Comments on Ongoing Debate about ISI in the Afghan War

USSR was not economically strong. So, those who has aligned with USSR, they were poor.

The USSR was a champion of Third World Rights.Without USSR help the Vietnamese could not have played hell with Americans.Note that the Chinese were ready to ditch the Vietnamese once they had rapproachment with USA.The USSR supported all maor national liberation movements in Asia and Africa.Now that the Russians are not powerful Muslims are being kicked everywhere by USA.

Amin,

(The USSR was a champion of Third World Rights.)

The Soviets being a champion of Third World Rights and Muslims is ridiculous. If they had been one, they would never have invaded Afghanistan. The USSR actively oppressed Muslims within their own borders and supported dictatorial regimes outside their own borders- Castro, Kim, Mengitsu et al. And incidentally the USSR was also a big supplier of arms to Saddam.

(The USSR supported all maor national liberation movements in Asia and Africa.)

Only becuase the national liberation movements were directed against their rivals the Western Powers. They sang a very different tune against national liberation movements in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Regards

I think that in many cases USSR was the champion of the Third World.They intervened in Hungary,Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan as it was case of super power rivalry.

Very bold assessment.

typical, green jealous, envious desi article.....the authors sole raison detre seema s to be to complain about the life-style of the people in power, e.g quote from the article

"Now compare the above with life style of General Zia's son . Zia was from humble background.So was the case of General Akhtar who led the so called Afghan Jihad and now his sons are multi millionaires and sitting ministers in the present Pakistani Government. "

The essential conclusion/premise of the article is bold, and assertive and needs to be told...but the manner in which this is done leaves a lot to be desired.....coming from a person of Agha Amin's standing, I would have expected something more stimulating and scintillating than this gibberish....(atleast choskstaff should allow the author to write in urdu, and translate the article themselves).


The worthwhile part of the article is the conluding paragraph, and I quote

"The so called Afghan Jihad was a success for many Pakistani and Afghans in personal terms.But these were a small minority.For the vast majority of Afghans it was a failure.Afghanistan lost the flower of its leadership,intellectuals and infrastructure ! "

But it need to be developed better. This is said in such a manner for the first time - and indeed this paragraph deals directly with the here and now, rather than the chimeral religiosity ........

Amin sahib/Diesel sahib,

At least one thing can be said about American Imperialism that some of the countries which were ruled by 'Peons of The West" went on to become very wealthy and successful nations- Eg. Japan, Chile, Taiwan, South Korea. The Russian stooges remained third rate nations until they had junked Commie-ism

Regards

Re: # 6

You have missed the essence of what he is saying.Compare the pathetic Paki generals with men like Najeeb Jan and Malgaray Aslam Watanjar.

Re: # 6

You have missed the essence of what he is saying.Compare the pathetic Paki generals with men like Najeeb Jan and Malgaray Aslam Watanjar.

Re: # 8

No I did not miss it - he is comapring life styles....

In fact the really intersting and bold comment which needed to be explored in greater depth (as I said in #6) was the last paragraph of the article The phrase "so called afgha jihad...." needs to be explored....

Re: # 6:---

The assertions that you have are not correct.The tinpot generals destroyed Afghanistan.

The good part is the ending.Now Pakistan is in the same crisis that it imposed on Afghanistan.So all your life style will go to hell.Visit Kabul and see how your paid hirelings the Murdagao Mujahids destroyed it.

Re: # 11:--

Also we Afghans follow Dr Hamid Hussain.So please read his article on ISI in Afghanistan in Defence Journal October 2007 issue.Amin Agha I can meet since he is in Kabul but Dr Hamid I think is abroad in USA.

Fakir,

A'stan was collectively destroyed by the Russian invaders as well as the Yanks as well as their lackees (the puppet Karma/Najeeb govt and Mujaheeds). Whatever was left was finished off by the Talibs and the warlords.

Regards

Re: # 13:-- I am posting Hamid Hussain's articles in Defence Journal October 2007 here.As I was told by Amin , he was compelled to write this letter to Defence Journal after reading Hamid Hussain's article.Amin was editor of Defence Journal from 1999 to 2002.

------------------------------------------------------------

DR HAMID HUSSAIN'S ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN DEFENCE JOURNAL





Recycling Old Myths

Hamid Hussain

Former Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Afghan Cell chief Brigadier ® Muhammad Yusuf has written about his experiences. He has given first hand account of Pakistan 's involvement in Afghan affairs in 1980s which is very valuable for anyone interested in a very important chapter of the Cold War between Soviet Union and United States . Yusuf is a professional soldier belonging to Frontier Force Regiment (PIFFERS) and his career was typical of an infantry officer. He was reincarnated into a totally different role when he was assigned the task of heading the Afghan Cell of ISI in 1980s. He is still very well respected including this scribe as he has the distinction of not getting soiled with the corruption despite serving at a very senior position in intelligence apparatus. He deserves the honor and respect for trying to perform the assigned task to the best of his abilities and staying clean in a dirty environment. However, there is plenty of room for disagreeing with some of the policies during his tenure at Afghan Cell.

Some of the tactics used during his tenure caused much pain and suffering to innocent Afghans and may be partly responsible for some long term negative fallout for Pakistan . He was responsible for sending Afghan proxies for deliberate bombing of cafeteria of Kabul University resulting in death of students and staff. Many independent minded and nationalist Afghans were assassinated on Pakistani soil. There is no evidence that ISI directly ordered their elimination, however the job was done by ISI's Afghan proxies and surely at that time ISI could have intervened or warned their proxies. This is the major problem with proxies. They will take the orders from the hand that feeds them but at the same time they follow their own agenda whenever possible. It was not the intention of ISI but fragmentation of Afghanistan was invariably linked with Afghan policy of Pakistan .

In 1980s, Afghan operation was a joint CIA-ISI operation where each party had its own influence and responsibilities. Yusuf could not escape working with CIA. In his post-retirement memoirs, he tried his best to distance himself from the Americans. His statements like, 'relations between the CIA and ourselves were always strained', 'I resorted to trying to avoid contact with the local CIA staff', 'I never visited the US embassy' and vehement denial of any direct contact between CIA and Mujahideen shows that he is uncomfortable to be seen close to Americans. It is true that Yusuf tried to keep his operations clear of direct CIA involvement and kept his distance from Americans which was the right course. Yusuf's independence was not much appreciated by CIA and they were happy to see him leave the Afghan Cell in 1987 when he was passed on for promotion to Major General. However, at other levels especially at higher level and lower operational level there was regular contact between ISI and CIA and this could not be avoided. Many details of these interactions are now public knowledge. CIA happily passed on the skills of sabotage, urban warfare, handling of explosives and assassinations to Afghans via Pakistanis. CIA kept its hands clean as nothing could be directly traced to them but enthusiastic Pakistani intelligence officers found themselves neck deep into the dirty world of covert operations and civil war. This would come back a decade later to haunt them and their country. Arab countries let loose their own lunatics into the killing fields of Afghanistan and Pakistan is now left with cleaning that mess in its own backyard. The final balance sheet shows that the demons which Pakistan helped to create have been able to kill more Pakistani civilians and soldiers than Pakistan 's real and imaginary enemies.

Yusuf praises his boss former ISI chief General Akhtar Abdul Rahman and tries to reincarnate him as a 'holy warrior', 'great strategist' and then throws in the caveat of 'anti-American' as an icing on the cake. All officers have some strengths and some weaknesses. National and personal interests frequently intermingle which need to taken into consideration. In analyzing any policy, individual traits of the officer involved helps to understand the policy. This should be done not as an admiration or condemnation exercise but to document different perspectives of a policy so that people can reach their own conclusions. Rahman was considered a mediocre officer by most of his peers. He had been superceded during his long career from the rank of Lieutenant Colonel all the way to General; a very unusual incident in Pakistan army. This was always a point of ridicule during his long career among army officers. He was successful because he was a close confidant of General Muhammad Zia ul Haq and gave him unquestioned loyalty. Two events; 1977 Martial Law and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 provided the right opportunity for Rahman's star to rise. General Zia and Rahman had very cordial relations with director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) William Casey during cooperation of United States and Pakistan against Soviet Union . To offset that uncomfortable closeness with Americans, Zia and Akhtar were portrayed as holy warriors of Islam and modern day Saladins. There is nothing wrong with countries cooperating to serve their interests. It is also normal for any country to engage in covert operations. Intelligence chief of any country have some kind of liaison with friendly countries and they also keep a line of communication open with even an adversary. This helps them to perform their job professionally. There is nothing wrong with these communications. Just as defaming someone for keeping channels open is not appropriate similarly downplaying or denying such contacts also does not help to understand a policy.

Officers can give their own perspective about events but they can not create their own facts to prove a point regardless of their motivations. They can argue that it was in Pakistan 's national interest to pursue a particular policy and present their arguments. However, simply throwing in religious symbols and half baked theories does not help in understanding a complex policy. Pakistani intelligence cooperated with CIA to safeguard its interests. The two major ones were containment of Soviets in Afghanistan and using U.S. dependence on Pakistan in Afghanistan to thwart pressures regarding country's nuclear weapons program. Now to reincarnate Zia and Rahman as 'anti-Americans' or 'holy warriors' are not much convincing. Majority of Pakistani officers now simply blame U.S. for the Afghan mess absolving themselves of any wrongdoing. They throw in conspiracies hatched by U.S. , Russia , India and Israel to harm them. In fact, weapons seized by Israelis from Palestinians in Lebanon were shipped via Pakistan to Afghan resistance forces. U.S. Congressman Charles Wilson specifically asked both General Zia and Afghan resistance leader Gulbadin Hikmatyar whether it was alright to ship these weapons to Afghans. Zia jokingly commented that 'just don't put Star of David on boxes' while Hikmatyar stated that he wouldn't mind using these weapons and that God has His mysterious ways to help Muslims.

Those who are familiar with the social background and career of Rahman and compares it with the lifestyle of his progeny may reach a different conclusion. In 1970s, officers went to condole Rahman's mother death to a mud family house. After Rahman was done with the ISI stint, he was on a totally different ground and accumulated quite a wealth. May be Pakistan army rewards some of its generals on a different pay scale. His progeny educated in U.S. are multi-millionaires and this is no secret. They are also major players in all wheeling-dealing orchestrated in General Head Quarters (GHQ) in the last two decades. Islamabad station of CIA was one of the most influential and Rahman had closest relations with William Casey and local CIA officers. Yusuf argues that Rahman was kicked upstairs as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) because Americans wanted him out of ISI. There is no evidence which supports this conclusion. In fact, U.S. ambassador and CIA wanted him to be retained as head of ISI as they were very comfortable with the long standing smooth working relationship with Rahman. This subject was directly discussed with General Zia ul Haq. The reason of pushing Rahman upstairs had to do with internal dynamics of senior brass. Rahman's boys were involved in surveillance of senior army officers and Rahman's personal close association with Zia resulted in many complications which needed to be addressed. Rahman prepared background checks of army officers considered for senior positions. There was a great deal of resentment among some senior officers who were either bypassed for promotion or didn't get the 'prized' appointments. They blamed Rahman for poisoning Zia's ears against them. Rahman didn't move to his new residence as CJCSC but decided to stay in his old residence as it was close to Zia's power house. As CJCSC, Rahman was not responsible for Afghan operations but he continued to meet Islamabad CIA station chief on regular basis to exchange information about Afghan operations. CIA got insight about internal intrigues of senior army brass through these meetings. Like any human being, Rahman had his strengths and weaknesses. He performed some of his assigned tasks professionally and made some mistakes at other times.

Historical facts can not be distorted to accommodate ideological inclinations. It is helpful to get perspectives from different sources to try to understand a policy. There are different positions about any given policy and each position needs to be heard. All angles of any given policy even the uncomfortable truths need to be acknowledged for better understanding. There is never one hundred percent consensus about any given policy and those involved in formulation, planning and execution of any foreign and security policy will have different perspectives. Analysis of past policies is a difficult task but it is an essential one for documenting history and learning lessons for future policies.



Hamid Hussain

August 20, 2007





---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------

Revisionist History of Pakistan's Afghan Policy

Hamid Hussain

Recent few articles in national newspapers by former senior army officers about Afghanistan are an attempt to write a revisionist history. Pakistan has been deeply involved in the internal affairs of Afghanistan for over two decades. The irony is that majority of Pakistanis are not aware of the history of this involvement. There are two reasons for this ignorance. First, major Pakistani players in Afghanistan are country's military intelligence personnel and second Pakistan 's policy was presented to general public in an ideological package. There was no attempt of serious discussion about benefits and risks of any given policy even among senior military and intelligence officers.

These Pakistani officers are rightly proud of providing support to Afghan resistance during Soviet occupation. However, they simply ignore the fact that after departure of the last Soviet soldier from Afghan soil in 1989, Pakistan was one of the parties directly involved in the civil war of Afghanistan . Pakistan supported one or other faction in a brutal civil war which resulted in death of hundreds of thousands of both combatants and civilians. This also resulted in complete destruction of Afghan civil society. Using religious symbols and euphemisms can not hide this simple fact. A large number of Afghans hold Pakistan responsible for destruction of their country to fulfill its own genuine and delusional national security interests. It is the right of Pakistani officers to defend their policies but they also need to acknowledge the other perspective whether they agree with it or not.

Former army Chief General Mirza Aslam Beg is now seeing conspiracies and grand conspiracies everywhere. In late 2001, when U.S. was in the final stage of the routing of Taliban, Beg cried wolf. He argued that U.S. was planning to divide Afghanistan . He conveniently forgot to tell the audience that Pakistan 's exclusive support of its own Pushtun proxies put all non-Puhstun groups including Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen and Hazara in the opposite camp. Pakistan 's short sighted policies not only widened the Afghan fault lines but also sent majority of non-Puhstun leaders into the arms of India . He is now seeing intelligence agencies of every country sitting in the dark corners of Afghanistan to settle scores with Pakistan . However, he fails to mention the fact that this art was perfected by Pakistan long before any spook dreamed of having a stint in a war ravaged Afghanistan . Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) officials were making and breaking alliances with their Afghan proxies. Weapons were pumped to everybody who was willing to jump in the bed without any serious thought about the consequences. ISI officers were working in Pakistani embassy in Kabul and Pakistani consulates in Kandahar , Herat , Jalalabad and Mazar Sharif in 1990s. In this capacity, they coordinated with their own proxies in the civil war of Afghanistan . Pakistan picked and dumped its Afghan proxies with a breathtaking speed. One could easily imagine the feelings of Afghans who were on the receiving end. Off course, all blame can not be put on Pakistan 's door. Afghans of call ethnicities willingly played the part in destruction of their own country. Iran , Russia and India supported their own proxies with money and weapons. It was a power struggle among the wolves which was presented as a 'holy war'.

Pakistani intelligence brass not comprehending the rapidly changing local, regional and international currents failed to calibrate its polices and paid a heavy price. 1990s saw the gradual shift in Washington regarding Afghan operation after the departure of Soviet troops. This was the time when Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was in retreat while Congress and State Department bureaucrats were getting restless and wanted to manage Afghan policy. A new interagency Afghan group (headed by Peter Tomsen; other members included Chief of Near East division of CIA Thomas Twetten, Richard Haas from National Security Council and delegates from Pentagon and sections of State Department) decided to directly deal with Afghan commanders inside Afghanistan. Afghan players engaged in the power struggle especially those who were not happy with ISI Colonels were euphoric about opening of a new direct channel of money and guns. They were showing signs of independence and two meetings of National Commanders Shura in Paktia and Kunar alarmed ISI which saw this as an effort to outflank them. Pakistan 's nemesis Ahmad Shah Masud was behind these maneuvers. ISI got alarmed and tried to break away some of these commanders and encouraged their subordinates to rebel by providing weapons and money while at the same time invited Massoud to Islamabad for a meeting. Later, ISI opened channels of negotiations with Najib and former King Zahir Shah. When Lieutenant General Javed Nasir took over as Director General (DG) of ISI, he closed down all contacts with Afghan government stating that he was not going to negotiate with 'communists', 'atheists' and 'infidels'. Afghan game became dirtier during this time and further fractured Afghan resistance. In addition, Pakistan 's policy became haphazard with no serious long term planning.

Those who contend that Pakistan 's Afghan policy in 1990s was in the country's best interest should give rational and logical arguments about the soundness of their policy. Using religious rhetoric and simply referring to real and imaginary conspiracies of outsiders is not going to convince people that right course was adopted. Majority of intelligence officers involved in Afghan adventure blame every one including U.S. Russia , Iran , India , Pakistani politicians and foreign office of their own country for the Afghan mess.

Limited intellectual horizon of officer corps, simplistic world view, paranoia, total disregard of facts which are contrary to one's opinion and lack of perception is quite evident from the statements and writings of many senior officers. Difference of opinion about any given policy is an accepted norm and contending parties present their point of view in a cogent and rational way to support their point of view. Some retired senior Pakistani officers are mixing policy issues with their own biases, dreams and delusions totally oblivious to facts. They are trying to explain a policy through the prism of an ill defined ideology, pan-Islamic ideas, anti-American rhetoric and anti-Indian sentiment which is resulting in further confusion rather than clarification of a policy.

Pakistan army is a large organization of about half a million personnel with thousands of officers of all ranks. These officers are a small minority among a large group. It should also be remembered that most of these officers have been accused of many acts of omission and commission including allegations of political intrigues and improper use of national exchequer while wearing the uniform. A number of them have been removed from army by military's own leadership. It is expected that these officers will present a point of view which exonerates them of all wrongdoing. In the absence of reasonably independent investigative journalism or serious academic research, many aspects of Pakistan 's Afghan policy are still shrouded in mystery. The view of a small minority of officers is the only version available to Pakistani audience. However, in this effort, these officers are damaging the work of professional intelligence officers mainly mid level (Majors & Colonels) who gave their best to perform the job assigned to them. They risked their lives and worked ethically and professionally. Many of these officers whose names will never be known presented their views candidly which ran against the conventional wisdom of their seniors to the detriment of their own careers. These are the unsung heroes of the much maligned Pakistani intelligence. People like General Mirza Aslam Beg, former heads of ISI including Hamid Gul, Asad Durrani and Javed Nasir have their fair share in some of the short sighted policies which proved more dangerous to the country than any adversary's move. Rational analysis with new information and acknowledging any mistake to learn lessons is not a trait of Pakistani senior brass. Majority of them who have not fought any battle are walking a fine line between dreams and delusions causing more confusion rather than bringing clarity.



Hamid Hussain

August 18, 2007

Fakir sahib,

I am not denying GoP/ISI's nefarious role in the tragedy of A'stan but a lot of blame has to be shared by the USSR too.

Regards

Re: # 15;--

I am an Afghan and did not leave Afghanistan from 1978 till 1992.During this time damage to infrastructure was 95 % the work of ISI sponsored Murdagao Mujahids.In between 1992 and 2001 the remaining damage was done.All who did this were Pakistan sponsored.In contrast the North is very un damaged because it was controlled by relatively liberal Northern Alliance and Dostums Jumbish i Milli.

Fakir sahib,

Had USSR not invaded A'stan, maybe US and Pak would never have intervened in A'stan. This is of course not to justify Pakistan's shameful role in that country.

Regards

#17 a small modification to that interact: I would say

"Had USSR not invaded A'stan, maybe US would never have intervened in A'stan. "

pakistan would have done with or without the US being interested. Having failed in the East Paksiatn and lost it, having tried Kashmir and done a Shimla they needed something else.

That the indians gave them Kashmir once more on a platter is besides the point.

roses are red
violets are blue
the jihadi ideology you backed
is now killing you

Yes .They used to talk about Isloo and all nonsense.Just compare Isloo after Lal Masjid ! You reap what you sow.All that constipated Silent Soldier.Silent Jihad making silently millions.Good keep it up.Now you guys will know what is civil war.Well done silent soldier.Cheers.

The essay is rather short ended. I actually expected some incisive stuff. Maybe written in a hurry, Amin could not conceal his biases. The essay would have definitively made better reading if it was more analytical.

When Northern Alliance reached Kabul with assistance of both USA and Russia, I thought that now it was back to square one. A time would come once this same alliance with the help of Russia and Shanghai-5 would push USA-NATO out of Afghanistan. Before that happens, the Pashtun resistance in Afghanistan has to be crushed so that the NA has a walkover. Maybe that takes place 5-10 years from now if it happens at all.

As I mentioned in a previous post and I reproduce here: -

"It may surprise many, but the contours of Pakistan's Afghan Policy were drawn in the mid 70s by Bhutto and Naseer Ullah Babar, who was then the Inspector General of Frontier Corps in NWFP. This was done in the backdrop of growing propaganda emanating from Kabul and supported by India for Pakhtoonistan. Some Afghan Student leaders and dissidents like Hikmatyar, Ahmad Shah Masud, Rabbani and Younis Khalis were brought to Pakistan for training and unleashed on Sardar Daud's Regime. This mass insurgency moderated Daud in 1977 and he was now prepared to sign the Durand Line. Unfortunately Zia's Coup removed Bhutto and an opportunity was lost. Soon Daud too was murdered and then came the Soviet invasion. Also recall that French Book, 'Muslim Threat to Soviet Russia'."

These Afghans kept hanging around Cherat and Peshawar for many years, till they were picked up by ISI/CIA for the Mock Jehad.

Cheerios

FakirIppi,

Yourself being Afghan (even though you use the moniker of someone from North Waziristan), I have full sympathy for your embitterment over your country's destruction.

Afghanistan, in one way or another, was always a USSR client in recent history. All the roads were built by the Russians, most trade was with Russia, and even butter was imported from there. There was a beer factory though owned by some Pir family.

King Zahir Shah ruled only in Kabul (just as Karzai does now) with autonomous regional war lords backing him through a loya jirga (just as Karzai does now) with absolutely no writ over the rest of the land. The only difference between then and now in terms of federal authority is that Zahir Shah managed to keep the foreign policy and currency uniform through loya jirga consensus, which fell apart after direct Russian intervention. Pakistan had nothing to do with that.

It is though true that Shahre-Nau in Kabul was an island populated by persian speaking Tajiks, in a sea of misery populated by Pushtoons, which was Afghanistan. Now, that island is gone as well.

Pakistan's interest was solely in ensuring whoever won after the civil war subsequent to soviet withdrawal remained friendly to Pakistan. Certainly that wasn't going to be the Lion of Panjsher who was supported by the Indians, so they had no choice but to support the southern Pushtoons i.e. first Hikmetyar, and later Taliban, who were ethnically and geographically close to Pakistan and could be counted upon as allies.

I also believe it is a fallacy that Taliban were 'created' by Pakistan. They were a spontaneous movement born in refugee camps in Pakistan, and supported initially by the trucking and drug mafias alone to protect their convoys. In fact, the very first time when Pakistan engaged Taliban's services was when a Pakistani trade convoy headed for Central Asian Republics was guarded through the entire length of war-torn Afghanistan, full of highwaymen at each turn, by Taliban. One thing after that led to another and Pakistan dumped Hikmetyar in favour of Mullah Umar when the former failed to take Kabul.

Another important figure which people miss is Jalaluddin Haqqani, the present mentor of the 'Pakistani Taliban'. He was the fierce Jihadist fighter whom CIA coveted and one of those feted by Reagan on the White House lawns as the 'moral equivalent of our founding fathers'. Haqqani, Pakistan and USA's blue-eyed boy, was offered to turn against Taliban by musharraf in 2001 but refused, and initiated the Waziristan rebellion in support of Taliban and the 'Arab Afghans' aka Al-Qaida, which has now turned against Pakistan after Pakistan army intervention in FATA.

Point is, Pakistan is not responsible for Afghanistan's destruction, but a victim of the Afghans inability to hold their country together.

(P.S. The assertion re rise of Taliban are taken from Steve Coll's "Ghost Wars". Ahmed Rashid has an opposing view which I believe to be totally false.)

Mr Gul this is not an essay as the title inside indicates.This is a letter stating some impressions.The feedback that this writer has offered is quite thought provoking.

Attached is Agha's article on Taliban published in Defence Journal October 2007 issue.





The Ongoing Taliban War in Afghanistan- A Brief Assessment

A.H Amin







The Taliban War in Afghanistan has its origins in the Afghan Revolution of 1978.At that time Khalq and Parcham were the two key groups of the Afghan Leftists.The Khalq was the more rigid as well as extremist while the Parcham was more flexible, opportunistic and urbanized.The Khalq in turn had two groups the Pro Tarraki Khalqis and the Pro Hafizullah Amin Khalqis.

As the Afghan War intensified after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 just like the USA intervened in November 2001 the war became very complicated.The new Afghan Intelligence initially known as AGSA headed by the indomitable Sarwari was later reorganized by Dr Najeeb and was known as the KHAD.When Dr Najeeb became the Afghan President in 1986 the KHAD was headed by Ghulam Farooq Yaqubi from 1986 till his sad suicide in 1992.During this time the KHAD succeeded in having various secret protocols with various Afghan leaders from various factions of the so called Afghan Mujahideen.Most of these protocols were with non Pashtun Mujahid groups.Thus as a result the non Pashtun Mujahid groups were brought closer to the leftist regime and since they were seen as moderates the USSR saw them as future allies in Afghanistan.As a result the non Pashtun areas of the north were relatively undestroyed while the brunt of destruction was borne by Pashtun areas of Afghanistan.

General Yaqubi a great intelligence professional knew that if the Mujahids occupied Kabul he was a dead man.He destroyed many secret documents and killed himself when the Mujahids occupied Kabul abandoned by the Khalqis and Parchamis to them for the sake of peace.

When Kabul was abandoned by the Khalqis and Parchamis in April 1992 following the last minute betrayal of General Dostum a diehard Parchami till then the Afghan leftists dissolved the party and the Pashtuns joined Hekmatyar's Hizb e Islami while the non Pashtuns joined Ahmad Shah Massouds group of Jamiat I Islami.

The ensuing civil war which started after the Mujahid (so called) occupation of Kabul in April 1992 continued till November 2001 when the USA launched Operation Enduring Freedom.During this period a new power alignment took place.The Russians,Iranians and Indian Governments became patrons of the Non Pashtun Groups later known as the Northern Alliance while the Pashtun Groups initially Hikmatyar and later Taliban were supported by Pakistan as well as Saudi Arabia.

In a crude way the struggle drifted from ideological lines to ethnic lines with Parchamis who were mostly non Pashtuns joining the Jamiat of Massoud later known as Northern Alliance while the Khalqis who were Pahtuns joined Hekmatyar and later the Taliban.

The US invasion of Afghanistan was launched with internal collaboration of the Northern Alliance a largely Non Pashtun dominated alliance against the Taliban who were largely Pashtun.True that the Northern Alliance had some lightweight Pashtuns like Abdul Haq , Abdul Qadeer and Siaf , it was a largely non Pashtun group.This led to an ethnic war in Afghanistan in which the Pashtun majority was pitched against the non Pashtun minority which was a US ally.It became immaterial whether a man was a so called Mujahid or a Khalqi or a Parchami.The dividing line became language i.e whether you were a Pashtun or a non Pashtun.The US tried to change this impression first by introducing Abdul Haq and later Hamid Karzai but the popular perception remains that Afghanistan is no longer a Pashtun dominated country. Operation Enduring Freedom the US operation to invade and occupy Afghanistan in late 2001 was hailed as a new kind of war in the US press.Till to date there is no tangible proof that this operation has succeeded.

According to US claims (Refers - Strange Victory: A critical appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan war- Carl Conetta-2002-PDA Monograph # 6 , 30 January 2002) following was achieved :--



1. A reasonable estimate is that 3,000 to 4,000 Taliban coalition troops died, including those killed in battle, captivity, and by strategic bombardment.(Refers- Kirk Spitzer, "Green Berets outfought, out thought Taliban," USA Today, 7 January 2002, p.1) Among these dead may be 600-800 "Afghan Arabs" affiliated with Al Qaeda (out of an original total of 2,000-3,000). Notably, only a fraction of Al Qaeda fighters -- perhaps 25 percent -- are pledged members of the organization; the remainder are foreign volunteers brought to Afghanistan to fight in the civil war under Al Qaeda auspices.

2. Approximately 7,000 Taliban and foreign troops were prisoners as of 15 January; less than 500 of these had been transferred to US custody. A disproportionate number of the prisoners held by the Northern Alliance militias were foreign fighters, especially Uzbek and Pakistani.

3. Most of the top Taliban leadership has survived the war and eluded capture; many are in Pakistan and seeking to re-integrate into Afghanistan . Of more than three dozen Taliban leaders on the Pentagon's "wanted list," more than 12 have been killed, injured or have defected.

4. At least eight of the 20 top Al Qaeda leaders and aides pursued by the Pentagon in Afghanistan are believed dead. However, only two had been reported captured as of 15 January. Eleven training camps affiliated with Al Qaeda, and many other Al Qaeda facilities in Afghanistan, have been destroyed or overrun.

The same US observer analysed US success or failure as following :--



1. The Alliance victory and Taliban collapse profoundly altered the national and regional strategic situation in several ways -- none of them auspicious in terms of long-term stability:



2. First, the rapid victory of the Alliance and collapse of the Taliban released centrifugal tendencies throughout Afghanistan , giving warlordism, banditry, and opium production a new lease on life. This essentially erased the one positive feature of the Taliban period. An immediate effect was the aggravation of the country's humanitarian crisis. A longer-term effect will be greater difficulty in building a unified polity and resilient civilian authority.

3. Second, the advance of the Alliance and defeat of the Taliban altered the principal lines of opposition in Afghan society. Rather than following a "Taliban versus anti-Taliban" axis, conflict reoriented along purely ethnic, tribal, and sect lines. Within this, the position of Tajik and Uzbek minority interests advanced disproportionately. This will likely lead to a new bipolar configuration in the country: Pashtun versus non-Pashtun. The ethnic reframing of the Afghan struggle altered the political implications of US military operations in the country, which had focused almost exclusively on Pashtun areas since late-November.

4. Third, the increased salience of ethnic, tribal, and sect lines of division also increased the centrifugal pressures on the international coalition supporting the operation. Notably, the Alliance victory had substantially increased Russian influence in Afghanistan , contrary to US interests and to the dismay of both Pakistan and Iran. Indian interests (tied to the Tajik militias) also advanced substantially. These developments increased the prospects for intensified regional contention over Afghanistan.



This is not a brief written by an ISI general but the expert analysis of a US scholar.




The Afghan mission, NATO's first deployment outside of Europe or the US, is the alliance's biggest ground operation in its history with 35,000 soldiers currently in the country. The majority of these troops hail from the US and the UK. The ISAF currently has five regional commands in Afghanistan: north, south, east, west and Kabul . The ISAF's headquarters are at Camp Warehouse , 16 kilometers east of Kabul.

According to Brigadier General Patrick de Villiers of France, the ISAF's mission in Kabul is to hold Taliban insurgents in check while winning the hearts and minds of the local population by pursing small development projects in conjunction with local leaders to improve living standards while respecting local religion and culture.The same generally is the stated NATO/ISAF mission in Afghanistan.

The Turkish Armed Forces will lead the Kabul Regional Command mission until 6 December, when Italy takes the helm until August 2008.

Some Facts and Figures



NATO troops breakdown in Afghanistan as of early 2007 (based on interviews with various ISAF officers and authors own estimates)



United States, 12,000

Britain, 5,200

Germany, 2,750

Netherlands, 2,100

Canada 2,200

Italy, 1,800

France, 1,000

Romania, 750

Spain, 625

Turkey, 475

Norway, 350

Denmark, 325

Belgium, 300

Hungary, 200

Portugal, 180

Greece, 180

Bulgaria, 150

Lithuania, 135

Czech Republic, 100

Estonia, 90

Slovakia, 60

Slovenia, 50

Latvia, 35

Iceland, 15

Luxembourg, 10

Poland, 10

Non-NATO

Sweden, 350

Australia, 200

Croatia, 120

Macedonia, 120

New Zealand, 100

Finland, 100

Albania, 30

Azerbaijan, 20

Ireland, 10

Austria, 5

Switzerland, 5




The present situation is that the Taliban are controlling large parts of the following provinces :--



1. Ghazni (Andar District,Muqur) At least 30 % of the province by day and 60 % after sunset till dawn)

2. Zabul (At least 75 % of the province)

3. Uruzgan ( At least 55 % of the province)

4. Helmand (At least 80 % of the province)

5. Paktika (At least 20 % of the province)

6. Khost (At least 20 % of the province)

7. Paktia (At least 10 % of the province)

8. Farah (At least 55 % of the province)

9. Kunar (At least 20 % of the province)

10. Laghman (At least 20 % of the province)

11. Kapisa (Tagab district)

12. Kandahar ( at least 45 % )


Communications :---



1. Kabul –Torkham Highway is 90 % safe but there have been incidents of attacks on oil tankers.Many of these are however insurance frauds done by owners of oil tankers coming from Pakistan or by their crew who first sell the fuel and then put the tankers on fire.

2. Kabul-Kandahar Heart Highway :-- It is unsafe for any kind of civilian traffic between Muqur in Ghazni till Shahr e Safa in Kandahar and from Maiwand in Kandahar Province till Farah Rud and Adraskan in Herat Province in between 1600 in the evening till dawn.

3. Kandahar-Spin Boldak Highway :-- Safe during daytime but unsafe after 1600 till dawn.

4. Kabul-Mazar-Hairatan Highway :-- Safe 24 hours except odd cases of robberies.

5. Kabul-Kunduz-Bandar Sher Khan Highway :-- Safe 24 hours except odd cases of robberies.

Suicide Bombings :--



My personal study indicates that 70 % of suicide attacks against US/NATO/Afghan National Army/Afghan National Police occurred in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces ,15 % occurred in Kabul Province and 15 % in Khost,Ningrahar,Ghazni and Kunar.This scribe personally witnessed three suicide attacks and did manage to capture one on the camera in September 2006.According to some statistics compiled by Century Foundation New York the approximate casualties were as following :--

According to the Associated Press the USA has suffered as of Friday, Sept. 28, 2007, at least 375 members of the U.S. military had died in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan as a result of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001, according to the Defense Department. The department last updated its figures Sept. 22, 2007.Of those, the military reports 249 were killed by hostile action.

According to US Think Tank Century Foundations updated report of September 2007 casualty breakdown in Afghanistan was as follows:---



September 07, 2006

By the numbers: Casualties, Sept 2006

Here are the latest casualty figures I could find (Sept 7, 2006):



Violence related deaths in past four months: 1600 Source: AP

Coalition deaths since 2001: 466 Source: CNN

Non-US coaltion deaths: 137

US wounded in action since 2001: 893 Source: CNN



Breakdown of NATO/ISAF Casualties (Source Century Foundation/CNN)

US: 329

UK: 39

Canada: 32

Germany: 18

Spain: 18

France: 9

Italy: 6

Romania: 4

Denmark: 3

Holland: 3

Sweden: 2

Norway: 1

Portugal: 1

Australia: 1








AN ASSESSMENT OF EVENTS



The Taliban and USA had no conventional match so it was logical that the Taliban disintegrated initially in face of the US bombing offensive and later ground attacks of Northern Alliance as well as the US forces.



The Taliban's started re-grouping after mid 2002 having realized that the USA and its NATO allies had sparse ground forces.Initially they targeted NGOs and construction companies but by 2004 they started applying the tactics learnt in Iraq in Afghanistan.



By 2005 they were generally organized as regional battle groups under a command and control system.An assessment of this is shown on the map.Each regional group comprised a hard core of 150 to 350 and a total mobilized armed strength of 1000 to 2000 fighters.



According to a study done by this scribe for an international client IEDs were initially imported from Datta Khel and Pishin but later each regional group started manufacturing their own IEDs.Weapons and munitions were bought from Iranian Baloch and Kurd smugglers or from groups in Central Asian Republics.Most of the weapons were smuggled via Iran.



Taliban control over Helmand and South Nimroz ensured that they controlled the main drug transit routes hence this enabled them to maintain a strong leverage with Pakistani and Iranian Baloch tribes.



The USA and its NATO allies appear to have the following strategy :---



Control the key airfields of Afghanistan with minimum strength.
Hold Kabul in strength.
Show piece patrolling in Southern Provinces giving the impression that the ISAF/NATO is active but in reality avoiding pitched battles or any heavy troop copmmitment.
Rebuild the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.This may take many dccades.Actual fighting indicates that both the ANA and ANP have extremely limited value while operating independently.Thanks to US insistence the Afghan Army was destroyed effectively in the period 1989-92 and building a effective army may take many decades.
It appears that the long term strategic purpose of Afghanistan was to dominate the regional states as well the resources by occupying airbases which would enable the USA to attack targets of its choosing , may they be WMDs or other installations.Effective countermeasures by President Putin of Russia however severely limited US influence in the Central Asian Republics.
Pressurise/armtwist Pakistani into destroying the main Taliban bases in Waziristan and North Balochistan.


The Taliban strategy is as following :---



Harass Kabul Herat Road disturbing container movements.
Cause attrition on British-Canadian troops in Helmand and Kandahar the Pashtun heartland thus demonstrating to all Pashtuns in Afghanistan that the Talibans are a major player.
Dominate the major drug production areas in the south and the main drug export routes thus financially sustaining the ongoing war.
Carry out continuous suicide and IED\bombings in Kabul and surrounding area sapping morale Of anti Taliban forces and demoralising civilians.
Carry out selective IED/Suicide Attacks against US Forces and US Civilans
Targeting the Afghan National Police which was not completely disintegrated in 1988-92.The Taliban know that the hard core of the Afghan Government is the ANP trained by the indomitable Sayyid Gulabozai.The Afghan National Police has at least 25 % officers trained in ex USSR and is very professional as well as patriotic.Thus the attacks on Afghan National Police by the suicide bombers as well as IEDs.


ANALYSIS







The strategic challenges that the USA confronts are complex and challenging and the present US leadership lacks the strategic talent to find a solution.Just sitting in Afghanistan and Iraq is not the solution.If not a reverse it is certainly not a success for USA and its allies.And every day spent in Iraq and Afghanistan without striking at the real centre of gravity is a strategic failure of USA.







Using the Northern Alliance as main Allies



The USA was seen as friends of Non Pashtuns in 2001.This created an alienation and feeling of betrayal in Pashtuns both in Afghanistan and Pakistan .This fact was admitted even by US scholars.Professor Rasul Amin who is this scribe's personal friend offered a very interesting explanation of this US failure.According to Prof Rasul Amin who was also Afghanistan's first Education Minister the main US advisor who according to US decision makers possessed Solomon's wisdom about Afghanistan,Zalmay Khalilzad was a non Pashtun.Rasul Amin stated in various discussions that Zalmay was a Changharay ( of Hindu/Indian origin) and not a Pashtun.He thus carried a conscious as well as unconscious bias against Pashtuns.This led to his advocating a course in US policy as a result of which US position became very partisan and negative in the eyes of the Pashtun population.



The USA achieved little by this favour ironically.The Northern Alliance's real allies and saviours were the Russians,Indians and Iranians and this remains the present position.To rub salt in the wound today the Northern Alliance propagates that they singlehandedly removed the Taliban understating and under emphasizing the impact of US aerial bombardment on Taliban.Thus although without USA intervention the Taliban would still have been ruling Afghanistan,the USA failed to gained the goodwill that they deserved from the Northern Alliance.The Northern Alliance knows that their permanent allies are Russia,India and Iran while USA is a dangerous ally which can change its policy at any times.Thus US policy laid the foundation of a possible division of Afghanistan into Pashtun and non Pashtun parts.This may take a decade or more but a foundation has been laid.



US strategy is not aimed at pacifying Afghanistan



The force ratio of USA and its major NATO allies is so low that it is not designed to pacify or control whole of Afghanistan.The major US targets its appears were the airbases and those they occupied.These airbases will go a long way in enabling the USA to strike at a multiple number of targets in the region.This has already led to China and Russia becoming better allies and has not served US policy.



Material motivation of various major participants exposed



One good result of the war is the fact that materialistic motivation of many majopr participants has been exposed.When the USSR intervened in Afghanistan in 1979 the then Pakistani military regime adopted a policy of aiding Afghan rebel groups on the slogan of Jihad.Today with more than 20 Christian countries occupying Afghanistan and with Pakistan facing a more grave threat on its Western borders there is no talk of Jihad now.The motivation in 1979 was to get foreign aid and this has remained the motivation in 2001.The same is true for the so called Mujahids of 1979-1989.They fought a Jihad against a non Christian USSR and are now major vassals of more than 20 Christian countries occupying Afghanistan.



Taliban a force to stay on the scene



In pure military as well as political terms the Taliban are a force that will stay on the scene unless there is a major change in US strategy.This would not lead to US withdrawal but it would certainly make Afghanistan's Pashtun and non Pashtun divide deeper.The USA would be the loser as the Northern Alliance regards Russia as a more solid and reliable friend and ally.The Taliban will dominate the south and the drug trade and there dominance would ensure that the Pashtuns remain relatively uneducated.Thus fundamentalism would be strengthened in the Afghan South and the regional threat will remain functional.



Taliban's Ability to acquire SAM capability will be a serious challenge to USA/NATO



Presently the Taliban have no SAM capability but if they acquire this the whole balance in Afghanistan would seriously tilt against the Americans/NATO.Presently the NATO is the master of the land battlefield because of dominance of the skies.This has enabled it to occupy Afghanistan with minimum forces and to economise on the war expenditure.A few SAMs can however change the whole situation.



IED and Suicide Attacks Main Strength of Taliban



The Taliban have mastered the use of IEDs and have a large reservoir of suicide bombers.These are two formidable weapons that they possess against which the USA/NATO has no countermeasure or remedy.







Conclusion



The Afghan battlefield will see few decisive battles and would continue to be a slow war of attrition in which the NATO/ISAF will rarely see the faces of their enemies.Time is on the side of Taliban.The NATO/USA has to decide on a definite strategy unless their aim is just to control the strategic Afghan airfields as jump off points for attacks on other regional countries in the next decade.Pakistan lost the good will it should have had in Afghanistan because its foreign policy was controlled by non Professionals.This failure started from removal of Agha Shahi from the Foreign Office.Shahi was not in favour of doing everything that the Americans told the Pakistanis.He was a seasoned diplomat.After his exit the Foreign Office passed into hands of soldiers turned diplomats with an over ride gear from General Zia and the so called Silent Soldier.

Seen in retrospect Pakistan's Afghan policy was a failure and the threat in 2007 to Pakistan's integrity is far more grave than in 1979.In this scenario the Taliban are a major contender.They have acquired a fearsome reputation not only as warriors in the Pashtun areas but also in the eyes of their NATO opponents.However the talk of engaging them is impractical.The battle that they are fighting is to the bitter end and this fact has to be digested by all decision makers on all sides.The Taliban have succeeded in destabilisng the region and herein lies their nuisance value.

Re: # 21:-- I notice that all you writers are trying to pull each others legs and trying urself to pose as sages.

Re: # 7:-- You r one of the substantial and straight thinking intellectuals Majumdar Saaaab.

ISI is clearly acting in conformity with the "Islamic Principles" of the constitution of PAkistan. It was responsible for telling the CIA how the "jehad" would be done in Afghanistan like it is being done in Kashmir. CIA gave ISI money and logistic support. The rest of the details were worked by the ISI in Afghanistan.

Tigram bhai,

(You r one of the substantial and straight thinking intellectuals Majumdar Saaaab. )

If you are not pulling my leg, thank you very much!!!

Regards

Re: # 28;-- Majumdar Saaab , main aap ko follow kar rahan hoon, for long time.Please continue this good contribution .

Re: # 27:-- Islamic principles of earning money in name of Jihad.This is worse than a jew.Generals Zia , Akhtar etc had no war record.Just good liars and intriguer people these were.Zia Kana Dajal,Akhtar a constipated man.

Russia has committed a the basic blunder. USA, on behalf of Saudi Arabia committed bigger blunder. And the people of Afganisthan and other countries are suffering. The largest gainer from the entire conflict is Pakistan. Without Afganisthan problem, Pakistan would have been a begging bowl (The amount of US money poured in Pakistan, they should have purchased the entire country and made that their own territory).

Re: # 31:-- You are more near the truth than anyone who has interacted so far.We saw all this with our own eyes.

Russians were far more civilised than Americans.They never bombed any major Pakistani city.Compare this with what USA did to Hanoi.Worse than Huns these Americans.

I had sent few copies of my book Pakistan Army til 1965 for display in Mr Books in Islamabad in November 1999.A person in all probability a serving officer in civies came and told the shops manager as per my friend Abid Hamza " Why you are displaying this book,its binding and cover is not good" !

This is for those who are commenting on the poor style of this letter.This was just a letter written after reading Hamid Hussain.Just concentrate on the substance.This so called Jihad was only about money.

Re: # 34

pavocavalry sahib, precisely the point I was raising in #6. This article has some startling material...if only it was ordered better, and edited better (which Chowk Staff should have done)....I will reitterate what I said in #6

The worthwhile part of the article is the conluding paragraph, and I quote

"The so called Afghan Jihad was a success for many Pakistani and Afghans in personal terms.But these were a small minority.For the vast majority of Afghans it was a failure.Afghanistan lost the flower of its leadership,intellectuals and infrastructure ! "

But it need to be developed better. This is said in such a manner for the first time - and indeed this paragraph deals directly with the here and now, rather than the chimeral religiosity ........


Apart from this, this conclusion raises a number of questions:

(a) Why is this being raised now? Why was it not raised earlier? Indeed there was a fight here on Chowk many eons ago - why an american diplomat was quoted as sying that the pakistanis would sell their mothers (or something to this effect) for a few dollars - but this matter in the article was never brought up.

(b) Is this a part of the on going process of dismantling the aura around the Pak Army? This dribs and drab effort(s) is like killing with a thousand cuts! (ironic is it not!)

(c)Where are the numbers, and evidence - The article has material which read like conclusions, but these need to have a few more facts associated with them? The author (in this case I presume it is you pavocavalry) needs to assemble his arsenal together - I look forward to reading this stuff when he prints it here (defence journal is not something we all have access too!).

There are others, but I will leave those for now.

Re: # 35:-- You have quite a limited comprehension Dot Dash.U dont have the common sense to see that this is just a spontaneous response of the writer to an article published in defence journal in october 2007.Why he has raised this issue now is because the article that he was commenting on was published in October 2007.I have been studying this writer since a decade and he has been raising this issue since then.You seem like an Agent Provocateur ! Alas with a limited brain.

Pakistani strategists are actually quite adroit at making grand plans , the only thing is they always come to nought. In the aftermath of USSR intervention in Afghanistan in 1978, they saw an opportunity to profit from the situation and grabbed it. The immediate tactic was to pose as a frontline state fighting a Commumist superpower, thereby gaining sympathy, aid and weapons from the generous, gullible and fearful West. Zia played on the West's fears by constantly bombarding it with the theory that the Russians' adventure in Afghanistan was actually a launching pad for further Southward movement towards the warm waters of Arabian Sea, thereby convincing the West that the next target was Pakistan itself. This argument was swallowed by the West hook, line and sinker and the arms and money came gushing in. Of course the Army generals swallowed a considerable part of the loot.
The next trick was to actually welcome the refugees into Pakistan and then gain world sympathy. This has partly succeeded but at what cost, an entire generation of Pakistanis became addicted on drugs peddled by the refugees, a free for all gun running racket has turned vast areas into lawless regions and native Pakistanis have been elbowed out of entire vocations.
Pakistan gained the status of a frontline state and became a large madrassa for the Islamis terrorists of the world, who were given the treatment of exalted guests, some of the guests were diverted to Kashmir with the fond hope that Kashmir will fall into the lap of Pakistan just like that.

The fact is the the Russians were always maintaining a close relationship with Afghanistan, the Khalq party of Dawood, Babrak Karmal, Taraqui all being pro-communists. As a practice most Afghan students went to Eastern bloc countries for higher education and most Afghanistan army officers were trained in USSR and almost everybody spoke Russian. Afghans were always closer to Russia than they were ever to Pakistan notwithstanding the proximity. So if the Northern aliance does not want anything to do with Pakistan they are just being traditional.
It is Pakistan's wont to claim close cultural and historical ties with its western neighbours often citing and eulogising the invaders who came to India from these parts and claiming a fraternal bond, but neither Iran nor Afghanistan or for that matter the newly independent states of Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan or Tajikstan are reciprocating.

What have Pakistanis gained in return? All the grand plans have come to a naught. Afghanistan is not any closer to Pakistan that it was during the jehad, nor is it providing the proverbial depth against likely war with India. The west has dumped it as soon as its purpose was served. Kashmir remains a distant dream.The terrorists who were trained by ISI have not gone away but have become a frankenstein. The society has been devastated with three million rfugees refusing to go away and instead usurping a lot of opportunities for livelyhood which otherwise could have gone to native Pakistanis.
So the big question is why cannot Pakistan be ruled by real democrats and let it flower as a true federal democracy? It is time to send the army back to its barracks, so that the country can be governed internally democratically and externally steered with an objective foreign policy with no pretentious claims to leadership of the Muslim world

Muqadam,

Re: 37

Law of Unintended Consequences, in plain English Blowback.

Regards

Re: # 36 TIGRAM, I do understand what the author has done - or as you say a spontaneous response kind of thing...but then we have to read this stuff and take it seriously- maybe I am not as clever as you - but even a dimiwited guy understands that he needs to respect the audience and put in a bit of effort (note I am even more critical of chowk staff for not editing the article better).

Thank you for your other comments.

Re: # 37

Muqaddam, as majumdar says - blowback, but also Pakistanis are avid readers (and consumers) of History but poor at understanding it. As a result they repeat mistakes.

BTW TIGRAM - pavocavalry understands himself better than you understand him - and thats a point you need to note and understand....your statement in #36 "I have been studying this writer since a decade ......." reminds of the following song from SAGINA

saalaa main to saahab ban gaya
are, saalaa main to saahab ban gaya
re, saahab banke kaisa tan gaya
ye suit mera dekho, ye boot mera dekho
jaise gora koi London ka

Dash,

(blowback, but also Pakistanis are poor at understanding it. As a result they repeat mistakes.)

If it is of any consolation to you Injuns ( the INC to be more specific) too have had their share of blowbacks- LTTE/Khalistan. Fortunately it looks like lately they have learnt their lessons (of course if one day the Baloch/Panjshiris decide to launch a jihad against India, I would sound like an idiot)

Regards

Re: # 42 a small mistaaake, me injun - no, no (says me shaking my head the wrong way ;-() )....

In general the whole of the Indian Sub-continent is way to too aggressive with their histories to be (a) be comfortable with it (b) distill the under-lying trends in it (c) able to seperate the chaff from the grain.

Re: # 41:-- To understand pava better read his following article :--

Stray Reflections on Geopolitics and History Writing
August 2000

A.H Amin

This is not exactly an article but an attempt to analyse certain current geopolitical and current affairs issues. Many of these are discussed in various articles published in this journal. It is felt with a certain amount of conviction that there are certain psychological hang ups, which in my humble opinion have contributed, a great deal in adding fuel to fire in the Indo-Pak Sub Continent. We mortals are frail creatures vis-a-vis the current of history which we attempt to approach and understand and analyse in our own particular ways. In the process we mostly become subjective and passionate. Long ago the great psychologist Freud had concluded that majority of men are irrational and make most of their decisions on irrational basis! The role of those who write is thus to rise above their impulses and to write something to infuse some rationality in at least a certain segment of mankind!





One typical but vulgar approach in writing articles is to condemn any one particular state, without bothering to analyse the various factors that led a state to a certain point where its actions conflicted with another state or resulted in violation of human rights. I feel with considerable conviction that history is largely a record of crimes, follies and misfortunes of mankind as the great historian Gibbon said and above all is merely the story of manipulation of the many, the populace, by the few, the leaders or the dominant smaller classes, in the name of high sounding slogans like ideology, nationalism etc!





The Nature of Human Aggression

Human nature is essentially same, man can fight or kill for anything and any idea whether based on ideology, nationalism or class, it can divide people of the same race, even the same religion and even of the same family. The ulterior motivation is always personal or class interest disguised in the garb of high sounding slogans! I want to give certain concrete historical examples to prove this harmless assertion.

Take Spain of 1930s. One race, one country, one religion, and one sect. The struggle is between the feudal-clergy-military junta and the republicans asking for more equitable distribution of resources! No Two-Nation Theory but the Spaniards fight savagely for three years! Mind you there were no fighting in the Indian Freedom Struggle, as we like to call it, although the transfer of power was more the result of war exhaustion brought upon the British Empire as a result of two world wars! The result of the fighting between the Republicans and Monarchists under Franco1, 600,000 Spaniards were killed! In the Russians Civil War fought from 1917 to 1922 the casualties; killed only, were 1 crore or ten million!2 Russian killed Russians simply because one was from Denikin Kolchak or Yudenich’s White Army and another from Trotsky or Lenin’s Red Army! Even a Menshevik Communist killed another Russian simply because the other man was a Bolshevik Communist! The Chinese Civil War lasting from 1911 with uneven intervals till 1949 was equally brutal with Chinese killing Chinese in the name of an ideology conceived by a German of Jewish ancestry to liberate the workers of the world! The Britishers were horrified with the brutal pillage and destruction of Muslim Rohailkhand3 following conquest of Hindustani Pathan Muslim Rohailkhand by Shia Muslim of Oudh through hiring a British-Indian Brigade of the Honourable English East India Company!

What is the lesson! That man can fight for anything, not because two nations are different or war is inevitable between them or because Pakistan or India was inevitable; but simply because “Aggression” is ingrained in the human character! It is justified in the name of class war, war between two nations, a football riot or wars of successions between real brothers! The issue is never ideology but a piece of land that was lost by folly of one king or a flawed constitutional arrangement or a broken treaty concluded 100 years before. In the background is either class interest or ego of a leader or intrigue by a third party for its own interest! It’s a subtle combination of “Ideology” “Ethnicity” “Opportunism” and “Substance” that this scribe in his humble capacity has discussed in some detail in a small book written a year ago. Journalists make their living or channel their urges for aggression by writing militaristic and jingoistic sabre rattling articles about such issues, as is the case in Indo-Pak or any conflict dominated region! Leaders talk about these issues frequently as Indian and Pakistani leaders do to galvanise their electorate, so that their mind remains distracted from the core issues of class exploitation economic disparity and exploitation!





Take the Indo Pak Subcontinent. The two states of Pakistan and India were created because a third party i.e. the Britishers who were neither Muslim nor Hindu conquered India. Communalism based on religion emerged as a factor, emerged only after 1857 when the Hindu middle classes and business classes saw in introduction of Western Democracy and Competitive examinations, an opportunity to grab power without fighting a battle. It all started from the three coastal cities of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras with the highest number of educated Indians dominated above all by the Bengali Hindus who were the first to enjoy the fruits of Western Education by virtue of being colonised by the British before all other parts of India! I will quote some statistics to reveal the Bengali Hindu dominance in education over all other parts of India. From 1864 to 1885, the reader may note that this was Bengali Hindu dominance vis-a-vis other provinces which had similar Hindu majorities; thus the dominance was more provincial and ethnic than religious! From 1864 to 1885, 2,153 Indians from Bengal Province (Bengal Bihar and Orissa) passed the B.A examination as compared to 272 from NWP and Oudh (Modern UP), while only 107 candidates from Punjab (which at that time had two large non-Punjabi enclaves in the Trans Indus territories and the Hariana Districts) passed B.A.4 The Bengalis took the lead and were viewed as a threat by the UP elite both Hindu and Muslim in the 1880s! In 1886 Pandit Ajudia Nath a leading UP Hindu made a statement before the Public Service Commission against recruitment to government posts by competitive examination since the learned Pandit felt that UP men were backward in English education compared with maritime province (i.e. Bombay, Madras and Bengal). Candidates could stand little chance in open competition against the maritime province candidates.5 As education advanced in UP the Hindus of other provinces came closer. Being the larger community and more dominant in terms of education, business assets and representation in the professional and civil servant classes. The Indian Hindus were in a position of strategic advantage to dominate post British politics of India after the British withdrew from India! Even this was a class affair since the Hindus who dominated the Congress were from Brahmin and Kayasth classes while the older Hindu dominant classes i.e. the Rajputs, Jats and Marathas were now relegated to the background by virtue of being less educated and financially insolvent or bankrupt!6 The Muslim League founded in 1906 was on the other hand a Muslim feudal dominated party with its base in UP till at least 1937! In 1937 Nehru foolishly antagonised the UP Muslims who dominated the Muslim League by not offering them any seat unless they left the Muslim League! It was just a question of two seats in the UP Cabinet over which the Hindustani Muslims decided to stand behind Jinnah. Pure Punjabi intellectuals like S.M. Ikram have admitted that Muslim separatism had its origin in the Muslim minority provinces, and that too primarily U.P. Francis Robinson has made a remarkable study of the UP Muslims and has proved, with conctrete facts and figures that it was while defending a position of strength, during the periood 1860-1923 which was threatened by introduction of local; government and the competitive examinations that the UP Muslims decided to opt for separatism, which became the basis of Pakistan Movement! The point is that all these political developments were more related to individual leaders and class interests than ideology as is propagated in India and Pakistan. Mr Jinnah broke away from Congress not over Hindu Muslim issue but over use of violence as a policy to evict the British from India! As late as 1937 Mr Jinnah described Punjab, which became the cornerstone of Pakistan in 1946 as a hopeless place, which he shall never again visit!7





Pakistan was created in 1947. It is thought provoking to note that only 10 % of the population of India was eligible to vote in the 1935 Elections and out of these less than half did not vote8 The situation was not much different in 1947! Muslim separatism which finally led to the division of India in 1947 was not something inevitable since 711 A.D but was a tactical response of the Indian Muslim middle and higher classes to fear of Hindu Brahmin and Kayasth class domination. A valid response but one, which required great vision which was sadly lacking! Once religion was misused to exploit the East wing, Bangladesh was created. Bangladesh has survived, a fact that disproves the pre 1947 Congress assertion that India cannot be divided into smaller states and the post 1947 Pakistani assertion that mere religion is a panacea for all problems!





Kashmir Issue

Now coming to Kashmir, the subject of some 60% articles of many Indo-Pak military, historical and geopolitical journals. The issue in Kashmir is simple. An insurgency in order to succeed must either be backed by armed intervention by the neighbouring state or by massive financial or military aid from outside. The former was the case in Bangladesh in 1971 when the Bengalis got their country because of Indian military intervention! Or it was Kuwait in 1991, which owed its re-birth to US military intervention! The latter happened in Afghanistan or Vietnam with massive US or Soviet/Chinese aid to guerilla forces, or in Spain in 1936-37 with massive German aid to Franco. Now lets look at the failures. The Poles revolt heroically against Russia in 1830 and 1863 but are crushed since no foreign power intervenes or exerts real diplomatic pressure on their behalf! They are overrun in 1939 and are again liberated in 1945 by the Red Army. Now what do we have in Kashmir? We do not have the military potential to intervene and no massive aid like Afghanistan from 1979 to 1988. The Kashmiris are dying, they are fighting heroically, but how do we suppose that Indians will leave without an all out war which our leaders do not have the resolution as proved by Nawaz’s irresolution in the Blair House ‘Bachao Bachao’ rush of June 1999! We don’t have any massive finances to back the Kashmiri guerillas! What’s the solution! Wait like the Germans from 1945 to 1988 or to let the Kashmiris die like the Poles! Or fight a war, a suicidal war, but that is not in our culture! So Hara Kiri or Kami Kazi attacks are out! What is left is rhetoric! Kashmir Committees!





The employment of the Jehadis voluntarily or deliberate is an interesting phenomenon of the Kashmir situation. Many of these are men who would be as happy to kill a Shia as a Hindu! A saying of a Britisher said about a Bannu Tribal Pathan lashkar brought to loot and kill Muslims of Lucknow and Oudh in 1857-58 fits well with these extremists i.e. “whether these blood thirsty brigands kill a rebel Hindustani Indian or are killed is equally beneficial for the British Empire, for in the Trans Indus Frontier one tribal Pathan less will make our task easier and one Indian rebel Sepoy killed in Lucknow will make our task in the Ghadar easier”!

The problem is that mere “Eeman” as some would call or fanaticism as some others may call it is not a tailor made formula to solve all military or political issues! There were Ghazis in 1857 who would charge British positions with the firm conviction to kill or get killed! They were brave men but the British managed to win and Ghazis despite all their devotion failed to carry the day! Some people in our top decision making echelons mistakenly thought in the 1980s that guerrilla war or low intensity operations as presently being waged in Kashmir could solve all our military and political problems!





Guerrilla warfare as perfected by Sivaji, the father of modern guerrilla warfare was a savage and protracted affair and it took about eighty years to succeed even at that time! A rudimentary glance at guerrilla warfare’s history proves that guerrilla warfare is a story of successes as well as failures. A Guerrilla war in order to succeed must be fought in an environment in which both internal, local and international conditions favour it. Imam Shamyl who led the Daghestanis war of resistance against the Russian Czars was one of the most charismatic and brilliant leaders in the history of guerrilla war. Yet Shamyl failed and finally died as a prisoner under house arrest in European Russia. The international conditions did not favour Shamyl’s war and the great man despite all the valour and advantages of adverse terrain failed! Almost during the same time the Greeks were successful in attaining independence since West European powers specially Britain actively helped them. Around the same time, the Armenians, another Christian people failed to attain independence since no external power favoured their cause! Sandino of Nicaragua was a great guerrilla leader of Central American history! He eluded the US Marines who hopelessly tried for a long time to militarily defeat him but was finally treacherously killed by the Somozas. Nicaragua had to wait for many more decades to evict the Somoza dynasty till the late 1970s. Local conditions favoured guerrilla warfare but international conditions were against it and USA was bent at all cost to defeat any radical movement in Central America. Cuba with the particular Cold war tension of the late fifties and early sixties was the only guerrilla success story in South and Central America. The Basmachis also failed for similar reasons to defeat the USSR in Central Asia in the 1920s and 1930s. Biafara was yet another failure of a secessionist movement. The worst story of failure of guerrilla warfare can be found in Kurdistan where the brave Kurds despite being morally right, ethnically homogeneous and terrain wise well placed have failed to create an independent Kurdistan. Local conditions favour them but international conditions by virtue of being divided into three different countries as well as lack of open superpower support has so far doomed their struggle. I do not think there is any braver race in the Middle East than this warrior race that produced a Saladin! But all the valour and sacrifice of many decades has so far not brought them any success! Balochistan is yet another failure story of guerrilla warfare. Local conditions favoured the guerrillas in Balochistan in the 1970s but international conditions were against them and those indomitable men who were superior in minor tactics than any Afghan Mujahideen group failed in the final reckoning! They failed not because they lacked valour or because of tactical incompetence but simply because they did not get a billion dollar aid package from a super power and all important neighbouring countries did not actively help them! Malaya is yet another example of failure. Distance from Mainland China, ethnic composition of the local population and international involvement doomed the cause of the extremely brave, motivated and tactically sound, Chinese Communist guerrilla warriors of Malaysia. Che Guevera an extremely charismatic and brilliant guerrilla leader is yet another example of failure in guerrilla wars. Che drew wrong conclusions from the successes of the Cuban revolution and paid it with his life while trying to bring a similar revolution in Bolivia through guerrilla war! The ethnic logistic as well as internal conditions of Bolivia were different from Cuba and did not favour guerrilla warfare. The population was largely Mestizo (Red Indian/European mixed) and was far more conservative than Cuba. Distance from main external base country was so great that logistically it was difficult to support Che’s brilliant war from outside.

Now compare figures like Che Guevera, Shamyl, Barzani with pedantic officers in charge of guerrilla operations in Third World countries! These are the officers working in the agencies dealing with guerrilla forces fighting a war of secession in neighbouring countries! What is their intellectual calibre or what is their motivation! Does an army’s best lot serve in the Intelligence agencies which at least in the Third World perform most despicable task of petty spying rather than any grand strategic intelligence work! Can these pedants succeed where Che, Shamyl and many extremely brilliant motivated and brave leaders failed. The organisation dealing with the so-called Kashmiri Jihad is more illustrious for so scientifically rigging elections that the first Nobel Prize for rigging elections without being caught can be awarded to it. This organisation has a history of doing everything including personal fortune enhancement, selling Stingers, and sleeping all the time when the Indians infiltrated 35 miles inside Siachen glacier! In short doing everything except its actual intelligence job!





Back in the 1980s we in Pakistan drew the wrong conclusions from the Afghan Guerrilla war! It was mistaken as the success of Islam over Godless communism! In reality it was the success of a multi- billion dollar CIA sponsored war over the army of a country which was hardly communist but was run by third generation bureaucrats who had survived all the Soviet purges of 1920s and 1930s in which all real communists were killed by Stalin! The first blunder that resulted from false conclusions was our backing of Sikhs! The Sikhs fought well and local conditions favoured their cause but Pakistan did not have the military potential to deliver the final coup de grace and transform the Sikh guerrillas into creators of a new Sikh Desh as was India able to do with a physical invasion of East Pakistan in 1971!. In the process the flower of Sikh youth died although they were relatively far braver than the Afghans were without CIA Stingers, or without the relative security of the high mountains of Afghanistan! A whole generation was destroyed for no purpose and simply because someone in an intelligence agency thought that lessons of Afghanistan could be applied in Indian Punjab. Resultantly and most mysteriously around the same time as the Indians came close to crushing the Sikhs another kind of political semi-secessionist and ethnic movement emerged in urban Sindh in the shape of MQM





To come back to the main discussion i.e Kashmir. Kashmir is not Afghanistan by any definition. The growth of militancy in Kashmir is the result of a complicated series of historical processes. It is not simply a case of Islam versus Hinduism but a case of a history of disillusionment of a particular ethnic-religious group with a central government which increasingly infringed over provincial autonomy to a point where a conflict situation was created where the Kashmiris perceived that their ethnic as well as religious survival was at stake unless they struck back! This was largely a result of the Indira Gandhi era when India was transformed from a relatively secular progressive state into a pseudo secular but essentially Hindu Chauvinistic state with a most negative tendency to destroy provincial autonomy. The Kashmir struggle in this sense has a very close similarity with the East Pakistani struggle against West Pakistani domination, the only difference being that the Bengalis were Muslims by pure chance and the Kashmiris are Muslims by pure chance! We must remember that the same Kashmiri Muslims betrayed thousands of infiltrators from Pakistan to the Indian Army in 1965! A subtle difference has to be recognised at this point of discussion! The same Kashmiri Muslim in 1965 viewed India or to be more specific India’s Federal Government differently! The difference between 1965 and 1999 or 2000 is not about Kashmiris being good or bad Muslims but a radical transformation in Kashmiri Muslim perceptions about India’s Hindu identity! The conflict is essentially between centrifugal tendencies in an ethnically and religiously divergent province made further intense by religious differences! But then we must remember that a similarly savage war between ethnically different but religiously same West and East Pakistanis in 1971! We must not forget that the Kashmiris war with India did not start over independence but over the Indian Federal Governments infringements on Kashmir’s special status relatively slowly from the 1950s and markedly speedily since the 1984 elections! The situation became more radical following the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan since many extremist religious groups of Pakistani Pathan or Afghan origin diverted their energy towards Kashmir! Many people in the highest echelons of Pakistani decision-makers thought that Kashmir could be another Afghan Jihad!





The Kashmir situation unfortunately is very different from that of Afghanistan. The war being fought there may be outwardly or symbolically a war of Islam with Hinduism! In reality the issue is far graver for both the successor states of the post-1947 partition of British India i.e India and Pakistan! Kashmir is an ironic Catch 22 situation for both the states, which some political scientists have termed as ‘failed states’. The core issue till 1947 was the controversy whether religion is the basis of a nation or is geographic compactness, economic viability requirements of external Defence and abstract ideas like democracy and secularism more important! The result was a compromise, India being divided as Muslim and Hindu India, while in reality Muslims were divided into Muslim majority Pakistan and India with a huge Muslim minority.

The populace of Indo-Pak had voted for the Congress and the League motivated by vague hopes, unrealistic expectations and impractical ideals! Secular or supposedly secular Bharat did not bring prosperity for millions of Indians whether Hindu or Muslim! The class that did the best was the middle class, Hindu, Muslim and Sikh that had most shamelessly collaborated with the British and had little to do with any tangible or concrete anti-British actions! The new rulers of Indo-Pak were little different from the oppressive Aurangzeb or the Colonial British. A non-Muslim Government at Delhi did not save the Indian Sikhs from or the brave Nagas or Mizos from persecution. This was despite the fact that all of these groups were not Muslim by any definition! Similarly a pure Muslim government in Pakistan did not save the Pakistani Muslim, Baloch or Bengalis from genocide, discrimination and persecution! The Baloch or Bengalis soon discovered that their new masters were far worse than Outram Sandeman, Jacob or even Clive and Warren Hastings! Ironically the partition of India was justified with the constitutional rationale that “if India was not divided the Hindus would use a Hindu controlled and dominated army to discipline Muslim provinces! But the Baloch and Bengalis discovered that the Butcher of Balochistan or Bengal Tikka Khan was not a Hindu but a Muslim! Similarly the Sikh Kabba i.e the Golden Temple was not desecrated by a Muslim Army but by a Hindu army of a supposedly Secular Socialistic country!





In this respect thus both the countries were partial failures. The partition was logically a neat solution but future developments proved that things were not as simple as both Mr Nehru and Jinnah could have imagined in the wildest of their dreams! The course which future history as we have briefly discussed took proved that both great leader premises were fallacious! The separation of East Pakistan in 1971 and the resultant creation of Bangladesh proved that mere religion was no panacea for all political problems! That religion was an important aspect of man’s life but was not an absolute basis for nationhood! Bangladesh further proved wrong the pre-1947 Congress assertion that India’s provinces could not survive as smaller states!





In Kashmir the issue is once again at stake! Ironically Kashmir is a vindication of the “Smaller State Theory” just like Bangladesh rather than a proof of Islamic identity as we in Pakistan are inclined to believe! Kashmir is no Afghanistan, which was an unproductive country far away from the Great Russian heartland! It has been a province of the Indian Union for half a century just like Sindh or Balochistan are provinces of Pakistan! It’s not an uninhabited desert like Sinai or something like Algeria with many hundred miles of sea in between France and Algeria! How on earth do we expect that the Indians would withdraw from Kashmir without a major war or a multi-billion dollar logistically backed hi-tech guerrilla war like Afghanistan!





The pedants who make our strategic decisions fallaciously imagined that Kashmir could be yet another Afghanistan! The men in charge of overseeing the guerrilla war are not having a fraction of Mao’s or Lawrence’s or Che’s acumen, nor any of Ho Chi Min’s ideological conviction! They are the ones who act once their personal interests whether that of a politician or that of a serving officer are threatened; but never in cases when national pride is at stake or the country is forced into a humiliating political retreat. The most convincing proof of this assertion is the Kargil Crisis when the army should have removed Nawaz Sharif! The action of 12th October albeit necessary and decisive was taken once personal careers were under danger of termination and the situation was that of a clash of personalities rather than a clash of ideas! So much for the strength of conviction of our leaders, civil or military! I am tempted to agree to the adage that the danger is not that a particular class is unfit to govern but that every class is unfit to govern! At least in the Indo-Pak subcontinent where one thousand years of subjugation has destroyed the leadership qualities of all the classes that dominate the society! The elite in reality is fooling the common man in the name of Hinduvta or Islam!





Pakistan lacks the military potential to physically invade Kashmir and lacks the economic potential to finance the proxy war. The foreseeable result is that the fate of the Kashmiris will be something similar to that like the Polish people of East Europe. The reader may note that the Poles were crushed by Germany, Austria and Russia for two hundred years despite the fact that they fought more than three heroic wars of independence against Russia, the country which was occupying the vast bulk of Polish territory till 1918. The Poles were as brave as the Kashmiris but no country was willing or geographically able to assist them! They were liberated only as a result of the First World War, which destroyed Russia, Austria and Germany. Germany and Russia only liberated in 1945 yet again occupied them in 1939 when they traded German oppression for Soviet Russian oppression till 1988! All that we are doing is pushing the Indians as well as ourselves into a “Catch 22” situation which has the danger of a nuclear exchange which both the countries cannot afford! The issue is more sentimental tha