The General and Kargil

Other more interesting versions of names:

Mouse arraf!

Man o man Sing!

Taali ban!

Army tease!

Pow well!

Can do Rice!

Chain ee!

Rum s felt!

kargil was a great war in in india, it was the first war which was fully televised, chicks sending SMS to jawans an all. irrespective of casualties, the important thing is most indians felt victorious though are ashamed of intelligence failure and most pakis are ashamed of their faujis who lied about mujees, had a shameful visit to beg to clinton etc. it was offcourse good for raytheon.

I don`t know how macacas have this thing about Nawaz`s visit to US ... I`ve heard this more than once ... perhaps it`s what their media told them that Nawaz requested that visit.

On 4th of July? Would Clinton see anyone on the national holiday at his request?

Nawaz was called by Clinton at Nawaz`s convenience, and Nawaz`s convenience was 4th July. Kulsoom went with him and he dropped her off in NY for shopping. She came back with bags full of Bloomingdales.

Don`t macacas know that CIA had reported that Pak had positioned tactical nukes and it was Clinton who requested the meeting, not Nawaz?

Silly macacas.

#35

the day Gen Daljit Singh will stand at the head of his column of tanks rolling down the Qaid-e-Azam boulevald in Isloo (oh, I`m sure there must be atlest one Q-e-A road in Islamabad).

Zeemax will be standing by the roadside

``oh this Sikh guy, he was going from Pathankot to Wagah and lost his way, and we Paki`s were generous in letting him in. This is just you macacas making a big deal out of nothing, his car is kinda unusual though.``

``Writing about the coup in Thailand last week, Simon Tisdall of the Guardian coined the word ‘musharrafed’ to describe events in Bangkok.

Clearly, this word describes what happens when a general seizes power from an elected government, and might enter the lexicon of political expressions. I think it was in the early nineties that a sports writer in England first used the verb ‘Waqarred’ to describe the dismissal of a batsman to a fast, swinging Yorker directed at his toes. Coined after our very own Waqar Younus, this word has entered the Oxford dictionary. I imagine it’s a matter of time before ‘musharrafed’, too, is similarly honoured with an entry, which, I suppose, would look something like this:

To Musharraf: Verb, transitive. Pronunciation: mush-a-ruff. 1) To stage a coup d’etat against an elected government. 2) To seize power illegally. 3) To use spurious reasoning to justify grabbing power, and then hanging on indefinitely.``(Irfan Husain in Khaleej Times)


Just to remind Irfan Husain -- that the term was first coined on Chowk -- the very next day of the Thai coup by a Thai Muslim COAS General SOndhi -- about to be fired by the great Thai sinner Prime minister Thaksin.

#35

you are a jerk, but anyway, read Strobe Talbotts ``Engaging India``.

re #36
:)
It`s kinda hard to understand why Pakistan would need to rattle their `tactical` nukes if they were winning brilliantly in Kargil and India was losing hundreds or even thousands of soldiers and they had just lost 5....

Re: # 35 zeemax

I think your theory has weight. One must keep in mind that during the whole two month of combat operations Indian Air Force was put in the strait jacket by Pakistan from the very beggining. This is only possible when there is a credible threat present for tactical nuclear strike in response to air incursions. Practically, Indian airforce and military could strike on any Pakistani city or the supply lines to the Kargil or Karakoram Highwayby using air strikes or surface-to-surface missile, but for all intent or purpose they couldn`t.

I think at tactical level we can say that Pakistan was not able to achieve is military objective of cutting Indian highway 1-A leading to Siachin but strategically it gained at two levels - One, it broiught the issue of Kashmir back on the international table and second, from now on there will be a double-edged sword of Democlese always hanging on Indian heads - one edge of this sword is the fear that Pakistan can (and I believe it should) repeat a Kargil like operation anywhere along 800 km long Cease Fire Line and the other edge is the fear that next time the militant freedom struggle from inside Kashmir will be more coordinated in case of a Pakistani operation. In order to counter these two simultaneous threats India has to keep a mobilized army with in Kashmir numbering upto 700k at times. Mobilizing an army of this magnitude has cost associated with it.

On the other hand Pakistan does not have to maintain a posture of this magnitude to neutralize a potential Indian threat because of two reasons - One there is no insurgency on Pakistani Kashmir, therefore, supply lines are safer and, second, The Kargil war proves that Pakistan has a credible tactical nuclear defense system so Indians will have to think millions of times before stepping into Pakistani territory.

#40 urstruly, i agree mostly that pakistan withot nukes would not be able to do a kargil. i agree that the indian forces (and govt) were not ready (strong enough) to attack at least muzzafarabad..they were not ready for the consequences, nuke and others (like getting into a costly war which will cause another decade of economic stagnation like thhe seventies). so however ill-advised the kargil was i am somewhat proud of the way the indian govt handled and contained the crisis without affecting the indian public in general negatively.

one thing that is confusing however is this stuff about ``internationalization`` of kashmir. what the heck is that but hollow rhetoric? there was a question on who wants to be millinaire about which two countries fight over kashmir and the contestant was a teacher (american). she had no real idea which two countries .. and what does internationalization achieve? IMO the last years earthquake internationalized kashmir far more than kargil.

#40 by Urstruly on October 9, 2006 9:09am PT


Practically, Indian airforce and military could strike on any Pakistani city or the supply lines to the Kargil or Karakoram Highwayby using air strikes or surface-to-surface missile, but for all intent or purpose they couldn`t.


Practically, you could have threatened to escalate the conflict to a nuclear level and refused to give up the land you had occupied in Kargil..land that you`ve said all along is your jugular vein..You could have sent the PAF over the LoC to save your army that was getting the crap bombed out of it..

You didn`t because you lacked the testicular fortitude and the capability to hold on to what you`ve always claimed was yours..and then there`s this little matter of India having nukes as well, something pakis tend to forget..


I think at tactical level we can say that Pakistan was not able to achieve is military objective of cutting Indian highway 1-A leading to Siachin


that`s right...you failed..suck it up..


One, it broiught the issue of Kashmir back on the international table


It`s brought Kashmir to the terrorism table..Pakistan is much much further away from the Kashmir banega Pakiland dream than it ever was..you`ve even given up your demand for the UN resolution to be implemented without India giving up anything in return..


In order to counter these two simultaneous threats India has to keep a mobilized army with in Kashmir numbering upto 700k at times. Mobilizing an army of this magnitude has cost associated with it.


Umm...Pakistan spends a far higher percentage of it`s GDP on it`s military...

So it was a tactical failure and a strategic failure...

What Kargil has done is send the message that the Indian public considers Indian Kashmir a part of India and Pakiland`s nukes aren`t a deterrent to India taking back what it considers it`s own...

#35 by zeemax on October 9, 2006 8:37am PT

reality: female of the canine species..

Zinni`s book throws light on Kargil withdrawal


By Anwar Iqbal

WASHINGTON, June 3: It was President Pervez Musharraf who advised former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to listen to the US proposal for withdrawing troops from Kargil, says a former US general.

Gen. Anthony Zinni, who headed the US Central Command from 1997 to 2000, was sent to Pakistan as a special presidential envoy during the Kargil crisis. In his book ``Battle Ready``, which was published in the United States this week, Gen. Zinni dispels the general impression that it was the civilian leadership in Pakistan that sought Washington`s help for arranging a respectable withdrawal from Kargil.

Instead, the former general says, Pakistan`s civilian leadership was worried about a loss of face that the withdrawal could have caused and to allay their fears President Bill Clinton offered a plan that could have arranged a respectable withdrawal.

But even at this stage, according to General Zinni, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his civilian colleagues appeared reluctant to endorse a withdrawal. That got Musharraf`s attention, and he encouraged Prime Minister Sharif to hear me out,`` writes Gen. Zinni.


Sharif was reluctant to withdraw before the meeting with Clinton was announced (again, his problem was maintaining face); but after I insisted, he finally came around and he ordered the withdrawal,`` he adds.

``He set up a meeting with Clinton in July,`` says Gen. Zinni while explaining how Mr Sharif arrived in Washington for the 1999 meeting with President Clinton that took place on the American Independence Day, July 4.

Explaining the background of the Kargil adventure, Gen. Zinni writes: ``In May, Pakistani forces made a deep incursion into an area called Kargil, on the Indian side of the Line of Control. Though there was normally fighting near the Line of Control, the area for a long time has been quite stable.

There would be probes and shooting during the good months of the year, but nothing ever changed much; and in wintertime, everybody would pull back down into the valleys, and the two sides would create `no-man`s-land`.

As spring came, they would go back up into their positions. Every so often, somebody on one side would be a little late getting up to their spring positions, and the other side could grab an advantage of a kilometre or so. It was ``Aha, I`ve gotcha!`` on a tactical level. But it did not really change things.``

Dear Aparna,
I commend you for highlighting the half-truths and outright lies uttered in 1999 and now so shamelessly recounted by Mushy in his best-seller. That said, I must stress that if this was such a major defeat for the Pakis, why are Injuns so upset at the mere mention of Kargil?

The way I see it, Pakistan`s aggression in Kargil backfired because India responded with overwhelming force to dislodge the occupiers. In the long run, it failed to accomplish anything lasting. In the case of India, I think that the Indians lost too many lives in trying to repel the attack and retake the occupied territory. There was a story by a Paki jawan who said that his fingers got tired of using his weapon, but the Indians kept charging and kept dying.

I think that Kargil was like Pakistan`s Siachen - stupid tactic, missing strategy, and a shameful loss of lives on both sides.

Jang #45

Totally agree with the ``Internationalization`` issue. I too dont get it.. What does that achieve? Does Pakistan see it as a means to an end(which, as arjun says ``Kashmir banega Pakistan)? If so, what has changed on the ground pre and post Kargil??

Also, what is the guarantee that it will not become another Palestine like thing, where three countries (instead of 2) incl USA do some posturing every 6 months.

SN

Re salim #44
Salim,
I think that Kargil was undertaken by the Pakistani Army Brass to engineer a confrontation with the civilian authority. After almost a decade of democracy the civilian govt. in Pakistan had started to exercise some control over the army and that did not go down well with the army.

Regards,

Faruk

#45

SN, In a nut-shell the ``internationalization`` theme belongs to the cold war where Pakistan thought that giving prominence to Kashmir at the UN would elicit support from western and the Islamic countries against India. This was during the cold war when the Pakistani POV found resonance in US and Britain and India was regarded as the hand-maiden of the Soviet Union.

#46 Faruk,
Your explanation is probably more logical than many others - from revenge for `71, to internationalization of Kashmir issue, to obtaining a toehold in J&K.