious” physical and mental suffering to obtain information; the admissibility of evidence obtained in the United States without a search warrant; the licensing of the president to declare a legal resident of the United States an enemy combatant — all this represents an historic shift in the balance of power between the citizen and the executive.

An intelligent, skeptical American would no doubt scoff at the thought that what has happened since 9/11 could presage the destruction of a centuries-old constitution; but then, I suppose, an intelligent, skeptical Roman in 68 B.C. might well have done the same.

In truth, however, the Lex Gabinia was the beginning of the end of the Roman republic. It set a precedent. Less than a decade later, Julius Caesar — the only man, according to Plutarch, who spoke out in favor of Pompey’s special command during the Senate debate — was awarded similar, extended military sovereignty in Gaul. Previously, the state, through the Senate, largely had direction of its armed forces; now the armed forces began to assume direction of the state.

It also brought a flood of money into an electoral system that had been designed for a simpler, non-imperial era. Caesar, like Pompey, with all the resources of Gaul at his disposal, became immensely wealthy, and used his treasure to fund his own political faction. Henceforth, the result of elections was determined largely by which candidate had the most money to bribe the electorate. In 49 B.C., the system collapsed completely, Caesar crossed the Rubicon — and the rest, as they say, is ancient history.

It may be that the Roman republic was doomed in any case. But the disproportionate reaction to the raid on Ostia unquestionably hastened the process, weakening the restraints on military adventurism and corrupting the political process. It was to be more than 1,800 years before anything remotely comparable to Rome’s democracy — imperfect though it was — rose again.

The Lex Gabinia was a classic illustration of the law of unintended consequences: it fatally subverted the institution it was supposed to protect. Let us hope that vote in the United States Senate does not have the same result.

#479 Mr. Bhand-Macacus-ignoramus,

So Mr. Bhand-Macacus-ignoramus, what`re you trying to argue? Is it that Pak lost that war? That is no argument. Of-course Pak lost that war so it is not contentious. What else? Is it that Pak government lied to its people? Of-course it did and that is not contentious either. So what`s your point? I doubt if you know yourself what exactly you`re getting at.

Anyway, now let`s get serious. Pak underestimated the Muktis which was a folly. But for Muktis joining Indians into Mitro Bahini, Pak wouldn`t have lost that war even with 30,000 troops against the Indians alone if the locals weren`t against them. As it was, there was a guerilla movement with popular support and the Indians in front in pitched battle, so Pak had to pay the price for their mistake in surrendering to prevent wholesale slaughter.

Happy now?

#482 by okhla99

In Cricket, in Hockey, in Squash, wherever India does not have numerical superiority, Pakistan has completely outclassed and outcompeted India.

Yaar Okhla, it is true that Indians generally aren`t as physically strong, but it is also true that when it comes to brains, Pakis are a poor second. Perhaps that is nature`s way of balancing things between the two peoples. However, even where physical strength matters, why is that Pakistan hasn`t won a single war against India? Even in Kargil, where the Paki Army had the commanding heights, it eventually lost them. Perhaps the brain is more important than brawns? Any other nation with half a brain would have wisened up after 71, but like I said, Pakistan is a different kettle of fish.

Even today, India is scared of Pakistan military (whether due to nuclear option or not..)....

Dude, which fairy world are you living in? Pakistan has been humiliated every time it has gone to war with India, isn`t that some accomplishment for a ``scared`` army?

India is also scared of Bangladesh Army, it cannot take any action against what it sees as insulting and violent acts. Or maybe there is no sense of self-respect left any more..

That is because India doesn`t believe in going to war for flimsy reasons. Hugo Chavez humiliated the US on US soil, does that mean the US will attack Venezuela? As for self-respect, your President wets his pants on just a phone call from Colin Powell, your establishment sells Pakis for dollars, and you guys continue to live under such a regime. Could there be anything more humiliating than that?

Re: # 479

Harish Bhai,
In Cricket, in Hockey, in Squash, wherever India does not have numerical superiority, Pakistan has completely outclassed and outcompeted India.

Even today, India is scared of Pakistan military (whether due to nuclear option or not..).
India is also scared of Bangladesh Army, it cannot take any action against what it sees as insulting and violent acts. Or maybe there is no sense of self-respect left any more..

#478 by fiendish_macaca_adhominus (yet another category discovered).

Why do you keep harping on my dad? At the time he was just visiting on an official trip and got caught up in the whole thing when all flights were suspended. Didn`t I say he wasn`t in the army and nothing to surrender? The macacas abducted him while on his way to Dacca Intercontinental (the UN camp in Dacca) alongwith his colleagues and he was never in any danger. However the macacas upon checking his identity found out he would be a nice hostage.

Anyway if you feel better, they treated him fine, and he doesn`t hold any grudge.

That`s the characteristic of people like you ... i.e. the macaca_adhominus. When they can`t find any other argument, they just try to attack any useful stuff they come across during the argument. That`s the most disgusting category. But don`t worry, you`re in good company. There`re plenty like you here.

Re: # 476

Most ``utterly`` respected Masadi Sahib,

You cannot ignore sanity. You cannot ignore reason. Not for long anyway.
Pakistan will not let the Jehadis take over.

Deepest regards.....

#475 by zeemacaca

Ok .. So, Mr. Bhand-Macacus-ignoramus, you accept that you don`t know head or tails about that war.

LoL! The great warrior Paki warrior Zeemacaca has already declared victory, just as his dad had done 35 years ago, only to be humiliated and then taken a POW. Trust the Paki macacas to conjure up victories from the thin air. Sample this:

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,878969-1,00.html

``All week long, meanwhile, the Pakistani regime kept up a running drumfire about Pakistan`s jihad, or holy war, with India. An army colonel insisted there were no Pakistani losses whatsoever on the battlefield (is that Zeemacaca`s dad? How convincing he is!! LOL!). His reasoning: ``In the pursuit of jihad, nobody dies. He lives forever.`` Pakistan radio and television blared forth patriotic songs such as All of Pakistan Is Wide Awake and The Martyr`s Blood Will Not Go Wasted. The propaganda was accompanied by a totally unrealistic picture of the war. At one point, government spokesmen claimed that Pakistan had knocked out 123 Indian aircraft to a loss of seven of their own, a most unlikely kill ratio of nearly 18 to l. Islamabad insisted that Pakistani forces were still holding on to the city of Jessore even though newsmen rode into the city only hours after its liberation.``

Next, to answer your question, Pak army of 30,000 lost to Mitro Bahini.

I`m sure you know who the Mitro Bahini was made up of, look it up a little more closely and don`t believe what your dad told you. He was probably doing that to soothe his bruised and humiliated ego.

Pee max, merey betay
Tell me why your dad surrendered to Indian army and not to Muktis, his ex-pakistani brothers?

PS: I will suggest that you try google to find out on what condition Pakistan agreed to recognize Bangladesh.

PPS: Also check why papa peemax starting pee-ing in his pants again when Bangladesh wanted to try 195 war criminals in 1973 and why that didn`t happen.

A review of Musharraf`s book published on Amazon.com by someone from Karachi. It captures the essence of the book in my opinion:


Reviewer: Book Lover (Karachi) -

When I went to purchase the book at a Karachi bookshop there was an amusing debate going on between some of the shop staff and customers on whether the book was better suited for the fiction shelves as opposed to its assigned place in the non-fiction section.

I suggest to all die-hard Musharraf fans, please ease off. Most of you live in the US, Canada or elsewhere. Try living in Pakistan under this self-heroic miltary dictator who `can do no wrong` and you might quickly change your mind.

To expose the blighter all you have to do is ask him one simple question : General, Where do you see yourself five years from now?

The answer will of course be ``In uniform and in power in Pakistan, and god help anyone who dares oppose me``.