Shanay Khuda January 11, 2007
#129 Posted by dost_mittar on January 14, 2007 12:19:41 pm
taikonaut#128:
An authoritative historical account of what happened has yet to be written on that most tragic episode. I would hope that some diligent history student would go over the deliberations of the cabinet meetings of that time held in Delhi, Karachi and Lahore to find out exactly what happened. Until then, we all go mainly by hearsays and a selective quote or two by someone out to prove a point.
In the meantime, I think a lot of historical wounds would be healed if Indian and Pakistani governments officially opologised to their minorities for their acts of ommission and commission at that time and may be erect a memorial at Wagha to remember those who lost their lives in crossing their ill-fated border.
An authoritative historical account of what happened has yet to be written on that most tragic episode. I would hope that some diligent history student would go over the deliberations of the cabinet meetings of that time held in Delhi, Karachi and Lahore to find out exactly what happened. Until then, we all go mainly by hearsays and a selective quote or two by someone out to prove a point.
In the meantime, I think a lot of historical wounds would be healed if Indian and Pakistani governments officially opologised to their minorities for their acts of ommission and commission at that time and may be erect a memorial at Wagha to remember those who lost their lives in crossing their ill-fated border.
#130 Posted by zeemax on January 14, 2007 12:49:31 pm
#129 by dost-mittar, Para 2,
That`s the least they could do. There`s still no remembrance of the million dead ...
If Punjab & Bengal had not been partitioned, TNT would have an entirely different meaning. As it is, it turned out to be religious grounds when it wasn`t to begin with.
That`s the least they could do. There`s still no remembrance of the million dead ...
If Punjab & Bengal had not been partitioned, TNT would have an entirely different meaning. As it is, it turned out to be religious grounds when it wasn`t to begin with.
#131 Posted by anil on January 14, 2007 1:07:55 pm
Re: # 129
Dost-Mitter:
``...I would hope that some diligent history student would go over the deliberations of the cabinet meetings of that time held in Delhi, Karachi and Lahore to find out exactly what happened. ... ``
Do you really believe, the history so written would not suffer from student`s bias?
Dost-Mitter:
``...I would hope that some diligent history student would go over the deliberations of the cabinet meetings of that time held in Delhi, Karachi and Lahore to find out exactly what happened. ... ``
Do you really believe, the history so written would not suffer from student`s bias?
#132 Posted by zeemax on January 14, 2007 1:13:08 pm
But I have to say this ... it appears Hindus have the notion that Muslims broke away from India ... nothing can be farther than the truth. As I`ve said many times before, the flea does not own the dog. Muslims did well by getting their own piece of the dog, but many fleas still remain on India`s back who`ll get their own bite size in time to come ...
The Hindus were just one flea ... it is naive of them to think otherwise ...
The Hindus were just one flea ... it is naive of them to think otherwise ...
#133 Posted by dost_mittar on January 14, 2007 1:38:47 pm
anil#131:
``Do you really believe, the history so written would not suffer from student`s bias?``
...if only, we could persuade sadna and Manto to collaborate on such a project. :)
sadna has given an example of the kind of diligent research I was talking about in this piece on unplugged. Interestingly, it is mostly quotations from Jenkins whom takenout referred to:
Ian Talbot `Khizr Tiwana, the Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India` :
`Khizr called a full cabinet meeting on the morning of 28 January. This decided to withdraw the ban on the Muslim National Guards and the RSS, whilst reemphasising the Ministry`s committment to maintaining law and order. The Muslim League`s initial grievance had been fully met. But the genie was now out of the bottle. Shaukat uncompromisingly declared that `The Khizr Ministry must be made to go whatever the cost to the Muslim League.` He boasted that the opposition would `put out 15 million Muslims to break the law.`.
..
[On 3 February 1947, to Wavell, Punjab Governor] Jenkins sombrely concluded that ` the agitation has convinced Hindus and Sikhs that the League wanted undiluted Muslim Raj`. `It is quite impossible to rule the Punjab with its present boundaries. Long term alternatives are therefore reversion to Unionist principles.. or partition which would create intolerable minority problems. Effect of agitation is to force second alternative on non-Muslims and to impair very serious long-term prospects of the Muslim League and Muslims generally. The Muslim League are in fact wantonly throwing away the certainty of Muslim leadership in a United Punjab for uncertain advantages of a partition which the Sikhs will gradually now demand. But nobody has the brains to understand this.`
On 2 March Khizr Hayat Khan decided to resign. ``Jenkins saw the Nawab of Mamdot late on the morning of 3 March. He gave him an absolutely free hand to form a Ministry in the expectation that the Muslim League President would be able to report positive progress by Saturday 8 March at the latest. The installation of a Muslim League led Coalition Ministry proved impossible. The Punjab entered its final months of British rule under a Section 93 administration, with the morale of its officials severely undermined.
Mamdot failed to provide the reassurances which the Sikhs and the Congress demanded, mainly because his hands were tied by the Muslim League High Command. Jinnah discountenanced a local arrangement in the Punjab which would in any way weaken his All-India demand for Pakistan. Moreover, Sikh resentment had almost boiled during the Punjab Muslim League agitation. The mild-mannered Swaran Singh had warned Jenkins, that the Sikhs `must have a clear account of the Muslim League`s plan for the future of the Punjab and of the position of Sikhs within this.. The Sikhs had no intention, ` he addeded, `of being serfs under Muslim masters and felt they were strong enough to defend themselves.`. Tara Singh used far more intemperate language which he unsheafed his sword on the steps of the Punjab Assembly building, after hearing of Khizr`s resignation. This action is conventionally taken as the catalyst for the violent demonstrations and riots which engulfed the Punjab in the following days.
The Punjab had been a poweder keg for many months. It is nevertheless significant, that within less than a week of Khizr`s resignation, communal violence had reached alarming proportions and the Congress had demanded the partition of the province. For the first time, violence spread from the cities othe countryside and took on the sinister undertones of `ethnic cleansing`. Whole villages in the Jhelum, Attock and Rawalpindi districts were put to the sword. About 40,000 people, mainly Sikhs had taken refuge in hurriedly established camps. The outrage which many Sikh leaders felt at these assaults which were orchestrated by Muslim National Guards and ex-servicemen[Jenkins to Wavell, 17 March 1947] and condoned by Muslim League politicians[Jenkins to Mountbatten, 30 April 1947] fed a desire for revenge which bread a civil war mentality..
The March violence destroyed any lingering hopes that the Punjab might escape partition... The violence also destroyed the British system of control in the countryside centred around such loyalist political families as the Tiwanas. The collapse of Unionist influence created political and administrative chaos..``.
Transfer of Power Vol IX
Jenkins to Wavell on 17 March 1947
``... It is very difficult to account for this extraordinarily violent rural movement. General Messervy thinks that there are some signs of organisation and conspiracy- in parts of Rawalpindi outbreaks seem to have occured almost simultaneously, and the raid at Murree,.., appears to have been carefully planned and carried out. .. The Commander 7th Division told me when I saw him yesterday that attacks on non-Muslims had been led in some cases by retired Army officers-some of them pensioners with honorary Commissioned rank. The Muslim section of the local notables.. were extremely sulky, and though some of them are beginning to be frightened, there is little doubt that they believe that the movement was inevitable and are not prepared to oppose it. The most probable theory is that the growth of the Pakistan idea from 1943 onwards, the extreme communalism of the election campaign of 1945-46, the frustration which followed it, the propaganda against the Coalition Ministry, the Muslim League agitation, H.M.G`s statement of 20th February, and Khizar`s resignation combined to touch off an explosive mixture which had been forming for some time. The Muslims say that they were influenced by rumors of a large Sikh Army marching on the north; also that the movement is a spontaneous outburst against black-marketing by non-Muslims. It is more likely that they believe that by exterminating non-Muslims now they will make their districts a safe base for operations against the other communities in due course. No educated man could reasonably believe the story about the Sikh army, and though opportunity had been take to wipe out economic scores, resentment at the controls and the way in which non-Muslims make money out of them was not in my judgement the immediate cause of the trouble.
Note by Jenkins, 20 March 1947
Raja Ghazanfar Ali came to see me at 4 p.m. today. He opened in rather a complacent way about the riots in the Rawalpindi and Attock districts and in the Chakwal Sub-Division. He took great credit for having kept Gujrat and the greater part of Jhelum quiet. He scouted the idea that the outbreak was organised or that the League had anything to do with it.
He worked up gradualy to the suggestion that I might now put a Muslim League Ministry into power. He suggested a general election and said that this would give the electorate an opportunity of deciding whether the Punjab should be partitioned or not. [ In other words, the Muslim League was prepared to accept partition of the province -sadna]
...
I was exasperated by Ghazanfar Ali`s complacency and dealt with him rather roughly. I said he did not appear to realise that what had occured in Rawalpindi, Attock and the Chakwal Sub-Division was a general massacre of a most beastly kind. He could suggest, as he had suggested, in dealing with the conspiracy theory that the non-Muslims had been provocative, but the provocation was certainly not such as to justify the slaughter and savagery that had occured.
As regards a Muslim League Government, I said I would resign sooner than see one in office at this juncture, and I thought practically every British officer would do the same. The massacre had been conducted in the name of the Muslim League, and senior Military Officers thought that it had been carefully planned and organised. Non-Muslims with some justice now regarded the Muslims has little better than animals, and for my own party I thought that British officers would find it difficult to work with or under such people.
I could see no object whatever in a a general election. It would not alter the basic position that no single community could rule the Punjab except by actual conquest. If a Muslim League Government took office, there would be immediate fighting, and the Government would find it impossible to hold even a single session of the Assembly. I considered Raja Ghaznafar Ali`s political views so irresponsible as to be hardly worth discussing.
...
I said that the troubles of the Muslim League were due to folly and bad leadership. The League had given the impression that the Muslims were a kind of ruling race in the Punjab and would be good enough to treat with generosity their fellow Punjabis, such as the Sikhs, when their rule was established. They could not explain what they meant by ``Pakistan``, and unless they were prepared to deal with other Punjabis as equals, they would make no progress at all. It was a ludicrous position in which the so-called League leaders had to take orders from Bombay from a person entirely ignorant of Punjab conditions. If Raja Ghazanfar Ali argued, as he did, that the Central picture must be complete before any picture of the Punjab could even be sketched, my reply was that his whole conception of the future of India was topsy turvy. A Punjab divided into two or three States or in a condition of chaos and civil war could not possibly fit into any conceivable all-India picture. Surely the right course was to determine the future of the units in a way accept to their inhabitants and then to sketch the all-India picture. (Raja Ghazanfar Ali said that he thought there was something to this.).
At the end of the interview Raja Ghazanfar Ali said that I had distored and misrepresented the League`s views and that he would send me a number of statements by Mr. Jinnah showing that he had never intended to treat the minorities and particularly the Sikhs, in the way I suggested. I said that the first task now was to restore order.
I could not prevent the League from making further blunders. They had already fooled away a kingdom, and it would in my judgement be futile now to attempt any final solution of the Punjab problem until feelings had settled down. The League did not seem to realise that the non-Muslims regarded the Muslims of Rawalpindi and Attock as little better than beasts and hated the League profoundly. It was futile to suggest, as he had suggested, that the League agitation was non-communal. It was manifestly communal from the first, and could not have been anything else.
..
TOP Vol X
14 April 1947 Meeting, Mountbatten papers
..
Sir Evan Jenkins said... The Muslim aim, vehemently pursuded, was to dominate the whole Punjab within its present boundaries. The Sikh aim, even more vehemently pursued, was to frustrate the Muslim. The Jats wished to separate and join with the U.P, bu their claim was not being very strongly voiced. He doubted whether there was any possibility of an announcement of parition without it being followed up by an immediate blow-up..
Sir Eric Mieville asked what were the alternatives to plan of partition. Sir Evan Jenkins replied that there were three alternatives, namely : (a) reversion to unionism ( partition (c) civil war. If we were unable to get (a) or ( then there was little option but to withdraw and leave both sides to fight it out. He had no doubt that the Sikhs would fight at some stage, but would rather wait until we were out of the way..
...
There followed some discussion on means of bringing about any form of agreement between Muslims and Sikhs, in which Sir Evan said that the Muslim policy was one of `daring us to leave` by threatening us with the bogy of the conditions which would be the result of our departure: and that the Sikhs were almost certain to ask for partition on their own terms and would be content to have the Hindus in with them.
Note by Sir E. Jenkins, 16 April 1947
[about the rioting in March 1947]
``.. Casualties were heavy in the other cities also, and except in Amritsar the non-Muslims suffered much more heavilty than the Muslims.
By 6th-7th March the trouble was spreading to the rural areas of the Rawalpindi Division and the Multan district. In the Rawalpindi and Attock districts and later in part of the Jhelum district there was an absolute butchery of non-Muslims. In many villages they were herded into houses and burnt alive. Many Sikhs had their hair and beards cur, and there were cases of forcible circumcision. Many Sikh women who escaped slaugher were abducted.
The Muslim League made no efforts to maintain peace and Mamdot made no serious attempt at forming a Ministry. At the time he had no majority and he gave me the impression that he was not anxious to take responsibility for quelling a veyr serious outbreak of violence.
(2) The total number of dead is not yet known. The latest figure is just under 3,000 and I believe that the final figure may be 3,500. The communal proportions have not been accurately recorded, but I shouls ay that among the dead there are 6 non-Muslims for every Muslim. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan can hardly realise the terrible nature of the rural massacre. One of my troubles has been the extreme complacency of the League leaders in the Punjab, who say in effect that ``boys will be boys``. I have no doubt that the non-Muslims were provocative in the cities, but the Msulims had been equally provocative during their agitation and had in particular murdered a Sikh constable in Amritsar.
..
(9) For what object the British officials in the Punjab, including myself, are ``fostering chaos`` I do not know. Every British official in the I.C.S and I.P in the Punjab, including myself, would be very glad to leave it tomorrow. With two or three possible exceptions no British offical intends to remain in the Punjab after the transfer of power. Six months ago the position was quite different; but we feel now that we are dealing with people who are out to destroy themselves, and that in the absence of some reasonable agreement between them the average official will have to spend his life in a communal civil war.
(10) The Punjab is not now in a constitutional, but in a revolutionary situation. If a Muslim League Government were formed tomorrow, it would be attacked by the non-Muslims, and particularly the Sikhs, with a violence which might be uncontrollable and would certainly involve frightful slaughter by Police and troops. If Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan means to start an agitation against authority in the Punjab, he will produce very much the same result. He might be reminded that it was the Muslim League, and not the non-Muslims, who first attempted to dislodge a Ministry by force.
taikenout:
If you read the above cut-and-paste, you will know that the mayhem started before May 1947 in Rawalpindi. Many people also blame Tara Singh for his provocative speech in Lahore. Jinnah, of course, had no constitutional responsibility at that time but he did call the shots in the Muslim League, a fact mentioned by Jenkins in the above piece (namely, Ghaznafar Ali Khan got his orders from Bombay).
``Do you really believe, the history so written would not suffer from student`s bias?``
...if only, we could persuade sadna and Manto to collaborate on such a project. :)
sadna has given an example of the kind of diligent research I was talking about in this piece on unplugged. Interestingly, it is mostly quotations from Jenkins whom takenout referred to:
Ian Talbot `Khizr Tiwana, the Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India` :
`Khizr called a full cabinet meeting on the morning of 28 January. This decided to withdraw the ban on the Muslim National Guards and the RSS, whilst reemphasising the Ministry`s committment to maintaining law and order. The Muslim League`s initial grievance had been fully met. But the genie was now out of the bottle. Shaukat uncompromisingly declared that `The Khizr Ministry must be made to go whatever the cost to the Muslim League.` He boasted that the opposition would `put out 15 million Muslims to break the law.`.
..
[On 3 February 1947, to Wavell, Punjab Governor] Jenkins sombrely concluded that ` the agitation has convinced Hindus and Sikhs that the League wanted undiluted Muslim Raj`. `It is quite impossible to rule the Punjab with its present boundaries. Long term alternatives are therefore reversion to Unionist principles.. or partition which would create intolerable minority problems. Effect of agitation is to force second alternative on non-Muslims and to impair very serious long-term prospects of the Muslim League and Muslims generally. The Muslim League are in fact wantonly throwing away the certainty of Muslim leadership in a United Punjab for uncertain advantages of a partition which the Sikhs will gradually now demand. But nobody has the brains to understand this.`
On 2 March Khizr Hayat Khan decided to resign. ``Jenkins saw the Nawab of Mamdot late on the morning of 3 March. He gave him an absolutely free hand to form a Ministry in the expectation that the Muslim League President would be able to report positive progress by Saturday 8 March at the latest. The installation of a Muslim League led Coalition Ministry proved impossible. The Punjab entered its final months of British rule under a Section 93 administration, with the morale of its officials severely undermined.
Mamdot failed to provide the reassurances which the Sikhs and the Congress demanded, mainly because his hands were tied by the Muslim League High Command. Jinnah discountenanced a local arrangement in the Punjab which would in any way weaken his All-India demand for Pakistan. Moreover, Sikh resentment had almost boiled during the Punjab Muslim League agitation. The mild-mannered Swaran Singh had warned Jenkins, that the Sikhs `must have a clear account of the Muslim League`s plan for the future of the Punjab and of the position of Sikhs within this.. The Sikhs had no intention, ` he addeded, `of being serfs under Muslim masters and felt they were strong enough to defend themselves.`. Tara Singh used far more intemperate language which he unsheafed his sword on the steps of the Punjab Assembly building, after hearing of Khizr`s resignation. This action is conventionally taken as the catalyst for the violent demonstrations and riots which engulfed the Punjab in the following days.
The Punjab had been a poweder keg for many months. It is nevertheless significant, that within less than a week of Khizr`s resignation, communal violence had reached alarming proportions and the Congress had demanded the partition of the province. For the first time, violence spread from the cities othe countryside and took on the sinister undertones of `ethnic cleansing`. Whole villages in the Jhelum, Attock and Rawalpindi districts were put to the sword. About 40,000 people, mainly Sikhs had taken refuge in hurriedly established camps. The outrage which many Sikh leaders felt at these assaults which were orchestrated by Muslim National Guards and ex-servicemen[Jenkins to Wavell, 17 March 1947] and condoned by Muslim League politicians[Jenkins to Mountbatten, 30 April 1947] fed a desire for revenge which bread a civil war mentality..
The March violence destroyed any lingering hopes that the Punjab might escape partition... The violence also destroyed the British system of control in the countryside centred around such loyalist political families as the Tiwanas. The collapse of Unionist influence created political and administrative chaos..``.
Transfer of Power Vol IX
Jenkins to Wavell on 17 March 1947
``... It is very difficult to account for this extraordinarily violent rural movement. General Messervy thinks that there are some signs of organisation and conspiracy- in parts of Rawalpindi outbreaks seem to have occured almost simultaneously, and the raid at Murree,.., appears to have been carefully planned and carried out. .. The Commander 7th Division told me when I saw him yesterday that attacks on non-Muslims had been led in some cases by retired Army officers-some of them pensioners with honorary Commissioned rank. The Muslim section of the local notables.. were extremely sulky, and though some of them are beginning to be frightened, there is little doubt that they believe that the movement was inevitable and are not prepared to oppose it. The most probable theory is that the growth of the Pakistan idea from 1943 onwards, the extreme communalism of the election campaign of 1945-46, the frustration which followed it, the propaganda against the Coalition Ministry, the Muslim League agitation, H.M.G`s statement of 20th February, and Khizar`s resignation combined to touch off an explosive mixture which had been forming for some time. The Muslims say that they were influenced by rumors of a large Sikh Army marching on the north; also that the movement is a spontaneous outburst against black-marketing by non-Muslims. It is more likely that they believe that by exterminating non-Muslims now they will make their districts a safe base for operations against the other communities in due course. No educated man could reasonably believe the story about the Sikh army, and though opportunity had been take to wipe out economic scores, resentment at the controls and the way in which non-Muslims make money out of them was not in my judgement the immediate cause of the trouble.
Note by Jenkins, 20 March 1947
Raja Ghazanfar Ali came to see me at 4 p.m. today. He opened in rather a complacent way about the riots in the Rawalpindi and Attock districts and in the Chakwal Sub-Division. He took great credit for having kept Gujrat and the greater part of Jhelum quiet. He scouted the idea that the outbreak was organised or that the League had anything to do with it.
He worked up gradualy to the suggestion that I might now put a Muslim League Ministry into power. He suggested a general election and said that this would give the electorate an opportunity of deciding whether the Punjab should be partitioned or not. [ In other words, the Muslim League was prepared to accept partition of the province -sadna]
...
I was exasperated by Ghazanfar Ali`s complacency and dealt with him rather roughly. I said he did not appear to realise that what had occured in Rawalpindi, Attock and the Chakwal Sub-Division was a general massacre of a most beastly kind. He could suggest, as he had suggested, in dealing with the conspiracy theory that the non-Muslims had been provocative, but the provocation was certainly not such as to justify the slaughter and savagery that had occured.
As regards a Muslim League Government, I said I would resign sooner than see one in office at this juncture, and I thought practically every British officer would do the same. The massacre had been conducted in the name of the Muslim League, and senior Military Officers thought that it had been carefully planned and organised. Non-Muslims with some justice now regarded the Muslims has little better than animals, and for my own party I thought that British officers would find it difficult to work with or under such people.
I could see no object whatever in a a general election. It would not alter the basic position that no single community could rule the Punjab except by actual conquest. If a Muslim League Government took office, there would be immediate fighting, and the Government would find it impossible to hold even a single session of the Assembly. I considered Raja Ghaznafar Ali`s political views so irresponsible as to be hardly worth discussing.
...
I said that the troubles of the Muslim League were due to folly and bad leadership. The League had given the impression that the Muslims were a kind of ruling race in the Punjab and would be good enough to treat with generosity their fellow Punjabis, such as the Sikhs, when their rule was established. They could not explain what they meant by ``Pakistan``, and unless they were prepared to deal with other Punjabis as equals, they would make no progress at all. It was a ludicrous position in which the so-called League leaders had to take orders from Bombay from a person entirely ignorant of Punjab conditions. If Raja Ghazanfar Ali argued, as he did, that the Central picture must be complete before any picture of the Punjab could even be sketched, my reply was that his whole conception of the future of India was topsy turvy. A Punjab divided into two or three States or in a condition of chaos and civil war could not possibly fit into any conceivable all-India picture. Surely the right course was to determine the future of the units in a way accept to their inhabitants and then to sketch the all-India picture. (Raja Ghazanfar Ali said that he thought there was something to this.).
At the end of the interview Raja Ghazanfar Ali said that I had distored and misrepresented the League`s views and that he would send me a number of statements by Mr. Jinnah showing that he had never intended to treat the minorities and particularly the Sikhs, in the way I suggested. I said that the first task now was to restore order.
I could not prevent the League from making further blunders. They had already fooled away a kingdom, and it would in my judgement be futile now to attempt any final solution of the Punjab problem until feelings had settled down. The League did not seem to realise that the non-Muslims regarded the Muslims of Rawalpindi and Attock as little better than beasts and hated the League profoundly. It was futile to suggest, as he had suggested, that the League agitation was non-communal. It was manifestly communal from the first, and could not have been anything else.
..
TOP Vol X
14 April 1947 Meeting, Mountbatten papers
..
Sir Evan Jenkins said... The Muslim aim, vehemently pursuded, was to dominate the whole Punjab within its present boundaries. The Sikh aim, even more vehemently pursued, was to frustrate the Muslim. The Jats wished to separate and join with the U.P, bu their claim was not being very strongly voiced. He doubted whether there was any possibility of an announcement of parition without it being followed up by an immediate blow-up..
Sir Eric Mieville asked what were the alternatives to plan of partition. Sir Evan Jenkins replied that there were three alternatives, namely : (a) reversion to unionism ( partition (c) civil war. If we were unable to get (a) or ( then there was little option but to withdraw and leave both sides to fight it out. He had no doubt that the Sikhs would fight at some stage, but would rather wait until we were out of the way..
...
There followed some discussion on means of bringing about any form of agreement between Muslims and Sikhs, in which Sir Evan said that the Muslim policy was one of `daring us to leave` by threatening us with the bogy of the conditions which would be the result of our departure: and that the Sikhs were almost certain to ask for partition on their own terms and would be content to have the Hindus in with them.
Note by Sir E. Jenkins, 16 April 1947
[about the rioting in March 1947]
``.. Casualties were heavy in the other cities also, and except in Amritsar the non-Muslims suffered much more heavilty than the Muslims.
By 6th-7th March the trouble was spreading to the rural areas of the Rawalpindi Division and the Multan district. In the Rawalpindi and Attock districts and later in part of the Jhelum district there was an absolute butchery of non-Muslims. In many villages they were herded into houses and burnt alive. Many Sikhs had their hair and beards cur, and there were cases of forcible circumcision. Many Sikh women who escaped slaugher were abducted.
The Muslim League made no efforts to maintain peace and Mamdot made no serious attempt at forming a Ministry. At the time he had no majority and he gave me the impression that he was not anxious to take responsibility for quelling a veyr serious outbreak of violence.
(2) The total number of dead is not yet known. The latest figure is just under 3,000 and I believe that the final figure may be 3,500. The communal proportions have not been accurately recorded, but I shouls ay that among the dead there are 6 non-Muslims for every Muslim. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan can hardly realise the terrible nature of the rural massacre. One of my troubles has been the extreme complacency of the League leaders in the Punjab, who say in effect that ``boys will be boys``. I have no doubt that the non-Muslims were provocative in the cities, but the Msulims had been equally provocative during their agitation and had in particular murdered a Sikh constable in Amritsar.
..
(9) For what object the British officials in the Punjab, including myself, are ``fostering chaos`` I do not know. Every British official in the I.C.S and I.P in the Punjab, including myself, would be very glad to leave it tomorrow. With two or three possible exceptions no British offical intends to remain in the Punjab after the transfer of power. Six months ago the position was quite different; but we feel now that we are dealing with people who are out to destroy themselves, and that in the absence of some reasonable agreement between them the average official will have to spend his life in a communal civil war.
(10) The Punjab is not now in a constitutional, but in a revolutionary situation. If a Muslim League Government were formed tomorrow, it would be attacked by the non-Muslims, and particularly the Sikhs, with a violence which might be uncontrollable and would certainly involve frightful slaughter by Police and troops. If Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan means to start an agitation against authority in the Punjab, he will produce very much the same result. He might be reminded that it was the Muslim League, and not the non-Muslims, who first attempted to dislodge a Ministry by force.
taikenout:
If you read the above cut-and-paste, you will know that the mayhem started before May 1947 in Rawalpindi. Many people also blame Tara Singh for his provocative speech in Lahore. Jinnah, of course, had no constitutional responsibility at that time but he did call the shots in the Muslim League, a fact mentioned by Jenkins in the above piece (namely, Ghaznafar Ali Khan got his orders from Bombay).
#134 Posted by bjkumar on January 14, 2007 2:02:12 pm
#125 Zeemax
Ama Zee, why stop at those two lines.
Go read everything else I have written – in write-ups, interacts, and i-logs – all of it is traceable to that writer in some fashion.
And that is the absolute truth!
I wrote in my piece what came to me!
I always do.
And as far as the political discussions are concerned…
Frankly, you (and the rest of the gang) – who take your “opinions” rather seriously…
Especially, over such important issues as the “partition” of the subcontinent into India and what should be called West India…
Y’all can take those opinions…
And stick them!
Now, let me be kind to you and say it below in no uncertain terms:
This is to acknowledge to all the dumb-bells of chowk (including those who pretend not to already know) that every line I have ever written on chowk.com comes to you courtesy of the Versey!
Especially the lines that came to ME!
And in case you don`t already know it, so shall every future line that I shall write here!
There.
I feel better already!
Don`t feel bitter now!
Or jealous!
PS: I intend to keep saying whatever comes to me – and there is not a thing that you and your like or anyone else can do about that! :)
Also Zee – let us see if you have the guts to admit the very evident fact!
That you are jealous!!!
#135 Posted by anil on January 14, 2007 2:28:38 pm
Re: # 133
Dost-Mitter:
`` ``Do you really believe, the history so written would not suffer from student`s bias?``
...if only, we could persuade sadna and Manto to collaborate on such a project. :) ``
A while back I had suggested this on Chowk, that they collaborate to write a book, I had even offered to underwrite all expenses.
Dost-Mitter:
`` ``Do you really believe, the history so written would not suffer from student`s bias?``
...if only, we could persuade sadna and Manto to collaborate on such a project. :) ``
A while back I had suggested this on Chowk, that they collaborate to write a book, I had even offered to underwrite all expenses.
#136 Posted by bjkumar on January 14, 2007 2:38:36 pm
#135
[offered to underwrite all expenses]
FINALLY, somebody offers to put up the money where the mouths are!
#137 Posted by mohar11 on January 14, 2007 2:43:23 pm
Re: # 132
[....it appears Hindus have the notion that Muslims broke away from India...]
true.... for a while, the partition was considered some kind of ``betrayal`` by muslims ... but with time, hinuds have got a better perspective... now, after 60 years, people have understood that there was no ``betrayal`` or ``breaking away`` - partition was the right thing to do... it was good that muslims got their ``homeland``...
Building monuments may not server any purpose... it may inflame things , particularly on paki side.... on indian side, partition affected a small section of people - so most people have pretty much moved on... but unfortunately, you pakis haven`t... you still talk about ``moth-eaten pakistan``, ``unfinished business``, ``war of thousand years`` , ``war by thousand cuts``... blah, blah... and now I am hearing that you pakis actually wanted to get ``all of punjab, bengal``... I mean - come on pakis... give us a break...
you pakis just have to move on... be happy with what you have, and try to keep it together, if you can... have some decent administration, democracy or something... and produce something positive, for a change...
[....it appears Hindus have the notion that Muslims broke away from India...]
true.... for a while, the partition was considered some kind of ``betrayal`` by muslims ... but with time, hinuds have got a better perspective... now, after 60 years, people have understood that there was no ``betrayal`` or ``breaking away`` - partition was the right thing to do... it was good that muslims got their ``homeland``...
Building monuments may not server any purpose... it may inflame things , particularly on paki side.... on indian side, partition affected a small section of people - so most people have pretty much moved on... but unfortunately, you pakis haven`t... you still talk about ``moth-eaten pakistan``, ``unfinished business``, ``war of thousand years`` , ``war by thousand cuts``... blah, blah... and now I am hearing that you pakis actually wanted to get ``all of punjab, bengal``... I mean - come on pakis... give us a break...
you pakis just have to move on... be happy with what you have, and try to keep it together, if you can... have some decent administration, democracy or something... and produce something positive, for a change...
#138 Posted by bjkumar on January 14, 2007 2:50:04 pm
#137 Mohar11
[you pakis just have to move on... be happy with what you have, and try to keep it together, if you can... have some decent administration, democracy or something... and produce something positive, for a change...]
Ama yaar, what kind of cruel joke is this?!! You ask SO much of those people.
And before one knows it, you will start asking those same people to develop even such concepts as human rights! (Tauba!)
To start showing equality to their women! (Tauba! Tauba!)
To actually do some work! (Tauba! Tauba! Tauba!)
No way, my dear! You are talking with the enlightened folks from the land of the pure!
#139 Posted by bulleya on January 14, 2007 3:42:15 pm
dost-mittar #: ``Did he have the power to dismiss the top policemen in the country for dereliction of their duties?``
.......i will assume that you have now moved beyond your original point that jinnah was, himself, directly involved in the, ``ethnic cleansing`` of the minorities.....i.e. he could have personally done something to avoid the situation beyond what he did.......or that he ordered it.......
..........now you have brought up the point whether jinnah could have fired the top policeman of the country.........this is something he definitely could have done, from what i can see..........
.......but first one has to establish a case against this, ``top policeman,`` i.e. was he complicit? was he incompetent? was an acommplice to the violence?.........is it possible that within his limited resources, he did everything he could to help the minorities?.........could it be that he had little resources as they were controlled by india and the british?........
i have no information on the, ``top policeman`` and what he did.........however, since you have already convicted the top policeman of incompetence, or worst yet, being an accomplice.........and through that relationship, convicted jinnah of not firing him, i would like you to inform us of the information that is available to you........on the basis of which you have made your claim........i.e. who was the top policeman and what did he do, and what could he do and how many resources did he have.......
........once you have provided all the information, available to you, regarding the resources available to this top policeman to stop the violence, on the basis of which you have made your claim against jinnah and this top policeman, i will be able to answer you question...........
.......i will assume that you have now moved beyond your original point that jinnah was, himself, directly involved in the, ``ethnic cleansing`` of the minorities.....i.e. he could have personally done something to avoid the situation beyond what he did.......or that he ordered it.......
..........now you have brought up the point whether jinnah could have fired the top policeman of the country.........this is something he definitely could have done, from what i can see..........
.......but first one has to establish a case against this, ``top policeman,`` i.e. was he complicit? was he incompetent? was an acommplice to the violence?.........is it possible that within his limited resources, he did everything he could to help the minorities?.........could it be that he had little resources as they were controlled by india and the british?........
i have no information on the, ``top policeman`` and what he did.........however, since you have already convicted the top policeman of incompetence, or worst yet, being an accomplice.........and through that relationship, convicted jinnah of not firing him, i would like you to inform us of the information that is available to you........on the basis of which you have made your claim........i.e. who was the top policeman and what did he do, and what could he do and how many resources did he have.......
........once you have provided all the information, available to you, regarding the resources available to this top policeman to stop the violence, on the basis of which you have made your claim against jinnah and this top policeman, i will be able to answer you question...........
#140 Posted by Maharana on January 14, 2007 4:26:15 pm
Sadna,
Thanks for researching so painstakingly on the partition trauma of the subcontinent. Notes written by the people involved speak louder than ``authorities`` on an emotional subject.
Adios
Thanks for researching so painstakingly on the partition trauma of the subcontinent. Notes written by the people involved speak louder than ``authorities`` on an emotional subject.
Adios
#141 Posted by ramchandar on January 14, 2007 5:22:10 pm
Ref#132
Hi Zee
Breaking up of India was the best thing Muslims could do to Hindus. If they were all togeather the lives of Hindus would have become more miserable by the muslims. Muslim Jihad ( read sex + violence) is already making the world miserable place.
Hi Zee
Breaking up of India was the best thing Muslims could do to Hindus. If they were all togeather the lives of Hindus would have become more miserable by the muslims. Muslim Jihad ( read sex + violence) is already making the world miserable place.
#142 Posted by bjkumar on January 14, 2007 6:14:09 pm
#141 Ramchandar ji
I could not disagree more. Had British India stayed united as one country, the ``Muslims`` of West Pakistan:
(1) Would not have cleaned out their minorities. This would have necessitated a reliance on ``minority`` votes for continuation in power. Fundamentalism would never have grown and run amuck the way it did when it came loose by the likes of the vamp Jinnah.
(2) Would have more experience in living together with minorities - and the attendant diversity.
(3) Would not have forever suffered this constant need of having to defend the indefensible - of trying to do everything as opposite to India simply to justify their reason for existence.
(4) Would not have been held hostage to the whims of the Punjabi khakis and continuously killed off civilian leadership because the armed forces would have been much larger and too unwieldy to become dictators.
It is rather simple:
No Pakistan.
No khaki rule.
No dictatorship.
No Taleban.
No 9/11.
None of the gory stuff that followed 9/11 - including the Afghanistan invasion AND the Iraq invasion!
To this simple interactor it is crystal clear that the creation of ``Pakistan`` from West India was a blunder to last all blunders - whose prices are still being paid all over the world.
#143 Posted by bjkumar on January 14, 2007 6:19:46 pm
In fact, if one can take into account the true cost in human suffering and misery that came from partition - and still approves of it - it is fair to say that such individuals (mostly Pakistanis here) are utterly callous to the loss of human lives!
#144 Posted by dost_mittar on January 14, 2007 7:12:58 pm
bulleya:
Top policeman was merely a symbol; for all I know, that individual, whoever he was, might have been the kindest person and went to hajj several times to be forgiven for not being able to control the massacres. The point was that a man who could do everythig he wanted in his country should have been able to prevent ethnic cleansing; if he could not, to say that he could do anything he wanted is a meaningless claim.
Top policeman was merely a symbol; for all I know, that individual, whoever he was, might have been the kindest person and went to hajj several times to be forgiven for not being able to control the massacres. The point was that a man who could do everythig he wanted in his country should have been able to prevent ethnic cleansing; if he could not, to say that he could do anything he wanted is a meaningless claim.
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