The Conspiracy Theory

Conspiracy theory is well entrenched in Islam.
So every Pakistani holds an attitude that is in conformity wit h this "Islamic principle".

Pathetic of Musharraf to prop up the Saudis to try to "persuade" C. J. Chaudhry out of Pakistan...

Glad that C. J. Chaudhry showed back-bone and told H. E. Ali S. Awwad Al Asseri: "No Thank You!"

A quick and cheap excuse by those who cannot deal with the facts of the matter by using the label "conspiracy". There is nothing conspiratorial about institutional precident. When global institutions have been working on a set pattern for a while the relationships they give rise to become quite obvious. So if peons of the West, as generals of the Pakistan Army are used as disposable goods, and got rid of when they try to become too independant, there is no "conspiracy" involved in expecting a similar fate for Musharraf as was the case with Zia. Of course when the relationship changes, and the general chooses to become powerless by giving up the uniform, then the similarity ends and the power of prediction ceases, then institutional precident would decree that after a while he will become as powerless as other civilian leaders and so he will...That Musharraf fell out of favor with the Americans after his botched Middle East tour in February this year is a fact and his troubles started thereafter in quite an organized manner. Those who have studied the history of such opposition in the Third World can see American fingerprints on it. However, Musharraf the dictator is no Third World revoutionary out to battle the West, his opposition and confrontation is of a personal nature, as was Zia's confrontation before he was cleared from the equation. What I am interested in is not the manufactured nature of the CJ crisis, manufactured as I have been saying ever since it started, by the Pak Army under guidance from the US, but my interest is in the dynamic that such crisis set in motion, i.e. the very real lawyers movement and the spirit that is beginning to emerge in the students. These are unintended consequences of American adjustments, and they are positive in countering both the imperialists and their peons in our country...As for those shouting conspiracy, ignorant fools that don't have a clue about anything, cannot make connections nor decipher a pattern in social relations,sloganeering is the best they can muster.

"For a long time, I, like many children around me, used to think that God created horse for riding, dog for loyalty, chicken for eggs, goat for meat ....and Pakistan army for conquering West Pakistanis and losing East Pakistanis to -- Indians.

Well, Author, I agree with your contentions, but what will you do with certain people (an interactor called HP in particular) here who think all of Taliban, Waziristan, Lal-Masjid, Swat etc. are/were Pakistani intelligence inspired operations with hot-lines open to CIA?

Of-course they don't know Taliban jumped in only from Kandhar when Hekmatyar (whom ISI/CIA were supporting) failed to take Kabul despite rocketing it for months. That Waziristan peace agreement of musharraf (when the corp commander, Peshawar embraced Abdullah Mehsud) was reviled by the Americans and Bush had made his displeasure clear. That the peace agreement fell apart only due to Lal Masjid. And that Swat and Lal Masjid's demands are one and the same.

They also have never heard of something called 'Nizam-e-Adal' ordinance which has been accepted to be revived in Swat i.e. Fazlullah's demand has been accepted.

Sure, all of the above are 'intelligence operations'.

.. let alone have a clue where Jalaluddin Haqqani comes from and why he spurned Islamabad's offer in 2001 to switch sides against Taliban.

Re: # 3

mad masadi,

........ as an american citizen it makes me feel really proud that my government has the ability to change regimes, change the climate, change the earth's orbit and change al-lah mian if we want to .......... now, maybe we can get you to change your underwear and silly one note tune ....... get a job!

Pirzada,
I am confused. would you care to explain the modalities of what you wrote.
"With the creeping globalisation, the nostalgic water-tight state is neither possible nor desirable. Regional and foreign influences will enter and often mask themselves as domestic players. Now the Pakistani establishment has to learn to govern in a system not balanced on static but dynamic equilibrium."
I hope you know what happened at Bretton Woods. It happened to us too.
Care to respond.

blithe #2 This was indeed the kind of dirty "oversmartness" expected from Mush - try to embarrass the CJ by giving him the choice of rejecting the "hajj offer" vs. leaving Pakistan at this time when he stands like a rock that has galvanized all Pakistanis who understand the importance of the rule of law.

Re: # 8

ijaz mian,

....... you can easily set yourself free by converting your dollars to euros or yens .....

hamid writes "mad masadi.....get a job"

So much thought I put into the post and instead of responding to what I wrote, the miserable fcuk says "get a job". That is the dumb mentality people of conscience and thought have to deal with in a world dominated by the US elite...

Re: # 2 Blithe Spirit Yar:

S.Arabia has been the dumping ground for many a rulers, dictators and corrupt politicians. How can C. J. Chaudhry live next to them in a hot country. Who in the right mind would loose his pension!

Kamath

Re: # 11

masadi,

.... what 'thought'? .......... your romance with mills and boon is getting just as stale as urstruly's obsession with a fourteen hundred year old book of dubious authorship ..... you guys need to read another book and move on with your miserable lives ..... trust me, the us elite is not keeping you from using deodrant or using utensils - it is your own stupidity ........

"Even today I come across many adults who essentially think of the world in such simplistic terms:"

Pirzada, bhai,

If the people are told from childhood that every thing from science to administration is in one book, what do you think will happen to teh people.

They become simpletons.

Msadi hooked on the US conspiracy thoery, YLH with teh view that what ever came out of Jinnah are the iltimate truth...

All this can be traced to what teh children are taught at a tender age...from a single book.

Can you name the book.

Well that was good...
While it may be true that USA has its intelligence apparatus and they do have a tendency to "direct" events but the extent to which we attribute their indulgence is mind boggling....
I still remember those fancy theories about 9/11 and how USA itself created the incidence to have an excuse to destroy Islam!!!!
I think we do have a tendency to go into extremes...
And this mental mind set has to be changed before we can have any reasonable chances of improving our situation....
Because if everything is due to conspiracy of USA, then frankly there is nothing much we ca do about ourselves as any endeavour woul be an exerise in futility!!!!!!

#15 Posted by Skeptical,

...those fancy theories about 9/11 and how USA itself created the incidence...

No one believes USA itself created the incidence. But everyone believes (including some 45% of americans) that US intelligence did not have a clue who did.

For one, it is pretty well established that 19 easter bunnies and a santa claus in tora bora did not.

Interesting analysis.I agree that Ahmad Qureshi has made some wild assertions.However as I see it the USA as Marx said may not be creating history but it makes use of a situation that it inherits.Like it made use of 9/11 to occupy Afghanistan......a great strategic attack .....larger in dimension than Operation Barbarossa!About the Zia crash I have some observations ! While reading declassified CIA archives from the CIA History Staff I came upon a passge of the CIA reports in 1997 ...." after the Soviet withdrawal US relations with Zia will become complicated" ! As an officer of the 1st Armoured Division when Zia crash occurred I also met many direct witnesses in 1988 including the major who was incharge of despatching the dead bodies by air ! The major stated that while alive Zia's arrival brought every one to the airport but on despatch he had few soldiers with clothes tied on face to avoid the stench.Even the official Airforce report stated sabotage to be the cause.The incident could be a CIA operation or a KGB operation.General Zia was not toeing the American line.In this scenario US relations with the Musharraf regime are good.However it appears that they want Benazir in the future power set up.Perhaps they hope that Benazir will be able to deliver.Although with Benazir's team as it stands I have grave doubts if she can deliver ! This is the pattern in history ! The English East India Company also first used local collaborators and once they outlived their utility the English stepped in ! Sooner or later the Americans will physically intervene ! This is why they made Afghanistan their base of operations ! Its going to be a very complicated,bloody and sticky affair ! The line between right and wrong would be blurred ! A confusion in principle has already been introduced ! Generals have forgiven the corruption of politicians and politicans have also forgiven te general.The elite is the same ! Both the civil and military first collaborated with the British an are collaborating with the Americans since 1947.The policy was initiated by Jinnah.The same story as Punjab collaboration of 1857 and now the collaboration with USA.Pakistan was not created for the common man.

In case anyone is interested in these Declassified CIA archives , these can be seen in the National Defence College Library to whom I presented these in 1996-97.These are about 12 volumes.

#18 Posted by pavocavalry,

Thanks. Your posts are extremely valuable and authentic.

You wrote something about Taliban not having SAM capability. What was that?

Re: # 19

They dont have Surface to Air Missile capability.My assessment is that they will acquire it from Russia or China soon.Putin is the man who is going to paly hell with the Americans, if all goes well.In 2003 I had written an article in NATION that Afghanistan is Russia's Strategic Opportunity.

#20 Posted by pavocavalry,

Yes SAM capability is crucial to them. It was only when they acquired Stingers that the Mujahideen (not Taliban at that point) drove the russians out.

So you think Putin will deliver those. Fair analysis, given the lost russian pride over the americans.

But what If I say that it is only a matter of time before they get hold of some shoulder-fired ones from the Pakistan military's arsenals?

Taliban are good pay masters, and Pakistani army knows they better do something for their retirement instead of being paid in pumpkins as the russians did their army in the end.

In guerrilla warfare and covert operations nothin can be ruled out.

#22 Posted by pavocavalry,

True. Cheers mate.

And, welcome.

Re: # 17

procavalry,

...... that's all we needed to complete the set of conspiracy jokers on this site - an ex army goon who talked to someone who talked to someone whose aunt made marmalade for the cia in mazar sharif! ........

.....take a phrase like "after the Soviet withdrawal US relations with Zia will become complicated" from a declassified cia document combine it with the 'eye witness' account a subedar-major and wallah ! ........ you have a conspiracy !

.......... make sure you check under your bed before going to sleep tonight - there might be a hinddo/cia/zionist spook under it ............. fool !

ChachaZee,

Jhooth bolna achchhee baat naheen hai !!!!



In February 2007, you wanted us to believe that US itself had created 9/11.
Please refer to your posts #205 & #217 in "Get over the victim syndrome" board on Chowk.

http://www.chowk.com/interacts/11480/1/0/24#309726

It appears that in true lululand fashion, you have once again made a complete about turn. Waah !!!

#25 is in response to #16 by Zee.

pavo writes "Both the civil and military first collaborated with the British an are collaborating with the Americans since 1947.The policy was initiated by Jinnah"

Interesting observation regarding the MAJ, read some of my posts where I debate the high priest of the Church of MAJ, Manto. You have missed an important part in this generalization and that is that this collaboration with the imperialists and feudals received a setback during the ZAB era when Pakistan lost its status of "house slave" with the US and was put back on track by the Zia ul Fcuk. You also miss the fact that in this equation the military is primarily what the US deals with, the civilians are to them untrustworthy and mere stop gaps. In all talks of Pakistani elite, the military as an institution tops all and is second to none in corruption on a society wide level.

hamid writes ".....take a phrase like "after the Soviet withdrawal US relations with Zia will become complicated" from a declassified cia document...."

You are an idiot hamid, if you don't understand something or something is beyond your level of comprehension don't make a fool of yourself by commenting on it anyway. The military conducted its own internal investingation of the Zia ul Fcuk blowing up and I happened to talk to the person incharge of that investigation, nonetheless what happened to Saddam who was first pampered and then discarded by the US much like Noriega, and to other tin pot dictators supported for their "use value" by the US and then discarded when they develop amnesia about how they become powerful and act independant is no "conspiracy" but a predictable relationships coming out of a US dominated global system. Now go back to the "substance abuse" that describes your pathetic life

Utterly & Completely respected Masadi,

Now you have started increasingly referring to the "Pakistani elite" (whoever they are). The earlier references to "US Power elite" have become less frequent.

Perhaps you are learning. Soon it will be "waziristan elite" and then "kunpao elite".By next year you shall be referring to "cavedwelling elite".

The true evolution of Masadi the intellectual..... and Lululand shall rejoice.

Thanks for your comments.This was just a short response.I have always lauded ZAB.Many of my close friends were in Al Zulfiqar and our heart was with Murtaza.By civil and military elite I mean all starting from Sir Syed,Iqbal,Liaquat Ali Khan ,Feroz Khan Noon , Ghulam Mohammad and now Benazir.The idea of getting US aids father was Mr Jinnah and most ardent advocate Malik Ghulam Mohammad and Liaquat Ali Khan.Even Nawaz Sharif was pro American although now he claims a different line for pleasing the gallery as part of election campaign.The military yes was the main collaborator starting from the Punjab collaboration of 1857.

Re: # 24\;--

It is my conviction to answer to an assertion of substance based on real intellect . The language of street that you are using is incomprehensible to me ....exhibits lack of good grooming.The missionaries we studied with taught us good manners.

Venktaramani's classic work on US Pakistan relations covers in great depth the Pak-US relations.Also read Documents from the Spy's Nest...printed US secret correspondence from Tehran US Embassy 1979 if you can find it.

#32 pavocavalry: so, did you serve in the 11 cavalry regiment? and do you know the origins of the prefix "pavo"?

Okhla Mian,

What're you smoking? There's nothing in those two posts (#205/217) of mine on that link which you refer. The closest references I find in them to the gyarhween shareef drama are :

"...almost half the American population does not believe the US Admin`s version which you are parroting"

and:

"How do you even know that Muslims had anything to do with 9/11,"

So ??? ... !

#31 Posted by pavocavalry
Re: # 24;--

You have two really out of the whack statements and I think hamidm is right in questioning how you got to those conclusions.
First: " after the Soviet withdrawal US relations with Zia will become complicated" ! As an officer of the 1st Armoured Division when Zia crash occurred…. bodies by air !”

Was just reading a CIA document enough for you to believe that US relations with Zia would become complicated? How would you analyze that statement given the situation at that time? The US had just destroyed the Soviet myth in Afghanistan with Zia/Pak army help and there appeared to be no reason at all why the US relations with Zia would have deteriorated after the afghan war.

Pak army’s relations are with the Pentagon and the CIA is really a small player when it comes to US foreign relations issues, especially with the countries where the US has some major military involvement. Relying on some off the cuff statements without thinking about it certainly falls within the conspiracy theory boundaries.

#17 Posted by pavocavalry

"Both the civil and military first collaborated with the British an are collaborating with the Americans since 1947.The policy was initiated by Jinnah"

You really took a long hard brush to paint everyone a collaborator. There is no doubt that all Pakistani leaders around 1947 were strongly pro west. But that can also be applied to the Indian National congress leadership too. In terms of being pro west, Gandhi was as pro west as Jinnah was. Barring Nehru and his proclivities, pretty much every leader in the top rank in both Congress and the ML were pro-west.

The Pakistani collaboration with the US as a military and a cold war ally started after the 1951 Korean War and not before that. That was the period when the military and the civil bureaucracy had already taken over the country after masterminding Liaquat’s removal.

There are differences in being pro-west and creating military alliances with the West. Those military alliances have led to where we are in Pakistan now. India had never been anti west and in fact on most occasions its policies have remained pro west even during the Nehru era, but it never signed on the dotted lines what the US wanted during the cold war.

I see that you are aggressively promoting the army line here and are attempting to absolve the Pak army from its anti-Pakistan and anti-Pakistani policies. The army in Pakistan as a whole is the only institution that had effectively destroyed the country and here like many army men; you are attempting to shift the blame on the civilian leadership.

Re: # 35:-- Zia had outlived his utility after the Afghan War and his presence in chair was viewed as an irritant following the agreement on Soviet withdrawal.Note that I have asserted that it could have ben the KGB also.

Ypu cannot compare the Congress with League.The League was a loyalist party composed of toadies.The Congress launched the Non Cooperation Movement he 193O and 1942 Movements.It was an urban dominated party.All Muslim League consisted of feudals who were listed prominenly in Punjab Chiefs and gazeteers.Even Jinnah is on record having said ....all Muslim leaders consult the Deputy Commissioner before doing anything......if we believe Azeem Hussain Jinnah also said " The Punjab is a hopeless place ,I will never go their again".After 1947 Liaquat and all West Pakistani politicians delayed constitution making because it would have brought the Bengalis in power.Liaquat initiated the policy of being a US toady.Lastly for your worthy info I have always criticised the army.This is proven by my book Pakistan Army in 1965 held at US Army Staff College,US Army War College libraries.I have nothing to do with the army since 1993.My article on army's coruption is on the PPP website.Before you make false allegations you need to check your facts Mister .

We have connection with PAVO since it was raised in 1849.I am also PAVO.Originally commissioned in PAVO.

All major Muslim leaders or so called chiefs in 1857 sided with the British.These were what you call leaders of civil society.The same leaders were loyal to British in 1919-21 when Gujranwala was bombed and the Sikhs led the anti British agitation.When the British declared martial law in Punjab in 1919 the leading Muslim leaders like Fazl I hussain and Shafi were attending tea parties hosted by the British governor.95 % Muslim League members of 1946 had a loyalist path.The Muslim League never launched any anti British movement.These are facts of history.The same situation continues.Benazir has come back because she will deliver on the agenda of working against Islamists in Pakistan.ZAB was the only politician who had guts and intellect.

pavocavalry: What I had meant was what the initials P.A.V.O. stand for. I know PAVO has something to do with indian cavalry regiments raised by the british, but since there is nothing much on the internet I was hoping to learn something from you since you have adopted it as your nick. That is all. So, I hope you take the time explain. Thanks in advance.

Re: # 39:--- PAVO means Prince Albert Victors Own 11th Cavalry Frontier Force.Raised by Liet Daly and Lieut Prendergast at Lahore as 1st and 3rd Punjab Cavalry from the nucleus of Hindustani Muslim and Ranghar Muslim JCOs and NCOs of the old Bengal Cavalry.Later these became 21st and 23rd Punjab Cavalry and finally merged as 11 Cavalry in 1921.23 Cavalry was stationed in Lahore in WW One and some Sikhs in it were conspiring against the British.These were caught and sntenced to death.

#40 pc: thanks. I am curious to know what you think of the regiment's performance in 1965. Would you care to describe it from what you understand?

pavocavalry, whatever pavo may mean and whoever you may be, you are an interesting person, with a sweeping view of time. I would have called that an excellent view but then there is considerable opposition to that view on chowk, and such things get more debate time than they deserve.

Welcome.

Re: # 41:-- It did well in Chhamb but suffered serious casualties in Chawinda.It as a matter of fact had marched on tracks from Chhamb to Chawinda,the only regiment to do so.It is the only regiment of Pakistan Army that advanced into indian territory in all three wars.In 1971 it again did very well in Chhamb and was commended by Major General Eftikhar .Detailed account of both battles are available in my articles in Defence Journals of October 1999 and September 2000.

#36 Posted by pavocavalry

“My article on army's coruption is on the PPP website.Before you make false allegations you need to check your facts Mister .”

How would I know your article is on the PPP site? I don’t even know your name. But writing an article on the PPP site does not mean that you are not promoting the army pov. In fact, the PPP was never anti army as long as Z.Bhutto lived. So writing on the PPP site does not prove any thing. What we see here is what we bring under discussion. Please post your article here for us to comment on.

“Zia had outlived his utility after the Afghan War and his presence in chair was viewed as an irritant following the agreement on Soviet withdrawal.Note that I have asserted that it could have ben the KGB also.”

Are you kidding me? The KGB line was first brought in by Richard Clark in his book just a couple of years ago. However, when you say Zia had outlived his utility after the afghan war, you are implying his utility for the US and not for the Soviet Union. So you are in fact saying that the US is responsible for his death because after the agreement with the Soviet Union Zia was of no use to the US. The missionary school that I went to, was owned by New Zealanders and they taught me just enough to figure out when a person is coherent and when he/she is not!

“Ypu cannot compare the Congress with League.The League was a loyalist party”

Where did I compare ML with Congress? I showed one common feature. The league was a loyalist and the Indian national congress was not? That is a subject view of the history from a person who claims to have some credentials as a historian.
The Indian national Congress definitely contributed more to Indian independence and also to Pakistani independence but that by no means implies that the Congress was NOT pro-west. The problem was that Pakistan fell into the hands of military and civilian bureaucracy immediately after the independence and the fault to a large extent lies with Jinnah and the Muslim league for not creating the democratic institutions immediately after the partition. But that is another issue and now where we differ is that your game is to blame the civilian for the ills that have fallen on this unfortunate country. The Pak army is solely responsible for what is happening in Pakistan now!

“The Congress launched the Non Cooperation Movement he 193O and 1942 Movements.It was an urban dominated party.”

I know enough history to figure this out. This is not something that would prove that the Congress was NOT pro-west! You are trying to project a Marxist theory here but obviously you are totally uncomfortable in what the theory means so I see your half hearted attempt to show that you are knowledgeable about the bourgeois or non bourgeois roots of both parties.
Congress also participated in the Khilafat movement and India paid a heavy price of Congress’s misadventure of the Quit India movement. You can’t take one aspect of the political movement and ignore the others. You’re showing the consistency of an army historian who stretches the limits and boundaries of history to prove the army pov.

pc: also - in WWII the brits had made elaborate defensive preparations in case the nazis broke through the Caucusus mountains and tried to enter the subcontinent via Khyber Pass to meet up with the japanese in india. Evidence of those preparations are still there in the form of tank barriers and place for an underground hospital a few miles short of Khyber pass. I assume 11 cavalry was held in reserve as part of these preparations. would you agree? or else, why was it not sent to battle in north africa or burma rather than sitting in lahore?

Re: # 42a:-- My dear I criticised Zia and Musharraf when they were at the height of their power.Now these guys are criticising Musharraf thinking that these are his last days.Read my articles in NATION from July 2001 till June 2004.What I wrote about the army's corruption no one dared to publish in 2003 except great Shaheen Sehbai.I have used my midnight oil.I have six publications to my credit some of them in Columbia University Library.In US Army my publications are regarded as reference books on Pakistan Army.My book on Pakistan Army was banned from libraries in 1999.

It is not necessary that someones opinion is exactly as you think my dear.The pre 1947 Muslims specially after 1857 were loyalists and that is history.The Congress was superior that is why they produced a constitution in 2 years.I do not want to quote all sources about the Zia affair.It was not an individual act.Either USA or USSR was involved.I may add that it was a job for which 100 marks should be given.I studies in Saint Marys Lalazar Pindi.Where did you study ?

It is not necessary that someones opinion is exactly as you think my dear.The pre 1947 Muslims specially after 1857 were loyalists and that is history.The Congress was superior that is why they produced a constitution in 2 years.I do not want to quote all sources about the Zia affair.It was not an individual act.Either USA or USSR was involved.I may add that it was a job for which 100 marks should be given.I studies in Saint Marys Lalazar Pindi.Where did you study ?

#43 pc: i tried looking up the articles you mentioned, but could not find them on google. are they available online?

what you tell me about 11 cavalry in 1965 is what i had also understood. thanks.

Re: # 45:-- Unfortunately my dear your knowledge of military history needs brushing up.First the Japanese never planned to invade India.Just read Liddell Harts book on WW Two.The Germans had little chance of even reaching Iran.The 11 Cavalry was I think the only tank regiment of British Army which fought against all three Axis powers i.e the Germans and Italians at Gazala in North Africa and against the Japanese in Burma.23 Cavalry was in Lahore in WW One.II Cavalry fought against the Turks in WW One in Iraq.In both World Wars parts of it were captured.In WW 2 The Germans released its two squadrons on parole and to honour that parole it was sent to Burma.

Re: # 45:-- Unfortunately my dear your knowledge of military history needs brushing up.First the Japanese never planned to invade India.Just read Liddell Harts book on WW Two.The Germans had little chance of even reaching Iran.The 11 Cavalry was I think the only tank regiment of British Army which fought against all three Axis powers i.e the Germans and Italians at Gazala in North Africa and against the Japanese in Burma.23 Cavalry was in Lahore in WW One.II Cavalry fought against the Turks in WW One in Iraq.In both World Wars parts of it were captured.In WW 2 The Germans released its two squadrons on parole and to honour that parole it was sent to Burma.

The fact that army is responsible for this mess was proved in great detail by this scribe in NATION Lahore in 2002 " The Fourth Military Government" , "Essence of the Matter" , and in December 2003 in NATION Lahore " Why Pakistan does not need Generals"," Dog or Dog Catcher" in MMN.

#45 pc: i think you are very mistaken if you think the japanese were going to stop with burma. in fact, they had even entered india and were pushed back only after several months battles at imphal and kohima!! i dont recall what riddel hart had to say about it, but actions speak louder than words.

Agreed that the germans did not stand a chance - but that was only because they were stopped by the russians long before that. and certainly the brits in wwii were convinced that the german game plan was to link up with the japanese in india - otherwise they would not have built the fortifications i mention. and logic would also indicate that the germans and japanese were out for complete victory when they burnt their bridges in taking on russia and the US - and india would have been the logical place for them to meet up.

My Dear HP the two bureaucrats who destroyed democracy in Pakistan Ghulam Mohammad and Iskandar Mirza were handpicked choice of MA Jinnah.Also note that while India immediately got rid of Section Nine giving Governor General power to dissolve assembly,Mr Jinnah deliberately kept it with him.That was why Ghulam Mohammad was able to dissolve the Constituent Assembly in 1954.

Re: # 53:-- With all humble respect.Burma War was the subject of my thesis.The Japanese mission was only to secure Burma so that British could not attack South East Asia.The attacks that you are referring to were individual decision of the Japanese military commander to cause attrition on British.11 Cavalry participated in relief of Kohima.I can suggest that you read the various battle accounts.Liddell Harts one being the basic.Even Japanese archives support this assertion.

#54 pc: interesting point about jinnah, unlike nehru, not getting rid of the colonial legacy whereby the executive head could dissolve the assembly. This is the flaw in our political structure that has plagued Pakistan for 60 years!

Grand Slam—

A Battle of Lost Opportunities


Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN from WASHINGTON DC does a detailed analysis of Pakistan Army’s attempt to capture AKHNUR in 1965.

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this article is to discuss “Operation Grand Slam” in the overall context of the 1965 War, assessing its strategic significance, and the various controversies surrounding it.

The Kashmir problem shaped the future of Indo-Pak Sub-Continental politics from 1947 onwards and led to the militarisation of India and Pakistan. The Poonch Valley link road connecting Jammu with Poonch Valley, the second largest valley of Kashmir, was a hot favourite military objective of military planners in Pakistan, right from 1947-48. One of the major military objectives of the 1947-48 War was to harass Indian communications around Jammu in areas Akhnur and Kathua.1 Beri Pattan Bridge over River Tawi a few miles south-east of Nowshera on this road was the main objective of a planned Pakistani armoured brigade and infantry brigade attack code named “Operation Venus” in December 1948.2 As a matter of fact one of the reasons which motivated the Indian Government, in 1948, into requesting for a complete ceasefire may have been its anxiety to avoid a major battle, opposite its communications to the Poonch Valley.3 The Pakistani governments, calling off the projected “Operation Venus”, and acceptance of this ceasefire offer and final ceasefire with effect from night 31 December 1948 and 1st January 1949, was later much criticised in Pakistan. Claims were made that the Pakistani Government agreed to a ceasefire “to the army’s horror” at a time when military victory was within Pakistan’s grasp!4 A Pakistani officer who was then commanding the infantry brigade strike force tasked to execute “Operation Venus”, much later in 1976 claimed that, had the operation been launched, he could have been in Jammu within 24 hours and into Pathankot and Gurdaspur in the next 24 hours! 5

Thus when “Operation Grand Slam” was conceived and launched in 1965 history was repeating itself and as later events turned out, ironically history repeated itself, in terms of irresolution and indecisiveness on part of Pakistan’s highest military and political leadership. The bluff self-promoted Field Marshal from a so-called martial area proved himself as indecisive as the Hindustani Muslim Prime Minister of 1948 who was much criticised by many intellectuals in Pakistan6 for indecisiveness and timidity in the 1947-48 War. History repeated itself for the second time in 1999 when a smaller scale military operation was called off in Kargil. The man accused of timidity on this occasion was a Punjabi (Kashmiri) Prime Minister! The 35th anniversary of the 1965 War demands that we in the Indo-Pak Sub-Continent must re-assess the validity of the historical life scripts into which past experiences have programmed us! It is a vain hope since most human beings despite all advancement in civilisation are dominated by absurd urges!

OPERATION GRAND SLAM

Background

1965 was an eventful year in Indo-Pak history. The Pakistani military ruler Ayub emerged victorious in the Presidential elections held in January 1965 amidst allegations of rigging. This factor created a desire in Ayub to improve his political image by a limited gain in the realm of foreign relations. He got an opportunity to do so in April 1965 over a minor border dispute with India in the Rann of Kutch area. The Pakistan Army dominated the skirmishes in the Rann area as a result of which a climate of overconfidence was created in the Pakistani military and political establishment.7

In May 1965 following the jubilation in Pakistan because of the Rann affair Ayub became keen to launch the proposed “Operation Gibraltar”: a proposed plan to launch guerrillas into Indian held Kashmir with the objective of creating a popular uprising, finally forcing India to, abandon Kashmir. Ayub went to Murree on 13 May 1965 to attend a briefing on the conduct of Operation Gibraltar.8 We will not go into the controversy surrounding this plan, which is basically an exercise in futility, and mud slinging initiated by some self-styled experts, motivated largely by personal rivalry and ulterior biases, since the prime aim of this article is to discuss the military significance of Operation Grand Slam and its connection with “Operation Gibraltar”. In this briefing Ayub “examined” the “Operation Gibraltar” plan prepared by Major General Akhtar Malik, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) 12 Division. The 12 Division was responsible for the defence of the entire border of Pakistan occupied Kashmir from Ladakh in the north till Chamb near the internationally recognised border to the south. It was during this briefing that Ayub suggested that the 12 Division should also capture Akhnur.9 This attack was codenamed “Operation Grand Slam”. General Musa, the then C in C Army and Altaf Gauhar the then Information Secretary and Ayub’s close confidant, the two principal defenders of Ayub have not given any explanation about what exactly was the strategic rationale of “Grand Slam” and what was its proposed timing in relation to “Operation Gibraltar”. We will discuss this aspect in detail in the last portion of this article.

OPERATION “GIBRALTAR”

The confusion in history writing in Pakistan may be gauged from the fact that Shaukat Riza’s book on 1965 War, despite being Pakistan Army’s official account does not contain the two words “Operation Gibraltar”! It appears that the idea of launching a guerrilla war in Indian held Kashmir was in vogue since the 1950s. Major General Mitha confirms in his GHQ inspired book, written soon after publication of Gul Hassan Khan’s memoirs10 that had outraged the Pakistani GHQ that he heard ideas that such an operation should be launched since 1958.11 Mitha claims that from 1958 to 1961 he had advised that “such operations had no chance of success and each time F.M Ayub Khan had agreed with me and vetoed the suggestions”.12 General Gul Hassan states that the secret “Kashmir Cell” formed by the Foreign Office on Ayub’s orders consisting of various key officials including the DMO i.e Gul Hassan was informed by the Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad that the President had ordered GHQ to prepare two plans to encourage/provide all out support sabotage/guerrilla operations in Indian Held Kashmir. Gul states that the decision to mount guerrilla operations with active Pakistan Army involvement was taken after the Rann of Katch skirmish. Altaf Gauhar who was the Information Secretary at that time claims that the Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad had “convinced himself that Pakistan was in a position to dislodge the Indians from Kashmir” and that “Once trained Pakistani soldiers went inside Kashmir the people of the Valley would spontaneously rise in revolt” and that “fear of China would prevent the Indians from provoking an all out war that would give Pakistan army the opportunity to drive the Indians out of Kashmir just as it had done in the Rann of Kutch”. Gauhar further claimed that the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate and the Foreign Office drew up the plan for Operation Gibraltar.13

Pakistani expectations, and this does not include Bhutto alone, as many self-styled experts based on personal rivalry would much later claim; were raised to unrealistic heights after the Rann affair and Ayub was convinced that Gibraltar would succeed! In a written communication before the war Ayub asserted that “As a general rule Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of blows delivered at the right time and place. Such opportunities should, therefore, be sought and exploited”.14

Gauhar states that Mr Z.A Bhutto the Foreign Minister was so convincingly persuasive in his advocacy of Operation Gibraltar that he convinced many Pakistan Army officers serving in the GHQ, who in turn urged the Pakistani C in C Musa to “bite the bullet”.15 Further Musa, the C in C much later in 1983 claimed that Bhutto had “Brainwashed” his officers.16 These two assertions if true means that either Bhutto was a military genius or those army officers who he convinced had no grey matter and that the Pakistani C in C was a glorified headclerk whose function was that of a rubber stamp rather than anything to do with higher military strategy or operational planning.

This article is not about “Operation Gibraltar” but “Grand Slam”, however, no discussion or analysis of Grand Slam is possible if Gibraltar is not discussed, although in brief. Operation Gibraltar envisaged guerrilla operations inside Indian Occupied Kashmir by a number of guerrilla groups of roughly a battalion strength comprising of Kashmiri Volunteers trained by Pakistan Army, Pakistan Army Special Services Group (SSG) Commando personnel and some regular infantry troops.17 The total strength of the “Gibraltar Force” was not more than 5,000 to 7,000 men subdivided into five forces i.e (1) “Salahuddin Force” operating in Srinagar Valley, (2) “Ghaznavi Force “ in Mendhar-Rajauri area, (3) “Tariq Force” in Dras-Kargil area, (4) “Babar Force “in Nowshera-Sundarbani area, (5) “Qasim Force” in Bandipura-Sonarwain area, (6) “Khalid Force” in Qazinag-Naugam area, (7) “Nusrat Force” in Tithwal-Tangdhar area, (8) “Sikandar Force” in Gurais area and (9) “Khilji Force” in Kel-Minimarg area.18 The mission assigned to the various Gibraltar forces was warfare in the enemy’s rear including harassing enemy communications, destruction of bridges, logistic installations, headquarters with a view to create conditions of an “armed insurrection” in Kashmir finally leading to a national uprising against Indian rule leading to liberation of Kashmir or at least parts of it.19

The infiltration operation of the Gibraltar Force commenced from first week of August 1965.20 General Harbaksh Singh the C in C Indian Western Command described the infiltration operation as “brilliant in conception”.21 The Gibraltar Forces mission was too ambitious and its achievement was beyond its means, however, in words of Indian military writer Major K.C Praval “Although the Gibraltar Force failed to raise a revolt, they did succeed in creating a great deal of confusion and disorder by acts of sabotage, violence and murder”.22 Praval praised “Nusrat Force” which was operating in Tithwal area which in his words “caused a great deal of damage before it could be pushed back over the ceasefire line”.23 Indian General Harbaksh Singh in the typical Indo-Pak style of not being intellectually honest once dealing with assessment of enemy actions, inadvertently admitted the mental dislocation that the Gibraltar Force had caused in the headquarters of Indian 15 Corps. Harbaksh thus stated “General Officer Commanding 15 Corps gave the following assessment of the prevailing situation: — The maximum success gained by the infiltrators was in the Mandi area where they had secured local support”24 .......... “General Officer Commanding 15 Corps in a personal signal to me recommended the abandonment of the Hajipir offensive .....on account of the serious tactical situation in that sector”. 25 This happened on 15th August! On 17th August 1965 General Harbaksh Singh noted that the 15 Indian Corps Commander’s assessment of operational situation in Kashmir was “rather too grim and gloomy”.26 Even Joginder Singh who later wrote a book to refute most of Harbaksh’s assertions admitted in his book that “GOC XV Corps Lt Gen Katoch appeared to be overwhelmed by the scale of infiltration”.27 The reader may note that all this was happening despite an overwhelming Indian numerical superiority in troops. A small example being the 25 Indian Division area where the Indians had some 20 infantry battalions 28 at a time when the total strength of the 12 Pakistani Division responsible for all 400 miles of Kashmir was not more than 15 infantry battalions! 29

The local population of Indian Held Kashmir did not co-operate with the Gibraltar Force and by 18th August the operations of the Gibraltar Force were considerably reduced. The Indians brought in additional troops and the infiltration operation was checked by 20th August. As discussed earlier the Indian 15 Corps Commander was unnerved, however, the C in C Western Command Harbaksh Singh exhibited greater resolution and spurred the 15 Indian Corps into launching two major counter infiltration attacks inside Pakistan Held Kashmir to destroy the logistic bases in Hajipir Bulge and Neelam Valley areas. Both these attacks succeeded since the 12 Division was already over stretched with single infantry battalions holding frontages varying from 10 to 20 miles. 30 There is absolutely no doubt that Gibraltar was an undoubted failure! The loss of Hajipir Pass, the principal logistic base of the infiltrators on 28th August and Indian successes in the Neelam Valley and opposite Uri on 29-31st August 1965 unnerved the Pakistani GHQ who assumed that Muzaffarabad was about to be attacked!31 The supposed liberators of Indian Held Kashmir were more worried now about what they had held before commencement of hostilities! It was under these circumstances that the Pakistani GHQ ordered execution of Grand Slam with the aim of relieving Indian pressure against Muzaffarabad! Shaukat Riza the official historian of the 1965 War admitted that by 31 August the Indians had ruptured 12 Division’s defences and this was the main reason why the GHQ decided to attack Chamb “to ease pressure on 12 Division”. Shaukat also quoted Musa and the Chief of General Staff Sher Bahadur in stating that the main reason why Grand Slam was launched was that “there was danger of Indians capturing Muzaffarabad”.32 Musa in his roundabout way of saying things did not mention Muzaffarabad but merely stated that the main object of launching “Grand Slam” was “reducing pressure in the north by capturing Chamb and threatening Akhnur”.33

THE BATTLE OF CHAMB-JAURIAN-AKHNUR

Significance of Akhnur

Akhnur Class 18 bridge 34 on the fast flowing Chenab River was the key to Indian communications from Jammu and mainland India a group of valleys lying south south of the Pir Panjal Range and West of Chenab River, most prominent of which was the Poonch River Valley. The bridge was the sole all weather lifeline of one oversized Indian infantry division, with at least twenty infantry battalions, defending Poonch, Rajauri, Jhangar and Nauhshera and one Independent Infantry Brigade defending Chamb-Dewa Sector. Possession of Akhnur could enable an attacker to threaten Jammu the key to all Indian communications from Pathankot to Srinagar/lLadakh etc.

Orientation with the area

Chamb-Jaurian Sector is bounded by the ceasefire line from Dewa till Burjeal in the west, the international border from Burjeal till River Chenab in the south, various branches of River Chenab from Phulkean Salient till Akhnur in the south and Southwest, and a range of hills between the height of 1000 to 3000 feet running in a roughly east-west direction in the north. Some ridges run from this range of hills downwards in a north-south direction, most prominent of which are Phagla-Sakrana Ridge located about between a mile and two miles, eastwards from the border, followed by Tam Ka Tilla, east of Pallanwalla and the Fatwal Ridge four miles west of Akhnur. Average relative height of each ridge varied from 40 to 80 feet. These ridges on the face value were minor features, however, in terms of fields of fire and observation; their value was immense for a defender engaged in opposing tanks. The gradient rose from north to south as well as from west to east, and the area to the north restricted tank movement, while the area in the south with minor boggy patches afforded excellent manoeuvrability for tanks. Two small ridges known as Mandiala North and South dominated Chamb village itself. The Munawar Wali Tawi running from north to south into the Chenab River divided the sector into two halves, was located about 7 to 8 Kilometres from the border. The Nala had a wide bed varying from 100 yards in the north to 300 yards in the south and steep banks, which made it a partial tank obstacle. There were various crossing places on the Nala notably at Chamb, Mandiala, Darh and Channi from north to south respectively. The Nala had a lot of water in summers but maximum water depth in September was not more than four feet, thus making it negotiable for all types of tanks. Only one partially constructed bridge spanned the Nala near Chamb in 1965. Road Akhnur-Jaurian Chamb to the south and Road Akhnur-Kalit-Mandiala, both running in a east-west general alignment were two metalled roads running almost parallel to each other connected Chamb with Akhnur. The area of manoeuvre for tanks from the west was restricted to a 12 Kilometre gap between Burjeal and Dewa Hills and a 7 to 8 kilometre tract from Burjeal to the Chenab River which became relatively more boggy as one went closer to Chenab River. Both the roads leading from Chamb to Akhnur were intersected by Nalas running from north to south at a distance of two to four kilometres with small ridges in between, thus reducing tank speed, but were no obstacle for tanks. The ground all along was thus broken as well as interspersed with dry Nalas. These Nalas restricted the cross-country mobility of wheeled vehicles once off road. There were mango groves and wild orchards at places, which provided adequate cover. The area was well cultivated and in September 1965 the fields had four feet high standing crops of millet and maize. River Chenab running from north-east to south west in the south and the line of hills running in an east-west direction provided natural built-in flank protection against any tank threat, for any tank force advancing from west to east but also restricted the movement of a tank force. In terms of tank manoeuvrability and space for manoeuvre the area from the border in the west till Akhnur may be described as a cylinder which is about 12 kilometres wide on the extreme western side at its western entrance and gets progressively narrower as one advances from west of east by virtue of a line of hills in the north and Chenab River in the south both of which successively get progressively closer narrowing the north-south space reducing the north south open space gap from 12 kilometre in the west to about 3 to 4 kilometre at Akhnur. Thus in terms of tank warfare, the defenders task became easier, as the attacker advanced from west to east since space for manoeuvre was reduced by some one fourth.35

Indian and Pakistani Force Composition and Plans

Indian Force Composition and Plans. Till August 1965 the Indian force defending Chamb Jaurian consisted of the 191 Independent Infantry Brigade Group consisting of four infantry battalions and no armour.36 In addition the border posts were manned by two irregular battalions of Punjab Armed Police and Jammu and Kashmir Militia Battalion. These two battalions, however, had nominal military value like the Pakistani Rangers, by virtue of being poorly trained/equipped. In May 1965 as part of “Operation Ablaze” (Indian plan of mobilisation/shifting forward of forces in Punjab in May 1965) the Indians placed a tank squadron of AMX-13 Light tanks under command 191 Brigade.37 Activities of the Gibraltar Force Infiltrators in Chamb-Jaurian forced the Indians to bring in two additional infantry battalions by end of August 1965, 38 however, both infantry battalions reverted to their parent formations after successfully dealing with the Gibraltar Force infiltrators by end of August.39 In 1956, 80 Indian Infantry Brigade responsible for defence of area Naushahra-Rajauri-Jhangar had pointed out that 191 Brigade defending Chamb-Jaurian Sector to his left constituted a vulnerable left flank.40 The same officer as Brigadier General Staff 15 Indian Corps Kashmir had concluded that Pakistani troops attacking from opposite Chamb could capture Chamb and had recommended stationing of a tank regiment in the sector, upgrading 191 Infantry Brigade to a division and construction of an alternate bridge over the Chenab at Riasi.41 None of these recommendations except upgradation of Akhnur Bridge to carry AMX-13 tanks were accepted by the Indian higher headquarters! The Indian military planners till 1965 had firmly believed that Pakistan would not cross the international border between Chenab and Burjeal and thus regarded the southern half of Chamb Salient as “sacrosanct”.42 The Indian planners had hypothesised that the most likely area of Pakistani attack in South Kashmir was the Jhangar-Nowshera Sector.43 The Indian defences in Chamb-Jaurian were thus not as extensive as in other sectors of Kashmir. The Indian artillery consisted of just one field regiment and a troop of medium guns.44 In August 1965 in the wake of Operation Gibraltar the Indian High Command finally decided to upgrade Chamb-Jaurian Sector to a divisional command, however, till 1st September 196545 the area was defended by 191 Independent Infantry Brigade directly under command 15 Indian Corps. The 10 Division headquarters staff designated to take over the area was at this time being organised at Bangalore in the Indian south.46 The 10 Division headquarters was assigned a time frame of three weeks in August 1965 and ordered to take over the command of 80 Brigade and 191 Brigade by 15 September 1965 and had reached Akhnur by 28th August 1965. The headquarters had no communication equipment and nominal staff on 1st September 1965.47 The Indian armour consisting of a squadron of AMX-13 Light tanks which was assigned the responsibility of anti tank defence of the main tank approach west of Chamb. It was deployed in an extended form two troops on a ridge between Daur and Palla responsible for the defence of the area from Paur in the north till a little east of Burjeal in the south, one troop in the south in Munawar area and one troop in reserve at Barsala. On 1st September, however, three tanks were under repair in the rear. All Indian infantry battalion anti-tank recoilless guns were grouped under 15 Kumaon and tasked with the anti-tank defence of the Mandiala crossing. The border was manned by the border force irregular battalions and 3 Mahar and 6 Sikh Light Infantry as shown on the map with 15 Kumaon and 6/5 Gurkha in depth. 15 Kumaon was deployed on the pivotal Mandiala Heights and 6/5 Gurkha was deployed till 1st September on the Kalidhar Ridge east of River Tawi. This Ridge it may be noted was an important feature which dominated both the Chamb-Jaurian-Akhnur Road from the north and overlooked the Akhnur-Naushera-Rajauri-Poonch Road from the south.

Pakistani Force Composition and Plans. Pakistan’s 12 Division Headquarters which was also responsible for the defence of entire Kashmir and was facing three Indian divisions and two independent brigades was tasked to command the Grand Slam attack force. The division was commanded by Major General Akhtar Malik described by Shaukat Riza as a “largehearted man and a natural leader”. One whose “subordinates never felt crowded by him, or inhibited in speaking out their minds”.48 Another military historian described Akhtar Malik as “an avid bridge player”.49 Akhtar Malik was assigned two tank regiments (from 6 Armoured Division then deployed in Gujranwala area), an independent artillery brigade (Artillery 4 Corps) consisting of three medium regiments, one field regiment, two heavy batteries of 155 mm guns and 8 inch guns respectively, a Light Anti-Aircraft gun battery, a corps artillery locating regiment, another artillery brigade (Artillery 7 Division) consisting of two field regiments and one locating regiment. His infantry component consisted of three infantry brigades i.e Number 4 Sector (3 and a quarter infantry battalions of the semi-regular AKRF), 10 Brigade (Two regular battalions) detached from 7 Division and placed under command 12 Division for Grand Slam and his own divisions, 102 Brigade (three infantry battalions).50 Akhtar Malik moved to Kharian on 28th August with a small tactical headquarters. Arrangements were made to exercise command of the Grand Slam force through the communication system of the 4 Corps Artillery Brigade. The Pakistani plan was based on three phases i.e an initial breakthrough by two infantry brigades each supported by a tank regiment along two points capturing the Chamb salient east of Tawi Nala, followed by capture of Akhnur by 10 Brigade Group (including a tank regiment) and finally a northward advance by the 102 Brigade on axis Akhnur-Jhangar linking up with Pakistan’s 25 Brigade operating against Indian communications in Naushera-Jhangar area with the final objective of capturing Rajauri51 which Pakistan had lost earlier to an Indian tank squadron on 12 April 1948.52

Comparison of Strength. It is an unfortunate trait of Indo-Pak history to magnify enemy strength and to omit mentioning own strength. The operational situation in Chamb was thus later described in words like “the Indians held the Chamb Valley strongly”53, or “Chamb was very well guarded. Apart from its very strong fortifications, the Indians had by then increased their forces in Chamb to seven battalions”.54 The following table comparing Indian and Pakistani strengths is self explanatory:—


PAKISTAN INDIA RATIO REMARKS
INFANTRY

(Battalions)
8.25 4 2 : 1 Two Battalions of border police have not been counted as these were like the Pakistani Rangers. One Indian infantry battalion included in the total i.e the 6/5 Gurkha was deployed at Kali Dhar in the rear and had nothing to do with the fighting on 1st September 1965.
TANKS

(Squadrons)
6 1 6:1 Pakistani tanks were far superior to Indian tanks in terms of firepower, mobility as well as protection.
ARTILLERY

(Batteries)
18 3.5 6:1 The Pakistani total does not include one anti aircraft battery that enhanced air defence and two regiments of locating artillery which severely reduced the Indian artillery’s capability to retaliate, by virtue of locating enemy guns and neutralising them by counter bombardment. Pakistani batteries included nine field batteries, seven medium batteries and two heavy batteries while Indians had three field and a troop of medium guns.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Ad hoc through artillery headquarters Same since 10 Div HQ was newly raised 10 Div HQ was brought from Bangalore to Akhnur on 28th August 1965 and was in the raising/formation process.

Execution of Operation Grand Slam.

We will not discuss each and every detail of Grand Slam operations but stick to the salient facts relevant to the overall context and scope of the operation. The Pakistani attack commenced at 0500 hours 1st September 1965 supported by a terrific pre-H-Hour artillery bombardment executed in the words of the Pakistani official historian by “nine field, seven medium and two heavy batteries” which had commenced belching fire 55 at 0330 hours. The artillery was deployed so boldly that medium and 8 inch howitzers were deployed ahead of field guns 56 thus increasing their range and ability to support operations for a longer duration without redeployment. Pakistani armour which was divided into squadrons did not do well on the 1st September and was effectively engaged by Indian anti-tank guns and AMX-13 tanks. 11 Cavalry was checked in the south by the two three tank troops of 20 Lancers while 13 Lancers attacking in the north was also checked by the brilliant anti-tank gun screen under 15 Kumaon and a single tank troop of 20 Lancers. The infantry brigade commanders took greater interest in the work of battalions and the first major tactical blunder of the day was committed once the southern attacking infantry brigade i.e the 102 Brigade Commander wasted the entire day by insisting that Burjeal a minor position must be captured despite clear instructions of General Akhtar Malik to bypass it.57 Thus half of 102 Brigade and a squadron of 13 Lancers was committed to clear the Rome that Burjeal was! Burjeal was finally captured at 1500 hours!58 Shaukat Riza states that it was defended by two infantry companies of 6 Sikh but also adds that only 14 Indian soldiers were captured once it (Burjeal) was finally cleared!59 Shaukat’s verdict on the operations of 1st September is accurate once he states that “The Indians had only covering troops on border outposts “but the Pakistanis failed to cross the Tawi on 1st September as their “artillery fire was distributed”.60 This is only a partial explanation since the artillery fire was distributed because armour was distributed and the 12 Division failed to cross the Tawi on the first day because of the delay of 102 Brigade at Burjeal. In any case by evening of 1st September the 191 Indian Infantry Brigade despite all the Pakistani blunders was at its last gasp! Its sole field artillery regiment i.e the 161 Field Artillery Regiment (14 Field Regiment as per K.C Praval) had abandoned its guns61 as a result of effective Pakistani artillery counterbombardment. Thus by afternoon the Indians were supported by just one troop of Medium guns! By 6.30 in the evening 13 Lancers finally reached the line of Tawi Nala but made no attempt to cross it.62

The Indian 10 Division which had assumed command by evening of 10th September ordered the 191 Indian Infantry Brigade to withdraw to Akhnur the same night. It also ordered 3 Mahar and 6/5 Gurkha to continue holding defences in the Kalidhar area in the north. 191 Brigade was now tasked with defence of Akhnur, while 41 Mountain Brigade which was concentrating at Akhnur was ordered to “occupy the Jaurian-Troti position as quickly as possible”.63 Chamb which had been captured by evening of 1st September 1965 was occupied by an infantry unit of the 102 Brigade at 0800 hours 2nd September 1965.64 On 2nd September 1965 while General Akhtar Malik was finalising arrangements for advance towards Jaurian the command of the C in C General Musa arrived in the area of operations in a helicopter and ordered change of command of Grand Slam, replacing General Akhtar by General Yahya the GOC of 7 Division which was also in the same area of operations since 28th August 1965. This happened around 1130 hours on the morning of 2nd September 1965. 65 Brigadier Gulzar who was provided access to official records of the GHQ66 and whose book was published in August 1968 i.e some 18 years before Shaukat Riza’s account, states that change of command took place at 1100 hours.67 The Indians were equally surprised and their military historian noted that because of this change of command the Pakistanis gave “24 hours to the Indians to strengthen their defences”!68 Brigadier Amjad Chaudhry well summed up the feelings of the Grand Slam Force as “Bitterly disappointed and completely at a loss to understand”!69 Yahya proceeded in a leisurely manner calling an orders group at 1430 hours and gave orders for crossing Tawi which was not held by any troops, the 191 Indian Brigade having withdrawn to Akhnur the previous night! The 10 Brigade supported by 13 Lancers crossed the Nala “without any trouble” in Shaukat Riza’s words by 2130 hours 2nd September. Thus the Indian defences continuity was not compromised despite the fact that their 191 Brigade had withdrawn in a near rout situation. In polite language the Indians were thus not routed but pushed back and given a grace period of 24 hours to prepare a brigade strong defensive position on line Troti-Jaurian over which more Pakistani blood was to be shed on 3rd September 1965. The critical time span was not seized by the forelock and what could have been accomplished with ease on 2nd September was postponed to 3rd September! The readers may note that the Indians were still outgunned in terms of armour and artillery by six to one and thus in no position to resist a determined onslaught. The Pakistanis had, however, lost the first major opportunity to impose strategic dislocation on the 10 Division by the 24 hour pause on 2nd September 1965. Thus when the Pakistanis resumed advance on 3rd September the 41 Mountain Brigade reported that it was in position at Troti-Jaurian “reasonably well prepared to oppose the enemy”!70 Another tank squadron of 20 Lancers was also in the same position. The Indians were not strong enough to stay in this position but it was a good bargain since they were trading space for time as their strategic reserves were swiftly moving into position to launch a “Riposte”. On 3rd September Yahya ordered 10 Brigade (three battalions) with a tank regiment under command to attack and secure Jaurian by last light of the same day.71

The Indian 10 Division assumed command of the 191 Brigade and 80 Brigade by the evening of 1st September.72 The Indian 15 Corps made frantic efforts to remedy the situation and ordered 41 Mountain Brigade (Corps reserve) to occupy an intermediate position at line Troti-Jaurian. It also ordered 20 Lancers (AMX-13) less two squadrons to move from Pathankot and occupy a defensive position under command 41 Mountain Brigade at Troti-Jaurian.73 10 Brigade was to attack from Pallanwala area on two axis i.e an infantry battalion and two tank squadrons on axis Chamb-Akhnur in the north and a battalion and a tank squadron on a southern axis heading towards Nawan Hamirpur and thereafter advancing along the northern bank of River Chenab with a view to outflank the Indians from the south.74 The 10 Brigade Commander issued his orders at 1130 hours and advance commenced at 1300 hours. The advance made very slow progress due to broken terrain interspersed by a growing number of north to south aligned watercourses (Nalas) and the Indian position at Troti-Jaurian was contacted by 13 Lancers by approximately 1700 hours in the evening. The right axis force reached Nawan Hamirpur by 1800 hours. The Indians now brought in their third brigade i.e the 28 Brigade (two battalions) deploying it in another position in the rear of 41 Brigade at Fatwal Ridge about 4 kilometres west of Akhnur.

On morning (0800 hours) 4th September Yahya ordered 6 Brigade of 7 Division to relieve 102 Brigade till then deployed at the line of Tawi Nala and 102 Brigade to move forward and concentrate at area Pahariwala. 10 Brigade commenced its attack on 41 Brigade position from 1130 hours. 13 Lancers attempted to outflank the Indian 41 Brigade’s defences between Kalit and Troti, and made some progress but was delayed by two Indian AMX-13 Tank troops till last light. The Indians realised that they could not hold the 41 Brigade position for long and ordered withdrawal of 41 Brigade to Akhnur during the night of 4/5 September 1965.75 The 102 Brigade also moved forward and two of its battalions attacked Sudhan Ki Dhok on the Tam Ka Tilla Ridge on 5th September 1965. By evening 5th September 1965 the leading elements of the 13 Lancers were in contact with the 28 Brigade position on the Fatwal Ridge just four miles west of Akhnur. It was at this stage that Musa sent the message about “teeth into the enemy and should bite deeper and deeper”, in all probability drafted by a staff officer who had read the exact text of Auchinleck’s message to the 8th Army during the Tobruk battle! But later events proved that the Pakistani GHQ, including the self- promoted field marshal of peace, only had Ritchies, Cunninghams and Mclellans, but no Auchinlecks! The whole situation changed on 6th September once India attacked all along the international border opposite Sialkot, Lahore and Kasur. The 7th Division was ordered to transfer 11 Cavalry, HQ 4 Corps Artillery Brigade and 39 Field Regiment to 1 Corps in Ravi-Chenab Corridor.76 Grand Slam was over!

ANALYSIS

The Origins of the Grand Slam and Gibraltar Controversy in Pakistani Military History

The Grand Slam and Gibraltar controversy instead of being handled like a military failure unfortunately degenerated into a highly personalised affair. As a result instead of dispassionate and constructive analysis, the real reasons for failure of the 1965 war were substituted for analysis of minor tactics and in settling personal scores. Mr Bhutto the principal leader of the pro-war party in the Pakistani leadership was dismissed by Ayub from the post of Foreign Minister and very soon became a major political opponent of Ayub. Ayub tasked his Information Secretary and right hand man Mr Altaf Gauhar to initiate a campaign of character assassination of Bhutto. Bhutto by no definition an angel, like any politician also indulged in personal attacks. The controversy was soon overtaken by the 1968-69 political agitation, which resulted in the exit of Ayub, and to a second military government in Pakistan. Since Yahya the military dictator who succeeded Ayub was one of the key figures in the Grand Slam drama the issue was tactfully avoided by all politicians. The emergence of Bhutto in 1970 elections as the principal leader of the West Pakistan Wing once again ignited the 1965 controversy, but again the issue became a low key affair once Bhutto became the Prime Minister from 1971 to 1977.

Grand Slam once again made headlines once Brigadier Amjad Ali Chaudhry’s book was published in 1977.77 Chaudhry raised doubts that Ayub may have been influenced by USA into not capturing Akhnur and that the change of command was merely a tactful way of slowing down the pace of operations. Amjad also quoted Yahya as saying that he did not capture Akhnur, which as per Amjad was within Yahya’s grasp, simply because he was ordered by the then army high command not to do so! 78 Amjad’s book infuriated the then government of the military usurper Zia who was engaged in a life and death political confrontation with Bhutto and like all military governments of Pakistan, including the present one, idolised the Ayub Government! Amjad had also accused the US government of pressurising Ayub into not capturing Akhnur and this was also regarded by the Zia regime as improper! The readers may note that the change of command on 2nd September was an outrageous decision that had shocked the participants of Grand Slam! As per a participant the change of command question was “debated with so much passion that GHQ had to issue instructions outlawing such talk”.79 There is substance in this assertion. Brigadier Riazul Karim a more credible authority states that soon after the ceasefire “a rumour went around that our senior officers were unnecessarily panicky and that the war had been fought by brigadiers and below....this caused a storm in the GHQ”.80

Later on Musa the most affected party, cooked up another story that the operations of 12 Division on 2nd September were delayed since artillery was not deployed well forward to support further advance. This false assertion was challenged by Brigadier Amjad Chaudhry who was a direct participant and was the man on the spot.81 Systematic efforts as part of a totally political plan of character assassination of Bhutto, without realising that Grand Slam was Pakistan Army’s failure, were undertaken during the 11-year old Zia government to re-write the history of Pakistan. General Musa was actively assisted in writing two books which were published some six years after Amjad’s book. Musa made up a story to cover up the change of command on 02 September, stating that it was a pre-arranged issue.82 The same story was repeated by Shaukat Riza in his GHQ dictated trilogy on the Pakistan Army.83 This was 1984-85. Finally in 1993 Gul Hassan the then Director Military Operations memoirs were published. Gul exposed the cover up and dismissed the idea that change of command had been pre-planned!84

Soon after publication of Gul’s book another defender of Ayub came on the scene ! He alleged that Grand Slam was a failure in any case! The learned author is an intelligent man! But so was Bhutto, Aziz and many others! The trouble starts when one intelligent man is at loggerheads with another! Thus the resultant subjectiveness of this book, since much of it is about another intelligent man, and defence of a benefactor who was injured by this intelligent foe of the learned author! Above all one who was the author in questions enemy, without doubt a terrible enemy!85 One about whom a close friend once said that “with friends like him one does not need enemies”!86 The reasons for failure of Grand Slam given by this author, thus, were emotional but not substantial! 10 Division, which came from Bangalore consisted of just three or four officers who organised a headquarters at a garbage dump in Akhnur and was a still born baby on 1st September 1965. One whose GOC was sacked for incompetence in 1965 war! 87 It was again a case of mixing Bhutto with Akhtar Malik and the intricacies of the art of war! The net result was thus a good biography of a benefactor while simultaneously exposing the machinations of a Machiavellian evil genius! It may have been a best seller but was certainly not good military history! The worst part about writing of history in Pakistan is the fact that those who took part in the actual conduct of operations either did not have the ability to express themselves in writing, were too disgusted or disillusioned to do so, or did not have the funds to get their accounts published! Military history has thus to date been distorted!

A case of failure at the highest level

Lack of resolution as well as military talent in Ayub was the most serious drawback as far as Pakistan Army’s conduct in 1965 War in general and Grand Slam in particular was concerned. Subconsciously Ayub was the last man who wanted war despite all the propaganda of Kashmir dispute. It is possible that this hesitation had some link with Ayub’s poor or insignificant war record in WW Two. On various occasions Ayub avoided military action. In the 1947-48 period when many officers in Pakistan were volunteering for participating in the Kashmir war Ayub did not show any inclination to participate in the Kashmir war. Ayub exhibited extreme timidity88 when the Chinese asked Pakistan to take advantage of the India-China War and settle the Kashmir dispute by exercising the military option. Seven years in power, however, somewhat emboldened Ayub’s spirits and by 1965 he felt confident enough that the Hindu who Ayub mistakenly thought as more timid than the Pakistani would not dare to start a conventional war even if Pakistan pinched the Hindu damsel at will, sometimes in the Rann and sometimes in Kashmir! Even in 1965 Ayub was not interested in a war which he wanted to avoid at all cost. This was a case of the desire to gain the glory of martyrdom in battle without actually getting killed in action! It was Ayub’s misfortune that he was surrounded by more resolute, ruthlessly ambitious, albeit militarily relatively naive, advisors like Bhutto and Aziz Ahmad who did not have any of Ayub’s timidity. Musa, Ayub’s handpicked Chief was the weakest link in the whole chain of command. The last person to wish for a war in which he would be forced to exercise his intellect in the actual conduct of modern war involving tanks divisions and corps etc, about whose employment Musa had very rudimentary ideas. A limited war i.e. a war in which fighting remained confined to Kashmir was seen by Ayub as a political opportunity to enhance his prestige which had suffered because of allegations of rigging in the 1965 elections. Thus Operation Gibraltar which visualised a Guerrilla War leading to Kashmir was seen by Ayub as a golden means of winning Kashmir without war and getting all the glory reserved for the victor of a war without ever starting an all out war! Ayub did not have the resolution to start an all out war in 1965! He also did not have the long-term vision to understand that India would retaliate militarily against the infiltrators sent into Kashmir by Pakistan. Ayub thus unwittingly set fire to the fuse which triggered a series of actions and counteractions which ultimately led to an all out war. Later critics blamed Bhutto for doing the right things for the wrong reasons! As a matter of fact all major actors were doing the right things for the wrong reason! But that is what the game of power is all about! Ayub was militarily naive enough to think that India would not start an all out war if Pakistan went for what Ayub himself called “India’s jugular vein”89 i.e. Akhnur. Critics think that Ayub lost his nerves later and made an attempt to halt the Pakistani advance by ordering change of command of the force, since he suddenly realised that an all out war was likely if Pakistan captured Akhnur. If this was Ayub’s motive then once again it was too late and Ayub’s half measures and half hearted conduct of military operations in Grand Slam harmed the Pakistani military cause in two ways. Firstly, it provoked India to launch an all out war which Ayub did not have the resolution to fight and which Musa did not have the military genius to conduct! Secondly, as a result of this indecision Pakistan failed to capture Akhnur whose loss would have led to a serious operational imbalance in the Indian dispositions in Kashmir and would have weakened India’s resolve to attack Lahore and opposite Chawinda without first redressing the serious imbalance opposite Kashmir. Thus Pakistani military/political leadership failed in both aims; ie to sever the jugular and to prevent an all out war; and primarily because of irresolution on part of their own higher leadership rather than enemy resistance. Thus Ayub and his team were not propelled by a burning desire to defeat the enemy by decisive conduct of operations but by an essentially defensive attitude. Thus even after 6th September they viewed Pakistani thrusts inside India not as actions taken to strike a decisive blow on the enemy but merely as measures to reduce Indian pressure on Lahore. The GHQ simply did not have a forward command and control set up designed to vigorously prosecute the war but essentially a distant headquarter modelled on colonial principles from where orders were issued for defence of India. The war on the Pakistani side was thus conducted disinterestedly because the higher leadership was simply irresolute and was not prepared or interested in fighting the war which came as a rude shock to them once the Indians attacked Lahore. Pakistani military writers like Shaukat Riza’s claim that the Pakistan Army never wanted a war in 1965 but war broke out in 1965 largely because of those accursed Machiavellian schemers i.e. Bhutto and Aziz Ahmad; does not speak very highly about the standard of resolution of Ayub or Musa.What is the aim of an army if it never wanted to fight a war to settle a just cause or to recover a territory which was at least as official propaganda went some sort of a Pakistani Alsace or Lorraine. It is an open secret that till this day the Pakistan Army claims that it was the Foreign Office who got them involved in 1965. So what did the army’s leadership want; to rule their own people, in uninterrupted peace,creating large business empires which made many far more prosperous than they were in 1958! Perhaps the only positive impact of the 1965 war was the realisation in the otherwise politically naive and docile Pakistani masses that their leaders were essentially making a fool out of them and Kashmir was just a cheap slogan to galvanise the masses! Unfortunately, that is what history is about! The masses have always been mobilised by great actors who were great leaders! Kashmir was never regarded as an issue by Ayub but was forced upon him by the hawks like Bhutto and Aziz, off course again for the wrong reasons, more subjective than objective, aided by military advice of Akhtar Malik. It is an irony of Pakistani military history that these civilian hawks possessed much greater resolution than the two soldiers leading the country’s government and the army! Once a man lacks resolution his conduct is vacillating and indecisive and all decisions that he makes are compromises and half measures. But even worse is the case when a man in total power lacks military talent or that animal instinct or talent that enabled civilians like Cromwell, Hitler, Stalin or Mao to do great things in the military sphere! It was a case of military incompetence at the highest level combined with lack of resolution! This essentially was the tragedy of the Pakistan Army in 1965. A time when it was still possible to settle the so-called Kashmir dispute by exercising the military option. It is best to quote Clausewitz who gave guidelines about the philosophy of war at least seventy five to ninety years before Ayub and Musa were born, but whose ideas perhaps were not digested by both of them. Clausewitz said; “No war is commenced, or, at least no war should be commenced, if people acted wisely, without first seeking a reply to the question, what is to be attained? The first is the final object; the other is the immediate aim. By this chief consideration the whole course of the war is prescribed, the extent of the means and the measure of energy are determined; its influence manifests itself down to the smallest organ of action”.90 The Pakistani leadership and the sycophants who courted them later laid the entire blame for starting the war on one who had nothing to do with soldiering and one who was not in any case the right authority for asking the question whether the Indians would start an all out war even if their jugular was severed !It was an irony that a soldier and not a naive civilian was leading the country at this stage. One who was far more naive than even Shaastri the civilian who knew much less about soldiering but understood grand strategy in a crystal clear manner. The Indians however dumb their execution of war at least started it with clear cut and definite rationale and did achieve their aim of putting an end to military adventurism in Kashmir. The Pakistani leadership, and this included the army chief turned president, was confused and as a result conducted the war with most inexplicably.

Responsibility for Operation Gibraltar and possible motivation of various principal characters

Operation Gibraltar conceived by the ISI91 as Gauhar has stated and perhaps by Akhtar Hussain Malik and/or other people and were in vogue since 1958 was approved by President Ayub in July 1965 and executed from 1st August 196592. This means that the operation was not a conspiracy by the Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto alone or a pet of General Akhtar but had the blessings of Ayub. Since 1977 many Pakistani intellectuals have been wasting a lot of stationery in proving that Ayub was an innocent bystander who was duped by his Machiavellian Foreign Minister! This is an exercise in futility and it is high time that it is stopped. Above all it proves that the intellectual calibre of the Pakistani GHQ was so low that responsibility for conceiving military operations had been abdicated to the Foreign Office! The idea was too idealistic and naive but before it was launched its advocates included almost everybody who mattered in the Pakistani military and political hierarchy! Off course later with the benefit of hindsight almost all participants tried to lay the entire blame on the Pakistani Foreign Office and Mr Z.A Bhutto.

After 1965 War an exercise was initiated to prove that Ayub Khan was duped by his Foreign Minister into war with India! One opponent of Bhutto propelled by a body chemistry of pure and unadulterated venom alleged that it was a conspiracy on part of Bhutto, so that Pakistan may lose the 1965 War as a result of which Bhutto would succeed Ayub as Pakistan’s next ruler!93

In the final analysis it was Ayub who bears the ultimate responsibility for ordering Gibraltar! Failure is no crime! Churchill one of the greatest names in modern history has been accused of ordering the Gallipoli landing, which turned out to be a blunder in terms of fallacious execution! But the idea was brilliant, and this mind you is Liddell Hart’s verdict! It was in execution that it failed! Continuing on this line of thinking Ayub or Bhutto cannot be accused of blundering! War as Clausewitz says is directed on assumptions and “All action in war is directed on probable, not on certain results. Whatever is wanting in certainty must be left to fate or chance, call it, which you will. We may demand that what is so left should be as little as possible, but only in relation to the particular case...”. To thus rephrase Clausewitz with special reference to Gibraltar or Grand Slam, initiating both operations was not a crime as many including the Pakistani official historian Shaukat Riza were trying to prove! It was failure to achieve success which was possible to achieve due to various military organisational strategic and operational lapses, which was a crime!

The aim of Gibraltar and Grand Slam was after all to internationalise or defreeze the Kashmir issue . The positive aspect about Grand Slam was the fact that unlike the most recent operation Kargil of 1999 Pakistan’s means were more balanced in relation to its objectives.

A word about the motivation of various principal characters in launching Gibraltar and Grand Slam. Ayub viewed Gibraltar and Grand Slam as acts of limited aggression like the Rann of Kutch skirmish which would force India into negotiating on Kashmir at best and redeem his political position at worst. Bhutto and Aziz also had similar ambitions on a smaller scale! Akhtar Malik may have been motivated by the lust for glory, a perfectly honourable aspiration as per Clausewitz . His minority status and humble origins , having risen from the ranks may have made this urge stronger!

Intelligence Failure on both sides

There were intelligence failures on both sides. The Indians failing to discover the move of 7 Division and heavy concentration of armour and artillery opposite Chamb