Aparna Pande January 3, 2007
#772 Posted by sadna on January 14, 2007 3:33:44 pm
#771
If you read history, you`ll see there were in fact many Muslim political factions(not just the religious ones) who resisted the Muslim League. They had to face the communal Hindus and communal Muslims both and were also dismissed wholesale, sometimes even persecuted by the British who were the patron saints in legitimising Muslim politicians. ( Due to various policies including limited franchise awarded by the British, Muslim parties in general did not have mass bases except perhaps in Bengal. The British picked and chose parties to legitimise among others too, for instance the Congress spent a lot of time banned by the British and Churchill always said it did not represent the Indian masses). Simply because no one today, between hagiography of Muslim League leaders and Congress leaders has the time or inclination to write about those Muslim factions and politicians who resisted the Muslim League, does not mean they did not do so.
If you read history, you`ll see there were in fact many Muslim political factions(not just the religious ones) who resisted the Muslim League. They had to face the communal Hindus and communal Muslims both and were also dismissed wholesale, sometimes even persecuted by the British who were the patron saints in legitimising Muslim politicians. ( Due to various policies including limited franchise awarded by the British, Muslim parties in general did not have mass bases except perhaps in Bengal. The British picked and chose parties to legitimise among others too, for instance the Congress spent a lot of time banned by the British and Churchill always said it did not represent the Indian masses). Simply because no one today, between hagiography of Muslim League leaders and Congress leaders has the time or inclination to write about those Muslim factions and politicians who resisted the Muslim League, does not mean they did not do so.
#771 Posted by mohar11 on January 14, 2007 3:13:18 pm
Re: # 770
I was referring to pre-partition muslims and their Muslim League party...
of course, that doesn`t apply today... today`s muslim situation is very different, that goes without saying...
I was referring to pre-partition muslims and their Muslim League party...
of course, that doesn`t apply today... today`s muslim situation is very different, that goes without saying...
#770 Posted by sadna on January 14, 2007 3:08:18 pm
mohar11 #769
That was more than 60 years ago, why are you and ranjit taking it out on Indian Muslims today? Most Indian Muslims were not even born then, in fact I will bet a majority of young Indian Muslims` parents were not born then. Whine about today`s problems if you have to, or even the aftermath of Partition on Indian Muslims and ditch this thing about collective guilt where none exists.
That was more than 60 years ago, why are you and ranjit taking it out on Indian Muslims today? Most Indian Muslims were not even born then, in fact I will bet a majority of young Indian Muslims` parents were not born then. Whine about today`s problems if you have to, or even the aftermath of Partition on Indian Muslims and ditch this thing about collective guilt where none exists.
#769 Posted by mohar11 on January 14, 2007 3:02:54 pm
sadna
That was too harsh... ranjit didn`t deserve that...
It was not always easy distinguish between Muslim League and Indian Muslims... consider this:
First: when you have a person like Jinnah leading the party, when secular, educated jinnah is doing all this hindu-bashing and communal stuff - then who can you really believe and depend on for a peaceful negotiation?... secondly, muslims followed jinnah en masse and considered him their leader, which indicates they identified with his and his party;s policies... third, if they really were different from jinnah and ML - where was the outrage when ML was doing it`s communal politics?... where was the counter-action, protests? how can hinuds just assume good behavior when none exists on the ground?
it`s not hindu`s fault if they can`t distinguish between Muslim League and regular Muslims... hindus are not stupid... Ranjit is not stupid... Like the guy said to Jerry McGure: ``Show me the money``... show me the difference and I will accept it... I am not naive, neither is ranjit... we are just practical... we want see the real thing on the ground, not wishy washy stuff some people may put up....
Show me the money... :)
That was too harsh... ranjit didn`t deserve that...
It was not always easy distinguish between Muslim League and Indian Muslims... consider this:
First: when you have a person like Jinnah leading the party, when secular, educated jinnah is doing all this hindu-bashing and communal stuff - then who can you really believe and depend on for a peaceful negotiation?... secondly, muslims followed jinnah en masse and considered him their leader, which indicates they identified with his and his party;s policies... third, if they really were different from jinnah and ML - where was the outrage when ML was doing it`s communal politics?... where was the counter-action, protests? how can hinuds just assume good behavior when none exists on the ground?
it`s not hindu`s fault if they can`t distinguish between Muslim League and regular Muslims... hindus are not stupid... Ranjit is not stupid... Like the guy said to Jerry McGure: ``Show me the money``... show me the difference and I will accept it... I am not naive, neither is ranjit... we are just practical... we want see the real thing on the ground, not wishy washy stuff some people may put up....
Show me the money... :)
#768 Posted by sadna on January 14, 2007 3:01:16 pm
ranjit #767
In addition to the stupidities I listed, it is stupid not to realise that there is no difference between those who ethnically cleansed Hindus and Sikhs and those who talk of ethnically cleansing Muslims. Given their total failures in past history(a failure indicated by how a 97% Pakistan keeps whining about Hindus), it is pretty stupid of both genocidal Muslims and genocidal Hindus to continue to fool themselves today that they have the sole moral right to perpeturate indiscriminate violence and to think that such indiscriminate violence on others will succeed. I thought Hindus were more intelligent than Muslims in that respect but somehow I keep being reminded that they are not.
#767 Posted by Ranjit on January 14, 2007 2:41:28 pm
Re:sadna
I may be stupid but I am not hypocritical and I certainly do not tend to hide my real feelings. It may be fashionable to pretend that you are secular, but no one buys it. That is why every Pakistani on chowk uses abusive language and vile names against you. To date, no one has used that sort of names against me which means that they understand that I am a straight shooter.
I may be stupid but I am not hypocritical and I certainly do not tend to hide my real feelings. It may be fashionable to pretend that you are secular, but no one buys it. That is why every Pakistani on chowk uses abusive language and vile names against you. To date, no one has used that sort of names against me which means that they understand that I am a straight shooter.
#766 Posted by anil on January 14, 2007 2:31:33 pm
Re: # 764
There is certainly a lot of truth in Sadna`s anger with whom she calls stupid Indians.
There is certainly a lot of truth in Sadna`s anger with whom she calls stupid Indians.
#765 Posted by KaalChakra on January 14, 2007 2:09:00 pm
ranjit, hope you won`t take #764 personally. Sadna is making an important point about how history is to be used, and hopefully you will focus on just that.
#764 Posted by sadna on January 14, 2007 1:45:39 pm
ranjit #763
Stupid Hindus like you can`t distinguish between the Muslim League and Indian Muslims, that is why such things are not published widely. Stupid Hindus like you can`t figure even after reading about these things in detail that the Muslim League was NEVER secular-minded by any measure, that is why such things are not published widely. Stupid Hindus like you offer genocidal Muslims cover and victimise peaceful Muslims, that is why such things are not published widely.
#763 Posted by Ranjit on January 14, 2007 1:37:24 pm
Re:sadna#762
Sadna, once again that is an excellent post. My blood boiled reading about the Muslim League behavior at that time. I wish these details are published and publicised all over India so that people can learn what happened, instead of reading the sanitised versions in our media. If people truly understood muslim league behavior, there would not be a single muslim left in India today. It is the extreme naivety and timid nature of hindus that we have a community still living in our midst whose erstwhile representatives committed such vicious acts against us.
What you have written is the real nature of Muslim League and its followers. Jinnah might have been secular, just as Yasser is a secular person. It doesnt mean anything. The 99.9% Muslim Leaguge members have always been the ``usrtruly`` and ``zeemax`` types, for lack of a better analogy. It was true then which is why the League was almost destroyed before Jinnah showed up. It is true now as well, as the heart and soul of the Pakistani establishment is now constituted by those same elements. We can argue and debate endlessly with Yasser, who is basically a nice chap, but he is completely unrepresentative of typical Muslim League or even typical Pakistani mindset. The reality is that the Pakistani establishment would happily engage in a genocide on hindus if it ever got the opportunity - this holds true irrespective of kashmir or anything else. We must never forget that.
Sadna, once again that is an excellent post. My blood boiled reading about the Muslim League behavior at that time. I wish these details are published and publicised all over India so that people can learn what happened, instead of reading the sanitised versions in our media. If people truly understood muslim league behavior, there would not be a single muslim left in India today. It is the extreme naivety and timid nature of hindus that we have a community still living in our midst whose erstwhile representatives committed such vicious acts against us.
What you have written is the real nature of Muslim League and its followers. Jinnah might have been secular, just as Yasser is a secular person. It doesnt mean anything. The 99.9% Muslim Leaguge members have always been the ``usrtruly`` and ``zeemax`` types, for lack of a better analogy. It was true then which is why the League was almost destroyed before Jinnah showed up. It is true now as well, as the heart and soul of the Pakistani establishment is now constituted by those same elements. We can argue and debate endlessly with Yasser, who is basically a nice chap, but he is completely unrepresentative of typical Muslim League or even typical Pakistani mindset. The reality is that the Pakistani establishment would happily engage in a genocide on hindus if it ever got the opportunity - this holds true irrespective of kashmir or anything else. We must never forget that.
#762 Posted by sadna on January 14, 2007 1:34:57 am
#759
You have quoted Jinnah and Wolpert yet again, but you still haven`t answered my questions in #739. H M Seervai does not answer them either, so no point in waving him as a red herring.
West Pakistan operated a veto on East Pakistan`s share of power from 1947 onward and its last attempt was in 1971. West Pakistan also had control over the bulk of the Pakistan Army. That the same situation did not occur wrt India`s constitution and army is all to the credit of the Congress`s decision in 1947 not to include any regions in India which were not willing to join the Constituent Assembly. And fyi, Gandhi was against the partition of India as a whole, not just the partition of Punjab and Bengal. He felt Congress conceding the partition of these provinces meant Congress eventually conceding the partition of India - as indeed it did.
East Bengal could have reworked its economy making borders irrelevant with West Bengal if Pakistan had not chosen to be hostile to Hindu-majority India by definition - if so many Hindu Pakistanis (1-2 million) had not been forcibly driven out of East Pakistan by violence in the early 50s. Not to have Hindus around was a choice many provinces of Pakistan made very early, some even before independence so to cry over the territory those Hindus occupy today makes no sense for a Pakistani at all.
What Jinnah wanted for the nonMuslim majority regions of Bengal and Punjab was not binding on the nonLeague legislators of the nonMuslim majority districts nor on the Congress who all chose partition.
The Muslim League agitations in Feb-March 1947 had lead to widespread communal massacres and a virtual collapse of the province`s government and administrative structure. Could you possibly check with Wolpert and let me know when he plans to write a book about that?
Ian Talbot `Khizr Tiwana, the Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India` :
`Khizr called a full cabinet meeting on the morning of 28 January. This decided to withdraw the ban on the Muslim National Guards and the RSS, whilst reemphasising the Ministry`s committment to maintaining law and order. The Muslim League`s initial grievance had been fully met. But the genie was now out of the bottle. Shaukat uncompromisingly declared that `The Khizr Ministry must be made to go whatever the cost to the Muslim League.` He boasted that the opposition would `put out 15 million Muslims to break the law.`.
[On 3 February 1947, to Wavell, Punjab Governor] Jenkins sombrely concluded that ` the agitation has convinced Hindus and Sikhs that the League wanted undiluted Muslim Raj`. `It is quite impossible to rule the Punjab with its present boundaries. Long term alternatives are therefore reversion to Unionist principles.. or partition which would create intolerable minority problems. Effect of agitation is to force second alternative on non-Muslims and to impair very serious long-term prospects of the Muslim League and Muslims generally. The Muslim League are in fact wantonly throwing away the certainity of Muslim leadership in a United Punjab for uncertain advantages of a partition which the Sikhs will gradually now demand. But nobody has the brains to understand this.`
On 2 March Khizr Hayat Khan decided to resign. ``Jenkins saw the Nawab of Mamdot late on the morning of 3 March. He gave him an absolutely free hand to form a Ministry in the expectation that the Muslim League President would be able to report positive progress by Saturday 8 March at the latest. The installation of a Muslim League led Coalition Ministry proved impossible. The Punjab entered its final months of British rule under a Section 93 administration, with the morale of its officials severely undermined.
Mamdot failed to provide the reassurances which the Sikhs and the Congress demanded, mainly because his hands were tied by the Muslim League High Command. Jinnah discountenanced a local arrangement in the Punjab which would in any way weaken his All-India demand for Pakistan. Moreover, Sikh resentment had almost boiled during the Punjab Muslim League agitation. The mild-mannered Swaran Singh had warned Jenkins, that the Sikhs `must have a clear account of the Muslim League`s plan for the future of the Punjab and of the position of Sikhs within this.. The Sikhs had no intention, ` he addeded, `of being serfs under Muslim masters and felt they were strong enough to defend themselves.`. Tara Singh used far more intemperate language which he unsheafed his sword on the steps of the Punjab Assembly building, after hearing of Khizr`s resignation. This action is conventionally taken as the catalyst for the violent demonstrations and riots which engulfed the Punjab in the following days.
The Punjab had been a poweder keg for many months. It is nevertheless significant, that within less than a week of Khizr`s resignation, communal violence had reached alarming proportions and the Congress had demanded the partition of the province. For the first time, violence spread from the cities othe countryside and took on the sinister undertones of `ethnic cleansing`. Whole villages in the Jhelum, Attock and Rawalpindi districts were put to the sword. About 40,000 people, mainly Sikhs had taken refuge in hurriedly established camps. The outrage which many Sikh leaders felt at these assaults which were orchestrated by Muslim National Guards and ex-servicemen[Jenkins to Wavell, 17 March 1947] and condoned by Muslim League politicians[Jenkins to Mountbatten, 30 April 1947] fed a desire for revenge which bread a civil war mentality..
The March violence destroyed any lingering hopes that the Punjab might escape partition... The violence also destroyed the British system of control in the countryside centred around such loyalist political families as the Tiwanas. The collapse of Unionist influence created political and administrative chaos..``.
Transfer of Power Vol IX
Jenkins to Wavell on 17 March 1947
``... It is very difficult to account for this extraordinarily violent rural movement. General Messervy thinks that there are some signs of organisation and conspiracy- in parts of Rawalpindi outbreaks seem to have occured almost simultaneously, and the raid at Murree,.., appears to have been carefully planned and carried out. .. The Commander 7th Division told me when I saw him yesterday that attacks on non-Muslims had been led in some cases by retired Army officers-some of them pensioners with honorary Commissioned rank. The Muslim section of the local notables.. were extremely sulky, and though some of them are beginning to be frightened, there is little doubt that they believe that the movement was inevitable and are not prepared to oppose it. The most probable theory is that the growth of the Pakistan idea from 1943 onwards, the extreme communalism of the election campaign of 1945-46, the frustration which followed it, the propaganda against the Coalition Ministry, the Muslim League agitation, H.M.G`s statement of 20th February, and Khizar`s resignation combined to touch off an explosive mixture which had been forming for some time. The Muslims say that they were influenced by rumors of a large Sikh Army marching on the north; also that the movement is a spontaneous outburst against black-marketing by non-Muslims. It is more likely that they believe that by exterminating non-Muslims now they will make their districts a safe base for operations against the other communities in due course. No educated man could reasonably believe the story about the Sikh army, and though opportunity had been take to wipe out economic scores, resentment at the controls and the way in which non-Muslims make money out of them was not in my judgement the immediate cause of the trouble.
Note by Jenkins, 20 March 1947
Raja Ghazanfar Ali came to see me at 4 p.m. today. He opened in rather a complacent way about the riots in the Rawalpindi and Attock districts and in the Chakwal Sub-Division. He took great credit for having kept Gujrat and the greater part of Jhelum quiet. He scouted the idea that the outbreak was organised or that the League had anything to do with it.
He worked up gradualy to the suggestion that I might now put a Muslim League Ministry into power. He suggested a general election and said that this would give the electorate an opportunity of deciding whether the Punjab should be partitioned or not. [ In other words, the Muslim League was prepared to accept partition of the province -sadna]
...
I was exasperated by Ghazanfar Ali`s complacency and dealt with him rather roughly. I said he did not appear to realise that what had occured in Rawalpindi, Attock and the Chakwal Sub-Division was a general massacre of a most beastly kind. He could suggest, as he had suggested, in dealing with the conspiracy theory that the non-Muslims had been provocative, but the provocation was certainly not such as to justify the slaughter and savagery that had occured.
As regards a Muslim League Government, I said I would resign sooner than see one in office at this juncture, and I thought practically every British officer would do the same. The massacre had been conducted in the name of the Muslim League, and senior Military Officers thought that it had been carefully planned and organised. Non-Muslims with some justice now regarded the Muslims has little better than animals, and for my own party I thought that British officers would find it difficult to work with or under such people.
I could see no object whatever in a a general election. It would not alter the basic position that no single community could rule the Punjab except by actual conquest. If a Muslim League Government took office, there would be immediate fighting, and the Government would find it impossible to hold even a single session of the Assembly. I considered Raja Ghaznafar Ali`s political views so irresponsible as to be hardly worth discussing.
...
I said that the troubles of the Muslim League were due to folly and bad leadership. The League had given the impression that the Muslims were a kind of ruling race in the Punjab and would be good enough to treat with generosity their fellow Punjabis, such as the Sikhs, when their rule was established. They could not explain what they meant by ``Pakistan``, and unless they were prepared to deal with other Punjabis as equals, they would make no progress at all. It was a ludicrous position in which the so-called League leaders had to take orders from Bombay from a person entirely ignorant of Punjab conditions. If Raja Ghazanfar Ali argued, as he did, that the Central picture must be complete before any picture of the Punjab could even be sketched, my reply was that his whole conception of the future of India was topsy turvy. A Punjab divided into two or three States or in a condition of chaos and civil war could not possibly fit into any conceivable all-India picture. Surely the right course was to determine the future of the units in a way accept to their inhabitants and then to sketch the all-India picture. (Raja Ghazanfar Ali said that he thought there was something to this.).
At the end of the interview Raja Ghazanfar Ali said that I had distored and misrepresented the League`s views and that he would send me a number of statements by Mr. Jinnah showing that he had never intended to treat the minorities and particularly the Sikhs, in the way I suggested. I said that the first task now was to restore order.
I could not prevent the League from making further blunders. They had already fooled away a kingdom, and it would in my judgement be futile now to attempt any final solution of the Punjab problem until feelings had settled down. The League did not seem to realise that the non-Muslims regarded the Muslims of Rawalpindi and Attock as little better than beasts and hated the League profoundly. It was futile to suggest, as he had suggested, that the League agitation was non-communal. It was manifestly communal from the first, and could not have been anything else.
..
TOP Vol X
14 April 1947 Meeting, Mountbatten papers
..
Sir Evan Jenkins said... The Muslim aim, vehemently pursuded, was to dominate the whole Punjab within its present boundaries. The Sikh aim, even more vehemently pursued, was to frustrate the Muslim. The Jats wished to separate and join with the U.P, bu their claim was not being very strongly voiced. He doubted whether there was any possibility of an announcement of parition without it being followed up by an immediate blow-up..
Sir Eric Mieville asked what were the alternatives to plan of partition. Sir Evan Jenkins replied that there were three alternatives, namely : (a) reversion to unionism (b) partition (c) civil war. If we were unable to get (a) or (b) then there was little option but to withdraw and leave both sides to fight it out. He had no doubt that the Sikhs would fight at some stage, but would rather wait until we were out of the way..
...
There followed some discussion on means of bringing about any form of agreement between Muslims and Sikhs, in which Sir Evan said that the Muslim policy was one of `daring us to leave` by threatening us with the bogy of the conditions which would be the result of our departure: and that the Sikhs were almost certain to ask for partition on their own terms and would be content to have the Hindus in with them.
Note by Sir E. Jenkins, 16 April 1947
[about the rioting in March 1947]
``.. Casualties were heavy in the other cities also, and except in Amritsar the non-Muslims suffered much more heavilty than the Muslims.
By 6th-7th March the trouble was spreading to the rural areas of the Rawalpindi Division and the Multan district. In the Rawalpindi and Attock districts and later in part of the Jhelum district there was an absolute butchery of non-Muslims. In many villages they were herded into houses and burnt alive. Many Sikhs had their hair and beards cur, and there were cases of forcible circumcision. Many Sikh women who escaped slaugher were abducted.
The Muslim League made no efforts to maintain peace and Mamdot made no serious attempt at forming a Ministry. At the time he had no majority and he gave me the impression that he was not anxious to take responsibility for quelling a veyr serious outbreak of violence.
(2) The total number of dead is not yet known. The latest figure is just under 3,000 and I believe that the final figure may be 3,500. The communal proportions have not been accurately recorded, but I shouls ay that among the dead there are 6 non-Muslims for every Muslim. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan can hardly realise the terrible nature of the rural massacre. One of my troubles has been the extreme complacency of the League leaders in the Punjab, who say in effect that ``boys will be boys``. I have no doubt that the non-Muslims were provocative in the cities, but the Msulims had been equally provocative during their agitation and had in particular murdered a Sikh constable in Amritsar.
..
(9) For what object the British officials in the Punjab, including myself, are ``fostering chaos`` I do not know. Every British official in the I.C.S and I.P in the Punjab, including myself, would be very glad to leave it tomorrow. With two or three possible exceptions no British offical intends to remain in the Punjab after the transfer of power. Six months ago the position was quite different; but we feel now that we are dealing with people who are out to destroy themselves, and that in the absence of some reasonable agreement between them the average official will have to spend his life in a communal civil war.
(10) The Punjab is not now in a constitutional, but in a revolutionary situation. If a Muslim League Government were formed tomorrow, it would be attacked by the non-Muslims, and particularly the Sikhs, with a violence which might be uncontrollable and would certainly involve frightful slaughter by Police and troops. If Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan means to start an agitation against authority in the Punjab, he will produce very much the same result. He might be reminded that it was the Muslim League, and not the non-Muslims, who first attempted to dislodge a Ministry by force.
You have quoted Jinnah and Wolpert yet again, but you still haven`t answered my questions in #739. H M Seervai does not answer them either, so no point in waving him as a red herring.
West Pakistan operated a veto on East Pakistan`s share of power from 1947 onward and its last attempt was in 1971. West Pakistan also had control over the bulk of the Pakistan Army. That the same situation did not occur wrt India`s constitution and army is all to the credit of the Congress`s decision in 1947 not to include any regions in India which were not willing to join the Constituent Assembly. And fyi, Gandhi was against the partition of India as a whole, not just the partition of Punjab and Bengal. He felt Congress conceding the partition of these provinces meant Congress eventually conceding the partition of India - as indeed it did.
East Bengal could have reworked its economy making borders irrelevant with West Bengal if Pakistan had not chosen to be hostile to Hindu-majority India by definition - if so many Hindu Pakistanis (1-2 million) had not been forcibly driven out of East Pakistan by violence in the early 50s. Not to have Hindus around was a choice many provinces of Pakistan made very early, some even before independence so to cry over the territory those Hindus occupy today makes no sense for a Pakistani at all.
What Jinnah wanted for the nonMuslim majority regions of Bengal and Punjab was not binding on the nonLeague legislators of the nonMuslim majority districts nor on the Congress who all chose partition.
The Muslim League agitations in Feb-March 1947 had lead to widespread communal massacres and a virtual collapse of the province`s government and administrative structure. Could you possibly check with Wolpert and let me know when he plans to write a book about that?
Ian Talbot `Khizr Tiwana, the Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India` :
`Khizr called a full cabinet meeting on the morning of 28 January. This decided to withdraw the ban on the Muslim National Guards and the RSS, whilst reemphasising the Ministry`s committment to maintaining law and order. The Muslim League`s initial grievance had been fully met. But the genie was now out of the bottle. Shaukat uncompromisingly declared that `The Khizr Ministry must be made to go whatever the cost to the Muslim League.` He boasted that the opposition would `put out 15 million Muslims to break the law.`.
[On 3 February 1947, to Wavell, Punjab Governor] Jenkins sombrely concluded that ` the agitation has convinced Hindus and Sikhs that the League wanted undiluted Muslim Raj`. `It is quite impossible to rule the Punjab with its present boundaries. Long term alternatives are therefore reversion to Unionist principles.. or partition which would create intolerable minority problems. Effect of agitation is to force second alternative on non-Muslims and to impair very serious long-term prospects of the Muslim League and Muslims generally. The Muslim League are in fact wantonly throwing away the certainity of Muslim leadership in a United Punjab for uncertain advantages of a partition which the Sikhs will gradually now demand. But nobody has the brains to understand this.`
On 2 March Khizr Hayat Khan decided to resign. ``Jenkins saw the Nawab of Mamdot late on the morning of 3 March. He gave him an absolutely free hand to form a Ministry in the expectation that the Muslim League President would be able to report positive progress by Saturday 8 March at the latest. The installation of a Muslim League led Coalition Ministry proved impossible. The Punjab entered its final months of British rule under a Section 93 administration, with the morale of its officials severely undermined.
Mamdot failed to provide the reassurances which the Sikhs and the Congress demanded, mainly because his hands were tied by the Muslim League High Command. Jinnah discountenanced a local arrangement in the Punjab which would in any way weaken his All-India demand for Pakistan. Moreover, Sikh resentment had almost boiled during the Punjab Muslim League agitation. The mild-mannered Swaran Singh had warned Jenkins, that the Sikhs `must have a clear account of the Muslim League`s plan for the future of the Punjab and of the position of Sikhs within this.. The Sikhs had no intention, ` he addeded, `of being serfs under Muslim masters and felt they were strong enough to defend themselves.`. Tara Singh used far more intemperate language which he unsheafed his sword on the steps of the Punjab Assembly building, after hearing of Khizr`s resignation. This action is conventionally taken as the catalyst for the violent demonstrations and riots which engulfed the Punjab in the following days.
The Punjab had been a poweder keg for many months. It is nevertheless significant, that within less than a week of Khizr`s resignation, communal violence had reached alarming proportions and the Congress had demanded the partition of the province. For the first time, violence spread from the cities othe countryside and took on the sinister undertones of `ethnic cleansing`. Whole villages in the Jhelum, Attock and Rawalpindi districts were put to the sword. About 40,000 people, mainly Sikhs had taken refuge in hurriedly established camps. The outrage which many Sikh leaders felt at these assaults which were orchestrated by Muslim National Guards and ex-servicemen[Jenkins to Wavell, 17 March 1947] and condoned by Muslim League politicians[Jenkins to Mountbatten, 30 April 1947] fed a desire for revenge which bread a civil war mentality..
The March violence destroyed any lingering hopes that the Punjab might escape partition... The violence also destroyed the British system of control in the countryside centred around such loyalist political families as the Tiwanas. The collapse of Unionist influence created political and administrative chaos..``.
Transfer of Power Vol IX
Jenkins to Wavell on 17 March 1947
``... It is very difficult to account for this extraordinarily violent rural movement. General Messervy thinks that there are some signs of organisation and conspiracy- in parts of Rawalpindi outbreaks seem to have occured almost simultaneously, and the raid at Murree,.., appears to have been carefully planned and carried out. .. The Commander 7th Division told me when I saw him yesterday that attacks on non-Muslims had been led in some cases by retired Army officers-some of them pensioners with honorary Commissioned rank. The Muslim section of the local notables.. were extremely sulky, and though some of them are beginning to be frightened, there is little doubt that they believe that the movement was inevitable and are not prepared to oppose it. The most probable theory is that the growth of the Pakistan idea from 1943 onwards, the extreme communalism of the election campaign of 1945-46, the frustration which followed it, the propaganda against the Coalition Ministry, the Muslim League agitation, H.M.G`s statement of 20th February, and Khizar`s resignation combined to touch off an explosive mixture which had been forming for some time. The Muslims say that they were influenced by rumors of a large Sikh Army marching on the north; also that the movement is a spontaneous outburst against black-marketing by non-Muslims. It is more likely that they believe that by exterminating non-Muslims now they will make their districts a safe base for operations against the other communities in due course. No educated man could reasonably believe the story about the Sikh army, and though opportunity had been take to wipe out economic scores, resentment at the controls and the way in which non-Muslims make money out of them was not in my judgement the immediate cause of the trouble.
Note by Jenkins, 20 March 1947
Raja Ghazanfar Ali came to see me at 4 p.m. today. He opened in rather a complacent way about the riots in the Rawalpindi and Attock districts and in the Chakwal Sub-Division. He took great credit for having kept Gujrat and the greater part of Jhelum quiet. He scouted the idea that the outbreak was organised or that the League had anything to do with it.
He worked up gradualy to the suggestion that I might now put a Muslim League Ministry into power. He suggested a general election and said that this would give the electorate an opportunity of deciding whether the Punjab should be partitioned or not. [ In other words, the Muslim League was prepared to accept partition of the province -sadna]
...
I was exasperated by Ghazanfar Ali`s complacency and dealt with him rather roughly. I said he did not appear to realise that what had occured in Rawalpindi, Attock and the Chakwal Sub-Division was a general massacre of a most beastly kind. He could suggest, as he had suggested, in dealing with the conspiracy theory that the non-Muslims had been provocative, but the provocation was certainly not such as to justify the slaughter and savagery that had occured.
As regards a Muslim League Government, I said I would resign sooner than see one in office at this juncture, and I thought practically every British officer would do the same. The massacre had been conducted in the name of the Muslim League, and senior Military Officers thought that it had been carefully planned and organised. Non-Muslims with some justice now regarded the Muslims has little better than animals, and for my own party I thought that British officers would find it difficult to work with or under such people.
I could see no object whatever in a a general election. It would not alter the basic position that no single community could rule the Punjab except by actual conquest. If a Muslim League Government took office, there would be immediate fighting, and the Government would find it impossible to hold even a single session of the Assembly. I considered Raja Ghaznafar Ali`s political views so irresponsible as to be hardly worth discussing.
...
I said that the troubles of the Muslim League were due to folly and bad leadership. The League had given the impression that the Muslims were a kind of ruling race in the Punjab and would be good enough to treat with generosity their fellow Punjabis, such as the Sikhs, when their rule was established. They could not explain what they meant by ``Pakistan``, and unless they were prepared to deal with other Punjabis as equals, they would make no progress at all. It was a ludicrous position in which the so-called League leaders had to take orders from Bombay from a person entirely ignorant of Punjab conditions. If Raja Ghazanfar Ali argued, as he did, that the Central picture must be complete before any picture of the Punjab could even be sketched, my reply was that his whole conception of the future of India was topsy turvy. A Punjab divided into two or three States or in a condition of chaos and civil war could not possibly fit into any conceivable all-India picture. Surely the right course was to determine the future of the units in a way accept to their inhabitants and then to sketch the all-India picture. (Raja Ghazanfar Ali said that he thought there was something to this.).
At the end of the interview Raja Ghazanfar Ali said that I had distored and misrepresented the League`s views and that he would send me a number of statements by Mr. Jinnah showing that he had never intended to treat the minorities and particularly the Sikhs, in the way I suggested. I said that the first task now was to restore order.
I could not prevent the League from making further blunders. They had already fooled away a kingdom, and it would in my judgement be futile now to attempt any final solution of the Punjab problem until feelings had settled down. The League did not seem to realise that the non-Muslims regarded the Muslims of Rawalpindi and Attock as little better than beasts and hated the League profoundly. It was futile to suggest, as he had suggested, that the League agitation was non-communal. It was manifestly communal from the first, and could not have been anything else.
..
TOP Vol X
14 April 1947 Meeting, Mountbatten papers
..
Sir Evan Jenkins said... The Muslim aim, vehemently pursuded, was to dominate the whole Punjab within its present boundaries. The Sikh aim, even more vehemently pursued, was to frustrate the Muslim. The Jats wished to separate and join with the U.P, bu their claim was not being very strongly voiced. He doubted whether there was any possibility of an announcement of parition without it being followed up by an immediate blow-up..
Sir Eric Mieville asked what were the alternatives to plan of partition. Sir Evan Jenkins replied that there were three alternatives, namely : (a) reversion to unionism (b) partition (c) civil war. If we were unable to get (a) or (b) then there was little option but to withdraw and leave both sides to fight it out. He had no doubt that the Sikhs would fight at some stage, but would rather wait until we were out of the way..
...
There followed some discussion on means of bringing about any form of agreement between Muslims and Sikhs, in which Sir Evan said that the Muslim policy was one of `daring us to leave` by threatening us with the bogy of the conditions which would be the result of our departure: and that the Sikhs were almost certain to ask for partition on their own terms and would be content to have the Hindus in with them.
Note by Sir E. Jenkins, 16 April 1947
[about the rioting in March 1947]
``.. Casualties were heavy in the other cities also, and except in Amritsar the non-Muslims suffered much more heavilty than the Muslims.
By 6th-7th March the trouble was spreading to the rural areas of the Rawalpindi Division and the Multan district. In the Rawalpindi and Attock districts and later in part of the Jhelum district there was an absolute butchery of non-Muslims. In many villages they were herded into houses and burnt alive. Many Sikhs had their hair and beards cur, and there were cases of forcible circumcision. Many Sikh women who escaped slaugher were abducted.
The Muslim League made no efforts to maintain peace and Mamdot made no serious attempt at forming a Ministry. At the time he had no majority and he gave me the impression that he was not anxious to take responsibility for quelling a veyr serious outbreak of violence.
(2) The total number of dead is not yet known. The latest figure is just under 3,000 and I believe that the final figure may be 3,500. The communal proportions have not been accurately recorded, but I shouls ay that among the dead there are 6 non-Muslims for every Muslim. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan can hardly realise the terrible nature of the rural massacre. One of my troubles has been the extreme complacency of the League leaders in the Punjab, who say in effect that ``boys will be boys``. I have no doubt that the non-Muslims were provocative in the cities, but the Msulims had been equally provocative during their agitation and had in particular murdered a Sikh constable in Amritsar.
..
(9) For what object the British officials in the Punjab, including myself, are ``fostering chaos`` I do not know. Every British official in the I.C.S and I.P in the Punjab, including myself, would be very glad to leave it tomorrow. With two or three possible exceptions no British offical intends to remain in the Punjab after the transfer of power. Six months ago the position was quite different; but we feel now that we are dealing with people who are out to destroy themselves, and that in the absence of some reasonable agreement between them the average official will have to spend his life in a communal civil war.
(10) The Punjab is not now in a constitutional, but in a revolutionary situation. If a Muslim League Government were formed tomorrow, it would be attacked by the non-Muslims, and particularly the Sikhs, with a violence which might be uncontrollable and would certainly involve frightful slaughter by Police and troops. If Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan means to start an agitation against authority in the Punjab, he will produce very much the same result. He might be reminded that it was the Muslim League, and not the non-Muslims, who first attempted to dislodge a Ministry by force.
#761 Posted by MantoLives on January 14, 2007 12:18:15 am
Re: # 760
Under stand this logic ... (oxy) Moron!
By forcing the partition of Bengal and Punjab on Jinnah and the League- even against your Gandhi`s better advice- Congress plunged India into unprecedented violence ... which is the sole and exclusive responsibility of the Congress Party.
I think this much is quite clear... but then again... you yourself are quite the (oxy)Moron!
Under stand this logic ... (oxy) Moron!
By forcing the partition of Bengal and Punjab on Jinnah and the League- even against your Gandhi`s better advice- Congress plunged India into unprecedented violence ... which is the sole and exclusive responsibility of the Congress Party.
I think this much is quite clear... but then again... you yourself are quite the (oxy)Moron!
#760 Posted by harimau on January 13, 2007 11:46:03 pm
Ref Mantolives #749
[... it made perfect sense to keep Congress under check till the constitution was made. And it turns out that Jinnah was right all along... Congress did go back on its word and proved itself to be a dishonest and stupid operator.]
So your complaint is what? That the stupid Congress screwed up the brilliant barrister Jinnah`s plans for getting all of Bengal and Punjab?
Looks like the Congress was brilliant and Jinnah was the stupid one.
But then I never could understand Muslim logic (an oxymoron since Muslims are morons).
[... it made perfect sense to keep Congress under check till the constitution was made. And it turns out that Jinnah was right all along... Congress did go back on its word and proved itself to be a dishonest and stupid operator.]
So your complaint is what? That the stupid Congress screwed up the brilliant barrister Jinnah`s plans for getting all of Bengal and Punjab?
Looks like the Congress was brilliant and Jinnah was the stupid one.
But then I never could understand Muslim logic (an oxymoron since Muslims are morons).
#759 Posted by MantoLives on January 13, 2007 10:58:43 pm
``when Wolpert writes a book on those issues; I am in no hurry. ``
No need. You may consult H M Seervai, who unlike you was never an expatriate and has much more under his belt than you ever will.
He wrote the Partition of India: Legend and Reality which shall remain forever a slap on the face of those who wish to distort history Sadna style.
No need. You may consult H M Seervai, who unlike you was never an expatriate and has much more under his belt than you ever will.
He wrote the Partition of India: Legend and Reality which shall remain forever a slap on the face of those who wish to distort history Sadna style.
#758 Posted by MantoLives on January 13, 2007 10:55:35 pm
Sadna,
There is no comparison between the two no matter how you spin it. Awami League in 1971 was asking exactly the same thing as the Muslim League in 1946- minimal federation and autonomy... only Awami League`s task was easier that it had 55-45 majority... and you can go on spinning it like you do but the way you`ve spun it shows me that you already realise how badly you fellows messed up. FYI I answered your questions in great detail. By repeating this mantra of you didn`t answer you didn`t answer may help you massage your bruised ego... but deep down surely you must be aware that you are trying to claim victory ala Saddam Hussain in Gulf War 1.
Other more serious students of the partition of Punjab and Bengal should read the following:
Partition of Punjab was Congress’ countermove as the sore losers put in place by the resolution of March 8, 1947, against ironically even Gandhi’s strong opposition. The reason…. Divided Punjab and Bengal would destroy Pakistan. Ironically, the date Lord Mountbatten and Nehru triumphantly decided to inflict such a horrible price on Pakistan was the 1st of April to make it repent.
The more I read the drama at the very end of the partition saga, the more I realize that Gandhi had seen the error of his ways at the very end… I suppose this following is the reason why Jinnah had described Gandhi as a friend of the Muslims after the latter’s death, despite the latter’s obvious role against the Muslims.
Mohandas Gandhi wrote this following letter to Mountbatten on May 8, 1947:
“I feel sure that the partition of Punjab and Bengal is wrong in every case and a needless irritant for the League… Whilst the British power is functioning in India, it must be held principally responsible for the preservation of peace.” (TOPP Volume X 667-668)
On May 17 Mahomed Ali Jinnah made this following appeal to reason – which Mountbatten and Nehru had none:
“The Muslim League cannot agree to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab… it cannot be justified historically, economically, geographically, politically or morally. These provinces have built up their respective lives for nearly a century… the principle underlying the demand for the establishment of Pakistan and Hindustan is totally different… In the name of justice and fairplay, do not submit to this clamour. For it will be sowing the seeds of future serious trouble and the results will be disastrous for the life of these two provinces.” (Jinnah’s letter to Mountbatten TOP X, p 852)
Sir Eric Meiville met with Jinnah on May 20th and reported the following to Mountbatten:
“At the end of our talk he (Jinnah) took my arm and said ‘I am not speaking as a partisan, but I beg to tell Lord Mountbatten once again that he will be making a grave mistake if he agrees to the partition of Punjab and Bengal.” (TOPP X 916)
What had Jinnah offered the Sikhs: Essentially a signed blank cheque… inter alia autonomy, defence ministry, permanent position as the Forces Chief…I remember Dullah Bhatti once asked Sadna this and Sadna refused to verify it. This is confirmed by Terrence Shone’s discussion with Jinnah . According to Terrence Shone, Jinnah said that he had offered 3.5 million Sikhs and Master Tara Singh everything he wanted, but “Sikhs in many ways admirable people lacked the leadership of the highest order”. (TOP Volume X P. 280)
On Bengal, Suhrawardy came up with the plan of a United Bangladesh endorsed and completely supported by Sarat Chandrabose and Kiran Shankar Roy… the major reason as John Tyson, Burrow’s special representative at the Governors Conference, reported was that
“Eastern Bengal alone was not going concern and never would be. It could not feed itself … it would become, in Sir Frederick Burrows words, a rural slum… Muslims knew all this as well as the Hindus- so they felt that the object of the cry to partition Bengal was to ‘torpedo Pakistan’”.
Mountbatten replied: “ Anything that resulted in torpedoing Pakistan was of advantage.”
(Minutes of the Governors Conference, 15th April. Page 255 TOP X)
To quote Stanley Wolpert:
“Two weeks later, Mountbatten asked Jinnah what he thought of Suhrawardy’s proposal to create a separate sovereign Bengal, expecting him to be shocked at his Muslim League lieutenant’s treachery. Much to Mountbatten’s surprise, Jinnah calmly replied: ‘I should be delighted. What is the use of Bengal without Calcutta; they had better remain united and independent. I am sure they would be on friendly terms with us.” And when Mountbatten added that Suhrawardy would like Bengal to remain in the Commonwealth, Jinnah retorted, ‘Ofcourse, just as I indicated to you that Pakistan would wish to remain within the commonwealth.’ Had Mountbatten followed the advice of Gandhi, Jinnah or Suhrawardy, instead of listening to only to Nehru, Punjab and Bengal might have been spared the deadly horrors, and a richly United Bangladesh, with its capital in Calcutta, would have emerged instead of the fragmented, impoverished Bangladesh born from its eastern half a quarter of a century later.” (Shameful Flight, Page 142)
I think we can make out very well that the partition of Punjab and Bengal was imposed on the subcontinent by Nehru and Mountbatten… with Patel absenting … Jinnah, Gandhi and to some extent Azad opposing …. Had this not been undertaken, perhaps the violence and the legacy of violence would not have existed… there would have been three more or less secular republics i.e. Pakistan, Hindustan and Bangladesh…. existing with mutual understanding in this great common subcontinent of ours… as opposed to the three polarized and hostile ones today.
There is no comparison between the two no matter how you spin it. Awami League in 1971 was asking exactly the same thing as the Muslim League in 1946- minimal federation and autonomy... only Awami League`s task was easier that it had 55-45 majority... and you can go on spinning it like you do but the way you`ve spun it shows me that you already realise how badly you fellows messed up. FYI I answered your questions in great detail. By repeating this mantra of you didn`t answer you didn`t answer may help you massage your bruised ego... but deep down surely you must be aware that you are trying to claim victory ala Saddam Hussain in Gulf War 1.
Other more serious students of the partition of Punjab and Bengal should read the following:
Partition of Punjab was Congress’ countermove as the sore losers put in place by the resolution of March 8, 1947, against ironically even Gandhi’s strong opposition. The reason…. Divided Punjab and Bengal would destroy Pakistan. Ironically, the date Lord Mountbatten and Nehru triumphantly decided to inflict such a horrible price on Pakistan was the 1st of April to make it repent.
The more I read the drama at the very end of the partition saga, the more I realize that Gandhi had seen the error of his ways at the very end… I suppose this following is the reason why Jinnah had described Gandhi as a friend of the Muslims after the latter’s death, despite the latter’s obvious role against the Muslims.
Mohandas Gandhi wrote this following letter to Mountbatten on May 8, 1947:
“I feel sure that the partition of Punjab and Bengal is wrong in every case and a needless irritant for the League… Whilst the British power is functioning in India, it must be held principally responsible for the preservation of peace.” (TOPP Volume X 667-668)
On May 17 Mahomed Ali Jinnah made this following appeal to reason – which Mountbatten and Nehru had none:
“The Muslim League cannot agree to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab… it cannot be justified historically, economically, geographically, politically or morally. These provinces have built up their respective lives for nearly a century… the principle underlying the demand for the establishment of Pakistan and Hindustan is totally different… In the name of justice and fairplay, do not submit to this clamour. For it will be sowing the seeds of future serious trouble and the results will be disastrous for the life of these two provinces.” (Jinnah’s letter to Mountbatten TOP X, p 852)
Sir Eric Meiville met with Jinnah on May 20th and reported the following to Mountbatten:
“At the end of our talk he (Jinnah) took my arm and said ‘I am not speaking as a partisan, but I beg to tell Lord Mountbatten once again that he will be making a grave mistake if he agrees to the partition of Punjab and Bengal.” (TOPP X 916)
What had Jinnah offered the Sikhs: Essentially a signed blank cheque… inter alia autonomy, defence ministry, permanent position as the Forces Chief…I remember Dullah Bhatti once asked Sadna this and Sadna refused to verify it. This is confirmed by Terrence Shone’s discussion with Jinnah . According to Terrence Shone, Jinnah said that he had offered 3.5 million Sikhs and Master Tara Singh everything he wanted, but “Sikhs in many ways admirable people lacked the leadership of the highest order”. (TOP Volume X P. 280)
On Bengal, Suhrawardy came up with the plan of a United Bangladesh endorsed and completely supported by Sarat Chandrabose and Kiran Shankar Roy… the major reason as John Tyson, Burrow’s special representative at the Governors Conference, reported was that
“Eastern Bengal alone was not going concern and never would be. It could not feed itself … it would become, in Sir Frederick Burrows words, a rural slum… Muslims knew all this as well as the Hindus- so they felt that the object of the cry to partition Bengal was to ‘torpedo Pakistan’”.
Mountbatten replied: “ Anything that resulted in torpedoing Pakistan was of advantage.”
(Minutes of the Governors Conference, 15th April. Page 255 TOP X)
To quote Stanley Wolpert:
“Two weeks later, Mountbatten asked Jinnah what he thought of Suhrawardy’s proposal to create a separate sovereign Bengal, expecting him to be shocked at his Muslim League lieutenant’s treachery. Much to Mountbatten’s surprise, Jinnah calmly replied: ‘I should be delighted. What is the use of Bengal without Calcutta; they had better remain united and independent. I am sure they would be on friendly terms with us.” And when Mountbatten added that Suhrawardy would like Bengal to remain in the Commonwealth, Jinnah retorted, ‘Ofcourse, just as I indicated to you that Pakistan would wish to remain within the commonwealth.’ Had Mountbatten followed the advice of Gandhi, Jinnah or Suhrawardy, instead of listening to only to Nehru, Punjab and Bengal might have been spared the deadly horrors, and a richly United Bangladesh, with its capital in Calcutta, would have emerged instead of the fragmented, impoverished Bangladesh born from its eastern half a quarter of a century later.” (Shameful Flight, Page 142)
I think we can make out very well that the partition of Punjab and Bengal was imposed on the subcontinent by Nehru and Mountbatten… with Patel absenting … Jinnah, Gandhi and to some extent Azad opposing …. Had this not been undertaken, perhaps the violence and the legacy of violence would not have existed… there would have been three more or less secular republics i.e. Pakistan, Hindustan and Bangladesh…. existing with mutual understanding in this great common subcontinent of ours… as opposed to the three polarized and hostile ones today.
#757 Posted by sadna on January 13, 2007 10:49:10 pm
#754
Except for personal abuse of Nehru, there is nothing in that write up which contradicts anything I said.
Except for personal abuse of Nehru, there is nothing in that write up which contradicts anything I said.








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