Daniel Berk August 19, 2007
#1 Posted by chowkstaff on September 17, 2007 12:29:02 am
Original article of Khalid Ahmed for reference:
TRANSFORMATION OF PUNJABI MAN
Khaled Ahmed's A n a l y s i s
The Punjabis are a great race. They are talented, adaptable to change, gifted with a sense of humour, and
possessed of an undying zest for life. They are good company, secure against bouts of suspicion about
self-esteem and generous in admitting the superiority of others. But they also have 'flaws'. Taken together,
these flaws constitute a kind of personality disorder which makes government virtually impossible. The
Punjabi man will sacrifice rules to benefit his own clan, will be 'excessive' in conduct when in power and quick
to stampede when under siege. In short, he is incapable of good governance because he will not submit to
agreed rules when pushed by opportunism. One wonders how Pakistan can survive if over 60 percent of its
population is subversive of the state merely because of its innate collective character?
Stereotyping is not in good taste but the world has always labelled nations and races. All nations express a
kind of collective behaviour. Hitler called the British a nation of shopkeepers and was proved right when
prime minister Chamberlain signed the capitulating Munich Agreement with him in 1938 'because the British
economy was in a depression'. The Germans are accused of compiling encyclopaedias over issues which
require just common sense to resolve. The French are addicted to a kind of enfeebling aestheticism. The
Italians have a heroic self-image but are disorderly and incompetent in war. The Spanish and the Hispanics
are too 'oriental' to run their economy honestly. The nations living in the Balkans are intensely nationalist,
idealising their narrow hatred of one another. The Poles, the Irish and the Bengalis were once described by
Ambassador Jamsheed Marker as nations passionately embracing causes that are impossible of
achievement. Alexander Blok described the Russian character as a mixture of European and Asian traits,
subject to the pendulum swing of rationalism and fatalism.
The Iranians are inward-looking and proud. The Arabs were negatively described by Ibn Khaldun as too
Bedouin at heart to sustain civilisation. His narration of the political history of the Central Asian Muslims is
an attempt to describe chaos of character. The hard-working nations living in the Far East are supposed to
be culturally insulated. The Chinese have a Middle Kingdom personality and no other land matters more
than their Centre of the Earth. The Japanese are insular when they favour export (what goes out) and
resolutely oppose imports (what comes in). But everyone in the Far East is supposed to be so highly
'stylised' in courtesy that you can't break into their culture as a foreigner. As opposed to the 'reserved'
British personality, the American man is supposed to be open and frank.
The Pakistani stereotypes: In Pakistan, the stereotyping goes like this. Pakhtun are warlike but hampered in
organisation by their inability to accept leadership in their tribal system. The Sindhi is wedded to his land,
devoted to humanism, but limited by his lack of enterprise. The Baloch is completely submerged in the
heroic persona of his sardar, the opposite of Pakhtun individualism. The Punjabi is enterprising but
strangely given to passivity in the face of status quo. Pakistan's nationalities also have mythified images of
one another. The Pakhtuns think the Punjabis cowardly while the Sindhis look at them as a class of
merciless exploiters. The Baloch will contest Pakhtun hegemony in their province but join them in their
mistrust of the Punjabi. The Punjabis think the Sindhis lazy but submit to the leadership quality of the
Pakhtun.
The Punjabi man will adjust and change his identity under pressure from circumstances quicker than others.
This makes him a good entrepreneur, but he tends to be 'visceral' and 'excessive', which undermines his
project. In comparison to the Hindu entrepreneur, his weakness springs from this 'anarchy of character'.
His urge to succeed quickly distinguishes him from the more 'incremental' Hindu. His commerce is therefore
tinged with high profit-taking and low levels of trust. The Gujrati communities of Sindh who dominate
commerce in Pakistan rely on the Hindu work ethic. A seth in Karachi will be prompt in his payments and will
thus establish trust. The Punjabi will block payments, live in excessive luxury, but inspire minimal trust. The
publishers of Karachi and the chappal-makers of Quetta will not send their goods to Lahore because Lahore
never pays up. If you want to do business in Punjab you must set aside crores that will remain blocked in
delayed payments.
The Punjabi ethic: The culture of default in Pakistan can be said to be a Punjabi trait followed by elites of
other nationalities as a mode of 'revenge', although there is a historical Sindhi wadera trait of borrowing
from the Hindu money-lender of Sindh and then never paying up. The Punjabi is a steady character subject
to bouts of chaotic behaviour which he expresses usually with regard to food. In Punjab, the annual
birthday of Ms Bhutto declines into an assault on the large cake which the workers are supposed to share.
The press usually describes these gatherings with expressions like gutham-gutha and toot-parna. The
Punjabi mind thinks of orgy when exposed to food. In the PML meeting organised in 1989 by Nawaz Sharif
in an Islamabad hotel, to wrest the party leadership from Sindhi Muhammad Khan Junejo, declined into an
orgy of eating. His Punjabi followers fell on the food, ate from the donga, threw the bones on the floor, and
wiped their shorba-covered hands with the curtains. After they left the hotel shouting victory, the dining
hall looked like a wasteland.
The Punjabi in politics is an opportunist looking for a sharing of the spoils. In 1993, when speaker of the
Punjab Assembly, Mian Manzur Wattoo, staged an internal party coup against a deposed Nawaz Sharif, 70
percent of the PML members joined him. When Nawaz Sharif was restored by the Supreme Court within
days, the 70 percent immediately shifted their loyalty back to him. They had joined Wattoo complaining that
Nawaz Sharif and his chief ministers 'did not do their work'. When under Wattoo and Nakai, Punjab sank
further into chaos, the word applied to their rule was sikha-shahi, a reference to Punjab's history which has
moulded the Punjabi man.
History as moulder of Punjabi character: In the 18th century Punjab, most Punjabi regional potentates
undermined one another to stay in power and to avoid rise of any one Punjabi to supreme power. Delhi
ruled over a divided and conspiratorial Punjab. No one was sure of his friends and was ready to parley with
his enemies for political leverage. The Afghans in the west were seen as a make-weight to the rulers in
Delhi. A weak Delhi often caused loyalties to shift westward. The governor in Lahore feared his own satraps
more than he feared the Afghans. He flirted with the Afghans (Pakhtuns) and at times invited them to
attack Lahore to 'correct' the balance of power. In one instance, he called them in but ran away when the
invaders appeared. Historians note that Punjab was always a region of the marches which the invaders
occupied as a launching ground against Delhi. Pakhtun king Ahmad Shah Abdali 'used' Punjab again and
again for his invasions of India from 1774 to 1793. Marauding armies left their soldiers behind as warlords.
Punjab became an ethnic melting-pot of tribes that looked outward to their original homelands.
When the capital of Pakistan was in Karachi, the Punjabi leaders of the Muslim League in Lahore behaved like
the 18th century satraps of the Mughals. If Mamdot was Mir Mannu, who ruled Punjab from 1748 to 1753,
Daultana was Adina Beq (d.1758). The Punjab Assembly was reduced to a sulphurous marshland where the
partisans of the two League splinters took their mud-bath. Early history books described the famous scene
of bhangra performed by the Daultana men after overthrowing Mamdot, paving the way for ten years of
martial law under a Pakhtun, General Ayub Khan. The textbooks described Pakistan's early democracy as
the Lost Decade. Daultana, after successfully undermining the government of UP-oriented prime minister
Liaquat Ali Khan, and getting rid of a fellow-Punjabi, gave up politics, as if he had achieved the terminal
dream of Adina Beg. Mamdot was notorious for his lethargy while Daultana was a born spoiler and
Machiavelli incarnate. Mamdot was programmed to fail, Daultana feared success. The Punjabi man thereafter
sought refuge in the leadership of charismatic non-Punjabi leaders. He was in fact reverting to the historical
paradigm of 'welcoming invaders' to inoculate himself against the chaos of his own mind.
Punjabi as dominant community: By reason of their numerical strength, the Punjabis dominated the armed
forces. The land forces were always Punjabi, but with time even the navy became 90 percent Punjabi. As the
Pakhtun assertion in the armed forces declined after General Ayub, it was time for the Punjabi general,
Zia-ul-Haq, to reassert the Punjabi supremacy, after putting to death the charismatic Sindhi prime minister
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1979. The majority province was placated by the non-Punjabi leader by putting on the
Punjabi war-paint against India. After that, it was easy to enlist Punjabi loyalties which followed a set
pattern of obsequiousness. A rebel Punjabi leader Malik Ghulam Nabi recorded in his book that once when
prime minister Bhutto was in Lahore a Punjabi PPP leader likened himself to Bhutto's faithful dog as a form
of greeting. The base of the PPP in Punjab partly springs from the fact that the Punjabi fears the tyranny of
the fellow-Punjabi. General Zia chose Nawaz Sharif as his satrap in Punjab, carefully nurturing him in Lahore
first as finance minister and then as chief minister, to set the stage for a Punjabi assertion in Islamabad.
General Zia in fact chose two satrapies from the among the families brutalised by Bhutto during his regime:
the Sharifs of Lahore and the Chaudhris of Gujrat. In the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) in Lahore Mian
Nawaz Sharif and Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain were the strongmen on the basis of their control of city
politics in Lahore and Gujrat. Mian Nawaz Sharif's base was the shopkeepers of Lahore with their strong
religious connections; Chaudhry Shujaat had emerged as the only man who could rein in the criminal gangs
of Gujrat. Both satrapies coexisted within the PML but not without tensions. This was a throw-back to the
days of Mir Mannu's 18th century Punjab and the rule of his wife, Mughlani Begum. The claim of the
Chaudhris over the leadership of Punjab remained alive though muted in deference to the Sharifs' broad
Punjabi alliance. Whenever a split in the PML appeared imminent - PML was now called PML(N) to indicate
Nawaz Sharif's predominance - it was always seen as a split between the two Lahore-Gujrat satrapies.
Punjabi's love of power: The Punjabi will obey a powerful leader. Nawaz Sharif was a powerful leader who
punished disloyalty. His non-intellectual 'viscerality' was his badge. In power, he consistently declined into
'anarchy of character' linking him with the 18th century adventurers like Shah Nawaz Khan, Yahya Khan,
Mughlani Begum and the later Sikh rulers. His largesse was also an excess at the expense of governance.
He benefited beyond reasonable measure those who supported him. He used violence against his
opponents which served as the binding force of his party. His gestures were royal, something that a
Punjabi satrap will appreciate. Nawaz Sharif's longing for a Mughal identity as a ruler could be a throw-back
to Punjab's old longing for the panoply of Delhi. Nawaz Sharif's eating habits were essentially Punjabi with a
tinge of Kashmiri languor in them. He had bouts of effete Punjabi moods when in the middle of great
national decisions, which are often described as lapses of an extremely short 'attention span'. His removal
from the scene is bad for Punjab because another leader with his quintessential Punjabi panache will not be
found. The Punjabi will really not accept a lesser Punjabi as his leader. He touched a collective chord with his
exercise of power and sudden paroxysms of disorganisation.
As a majority nationality in Pakistan, the Punjabis form 60 percent of the National Assembly. They can
amend the Constitution with this majority. The Punjabi opinion, the Punjabi ideology, becomes the opinion
and ideology of Pakistan. This also makes the Punjabi averse to intellectual inquiry. His lack of intellect is not
innate but has been forced on him by his compulsion to impose ideology. The non-Punjabi ruler will have to
submit to this ideology if he wants to stay in power in the parliament. The other communities hate them for
this. They don't always share the passions of Punjabis. The Sindhis and the Baloch tend to be
secular-mystical, but the Pakhtuns and the Punjabis are today joined in Pakistan's passion for a more strict
religion. In this Punjabi-Pakhtun religious confluence, the Punjabi is in the subordinate position, bringing
back the memory of Afghan-dominated 18th century Punjab. The Punjabi man is inwardly lacerated by many
things he does against his innate culture. He has abandoned his mother tongue in favour of Urdu, which
testifies to his protean quality, but which must leave a wound somewhere in his psyche.
The Pakhtun factor: The Afghan war changed the Punjabi character. It happened through the charisma of
the Pakhtun warrior and the spread of the spiritual side of the Pakhtun: the Deobandi faith. The charisma of
the Pakhtun was noted by the American anthropologist-writer Louis Dupree in his book on Afghanistan.
Afghanistan is inhabited in the north by non-Pakhtun nationalities. They may be opposed to the Pakhtuns
politically but all of them assert their masculinity through the Pakhtun dress and partly through his code of
honour. It was not surprising therefore that Pakistani army officers fell victim to reverse indoctrination while
handling the Afghan warrior. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar embodied this new mystique. The war also indoctrinated
the foreigners fighting in Afghanistan. The Arab mujahideen were Pakhtunised and most of them went back
to their countries no longer able to re-assimilate. Even the Russians were transformed, a large number of
whom came to be called Afgantsi, and were shunned by Russian society.
In Punjab, the Deobandi Pakhtun cleric gradually took over the mosques from Barelvi Punjabis. This was
also due to the fact that the Deobandi seminaries in Pakistani were the most competent teachers of the
Quran. But they were also more strict, coalescing historically with the old Ahle Hadith or Wahabi movement
in India. The recruitment for the Afghan jehad in Punjab exposed more and more Punjabi youth to the
charisma of the Pakhtun warrior. During the Afghan war, an extremely brave Pakhtun, Qazi Hussain Ahmad,
came to head the traditionally Punjabi-dominated Jamaat Islami of Lahore. The Punjabi army officer and the
Punjabi prime minister Nawaz Sharif allowed the Qazi-Hekmatyar combine to dominate Islamabad's Afghan
policy. After 1994, when the lack of actual strength of Hekmatyar among the Afghan jehadi factions was
revealed, and a more clearly Deobandi jehadi leadership came to the fore, the Punjab was already
transformed.
Punjabi as Islamic warrior: The Punjabi warrior fighting in Afghanistan and Kashmir is more Pakhtun in
appearance and character than Punjabi. His new leaders are still Pakhtuns like Mufti Shamzai and Maulana
Fazlur Rehman at the head of the most powerful jehadi outfit, Harkatul Mujahideen, but a Punjabi warrior is
now ready to challenge them in the person of Maulana Masood Azhar, the leader of Jaish-e-Muhammad,
sprung from an Indian jail this year. Another Punjabi leader of the Deobandi order, Maulana Azam Tariq of
Sipah-e-Sahaba has already been active in Punjab. But both owe their allegiance to the grand Deobandi
alliance under the khilafat of Mullah Umar of Kandahar, the final epiphany of the warrior-priest produced by
the Afghan jehad. So powerful is the 'reverse' charisma of the Pakhtunised Deobandi warrior of Punjab that
he is able to lead the Pakhtuns as well. The power of Maulana Azam Tariq of Jhang is asserted in Parachinar
in the Kurram Agency of the Pakhtun Tribal Areas. Along with Pakhtunisation has come the Pakhtun cult of
disagreement: to disagree is an assertion of individuality, and to agree is the submergence of individuality.
The warrior in Punjab is supreme but he is also given to internal splintering in the manner of the Afghan
Pakhtuns.
The Punjab has become more Pakhtunised than most Punjabis realise, and this is bound to have
far-reaching consequences for Punjabi society. As stated earlier, the Punjabi always had a deep-seated awe
of the Pakhtun as an upright and brave man. In pre-1947 India, the Pakhtun character inspired the
literature of the subcontinent, as reflected in the writings of Kipling and Tagore. Today, the Punjabi in
Pakistan is in the process of merging with this Pakhtun identity. He thinks this process religious in nature
but it is also a kind of Pakhtunisation of behaviour. In Lahore, the two-million strong annual Deobandi
congregation of Tablighi Jamaat brings hundreds of thousands of Pakhtuns together with the Punjabis. The
spartan puritanism of the highlander Pakhtun mixes well with the new understanding of the message of
Islam in Punjab. Even the non-jehadi Barelvi organisations are becoming warlike and strait-laced in
response, as for instance Dawat-e-Islami, which bans the human image in the Deobandi tradition and holds
its mammoth congregation annually in Multan. The intolerance of perceived heretical sects, and the Shias,
always a Pakhtun strong-point, is now wide-spread in traditionally tolerant Punjab.
Punjabi man in Punjabi folklore: The jehad has to some extent helped restore the sense of honour of the
common man in Punjab. But this restoration of self-respect has cut into two other areas: the writ of the
state and the status of women. A lower middle class Punjabi may join a jehadi faction and challenge the
administration with impunity from prosecution for breach of law. The jehadi faction may run its own system
of justice which in turn empowers its socially disadvantaged member. Honour was traditionally linked to
women. They formed the basis of most feuds and also became victims of avenged dishonour. But tolerance
for women was pronounced in Punjab. All the Punjabi folklore celebrated the Punjabi woman, her strong
personality and character. In Punjab's greatest classic Hir of Waris Shah, Hir, the heroine, dominates the
narrative while Ranjha, the hero, is shown as a passive type. Lahore's modern Punjabi poet Ustad Daman
used to complain that while Hir was described in great physical detail by Waris Shah, Ranjha did not get a
single good line. He in fact undertook to write his own Hir in which he undertook to celebrate the manhood
of Ranjha. The mystical folk poets of Punjab always took the female identity, often that of Hir, to express
their urge for divine union.
The 'active' male principle in Punjabi folk narrative is given to 'outsiders', which is perhaps a precursor of
the Pakhtunisation that has happened now in Punjab. In Sohni-Mahiwal, the passive male reaches his
apogee when Mahiwal allows Sohni to swim the Chenab river for a tryst on the other bank. He watched a
non-swimming Sohni every day risking death while negotiating Punjab's most tumultuous river. When she
finally dies by drowning, Mahiwal is perhaps unaware that her end was brought about by his passivity. A
powerful warrior Mirza in Mirza-Sahiban, abducts a willing Sahiban during her wedding. Chased by her
brothers, whom Mirza had challenged during the act of abduction, the two gain in the race, but Mirza,
over-ruling Sahiban's protests, decides to sleep under a tree. They are surrounded in the end, and Mirza is
killed in the fight. The way surviving Sahiban commits suicide by Mirza's dagger testifies to her superior
character.
Punjabi and rights of women: The popular rage against the freedom of women in Punjab is not a Punjabi
phenomenon but a result of the watering down of the Punjabi personality. Honour-killing was always there
but the panache it has acquired today is something new against the larger backdrop of Pakhutunised jehad.
What the Taliban do to women in Kabul now finds unprecedented resonance in Punjab. State institutions
manned by once-liberal Punjabis are responding to the new stimulus. The Punjabi judges of the Lahore High
Court hand down 'ground-breaking' judgements against rights of the woman traditionally allowed by the
Hanafi jurisprudence. The judges may think that they are responding to the new dictates of puritanical
Islam, but they may be simply acting as transformed Punjabis.
Given the changing collective personality of the majority population of Pakistan, it is going to be difficult for
the state of Pakistan to exercise all its options for survival in the year 2000. The Punjabi talent for
readjustment is today unaccompanied with any intellectual effort. The innate viscerality of his character will
expand the distance between indoctrinated opinion and realism. He is already living on two levels: that of
verbalisation (warlike defiance) and action (shrinking from sacrifice). Since he is in control of the state, his
weakness becomes the weakness of the state. His 'flexibility', known to history, will assert itself after he
has caused the state to collapse and has to 'adjust' to a post-collapse situation.
TRANSFORMATION OF PUNJABI MAN
Khaled Ahmed's A n a l y s i s
The Punjabis are a great race. They are talented, adaptable to change, gifted with a sense of humour, and
possessed of an undying zest for life. They are good company, secure against bouts of suspicion about
self-esteem and generous in admitting the superiority of others. But they also have 'flaws'. Taken together,
these flaws constitute a kind of personality disorder which makes government virtually impossible. The
Punjabi man will sacrifice rules to benefit his own clan, will be 'excessive' in conduct when in power and quick
to stampede when under siege. In short, he is incapable of good governance because he will not submit to
agreed rules when pushed by opportunism. One wonders how Pakistan can survive if over 60 percent of its
population is subversive of the state merely because of its innate collective character?
Stereotyping is not in good taste but the world has always labelled nations and races. All nations express a
kind of collective behaviour. Hitler called the British a nation of shopkeepers and was proved right when
prime minister Chamberlain signed the capitulating Munich Agreement with him in 1938 'because the British
economy was in a depression'. The Germans are accused of compiling encyclopaedias over issues which
require just common sense to resolve. The French are addicted to a kind of enfeebling aestheticism. The
Italians have a heroic self-image but are disorderly and incompetent in war. The Spanish and the Hispanics
are too 'oriental' to run their economy honestly. The nations living in the Balkans are intensely nationalist,
idealising their narrow hatred of one another. The Poles, the Irish and the Bengalis were once described by
Ambassador Jamsheed Marker as nations passionately embracing causes that are impossible of
achievement. Alexander Blok described the Russian character as a mixture of European and Asian traits,
subject to the pendulum swing of rationalism and fatalism.
The Iranians are inward-looking and proud. The Arabs were negatively described by Ibn Khaldun as too
Bedouin at heart to sustain civilisation. His narration of the political history of the Central Asian Muslims is
an attempt to describe chaos of character. The hard-working nations living in the Far East are supposed to
be culturally insulated. The Chinese have a Middle Kingdom personality and no other land matters more
than their Centre of the Earth. The Japanese are insular when they favour export (what goes out) and
resolutely oppose imports (what comes in). But everyone in the Far East is supposed to be so highly
'stylised' in courtesy that you can't break into their culture as a foreigner. As opposed to the 'reserved'
British personality, the American man is supposed to be open and frank.
The Pakistani stereotypes: In Pakistan, the stereotyping goes like this. Pakhtun are warlike but hampered in
organisation by their inability to accept leadership in their tribal system. The Sindhi is wedded to his land,
devoted to humanism, but limited by his lack of enterprise. The Baloch is completely submerged in the
heroic persona of his sardar, the opposite of Pakhtun individualism. The Punjabi is enterprising but
strangely given to passivity in the face of status quo. Pakistan's nationalities also have mythified images of
one another. The Pakhtuns think the Punjabis cowardly while the Sindhis look at them as a class of
merciless exploiters. The Baloch will contest Pakhtun hegemony in their province but join them in their
mistrust of the Punjabi. The Punjabis think the Sindhis lazy but submit to the leadership quality of the
Pakhtun.
The Punjabi man will adjust and change his identity under pressure from circumstances quicker than others.
This makes him a good entrepreneur, but he tends to be 'visceral' and 'excessive', which undermines his
project. In comparison to the Hindu entrepreneur, his weakness springs from this 'anarchy of character'.
His urge to succeed quickly distinguishes him from the more 'incremental' Hindu. His commerce is therefore
tinged with high profit-taking and low levels of trust. The Gujrati communities of Sindh who dominate
commerce in Pakistan rely on the Hindu work ethic. A seth in Karachi will be prompt in his payments and will
thus establish trust. The Punjabi will block payments, live in excessive luxury, but inspire minimal trust. The
publishers of Karachi and the chappal-makers of Quetta will not send their goods to Lahore because Lahore
never pays up. If you want to do business in Punjab you must set aside crores that will remain blocked in
delayed payments.
The Punjabi ethic: The culture of default in Pakistan can be said to be a Punjabi trait followed by elites of
other nationalities as a mode of 'revenge', although there is a historical Sindhi wadera trait of borrowing
from the Hindu money-lender of Sindh and then never paying up. The Punjabi is a steady character subject
to bouts of chaotic behaviour which he expresses usually with regard to food. In Punjab, the annual
birthday of Ms Bhutto declines into an assault on the large cake which the workers are supposed to share.
The press usually describes these gatherings with expressions like gutham-gutha and toot-parna. The
Punjabi mind thinks of orgy when exposed to food. In the PML meeting organised in 1989 by Nawaz Sharif
in an Islamabad hotel, to wrest the party leadership from Sindhi Muhammad Khan Junejo, declined into an
orgy of eating. His Punjabi followers fell on the food, ate from the donga, threw the bones on the floor, and
wiped their shorba-covered hands with the curtains. After they left the hotel shouting victory, the dining
hall looked like a wasteland.
The Punjabi in politics is an opportunist looking for a sharing of the spoils. In 1993, when speaker of the
Punjab Assembly, Mian Manzur Wattoo, staged an internal party coup against a deposed Nawaz Sharif, 70
percent of the PML members joined him. When Nawaz Sharif was restored by the Supreme Court within
days, the 70 percent immediately shifted their loyalty back to him. They had joined Wattoo complaining that
Nawaz Sharif and his chief ministers 'did not do their work'. When under Wattoo and Nakai, Punjab sank
further into chaos, the word applied to their rule was sikha-shahi, a reference to Punjab's history which has
moulded the Punjabi man.
History as moulder of Punjabi character: In the 18th century Punjab, most Punjabi regional potentates
undermined one another to stay in power and to avoid rise of any one Punjabi to supreme power. Delhi
ruled over a divided and conspiratorial Punjab. No one was sure of his friends and was ready to parley with
his enemies for political leverage. The Afghans in the west were seen as a make-weight to the rulers in
Delhi. A weak Delhi often caused loyalties to shift westward. The governor in Lahore feared his own satraps
more than he feared the Afghans. He flirted with the Afghans (Pakhtuns) and at times invited them to
attack Lahore to 'correct' the balance of power. In one instance, he called them in but ran away when the
invaders appeared. Historians note that Punjab was always a region of the marches which the invaders
occupied as a launching ground against Delhi. Pakhtun king Ahmad Shah Abdali 'used' Punjab again and
again for his invasions of India from 1774 to 1793. Marauding armies left their soldiers behind as warlords.
Punjab became an ethnic melting-pot of tribes that looked outward to their original homelands.
When the capital of Pakistan was in Karachi, the Punjabi leaders of the Muslim League in Lahore behaved like
the 18th century satraps of the Mughals. If Mamdot was Mir Mannu, who ruled Punjab from 1748 to 1753,
Daultana was Adina Beq (d.1758). The Punjab Assembly was reduced to a sulphurous marshland where the
partisans of the two League splinters took their mud-bath. Early history books described the famous scene
of bhangra performed by the Daultana men after overthrowing Mamdot, paving the way for ten years of
martial law under a Pakhtun, General Ayub Khan. The textbooks described Pakistan's early democracy as
the Lost Decade. Daultana, after successfully undermining the government of UP-oriented prime minister
Liaquat Ali Khan, and getting rid of a fellow-Punjabi, gave up politics, as if he had achieved the terminal
dream of Adina Beg. Mamdot was notorious for his lethargy while Daultana was a born spoiler and
Machiavelli incarnate. Mamdot was programmed to fail, Daultana feared success. The Punjabi man thereafter
sought refuge in the leadership of charismatic non-Punjabi leaders. He was in fact reverting to the historical
paradigm of 'welcoming invaders' to inoculate himself against the chaos of his own mind.
Punjabi as dominant community: By reason of their numerical strength, the Punjabis dominated the armed
forces. The land forces were always Punjabi, but with time even the navy became 90 percent Punjabi. As the
Pakhtun assertion in the armed forces declined after General Ayub, it was time for the Punjabi general,
Zia-ul-Haq, to reassert the Punjabi supremacy, after putting to death the charismatic Sindhi prime minister
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1979. The majority province was placated by the non-Punjabi leader by putting on the
Punjabi war-paint against India. After that, it was easy to enlist Punjabi loyalties which followed a set
pattern of obsequiousness. A rebel Punjabi leader Malik Ghulam Nabi recorded in his book that once when
prime minister Bhutto was in Lahore a Punjabi PPP leader likened himself to Bhutto's faithful dog as a form
of greeting. The base of the PPP in Punjab partly springs from the fact that the Punjabi fears the tyranny of
the fellow-Punjabi. General Zia chose Nawaz Sharif as his satrap in Punjab, carefully nurturing him in Lahore
first as finance minister and then as chief minister, to set the stage for a Punjabi assertion in Islamabad.
General Zia in fact chose two satrapies from the among the families brutalised by Bhutto during his regime:
the Sharifs of Lahore and the Chaudhris of Gujrat. In the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) in Lahore Mian
Nawaz Sharif and Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain were the strongmen on the basis of their control of city
politics in Lahore and Gujrat. Mian Nawaz Sharif's base was the shopkeepers of Lahore with their strong
religious connections; Chaudhry Shujaat had emerged as the only man who could rein in the criminal gangs
of Gujrat. Both satrapies coexisted within the PML but not without tensions. This was a throw-back to the
days of Mir Mannu's 18th century Punjab and the rule of his wife, Mughlani Begum. The claim of the
Chaudhris over the leadership of Punjab remained alive though muted in deference to the Sharifs' broad
Punjabi alliance. Whenever a split in the PML appeared imminent - PML was now called PML(N) to indicate
Nawaz Sharif's predominance - it was always seen as a split between the two Lahore-Gujrat satrapies.
Punjabi's love of power: The Punjabi will obey a powerful leader. Nawaz Sharif was a powerful leader who
punished disloyalty. His non-intellectual 'viscerality' was his badge. In power, he consistently declined into
'anarchy of character' linking him with the 18th century adventurers like Shah Nawaz Khan, Yahya Khan,
Mughlani Begum and the later Sikh rulers. His largesse was also an excess at the expense of governance.
He benefited beyond reasonable measure those who supported him. He used violence against his
opponents which served as the binding force of his party. His gestures were royal, something that a
Punjabi satrap will appreciate. Nawaz Sharif's longing for a Mughal identity as a ruler could be a throw-back
to Punjab's old longing for the panoply of Delhi. Nawaz Sharif's eating habits were essentially Punjabi with a
tinge of Kashmiri languor in them. He had bouts of effete Punjabi moods when in the middle of great
national decisions, which are often described as lapses of an extremely short 'attention span'. His removal
from the scene is bad for Punjab because another leader with his quintessential Punjabi panache will not be
found. The Punjabi will really not accept a lesser Punjabi as his leader. He touched a collective chord with his
exercise of power and sudden paroxysms of disorganisation.
As a majority nationality in Pakistan, the Punjabis form 60 percent of the National Assembly. They can
amend the Constitution with this majority. The Punjabi opinion, the Punjabi ideology, becomes the opinion
and ideology of Pakistan. This also makes the Punjabi averse to intellectual inquiry. His lack of intellect is not
innate but has been forced on him by his compulsion to impose ideology. The non-Punjabi ruler will have to
submit to this ideology if he wants to stay in power in the parliament. The other communities hate them for
this. They don't always share the passions of Punjabis. The Sindhis and the Baloch tend to be
secular-mystical, but the Pakhtuns and the Punjabis are today joined in Pakistan's passion for a more strict
religion. In this Punjabi-Pakhtun religious confluence, the Punjabi is in the subordinate position, bringing
back the memory of Afghan-dominated 18th century Punjab. The Punjabi man is inwardly lacerated by many
things he does against his innate culture. He has abandoned his mother tongue in favour of Urdu, which
testifies to his protean quality, but which must leave a wound somewhere in his psyche.
The Pakhtun factor: The Afghan war changed the Punjabi character. It happened through the charisma of
the Pakhtun warrior and the spread of the spiritual side of the Pakhtun: the Deobandi faith. The charisma of
the Pakhtun was noted by the American anthropologist-writer Louis Dupree in his book on Afghanistan.
Afghanistan is inhabited in the north by non-Pakhtun nationalities. They may be opposed to the Pakhtuns
politically but all of them assert their masculinity through the Pakhtun dress and partly through his code of
honour. It was not surprising therefore that Pakistani army officers fell victim to reverse indoctrination while
handling the Afghan warrior. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar embodied this new mystique. The war also indoctrinated
the foreigners fighting in Afghanistan. The Arab mujahideen were Pakhtunised and most of them went back
to their countries no longer able to re-assimilate. Even the Russians were transformed, a large number of
whom came to be called Afgantsi, and were shunned by Russian society.
In Punjab, the Deobandi Pakhtun cleric gradually took over the mosques from Barelvi Punjabis. This was
also due to the fact that the Deobandi seminaries in Pakistani were the most competent teachers of the
Quran. But they were also more strict, coalescing historically with the old Ahle Hadith or Wahabi movement
in India. The recruitment for the Afghan jehad in Punjab exposed more and more Punjabi youth to the
charisma of the Pakhtun warrior. During the Afghan war, an extremely brave Pakhtun, Qazi Hussain Ahmad,
came to head the traditionally Punjabi-dominated Jamaat Islami of Lahore. The Punjabi army officer and the
Punjabi prime minister Nawaz Sharif allowed the Qazi-Hekmatyar combine to dominate Islamabad's Afghan
policy. After 1994, when the lack of actual strength of Hekmatyar among the Afghan jehadi factions was
revealed, and a more clearly Deobandi jehadi leadership came to the fore, the Punjab was already
transformed.
Punjabi as Islamic warrior: The Punjabi warrior fighting in Afghanistan and Kashmir is more Pakhtun in
appearance and character than Punjabi. His new leaders are still Pakhtuns like Mufti Shamzai and Maulana
Fazlur Rehman at the head of the most powerful jehadi outfit, Harkatul Mujahideen, but a Punjabi warrior is
now ready to challenge them in the person of Maulana Masood Azhar, the leader of Jaish-e-Muhammad,
sprung from an Indian jail this year. Another Punjabi leader of the Deobandi order, Maulana Azam Tariq of
Sipah-e-Sahaba has already been active in Punjab. But both owe their allegiance to the grand Deobandi
alliance under the khilafat of Mullah Umar of Kandahar, the final epiphany of the warrior-priest produced by
the Afghan jehad. So powerful is the 'reverse' charisma of the Pakhtunised Deobandi warrior of Punjab that
he is able to lead the Pakhtuns as well. The power of Maulana Azam Tariq of Jhang is asserted in Parachinar
in the Kurram Agency of the Pakhtun Tribal Areas. Along with Pakhtunisation has come the Pakhtun cult of
disagreement: to disagree is an assertion of individuality, and to agree is the submergence of individuality.
The warrior in Punjab is supreme but he is also given to internal splintering in the manner of the Afghan
Pakhtuns.
The Punjab has become more Pakhtunised than most Punjabis realise, and this is bound to have
far-reaching consequences for Punjabi society. As stated earlier, the Punjabi always had a deep-seated awe
of the Pakhtun as an upright and brave man. In pre-1947 India, the Pakhtun character inspired the
literature of the subcontinent, as reflected in the writings of Kipling and Tagore. Today, the Punjabi in
Pakistan is in the process of merging with this Pakhtun identity. He thinks this process religious in nature
but it is also a kind of Pakhtunisation of behaviour. In Lahore, the two-million strong annual Deobandi
congregation of Tablighi Jamaat brings hundreds of thousands of Pakhtuns together with the Punjabis. The
spartan puritanism of the highlander Pakhtun mixes well with the new understanding of the message of
Islam in Punjab. Even the non-jehadi Barelvi organisations are becoming warlike and strait-laced in
response, as for instance Dawat-e-Islami, which bans the human image in the Deobandi tradition and holds
its mammoth congregation annually in Multan. The intolerance of perceived heretical sects, and the Shias,
always a Pakhtun strong-point, is now wide-spread in traditionally tolerant Punjab.
Punjabi man in Punjabi folklore: The jehad has to some extent helped restore the sense of honour of the
common man in Punjab. But this restoration of self-respect has cut into two other areas: the writ of the
state and the status of women. A lower middle class Punjabi may join a jehadi faction and challenge the
administration with impunity from prosecution for breach of law. The jehadi faction may run its own system
of justice which in turn empowers its socially disadvantaged member. Honour was traditionally linked to
women. They formed the basis of most feuds and also became victims of avenged dishonour. But tolerance
for women was pronounced in Punjab. All the Punjabi folklore celebrated the Punjabi woman, her strong
personality and character. In Punjab's greatest classic Hir of Waris Shah, Hir, the heroine, dominates the
narrative while Ranjha, the hero, is shown as a passive type. Lahore's modern Punjabi poet Ustad Daman
used to complain that while Hir was described in great physical detail by Waris Shah, Ranjha did not get a
single good line. He in fact undertook to write his own Hir in which he undertook to celebrate the manhood
of Ranjha. The mystical folk poets of Punjab always took the female identity, often that of Hir, to express
their urge for divine union.
The 'active' male principle in Punjabi folk narrative is given to 'outsiders', which is perhaps a precursor of
the Pakhtunisation that has happened now in Punjab. In Sohni-Mahiwal, the passive male reaches his
apogee when Mahiwal allows Sohni to swim the Chenab river for a tryst on the other bank. He watched a
non-swimming Sohni every day risking death while negotiating Punjab's most tumultuous river. When she
finally dies by drowning, Mahiwal is perhaps unaware that her end was brought about by his passivity. A
powerful warrior Mirza in Mirza-Sahiban, abducts a willing Sahiban during her wedding. Chased by her
brothers, whom Mirza had challenged during the act of abduction, the two gain in the race, but Mirza,
over-ruling Sahiban's protests, decides to sleep under a tree. They are surrounded in the end, and Mirza is
killed in the fight. The way surviving Sahiban commits suicide by Mirza's dagger testifies to her superior
character.
Punjabi and rights of women: The popular rage against the freedom of women in Punjab is not a Punjabi
phenomenon but a result of the watering down of the Punjabi personality. Honour-killing was always there
but the panache it has acquired today is something new against the larger backdrop of Pakhutunised jehad.
What the Taliban do to women in Kabul now finds unprecedented resonance in Punjab. State institutions
manned by once-liberal Punjabis are responding to the new stimulus. The Punjabi judges of the Lahore High
Court hand down 'ground-breaking' judgements against rights of the woman traditionally allowed by the
Hanafi jurisprudence. The judges may think that they are responding to the new dictates of puritanical
Islam, but they may be simply acting as transformed Punjabis.
Given the changing collective personality of the majority population of Pakistan, it is going to be difficult for
the state of Pakistan to exercise all its options for survival in the year 2000. The Punjabi talent for
readjustment is today unaccompanied with any intellectual effort. The innate viscerality of his character will
expand the distance between indoctrinated opinion and realism. He is already living on two levels: that of
verbalisation (warlike defiance) and action (shrinking from sacrifice). Since he is in control of the state, his
weakness becomes the weakness of the state. His 'flexibility', known to history, will assert itself after he
has caused the state to collapse and has to 'adjust' to a post-collapse situation.
#2 Posted by jayp on September 17, 2007 12:57:44 am
I have seen so much of hig wash on chowk, but never to this extend, of trying to analyse the pak psyche in terms of a so called punjabi mind influencing the emergence of jihad in pakistan.
At least nominally, befor partition, there was only one set of muslims in the then India. After the creation of pakistan, there are indian muslims and pak muslims. Any explanation of the pak situation has to account for hwy there is not even a single Indian in guntanamo, when the populations of muslims in india and pakistan are comparable. Then again there are muslims from all over the world, from the US to most of europe to australia have landed in guntanamo.
Hence, this pujabo mulsim change is simple nonsense, what has to be done is an analysis in relation what has changed in pakistan in relation to that in India.
No amount of Faued can help in denying the fact that TNT is essentially politicsation of the notion of kafir, and oprationalisation of the idea that muslims cannot live with people of other religions.
The people who moved to pakistan from India beleived in the TNT, and thsu there was a darwenian selection in terms of attitudes to other religions. That is the root cause of jihadisation of pakistan, and now the children of TNT are the suicide bombers.
It si pathetic to see so much of verbiage to hide the corrosive effects of TNT.
At least nominally, befor partition, there was only one set of muslims in the then India. After the creation of pakistan, there are indian muslims and pak muslims. Any explanation of the pak situation has to account for hwy there is not even a single Indian in guntanamo, when the populations of muslims in india and pakistan are comparable. Then again there are muslims from all over the world, from the US to most of europe to australia have landed in guntanamo.
Hence, this pujabo mulsim change is simple nonsense, what has to be done is an analysis in relation what has changed in pakistan in relation to that in India.
No amount of Faued can help in denying the fact that TNT is essentially politicsation of the notion of kafir, and oprationalisation of the idea that muslims cannot live with people of other religions.
The people who moved to pakistan from India beleived in the TNT, and thsu there was a darwenian selection in terms of attitudes to other religions. That is the root cause of jihadisation of pakistan, and now the children of TNT are the suicide bombers.
It si pathetic to see so much of verbiage to hide the corrosive effects of TNT.
#3 Posted by IB on September 17, 2007 5:38:29 am
My g’pa caught a phatan during the invasions of phatan tribes on Jammu – he chained a Indian Army Officer who was a sikh – and was taking him to his house somewhere in NWFP . Phatan was sharpening a rainbow knife infront of the sikh soldier – and the poor sikh officer was scared to death. When asked what are you going to do with the officer – the phatan replied , ‘ Sir , I am taking him to my old father who could not join the jihad – so I will take the infidel to my father so he could kill him and be part of the jihad’ – my g’father asked the phatan to buzz off and send the sikh soldier back.
I remember what my g’father said about phatans – during the 1950’s when Phatans started coming to work as laborers (obviously) in Karachi and how they showed up at every marriage tents which was in-place for the wedding for a free meal – at first the people tolerated them but then they had a beating.
And then there’s a story of a phatans who camped at a hill side and used to shoot anyone who passed by – and once he shot someone on a donkey and walked up to him and found couple of loaf’s – and the phatans said ‘ what the ****, two of my bullets got wasted’.
Pashtoons are one of the most non-progressive nation in Pakistan. They are like Negro’s – you would find two types of phatans – either very educated or plain illiterates.
Punjabis are a different breed. There’s no doubt they are very hard working but they happens to be one of the most ethinically biased people I had ever witnessed. Apart from all there goods – I think Punjabis are in a process of progressiveness and going towards industrialization. Punjabis with due respect to them happens to be one of the hypocritical of the lot as well and think that Punjab is Pakistan and Pakistan is Punjab.
I remember what my g’father said about phatans – during the 1950’s when Phatans started coming to work as laborers (obviously) in Karachi and how they showed up at every marriage tents which was in-place for the wedding for a free meal – at first the people tolerated them but then they had a beating.
And then there’s a story of a phatans who camped at a hill side and used to shoot anyone who passed by – and once he shot someone on a donkey and walked up to him and found couple of loaf’s – and the phatans said ‘ what the ****, two of my bullets got wasted’.
Pashtoons are one of the most non-progressive nation in Pakistan. They are like Negro’s – you would find two types of phatans – either very educated or plain illiterates.
Punjabis are a different breed. There’s no doubt they are very hard working but they happens to be one of the most ethinically biased people I had ever witnessed. Apart from all there goods – I think Punjabis are in a process of progressiveness and going towards industrialization. Punjabis with due respect to them happens to be one of the hypocritical of the lot as well and think that Punjab is Pakistan and Pakistan is Punjab.
#5 Posted by Urstruly on September 17, 2007 6:31:23 am
Typical racist, chauvinist, commie crap. When will commies understand that along with their red paradise the paradigm of promoting ethinic chauvinism has also been burried for good. The new paradigm is Kufr vs Islam. Choose your side wisely.
#6 Posted by IB on September 17, 2007 6:38:33 am
The new paradigm is Kufr vs Islam. Choose your side wisely.
by the looks of things Urstruly Uncle - the real war is between :
a) Sunnis vs Shias
b) Bharalwis vs Deobandis/Wahabis
c) Punjabis vs Mohajirs
d) everyone ..
by the looks of things Urstruly Uncle - the real war is between :
a) Sunnis vs Shias
b) Bharalwis vs Deobandis/Wahabis
c) Punjabis vs Mohajirs
d) everyone ..
#7 Posted by tahmed32 on September 17, 2007 6:41:59 am
#5 urstruly: kufr vs islam is a new paradigm? look at the ethnic abuse written in #3 below and think again.
divisions on the basis of "religious" groupings or "ethnic groupings" are in fact older than the hills. They derive from the primitive part of the brain that is no different than that of chimpanzees, apes, kan khajooras and other creatures.
But dont let me confuse the residents of chowk zoo who take "religious" groupings and "ethnic" groupings so seriously...
divisions on the basis of "religious" groupings or "ethnic groupings" are in fact older than the hills. They derive from the primitive part of the brain that is no different than that of chimpanzees, apes, kan khajooras and other creatures.
But dont let me confuse the residents of chowk zoo who take "religious" groupings and "ethnic" groupings so seriously...
#8 Posted by IB on September 17, 2007 6:58:52 am
According to your defination – I am a chimp ( since I am ethically biased ) . Okay – but you have to understand what makes someone ethinically biased? It is simple ( in Pakistani context ) – because of Punjabigardi and Pashtoon Forceful Religious Philosophy.
It’s official – I’m a chimp – a proud one.
It’s official – I’m a chimp – a proud one.
#9 Posted by cliftonbridge on September 17, 2007 7:11:10 am
Religious identification can fix the inherent chauvanism of ethnic identification. Yes. But if religious identification means having a saudi styled or taliban/pushtoon styled pakistan then we are better off bickering over ethnicity than being united under that banner than can only spell doom for at least a solid 50% of pakistanis (women).
#11 Posted by KaalChakra on September 17, 2007 8:08:13 am
# 9, it need not be a saudi style or taliban style world. If progressive people promote religious identitification then they can help craft a most modern state that's very good to women.
---------------
Khalid Ahmed and Daneiel Berk are definitely stuck on outdated issues. This question of the (then) looming afghanization of Pakistan was being discussed years ago. May be these two gentlemen were resting from their labors then, or chose not to raise a voice. Now the time is to realize that punjabi, mohajir, sindhi, pakhtoon - all these divisions are simply unIslamic.
---------------
Khalid Ahmed and Daneiel Berk are definitely stuck on outdated issues. This question of the (then) looming afghanization of Pakistan was being discussed years ago. May be these two gentlemen were resting from their labors then, or chose not to raise a voice. Now the time is to realize that punjabi, mohajir, sindhi, pakhtoon - all these divisions are simply unIslamic.
#12 Posted by tahmed32 on September 17, 2007 9:00:57 am
cliftonbridge #9: To give you a medical analogy (since you are a doctor), what you are saying is akin to saying that a heart attack can cure diabetes. Hope you dont cure your patients this way. :-)
#13 Posted by tahmed32 on September 17, 2007 9:08:19 am
Kaalchakra #11 Good point. In fact, if we did not have the primitive mindsets I mention below that masquerade as religion, it would become clear that a political system that has as its foundation the basic right of individuals would be consistent with all religions.
#14 Posted by cliftonbridge on September 17, 2007 9:20:59 am
chachoo i am pro religion and severly opposed to misogyny and whether it takes facism or surrealism or cubism to beat the misogynistic tendancies of so called religous leaders i am all for it.
As uncomfortable as it is to admit this there are huge ethnic differences to the way pakistani's treat women and in that sense i agree with the urgent need to move away from pushtoonization.
Short of that who cares about ethnicity? i am glad we have an interesting mix of songs and dances and clothes and poetry etc ...that part is all good .
As uncomfortable as it is to admit this there are huge ethnic differences to the way pakistani's treat women and in that sense i agree with the urgent need to move away from pushtoonization.
Short of that who cares about ethnicity? i am glad we have an interesting mix of songs and dances and clothes and poetry etc ...that part is all good .
#15 Posted by KaalChakra on September 17, 2007 9:25:25 am
cliffs, why not beat "religious leaders" (are there any "religious leaders" in your religion?) at their own game by creating/promoting your own brand of religion in Pakistan?
#16 Posted by KaalChakra on September 17, 2007 9:27:34 am
Cliffs, the point is that, that so long as your religion is about what you think or what you personally love or hate or wish it is of no consequence (unless you can hope that one day everyone will think like you).
Would you agree with that "harsh" view? :)
Would you agree with that "harsh" view? :)
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