An Insight Into Pakistan Army and Musharraf

# 49
You say:
"Today is 3 December when that dreaded war began., I was then in National Service fighting off an indian offensive near Lahore with a machine gun. Where were you Romair?"

My advice to you is to keep it dispassionate. Nationalism is the last refuge for the scoundrel (eg. Mushrraf in the garb of “Pakistan first“). Just because you stood with a machine gun in 1971, certainly does not make you a better person than Romair.

ijaz_gul #: "Today is 3 December when that dreaded war began.I was then in National Service fighting off an indian offensive near Lahore with a machine gun. Where were you Romair?"

...i was a toddler, learning to ride a tricycle.......

you are analyzing the army too much....take a look at their training and the level of individuals inducted into the army......they totally lack the ability to think beyond a certain level for solutions.....lack of exposure, education and intellect....kayani can only think so much and only has so much exposure.......

a donkey remains a donkey, even if he wears a general's ranks.......and a genius remains a genius even if he is riding on a donkey.....

you are hugely overestimating the abilities of pakistani generals.....hugely is an understatement.....

HP,
In my essay, I have deliberately avoided adding my own conclusions. Of all chowkies, I expected you to be the last to run down what I wrote. The teaser that I added was meant to allay just this.

Unlike a feature or investigative journalism, I despite many differing views tried my best to be Value-Neutral. I was also aware that I would draw flak but chose this method due to a situation; I shall allude to at the end of this paragraph. This essay is an explanation at best through events I laboriously pieced together. In my view it reflects the military view point. I was careful to remove as many personal comments I could except where it was considered to lead to some conclusions in parentheses. I had framed the paper with three perspectives. First the fallout of Zia’s era because that’s where the paper begins; Musharraf’s Coup-9/11 and the legitimacy-indispensability debate that has resulted in more political instability and political exclusion; and finally the threat perception. At that point I was aware that US army was carrying out war games (simulate various options) to attack Pakistan and that Pakistan Army was evaluating contingencies if that happened. So in my view, it was all the more important that readers at chowk particularly the serious minded are made aware of another angle within the present crisis, that could act like a rider clause. In fact I requested the editors to publish it immediately which they did. In my assessment, (I own this view) Negroponte’s rush to Pakistan had little to do with democracy but more to mend fences and allay fears. Read today’s Dawn and draw your own conclusions.

http://www.dawn.com/2007/12/03/top7.htm

Now the 1988-99 Events
1. Aslam Baig could have taken over, but he provided military backing and finally Benazir came to power. We could have endless debates on what happened and what could not.
2. The army when called out in Karachi by the PPP and Nawaz governments complied. As an aside, I was on a hunting trip to Toba Achakzai in 1992, when two proclaimed offenders belonging to MQM were slipped out of Pakistan by Asmat Militia of PKMAP to Afghanistan. They were Safdar Baqri and Saleem Shezad. We were stranded in Gulistan for a week where the rumour was that they were being provided sanctuaries by the Afghan government. So when someone from MQM supports BLA, my mind goes back there.
3. With squabbles not coming to an end, it was Waheed Kakar, who had forced both the President and Prime Minister to leave.
4. In Nawaz Sharif’s row with the Chief Justice and President, The Army under JK stood by the Prime Minister. According to Ch. Nisar, Corps Commander Mangla, LT Gen Musharraf fully supported the Prime Minister during one of the conferences and was therefore rewarded.

Visits to GHQ
There is something known as ‘Operational Briefings’. These are held in special briefing rooms- something like a bubble with jammers, high frequency generators etc, so that the conversations are not intercepted. They are always held in GHQ for everybody. Its too risky carrying maps and Eyes Only briefs to insecure locations proliferated with bugs and sensors.

Kayani
I may be an idealist in my thinking but cannot be wishful about an assessment. Kayani is one man, who was the DGMO, Spy Chief and now the Chief. Everything has unfolded before him. Just because USA thinks that he has their backing and that he will fight their war with renewed vigour and boot out Musharraf, they are in for a surprise and so are the many self styled reformists. The reality is that given a choice, military due to institutional choice will always tilt towards security, an economist towards economy and a doctor towards medicine.

Afghanistan
I agree with your point on Afghanistan. It may surprise many, but the contours of Pakistan’s Afghan Policy were drawn in the mid 70s by Bhutto and Naseer Ullah Babar, who was then the Inspector General of Frontier Corps in NWFP. This was done in the backdrop of growing propaganda emanating from Kabul and supported by India for Pakhtoonistan. Some Afghan Student leaders and dissidents like Hikmatyar, Ahmad Shah Masud, Rabbani and Younis Khalis were brought to Pakistan for training and unleashed on Sardar Daud’s Regime. This mass insurgency( thgat HP allused to) moderated Daud in 1977 and he was now prepared to sign the Durand Line. Unfortunately Zia’s Coup removed Bhutto and an opportunity was lost. Soon Daud too was murdered and then came the Soviet invasion. Also recall that French Book, 'Muslim Threat to Soviet Russia'

As for East Pakistan
War is an instruemnent of Policy. The level and duration of conflict are laid by political objectives and complimented in tandem with other instruements of policy. Because the military was at the helm of affairs in 1971, they should have excluded violence as an instruemnt of solution to the political crises. They did not and chose the military crackdown in March 1971 despite a very hostile international environment. I still remember what an Indian Newspaper had to say about the surrender,
"For these men, the war ended early. They fought hard at the battle of Khulna. Now they stand in the sun, having obeyed the final dreaded order of their commander, 'lay down your arms'". My brother a captain, surrendered there on 21st december was in the picture with many other soldiers.

Today is 3 December when that dreaded war began.I was then in National Service fighting off an indian offensive near Lahore with a machine gun. Where were you Romair?

yar romair, what if general musharaff had gotten great gains in kashmir, managed to have negotiated a nice truce in waziristan and gotten a frindly sarkar in afganistan in addition to all the moolah and economic boost and private TV channels? i think his illegitimate actions would not be questioned.

in 1971 one reasons pakistani army "surrendered" was to prevent getting the afsars slaughtered by bangalis. it was a friendly surrender, not hostile.

Re #45
Excellent! One of the most balanced and readable posts on Chowk. Puts across the Pakistani viewpoint succinctly and lucidly.

Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, former Army chief told Karan Thapar in ``face-to-face'' programme on BBC Asked about setbacks during the 1971 war:

On the fifth day of the conflict he told Ms Gandhi that ``everything had gone wrong. The navy lost the khukri. The air force lost a lot of aircraft on the ground. My advances in Bangladesh were halted''. She looked at me and smiled and said you can't win everyday, Sam. And then she turned around and said anyway we will not tell anybody ... Let everybody know that nothing has happened''. Asked to what extent did he win in Bangladesh, Manekshaw said:``Pakistan army in East Pakistan fought very gallantly. But they had no chance. They were a 1,000 miles away from their base. And I had eight or nine months to make my preparations. I had a superiority of almost 50 to one...''. He said it was true that he had written a personal letter to Pakistani captain S.R. Malik for defending his garrison in Kamalpur in Bangladesh ``stoutly'' despite ``hard'' Indian attempts to capture it. ``We did not succeed until about the third attempt....'' The former chief said he had even recommended Captain Malik's name for a gallantry award to the Pakistani army chief.

Re: # 44

Reply to #44

Mohar, if you have had a chance to study the 1971 geo-political situation you will not be making a statement based on sheer jingoistic perception. India was able to win on the former East Pakistan front not because Sam Manekshaw was a formidable commander like "Rommel" or the Indian army an expert in "Blitzkrieg" but because they were attacking a distant province of Pakistan whose ethnic Bengali population no longer wanted to live under West Pakistani rule they wanted their own home land.

Therefore it would be stupid to think that East Pakistan would have become a “Stalingrad” standing against the Indian guile. Indians trained the Mukhti Bahini rebels, these guys knew there terrain well spoke the native language there commanders were ex-east Bengal regiment soldiers and officers in addition to ex-policeman and Para-military of Bengali ancestry. They were adequately armed by Indians and helped by the local population to infiltrate and conduct gorilla operations deep inside Pakistani territory to demoralize the army through the war of a thousand cuts.

In this case India violated the international border because it suited its national defense policy but in reference to Kargil this off course was labeled as violation of international border by Pakistan army, how Indians change their view point when it suits there national interests. The war of attrition had already started in East Pakistan couple of years before the final conflict in 1971.

The Pakistani army knew the hopeless situation of fighting for a distant province whose Bengali inhabitants were there biggest enemy. It was a lost cause with no support from local population. India had banned Pakistani airlifts over there airspace this made lifting of heavy equipment such as artillery, tanks etc via Sri-lanka cumber some so on paper Pakistani formations had armor and artillery but in reality they were left behind in West Pakistan and soldiers were airlifted with light equipment that could not with stand a full frontal assault from a fully equipped Indian force and there well trained “Mukti Bahini” comrades.

The ultimate surrender was not due to the fine maneuvering or bravery of the Indian army but due to the intelligence that helped them get pass strong Pakistani defenses using back roads. Indians knew what they were up against which Pakistani unit was located where the Local Bengali scouts made sure of that. They idea was to get to Dhaka without fighting pitched battles with ground forces as the Pakistani defense doctrine was “fortress” style which also flawed to begin with. The lone airbase was out of commission in four days with 14 sabers against three operational Indian air force bases.

The Pakistani doctrine was that defense of East Pakistani lies in West Pakistan which antagonized the east Pakistanis and made them believe they were a colony run by West Pakistanis to extract there economic surplus into west Pakistani development projects. Here is an excerpt from Pakistan air force history of the lone number 14th squadron in 1971 eastern theatre:

“This lone squadron had to face no less than 10 squadrons of the Indian Air Force (IAF) simultaneously, comprising MiG-21s Gnats and Hunters. The grim but resolute and heroic resistance of No. 14 Squadron will go down in air combat history as a glorious chapter of a valiant and determined fight against a vastly superior enemy. It was a no win situation front the outset, but the squadron Put up a fierce fight and continued it against heavy odds. The young and gallant pilots of PAF, with only 1011-150 operational hours to their credit, were invariably pitted against eight to ten enemy aircraft at a time.”

Even under such adverse circumstances PAF shot down five Indian aircrafts in air combat during the three days that runaway was operational. The air defense battery was operational till the last day of war had accounted for six aircrafts these confirmed kills accepted by IAF records also.

To give an account of hostility of local population two Pakistani pilots who bailed out in East Pakistan territory were unable to be rescued by PAF because as soon as they landed on ground they were tortured and killed by “MUkhti Bahini”. The East Pakistan soil was just as hostile to Pakistani forces as it would have been on Indian soil. To fight for it was stupid to begin with but lot of good men did fight and die for it but the final surrender under the circumstances was the a smart decision not due to Indian gallantry but due the political ground reality.

The actual soldiers that surrendered were around 45,000 or so rest were west Pakistani civilians which were claimed to be solders by Indians. I think it would have been a military blunder to let Pakistani soldiers fight and die for a lost cause so the aftermath was a smart one it preserved lives without having aqeuate airlift capability.

Let the Indians be happy that they won because they fought a hard battle. A historical analysis of that time period points otherwise. The ground reality was that Indians were not fighting a neighbor twice the size in a distant province from the main land. It’s almost as if expecting Portugal to come fight a full battle in Goa to protect a distant island from Indian invasion without support from the native population. It was not worth the price but if Indians want to see that as “Bravery” then they need to re-evaluate what the term means.

Lord Mountbatten at the time of independence had predicted that the entity of East Pakistan will cease to exist as part of West Pakistan due to the sheer ill-logical geographical distant between the two parts so India need not give themselves the medal of honor.

The real battle of hearts and mind was fought and lost in the government circles of Islamabad after the 1970 elections and the final fate was sealed by Bhutto to keep power sharing away from MUJIB rest is just the logical course of events that India likes to take more credit than they actually deserve.

Therefore, Mohar get your facts straight and dont be an idiot and come back with a lame reply. Next time think before you write.

romair
[a pakistani soldier has never been known to surrender...]

Ha ha ... 90,000 paki soldiers surrendered half the country, withing a few days of fight... surrendering comes natural to you pakis....:)

#42 Posted by majumdar
Dada,
The one thing you forget to mention that while the Soviet intervention led to its own disintegration, the other interventionist in Afghanistan, Pakistan too is fighting to keep its geographical integrity.

HP sain,

Re #41

Basically, USSR invaded Afghanistan to ward off disintegration due to possible instigation of Muslim disaffection of population in CAR. And yet in the end, the invasion actually ended up expediting the demise of USSR.

The Law of Unintended Consequences at work!!!

Regards

Like Ijaz, many have written about the Pakistani intervention in Afghanistan thru it surrogate armies of Mujahideen. Surprising, not very many had tried to ascertain as to why the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan. Generally people appear to accept the standard Soviet line that the Soviet Union interfered because first, the Afghan govt asked for military help and second, the Soviet Union was bound by its solidarity with the communists in Afghanistan and interference was to help the red revolution in Afghanistan.

Rarely do we see political analyst mention that the Soviet action was in effect preemptive rather than a response. The Islamic mujahideen unleashed by Pakistan had become a threat to the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union had roughly 20% Muslim population close to the afghan borders and with enormous cultural and geographical closeness, the Soviets were fearful that the radical Islamic warrior helped by Pakistan and the US would attempt to instigate the Muslims living within the soviet union. Later events proved that that the Soviet fears were not entirely speculative in nature. The afghan war was just an extension of the cold war and Pakistan played the role it was assigned to when it joined in the cold war on the US side.

We need to look at both Pakistani and the Soviet interventions in Afghanistan in the broader context of the cold war.

Recently, A magazine gathered the similarities between the both Soviets and the US arguments for their respective intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. Here are a few snippets.

“Once the “terrorists” had been defeated, Afghanistan would be left to become “a stable, friendly country”. The invasion, then, was in the best interests of the Afghan people - the focus of the Soviet government’s benevolent concern.”

An eerie similarity to some statements we hear about the Iraq war.

“Before the arrival of the Soviet soldiers here, [the area] was literally swarming with [insurgents]... [who] were ruthlessly killing... everyone, who was desperately longing for a new life... However, Soviet soldiers arrived, and life in the district has started normalising." (Krasnaya Zvezda, October 27, 1985)”

On the April 12, 2005 edition of the BBC's Newsnight programme, diplomatic editor Mark Urban discussed the significance of a lessening of Iraqi attacks on US forces since January:
“It is indeed the first real evidence that President Bush's grand design of toppling a dictator and forcing a democracy into the heart of the Middle East could work.” (Urban, Newsnight, BBC2, April 12, 2005)

When George Bush declared: "we are not conquerors; we're liberators”, he could have been quoting one of the top Soviet generals in Afghanistan, who said:
“We didn't set ourselves the task of conquering anyone: we wanted to stabilise the situation.” (Varennikov, CNN Interview, 1998)

Even in reporting that a large proportion of world opinion wants to see the US leave Iraq, the BBC managed to boost the claimed humanitarian intent:
“Some 39% of people in 22 countries said troops should leave now, and 28% backed a gradual pull-out. Just 23% wanted them to stay until Iraq was safe.” (Most people 'want Iraq pull-out,' http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/ hi/middle_east/6981553.stm, September 7, 2007)

The idea that Iraq might not be safe until US-UK troops leave, is unthinkable to many Western journalists, as it was to Soviet journalists.

In some cases, Western reporting perhaps even surpassed Soviet propaganda. As US tanks entered Baghdad on April 9, 2003, ITN's John Irvine declared:
"A war of three weeks has brought an end to decades of Iraqi misery." (ITN Evening News, April 9, 2003)

In 1988, Izvestiya quoted general Boris Gromov, the commander of Soviet troops in Afghanistan:
"We came to Afghanistan at the end of 1979 at the request of the lawful government [of Afghanistan] and in accordance with the agreement between our countries based on the... Charter of the United Nations." (Izvestiya, July 2, 1988)\

We asked Hugh Sykes, a BBC journalist reporting from Baghdad, for his opinion on the issue of legality in relation to the invasion of Iraq. Sykes replied:
“The Americans et al always say they are here 'at the invitation of the democratically elected Iraqi government'.

Hehehehe!
The world we live in!

“Pakistan Army made concerted efforts to stay way from political interventions from 1988-1999.”
“However, the Army Chiefs continued to be dragged into political squabbles one way or another.”

By your standards, Ijaz this article is pretty flaky. The insight is really a narration of some known non facts about the army. In fact the more I look at it; it appears to me that you are putting forward an apology that is not very popular in the democratic circles in Pakistan. I for one always considered you a part of the democracy sympathizer’s block but this article squarely puts you on the opposite side.

While both above statements are fallacious, your conclusion that “Knowing Kayani, he will do what he does best; listen and think” is equally outrageous.

Pakistan army never made any effort to stay away from the political interventions. The reality is that it has looked for every occasion to find an excuse to intervene in the political affairs. The most dreaded call for every civilian PM in Pakistan was always the call from the COAS office. The COAS made the PMs visit their offices instead of going over to see the PM. They would send low ranking generals to communicate with the PM. If you know little bit about the Major Imtiaz affair, you would also know that a low ranking officer who was not even a general, was able to embarrass the PM of Pakistan with tacit approval from the Generals.

Nawaz Sharif dismissed Jahengr Karamat for a cause and he had a legit right to dismiss Musharraf. The fact that the army decided to overthrow him instead of following the orders from the civilian leadership shows that they were not making “concerted efforts to stay away from political interventions”.

I really should pick this whole article apart but I think I should first ask you to redeem yourself and show us what made you write this factually incorrect article with blatant fallaciousness I have pointed out above.

Sorry -- somebody should examine his stomach as well.

And the Joker is still sitting in the Aiwan-e Sadre now in a stupid civilian shirwani cutting a pathetic figure -- still looking hungry after 8 year of unbridiled unshared, unashmed, raw power that has not whetted his voracious apetie for public 'langar' for yet another 5 years.

Some body should examine his head.

For a 600,000 strong professional army -- that used to be fit as a fiddle -- Musharraf was the most unprofessional unhealthy COAS.

An inept incompetent, medicore strategist -- who acted more like a bipolar Islamabad warlord treating the army as his personal militia -- Musharraf wasted his army jawan's lives in thousands from Kargil to Waziristan -- drained its morale down the gutter -- all because of his pathological addiction to the contraband civilian power politics.

Re: # 35

romair,

just listen to yourself ! " did whatever i could to try to change the system, when i was in the military....i seriously doubt i would have gone beyond the rank of major, since i had too many bad reports against me...."

....... a frigging captian (or was it airman?) trying to change the military! ...... give us all a break - you are so full of shit you make masadi look almost sane ........ i am seriously beginnig to doubt you were ever in the military ........