Fall of Dacca

i think the rape and murder done by the paki army has no parallel in modern history.even in bosnia the serbs said that the were following the paki punjabi model of ethnic cleansing of 1971.Tum log ka kaam sirf jhoot bolna hai mr jaafri.mushaarraf kee khushamad kar kay tera dil nahin bhara...o bhai hamaree jaan chor...itnay baray jhoot na bol.

Re: # 20 "multi ethnic states" "hey need to be free of ethnic chauvinism and ideological extremism of any type"


how true! Pavo, my man, how true!

Life is too short to worry about these fine things......I have a strange sense of Deja Vu here

The 1971 War

An examination of the strategic concept of

the war

A.H AMIN
The strategic concept of Pakistan’s defence i.e. ‘Defence of East Pakistan lies in the West’ was formulated by Ayub Khan in late fifties and became the foundation of Pakistan’s defence policy. The concept envisaged having bulk of the army in the northern half of the West Wing and was based on the assumption that this arrangement would force India to keep bulk of its army/strategic reserves on its western front. We will analyse the various aspects of this concept as following:-
a. The interconnection between the internal and external fronts. The basis of defence and stability of a country is absolute harmony and in consonance with the internal and external fronts. The internal front means ‘morale of the civilian population’ ‘their belief in the legitimacy and moral credibility of the political government’ ‘belief in national aims and ideology of the country’ ‘identification with the Armed Forces of the country as defenders of the country’s integrity’ etc etc. External front includes the country’s Armed Forces, and its foreign policy. A country’s defence is based on both and any weakness in one will weaken the other. This inter-relationship was ignored by Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership during the period 1947-71. The Muslim League was initially dominated by a partnership of refugees from Muslim minority provinces and later by a combination of Punjabi Muslims and civil-military bureaucrats. The Bengalis were alienated first because of the National language issue and later because of the constitutional representation issue. The Bengalis were initially patriotic and only demanded linguistic equality and had even agreed to political parity in 1956. This arrangement was seriously disturbed once Ayub usurped political power in 1958. Immediately after independence the founder of the nation Mr Jinnah made an attempt to broaden the army’s recruitment base by ordering the raising of the East Bengal Regiment in 1948. This was a purely political decision taken by Mr Jinnah and implemented by a British C in C. By December 1948 two battalions of this unit composed of Bengali Muslims had been raised. This process was, however, discontinued once Ayub Khan an intellectually naive and tactically timid man became the Pakistan Army’s C in C in 1951. Ayub was biased against having Bengalis in the army. During his tenure an unwritten policy of not raising any more Bengali infantry battalions was followed. Ayub also retired the most promising Bengali officer Major General Majeed soon after taking over. The East Bengal Regiment was limited to two units and the expanded Pakistan Army remained a largely Punjabi dominated army. The irony of the whole affair was the fact that during this entire period all the army chiefs were non-Punjabi! In any case this was the first serious negation of the concept of having a national army. The Army was on the other hand firstly viewed as a Punjabi Army in the East Wing. Secondly and far more worse; it was viewed as an organisation designed primarily for the defence of the West Wing. The 1965 war further convinced the Bengalis that the army was not a national army but one designed to defend the West Wing. Thus from 1965 the rift between the internal and external fronts became much wider and the army was increasingly viewed as a foreign entity in the East Wing. The seeds of the events of 1971 were laid during the Ayub era. The Bengali populace viewed the federal government as a neo colonial government with its political base in the West Wing. The Army was increasingly viewed as a coercive instrument which was aimed at perpetuating the West Wing’s political and economic exploitation of the East Wing. By 1971 Pakistan’s ‘Internal Front’ was seriously eroded and this in turn greatly weakened its external front.
b. The Military Capability to implement the strategic concept. Till 1962 the military balance between Pakistan and India was equal. The Sino-Indian conflict led to a major change in Indian defence policy and the Indians initiated a major programme of military expansion. In 1965 when the second Indo-Pak War took place; the relative Indo-Pak military capabilities were not as significant; and Pakistan was better placed at least in terms of strategic reserves. Stoppage of US military aid in 1965 brought a major change in the military sphere. Pakistan concluded an alternate defence arrangement with China but this was not sufficient to redress the imbalance. India on the other hand more rapidly expanded her Armed Forces and the gap between India and Pakistan in terms of infantry formations became far more wider than in 1965. Thus India’s overall military superiority over Pakistan increased from 1965 when it was about 20 to 35 in Infantry1 to 15 to 32 in 1971. The situation became far more worse in terms of strategic reserves since Pakistan’s armour potential was severely reduced because of stoppage of US aid. The Indians on the other hand almost completely replaced their ancient tank fleet of 1965 with brand new Vijayanta-Vickers or Russian supplied T-54/55 Tanks. In brief Pakistan did not possess the military capability to implement the strategic concept.
c. Pakistan’s Internal Situation. The military regime of Yahya made an honest attempt to bring democracy in Pakistan and successfully held Pakistan’s first ever general elections based on Universal Suffrage since 1946. The country was already polarised because of the political legacy of the Ayub era and the East Wing was on the verge of secession. This situation was not of Yahya’s making but inherited by him. The situation demanded extraordinary political vision which was sadly missing in the country’s political as well as military leadership. Yahya although sincere at heart believed in the power of bayonet and thought that the East Wing could be kept within the federation through military action. The consequences of the surgical and brief military action were not fully grasped by Yahya and most of the West Wing’s politicians. In 1971 the country was divided and in no position to simultaneously deal with a civil war as well as an external war. This adverse internal situation nullified the whole concept.
d. Lack of clarity in the Pakistani Military Higher Command about the ‘Modus Operandi’ of executing the Strategic Concept. It may be noted that at least till 1968-69 the Pakistani GHQ was not clear about ‘what action should be taken in West Pakistan if an Indian attack was mounted against East Pakistan’2. In brief the Pakistani military leadership was confused and vague about the method of execution of the strategic concept; i.e. ‘Defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan’ as late as 1968-69 at the time when defence plans were revised under General Yaqub Khan’s tenure as CGS. The concept was based on the assumption that Indian pressure/threat against East Pakistan could be dealt with by launching a major counter offensive taking the war inside Indian territory on the Western Front. This was a very generalized assumption and was interpreted by different officers in a different manner. General Gul Hasan who took over as CGS had more clear ideas about the implementation of this concept; but Gul’s views were not shared by the higher military leadership. One school of thought led by the CGS General Gul Hassan felt that this could be best done by ‘simultaneous launching of preliminary operations and the counter offensive’ or ‘that the reaction to any Indian invasion of East Pakistan should be an all out offensive by Pakistan’s Strike Corps i.e. the I Corps’3. Yahya and his Chief of Staff General Hameed felt otherwise. They were of the view that ‘preliminary (local level tactical attacks) operations by the holding formations should be launched first and when the preliminary objectives had been secured and the enemy’s attention had been diverted, the main counter offensive should be set in motion.4 Yahya and Hameed failed to realise that the only chance of salvation in 1971 when Pakistan was facing serious odds was in resorting to the boldest measures. Gul’s views were not accepted and Yahya and Hameed decided on a vague plan of ‘first launch preliminary operations followed by counter offensive’. The final strategic plan was vague and confusing on two counts; i.e. firstly it did not take into account the fact that the Indians enjoyed overwhelming superiority in the Eastern Theatre and possessed the potential of overrunning East Pakistan; secondly no time frame was fixed for launching the counter offensive of 1 Corps. It may be noted that Pakistan possessed relatively superior strategic reserves on in the Western Theatre and its 1 Corps two strike divisions i.e. 6 Armoured Division and 17 Division had no offensive role. In brief once Pakistan embarked on war its strategic plans were confused and vague and its strike formation was not clear about when it was to be launched. This conceptual confusion doomed Pakistan’s strategic plans from the onset.
The Validity of the Chinese Card
The Chinese card on which so much hope was based had limited and seasonal validity! The Himalayan snow fall blocked the passes through which China could militarily influence the war! This seasonal factor was never incorporated as an important factor in the Pakistani strategic plan. If China was to be involved or Chinese friendship tested the ideal time to launch a pre-emptive attack on India was mid-June or mid-July or even September. Manekshaw the Indian Chief realised this and forced Indira to wait till December when the Himalayan snowfall had completely nullified chances of Chinese overland intervention and had freed India’s Mountain Divisions facing China for the attack on East Pakistan.
The Fate of Pakistan Army’s Strategic Plan in Actual Execution
Foch defined two broad essentials of strategy i.e. ‘Economy of Force’ and ‘Preservation of Freedom of Manoeuvre’. The Pakistani GHQ did well in case of the first and created a strong strategic reserve by new raisings and by economising sectors which were relatively less vulnerable. Its response to the East Pakistan insurgency in the first phase in March 1971 was praised even by Indian military writers as ‘a remarkable performance on Pakistan’s part’5. China aided Pakistan immensely and two new infantry divisions were raised to replace the 9 and 16 Divisions which were Pakistan’s strategic reserve till March 1971. In addition Pakistan raised 18 and 23 Division in June July 1971 and the 33 and 37 Division on the eve of the war. It may be noted that apart from this Pakistan had also raised two independent armoured brigades in 1970 by withdrawing the integral armoured regiments of some of its existing infantry divisions.6 All these measures gave the Pakistani commanders a significant strategic reserve to implement the official strategy of launching a counter offensive on the Western Front aimed at ensuring that the Indians could not concentrate their entire strength and over run East Pakistan. However, the Pakistani GHQ failed in the actual execution of this strategic plan.
It was in preservation of ‘Freedom of action’ that the Pakistani GHQ failed. This freedom of action could be preserved and denied on the other hand to the Indians only if Pakistan launched its counter offensive immediately after the war started. If this had been done it was possible that the Indians could have been forced to pull out some of their formations from the Eastern Theatre; thereby reducing the pressure on Pakistan’s Eastern Command. Since no such counter offensive was launched; India was allowed to invade and conquer East Pakistan at leisure. In the meantime two Pakistani armoured divisions; one independent armoured brigade (3 Armoured Brigade-Lahore) and three infantry divisions (17, 7 and 37) remained uncommitted during the entire war.
Once the war started the Indians were extremely cautious. Once they realised that Pakistan was irresolute; they became more audacious and stepped up their offensive operation. In Shakargarh for example the Indian 1 Corps Commander had initially earmarked five of his nine infantry brigades for a holding role. Once he realised by 7th September that Pakistan was not launching any major attack in his area of operations he switched three of his holding infantry brigades into an offensive role. This increased pressure, forced the Pakistani GHQ to pull out one armoured regiment from its 23 Division attack in Chamb and to commit half of its 33 Division (a part of the strategic reserve) to defence of Shakargarh. In addition the other half of 33 Division was committed to the defence of the Southern Sector once the 18 Division attack towards Loganewala failed. As a result of this increased pressure the Indians were unable to impose their will on the Pakistani GHQ in strategic terms.
This was despite the fact that Pakistan had a relatively better offensive potential in the Western Theatre.
Yahya Khan based the entire Pakistani plan on the wishful thought that the Indians would never invade East Pakistan. Once the Indians did so he became indecisive and kept on delaying the decision of launching Pakistan’s strategic reserve in order to reduce Indian pressure on the Eastern Command. He only decided to launch the counter offensive on 16 December when the Eastern Command had surrendered. Thus the strategic concept i.e. defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan; whatever it was worth in words of General K.M Arif was never tried or implemented.
Chances of Success of Pakistani I Corps Offensive
We will examine in brief the chances of success of the Pakistani 2 Corps offensive; in case it had been launched in brief. The Strike Force consisted of one armoured division (T-59/T-54/55 Tanks) and two infantry divisions (7 and 37 Division) which were based in area Arifwala-Pirowal-Burewala-Bahawalnagar. This strike corps was to launch the main attack inside Indian territory from general area Sadiq Ganj-Amruka-Minchinabad and thrust towards Bhatinda; thereafter, swinging north towards Ludhiana. The Indians were relatively well placed in this area and had their 1st Armoured Division in Muktsar area consisting of four armoured regiments (Vijayantas) and three mechanised infantry battalions. Apart from this they had two covering troop forces i.e. the ‘Mike Force’ (T-54 and T-55) comprising one tank regiment and one tank regiment minus, one squadron in area in Ganganagar area. This force was tasked to threaten the flanks of Pakistani 1st Armoured Division in case it attacked India while the 1st Indian Armoured Division manouvred into action. In addition the ‘Foxtrot Force’ (T-54/55) consisting of one tank regiment and another tank regiment less one squadron was already under command 67 Independent Brigade tasked with defence of Fazilka.
The above mentioned dispositions meant that force wise the Indians were well poised to defend the area where Pakistan’s main counteroffensive was to be launched. The result would surely have been a fierce clash of armour which may have led to a draw or one side inflicting relatively greater losses on the other without making much headway in the final reckoning.
This means that the 1 Corps attack even if launched held no guarantee of success in terms of relieving the pressure on East Pakistan or in terms of capturing a strategic objective. There was, however, one guarantee of success for Pakistan’s 2 Corps too! This was in case Pakistan launched a pre-emptive attack on India in early October. This would have been a good option. Pakistan in any case had been condemned for human right violations and genocide and this allegation is levelled even today. Unfortunately its leadership remained obsessed with diplomatic niceties and hairsplitting and tried to play an all correct conduct game. Thus this golden chance was lost.
Other Offensive Options
Pakistan had other offensive options to relieve pressure on East Pakistan. These included employment of its northern strike corps i.e. the 1 Corps (6 Armoured Division and 17 Division) to launch a thrust in the far more vulnerable Indian belly between Pathankot and Chamb; thereby threatening the lifeline of four Indian divisions in Kashmir; forcing the Indians to switch their 1st Armoured Division north of Beas River. This was a far better option since an advance of 15 to 20 miles would have enabled Pakistan to sever the Indian line of communication. In the case of 2 Corps counter offensive the operation involved an advance of more than 60 miles in face of an Indian armoured division. In 1 Corps area the Indians had two armoured brigades as against one Pakistani Armoured Division and one independent armoured brigades. The Pakistani GHQ, however, made no plans for any offensive employment of 1 Corps, offensive employment and this formation was left unutilised throughout the war. Initially two of its armoured regiments were employed in the 23 Division attack in Chamb and after 10 December once, one of its armoured regiments reverted back to it; it was given no other task except to be prepared to launch a counterattack in Zafarwal.
Pakistani Military Leadership’s Dilemma. It became fashionable after the war to heap all the blame on Yahya and his cronies. Yahya, as a matter of fact was a far more capable chief than Musa. He inherited a situation which was of Ayub’s making. Yahya did his best to remedy the serious military imbalances; raised new formations; improved plans where none as a matter of fact had existed. He was faced with a hostile neighbour having full support of USSR; while at the same time facing a civil war created because of ambition of two crafty politicians. The odds with which Yahya was faced were high and demanded the strategic vision of Moltke and the operational talent of a Rommel or Manstein. There were some Rommels like General Eftikhar but no Moltke’s to give higher strategic direction. Yahya was initially dynamic but successively became more timid and cautious at a time when the only salvation was in resorting to the boldest measures. Even the Indians praised Yahya’s initial conduct. One author thus wrote: ‘Nevertheless Yahya showed a good sense in taking decisions and his command decisions were generally well deliberated upon and sound. He had been thrown into a rotten situation, which had come into being the day Pakistan came into being with its two wings. His only hope lay in somehow getting round Mujeeb and getting him to see reason, he tried that... he had perhaps achieved a measure of success too... but the cyclone of 12/13 November destroyed everything... the elections gave the Bengalis an overwhelming majority. The Six Points would have meant a virtual dismemberment of Pakistan. This could not be permitted. So the only course open was to hold military rule and restore the law and order if necessary by force’7. Kissinger in his White House Years has asserted that it was USA’s intervention which saved West Pakistan from being overrun by India. This is a vague statement. It is doubtful whether India was willing to invade West Pakistan in force after the fall of East Pakistan.
The answer to Pakistan’s dilemma was a bold attack and only a bold all out attack could have forced India to drop the idea of invading East Pakistan. Long ago Clausewitz well summed up the solution for states like Pakistan in 1971 when he said ‘Offensive war, that is the taking advantage of the present moment, is always commanded when the future holds out a better prospect not to ourselves but to our adversary’. In this case the future had better prospects for India and Pakistan’s only hope was an all out offensive posture. Clausewitz defined the solution in yet more detail in the following words ‘Let us suppose a small state is involved in a contest with a very superior power, and foresees that with each year its position will become worse: should it not; if war is inevitable, make use of the time when its situation is furthest from worst? Then it must attack, not because the attack in itself ensures any advantages Ñ it will rather increase the disparity of forces-but because this state is under the necessity of either bringing the matter completely to an issue before the worst time arrives or of gaining at least in the meantime some advantages which it may hereafter turn to account’8.
Indian General Candeth who commanded the Indian Western Command made a very thought-provoking remark in his memoir of 1971 war which proves that Pakistan’s only chance lay in offensive action. Candeth thus wrote:-
‘The most critical period was between 8 and 26 October when 1 Corps and 1 Armoured Division were still outside Western Command. Had Pakistan put in a pre-emptive attack, during that period, the consequences would have been too dreadful to contemplate and all our efforts during the war would have been spent in trying to correct the adverse situation forced on us’.9
Conclusion
Only a Napoleon or a Frederick could have saved Pakistan in 1971 from being divided and humiliated and cut to size! There were potential Napoleons and Fredericks in the Pakistan Army in 1947-48 but these were systematically sidelined or weeded out from 1950 to 1958. A conspiracy against originality and boldness! Ironically the political situation that the Pakistan Army inherited was created once the West Pakistan Civil servants and the then army C in C had ganged up in the period 1951-58 to keep the much despised Bengali in his place! The civilians did well in creating the 1956 Constitution which solved all major political problems of Pakistan. The politicians were, however, never allowed to implement this constitution since its implementation through holding of a general elections in 1959 may have led to a East Bengali victory, thus seriously reducing the civil-military dominance of Pakistani politics. Thus martial law was imposed in 1958 to avoid a general election! Ironically the army finally saw the light of the day a bit too late once a martial law was imposed in 1969 to hold a general election ! The tide of history in these 11 years had become irreversible! Strategic insight could at best have averted total humiliation! But there was no strategic insight since Ayub Khan had ensured from 1950 to 1969 that no strategic insight should be groomed and cultivated!

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1In 1965 Pakistan had 20 Infantry Brigades (including 4 AK Brigades) as against 35 Indian Infantry Brigades. It had 756 Tanks as against 608 Indian tanks. In addition its M-47/48 Tanks were relatively new and better than the main Indian tank i.e. Centurion. It had 756 artillery guns as against 608 Indian. (Page-7-War Despatches-Harbaksh Singh-Lancer-New Delhi-1990). In 1971 the Indians had 25 Infantry Divisions (including 10 Mountain) and eight infantry brigades as against fourteen Pakistani Infantry Divisions and one independent infantry brigade. In artillery the situation was even worse since in 1971 India had 2900 Artillery Guns (400 Medium and 2500 Field) as against 1100 (300 Medium and 800 Field) Pakistani Artillery Guns. In armour the situation was more adverse. Numerically in terms of brigades/divisions there was parity; India having one armoured division and four independent armoured brigades as against two Pakistani armoured divisions and two independent brigades. However, both qualitatively and quantitatively the situation was markedly in India’s favour. India having 1650 tanks (200 Centurion, 250 Sherman, 450 T-54/55, 300 Vijayanta, 150 PT-76 and 100 AMX-13) as against Pakistan’s 1050 (200 M-47/48, 150T-54/55 tanks and the Vijayanta Tanks. In addition the Indians had 750 T-54/55/Vijayantas as against 350 Pakistani T-54/55/59 tanks. (Refers-The equipment strength in 1971 is based on figures given in Military Balance-Issue-1971-1972-International Institute of Strategic Studies-London). Number of Formations are based on figures given on pages-271 and 272-Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership-Fazal Muqeem Khan-National Book Foundation-Lahore-1973).
2Page-106-Fazal Muqeem-Op Cit.
3Page-112-Ibid and Page-310-Memoirs Gul Hassan Khan-Oxford University Press-Karachi-1992-The fact that Gul Hassan was a strong advocate of this view is also supported by General Fazal Muqeem (See page-112-Fazal Muqeem Khan-Op Cit).
4Page-308-Gul Hassan Khan-Op Cit.
5Page-426-The Indian Army after Independence-Major K.C Praval-Lancer International-New Delhi-1987
6page-107-Fazal Muqeem-Op Cit.
7Page-44-Dismemberment of Pakistan-Brigadier Jagdev Singh-Lancer International-New Delhi-1988.
8Pages-397 and 398-On War-Edited by Anatol Rapport-Reprinted National Book Foundation-1976.
9Page-28-The Western Front-Lt Gen P.K Candeth-Allied Publishers-New Delhi-1984.

Pakistan's Strategic Dilemma

A.H Amin

The creation of Pakistan and division of India in 1947 into two states i.e a Muslim and a Hindu ruled state was an accident of history stranger than any fiction ! Pakistan was created not because the Hindustani Muslims loved Islam or because the Punjabi Muslims loved Sindhis or Pathan Muslims or the Baloch Muslims but essentially because Muslims of all ethnicities feared Hindu domination ! The essential attribute of the whole exercise was the fact that the Hindu was feared becasue he was numerically larger and intellectually and financially dominating ! Thus the Muslim higher and middle classes combined out of class motivation , the higher feudal classes fearing land reforms ,the middle classes viewing their chances in the job market as dim once in competition with the Hindu and Sikh ! Both these classes galvanised the Muslim masses in the name of religion and Mr Jinnah the highly westernised Muslim ironically became the champion ofIslam !

Immediately after the creation of the new state ,the majority Muslim ethnic community the Bengalis realised that the minority West wing of thenew country had no intention of letting the Bengalis rule as per natural rules of democracy ! Traditionally the Bengalis were sidelined fromleadership of Muslim politics initially by the Hindustani Muslims from UP who dominated Muslim politics from1858 till 1936 and later the same act was replayed by post 1936 Muslim leaders i.e Jinnah and Liaquat ! By 1948 the Bengalis learnt the bitter lesson that they were condemned as Red Indians of the new state once Mr Jinnah refused to accept linguistic claims of the Bengalis ! Jinnah's successor the Hindustani Muslim Liaquat Ali Khan continued the same strategy sidelining the brilliant Bengali leader Suharwardy ! The same strategy was continued by Liaquats successors a group of Punjabi bureaucrats dominated by two viruses Ghulam Mohammad giftedto Pakistan by Mr Jinnah and Chaudhry Mohammad Ali gifted to Pakistan by Liaquat Ali ! The same ethnic chauvinism was carried on by Pakistan's first military usurper Ayub , Pathan by nomenclature and domicile , Punjabi by language and cultural norms , and a tactically timid paper tiger of WW Two Burma fame sacked andput on adverse by British general Reese in Burma for exhibiting phenomenal tactical timidity ! By 1969 the Bengali Muslims realised that they hadbeen thoroughly exploited in the name of Islam ,politically economically as well as culturally ! They decided to adopt thepath ofsecessionism ! Thus the civil war of1971 ,a genocide of Bengali Muslims and their final liberation by the hated Hindu Indian Army,who the Bengalis also hated but accepted as their liberators out ofsheer pragmatism !

2001 was another fatal turning point once Pakistan's elite dropped Islam which the Muslim elite had picked up as a slogan not out of love of Islam but out ofclass motives ! Thus Islam no longer remains the binding force of Pakistan ! Its a major strategic shift and the basis of two nation theory has been abandoned ! The bond that connected the Sindhis ,Baluchis and Pathans with Punjabis has been severed ! In any case Islam did notsave the Bihari ,Punjabi or Bengali Muslims from cold blooded massacres in 1971 ! Ideology becomes meaningless once nationalities are exploited and reducedto aborigines and Red Indians!

If someone in the Indian RAW has not picked up this fatal strategic dilemma ofPakistan then the eleven story RAW Building complex should be Oklahomised with TNT !

Ironically true patriots and men of substance are persona non grata in the Pakistani ISI dominated now by pen pushers and job seekers and sycophants !

Once a retired three star Pakistani general Hamid Nawaz incharge of Pakistans defence bureucracy naievely states in USA that Pakistan was saved by USA from Indian attack ,the Sindhis and the Balochis rightly deduce , why have such a large Pakistan Army if USA saved us as the know all secretary defence says !



Today in 2003 Pakistan's strategic dilemma is not India , not Phalcon system , not Israel but its nationality problem ! Today the passions of secessionism and mutual distrust in Pakistan's three provinces Baluchistan ,Sindh and NWFP are clearly present and can explode into civil war if political solution is not found !

2003 may be the jump off year for India to strategically redress the balance of losses suffered in Kashmir in Quetta,Panjgur,Dera Bugti ,Razmak,Hala,Khairpur,Dadu etc ! The hatred against many real and perceived injustices by Pakistans ruling Hindustani-Punjabi Muslim clique is a potent and serious threat to Pakistan's survival as a prosperous state !

The Sindhi Muslims feel that they have been reduced to Red Indians ! A man ofquestionable credentials and rubber stamp credibility has been thrust upon this ancient race as chief minister of the province ! All the major shots in the province are called by minority Hindustani Muslim politicians !

The Baloch Muslims feel that projects like Gwadar port would reduce them into a minority once Punjabi,Pathan and Hindustani Muslims converge into Gwadar as happened with the Sindhis in case of Karachi after 1947 ! They feel that construction of cantonments in Baluchistan is a prelude to a future policy of genocide against the Balochi speaking Baloches !

The Pathan tribal Muslims feel that Pakistan's military junta has little love for Islam and is all set to introduce the already failed and discredited police system in Pakistans settled areas ! They further feel that the decision to control cross border movement and carrying ofweapons without license is a breach of promises made by Mr Jinnah to the tribal Pathans in 1947 !

The population of the majority province Punjab is expanding and fast reducing the provinces water resources,thus the common Punjabi strongly feels that more water reservoirs should be constructed ! This is in direct opposition to Sindhi perceptions that any newwater reservoirs would mean the economic death of Sindh !

Pakistan's strategic dilemma is not the Indian armoured division at Jhansi or Ambala , no India Agni Prithvi or Trishul missille but its nationality question ! Ironically instead of resolving to solve the nationality question Pakistan's military junta misled by US citizens like Shaukat Aziz is placing great faith in economic recovery, which is not at all solving the nationality question ! These pedantic decision makers fail to admit that Pakistan was divided in 1971 because of circumstances which had its roots in fallacious policies of themilitary usurper Ayub ! 1971 was not a political failure alone , but also a major strategicfailure ! The nationality qusetion of 2003 may again prove to be a prelude to the next strategic failure !

There is no overestimation in the assertion that any insurgency in any single province of Pakistan would lead to anything less than the demise of a state created inthe name of Islam in 1947 ! Some parts of theTwo Nation Theory died in the bloody killing fields of Bengal , some in the stony wilderness of Sarawan,Jhalawan,Maiwand,Chamalng and Kohlu in 1974-76 , some in the containers at Kunduz,Mazar Sharif , Miran Shah and Wana ! Containers gained much fame in 2001 but containers were used to kill men first by the Nazis and Soviets in Second World War when cattle wagons of trains the ancient form of containers were used to suffocate prisoners being transported from point A to B.Later Taliban used containers to kill people and it was only in 2001 that Dostums containers gained fame.

The last and ironically thefatal battles may be fought in Baluchistan and Sindh !

A day may come when the Punjab province is a landlocked state in battle with Sindh over water and Baluchistan over gas ! God forbidthe day when Ghauris and Ghaznavi missiles are confined to Punjab while Sindh and Baluchistan are US sattellites ! If the present Pakistani military junta can be a US sattellite in order to avoid Indian domination , why cannot the same analogy bepickedup by a future Sindhi or Baloch Muslim state ! As a student ofstrategy Lieutenant General Hamid Nawaz made a fatal strategic statement !



There is one fence which divides India and Pakistan ! There is one which Sharon is constructing to divide thePalestenians and possibly a third psychological one which the Pakistani establishment has been constructing since 1971 to divide the Pakhtuns of Afghanistan and Pakistan ! A fine reward for services Pakhtuns rendered in fighting against the British while MAO College Aligarh or Lahore could not have survived one day without dole given by British Governor of UP/Punjab or the British Viceroy ! The tribal Pakhtuns( Pashtuns from settled districts of Mardan,Bannu,Kohat and Peshawar were job seekers and docile like Punjabis) braved bullets in many anti British movements while British knighted many Punjabi Muslims later famous as Pakistan's great leaders at the height of Non Cooperation Movement ! What a fineway of rewarding a race whose reservoirs of heroism and defiance of odds exceed all other races in the so called Islamic Republic of Pakistan !

I have met Somalis and Bosnians in USA and Canada who narrated terrible stories about how their countries were destroyed ! Ironically Pakistan may be following the Somali or Bosnian model !

Economic recovery is but a mirage! The gathering storm of the nationality question is the gathering storm that may prove to be a fatal strategic hurricane ! Pakistan saw one hurricane in 1971 ! Another onemay not be far away !

Bengal was fatal as 1971 proved ! Baluchistan or Sindh God forbid would be the final act if fatal strategic decisions are not revoked ! A statesman is not created by merely getting an Alpha grade in a military staff college or a national defence college ! Ho Chi Minh was not a conventional general but he brought to grief many regular three four and five star generals ! The disintegration of Pakistan will weaken the region ! The only way to avoid it is to dismantle the military-intelligence complex which has been dominating Pakistan since 1947 and to create a new democratic order which wants peace with all its neighbours and no strategic depth in any external direction.The strategic depth of Pakistan can only be its people.But the civil-military mafia dominating Pakistan has always regarded its people as a subject race.

Pakistan and Afghanistan are multi ethnic states.They need to be free of ethnic chauvinism and ideological extremism of any type.This fact must be digested by the Punjabi and Pashtun majorities in both countries.Punjabi chauvinism led to division of Pakistan in 1971 and Pashtun chauvinism condemned Afghanistran to its 25 year long civil war from 1978 till now.Kashmir and Pashtunistan issue were deadweights for both countries.The main block is not physical or material but mental and psychological.The day ethnic majorities in both countries start respecting minorities, both countries will be on the road to success.

FEDERAL STATE TO CONFEDERATION



History does not move in straight lines.It is manipulated by the privileged classes and by personalities in key positions of political or institutional strength.Movements and policies are justified in the name of race or ideology while ulterior motives are at work.Countries are created not because of solid ideological or national reasons but because of clash of egos !



Some states are created or owe their existence to clash of two great powers like Afghanistan and Nepal or Luxemburg or Finland . Some were created because of inadvertent affects of policies of Imperialist powers like " Divide and Rule".



India and the regions that include Pakistan and Bangladesh was never a country but it was united several times by invaders.Similarly Afghanistan was the highway of conquest and the modern state of Afghanistan was created only in 1747.



It is time now to revise the concept of the strong federal state led by an Iron man and to recognize the nationality principle . Pakistan was created not because the Muslim elite loved Islam but because they feared Hindu and Sikh economic , political and institutional domination.Initially Muslim separatism as Francis Robinsons classical research proves originated from the British Indian province of UP (United Province).The key issue was not ideological but social i.e inability to compete with the more educated and financially stronger Hindus.This separatism later spread to Muslim majority provinces where the Muslim landlords and Pirs under heavy debt to Hindu money lenders joined the Muslim League in order to drive out their Hindu debtors.



Pakistan was created in 1947 and soon the Pakistani generals in league with British trained civil servants and feudals started a joint Jihad to destroy Pakistan's democracy which finally succeeded in 1958.Since 1958 Pakistani military junta has ruled the country and used the Kashmir Dispute as a reason for gobbling up Pakistan's 70 % budget.In the process Pakistani military miserably failed in 1965 War despite significant superiority over Indians in number and quality of equipment.The matter is discussed in great detail in my book The Pakistan Army till 1965 held at US Army Staff College and War College Libraries and also at Air War College Karachi Library.The Staff College Quetta had refused to accept it in their library.



All along Pakistani military junta used various pretexts to solicit Western military and financial aid,the ulterior motive being to consolidate its own position in the Pakistani power politics.First it used the Soviet threat to get US aid.Later it used Afghan war as an excuse for getting aid and now it is using the Islamist Threat as an excuse for getting aid.Even this eqrthquake is a golden opportunity for this avaricious and corrupt military junta.



Recently General Musharraf has started another jugglery show claiming that he is the man of peace.A good move since Kashmir and USSR are no longer in vogue.Musharraf states that he wants friendship with India and Israel.We do not question his good intentions but taken in depth this signals Musharraf's acceptance that 1947 partition of India was a faux pas.If so many Muslims were killed in 1947 , 1965 and 1971 then what was the use of the whole exercise in futility.If Israel is now being engaged by Pakistan's military junta now why was it not done earlier ? Why this whole game ? Seen in depth Pakistan's military junta has an institutional interest in peace now.It wanted war when it suited its institutional interests and it wants peace when it suits Musharraf ! Seen in this context Pakistani military junta may be initiating a process similar to the one initiated by Gorbachev that led to disintegration of USSR.



Surely if India is not a threat , why have such a large army ? Why not undo the federal structure and let Balochistan and Sindh and NWFP be states as initially hinted in the Pakistan Resolution of 1940.Why should Pakistan Army be building cantonments in Balochistan ?



What Musharraf is indirectly signaling is that partition was a blunder . That war is good when it is good for Pakistani military junta and bad when it does not suit the Pakistani military junta.



Three wars fought for no reason.Afghanistan destroyed by pursuing an adventurist and a genocidal foreign policy by all starting from Ayub,Zia down to Naseerullah Babar's boys the Talibans and even Musharraf as he stood before 9/11.



The West must not forget that Musharraf may prove to be a liability rather than an asset for the world in the long run.What must be understood is the fact that Musharrafs appeasement of the West will lead to a massive Islamist backlash.Musharraf is far more fragile now than than anyone can imagine.Cheap adventurism as well as cheap appaeasement are equally dangerous.The Pakistan Army was a laughing stock when they bogged down at Khem Karan .Now Musharraf has proved that all was a grand strategic fraud.If peace with India was good why did not the Pakistani generals did it earlier.Why , so that they could gobble 70 to 80 % of Pakistans budget every year since 1958 ! This is a serious question which no Pakistani politician is asking.Why one million Bengalis butchered by the army in 1971 and at least 50,000 Baloch killed since 1947 ? Why this aimless genocide.Why were 1 million Afghans killed from 1978 till to date just because the military usurper Zia wanted US money and Stingers to sell in the black market ! Why is everyone silent !



Musharraf's short term theatrics need to be reviewed seriously.If all that he states is right then Pakistan will have to re-think its ideology .If Pakistan leaves its ideology then it is a state comprising nationalities , a multi ethnic state.The Pakistani military junta must not forget that since 1958 Pakistan was an army with a state rather than a state with an army.If now Pakistani military junta makes grand claims of peace in order to please USA , Pakistani is on the road to Balkanisation.



What Musharraf has initiated is a dangerous game.Paying in the short run but self destructive for the Pakistani military junta in the long run.Possibly good for the region if a self serving military machine is reduced to size.Possibly dangerous for the region if a backlash starts and Islamic extremism is the main beneficiary.Musharaffs policies need to be questioned not only by the Pakistani people but by the whole world.



In the Pakistani context following may be the implications :--



Pakistan's smaller provinces may question the rationale for Pakistan .If India is not a threat and Afghanistan is a friend why not have an idependent Baloch ,Pashtun or Sindhi state .Why have a large army which has been involved in a dangerous foreign policy and in aggression against Pakistan's neighbours.The Durand Line may have significance for the Pakistani junta but for the Baloch and Pashtun it is a Berlin Wall which will become meaningless one day.
Why should Pakistan have a nuclear programme and a large standing army .Why should not the US insist that Pakistan reduce its army and dismantle its nuclear warheads.
Conversely if the Pakistan Army is reduced why should the smaller provinces stay with the Pakistani Federal state.It is only the coercive force of the army that has kept the Pakistani confederation together.
Why should not Pakistan's neighbours demand a redrawing of boundaries.


Musharraf's policies and his petty opportunism is a grave danger for the region.It is possible that in the end his policies may prove to be seriously counterproductive for world peace.The Pakistani military junta needs to stop playing games which it has been playing since 1954 when it entered Pakistani politics as a subversive force and since 192 when it entered regional politics as a subversive adventurist force.The USA must understand that they are not dealing with rational good natured men but with crafty opportunists who may prove to be a serious strategic liability.



Who has given the Pakistani military junta to decide what is good and what is bad for Pakistan.If their claims are to be believed as now Musharraf states Pakistan was a faux pas !

even soldiers with outstanding war record who were even praised by their Indian opponents like Maj Gen Lachman Singh in his book Indian sword penetrates East Pakistan admitted that atrocities were committed.You can read about this in Story of My Struggle by Tajammul in which he admits that atrocities were committed by West Pakistani forces.Such was the fear of being shot without distinction that Major General Ziaur Rahman who was a Bihari but had a Bengali wife decided to join the Bengalis rather than mistakenly being shot by neighbouring West Pakistani unit as a Bengali.

Re: # 16----It was Major General Rahim Khan who got the nurses downloaded.He later served in ZABs time in Ministry of Defence also.

Re: # 10 Rao Farman ali escaped in last helicopter going to burma. He removed punjabi nurses of army and got in helicopterand escaped from Indian net to catch him.

Re: # 7

Ahmedmadani Sahib:

"...This is very old story over 36 years ago and no body remembers...."

Bangladeshis remember it. Sad you do not remember, you may repeat the same horrors. No matter who prompts you to do, Americans, Indians whoever. Before you get carried away, I protested Indira Gandhi's actions in Golden Temple.

Re: # 10

Urstruly Sahib:

You are honest and accepting man, who speaks his heart out. This is just one scene, I saw on BBC / ITN each day in those fate-ful days. Such shameless acts, who begged and got safety of their lives when they surrendered. Did they care to give guarantee of life to students and women?

I get angry when I see, so much vivdly comes back 35 years later.

People like Yasser need to learn to accept that horrible acts were committed by the protectors. Period. No ifs no but. Till then, I am sorry.

wonder if manto, the genocide denier, has seen this

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xwwPbkyZVJo

That's why the lifting of the Emasculating Emergency was moved a day earlier -- from Army Emasculation Day of December 16, -- (as originally planned) -- to December 15, 2007.

The way author started the article it got reader's attention expecting some honest facts from an insider. It turns out this oldman is still living in cuckoland. Shameless blame shifting and downplaying the atrocities. yes everyone was equally responsible...Sheeda from Mianwali and Gen sahib bahadur Rao Farman Ali khan to Yahiya Khan all were equally responsible. shame on you Mr Jafri...tangeiN kabar mein hai, abh tou kuchh sach bol jatay?

Jafri:

Just to refresh your memory before you try to appear so "united we stand" Pakistani again:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sMg9Ly9nK0g

Do you remember any of this? Wasn't it your boss Rao Farman Ali aka the Butcher of Dhakka who ordered this? Were you there on that day?

Apni auqaat main raho fouji. Tum log mujrim pesha thug ho and nothing more. Spare us your sermons ok?

The usuaul shameless tripe from the pro-NaPak fouj establishment. The only entity responsible for the tragedy of East Pakistan is NaPak fouj. IN their shamless efforts to divert attention from real culprits they do not spare any effort to shift the blame over the Quaid-e-Azam. Neither Quaid nor people of West Pakistan can be blamed for something that they had absolutely no control over.

Read this and tell me how none but fouj can be held responsible for breaking our country.

The people of East Pakistan were 54% of the polpulation:

* Among the 19 Federal Secraterias none was from East Pakistan.

* Among the 41 Joint Secrateries only 3 were from EP

* Among the 133 Deputy Secrarties only 10 were from EP.

* Among the 548 Under Secrataries only 38 were from EP

So this was the extent of participation of EP in a government run by a military dictator of NaPak fouj. Now here is the distribution of resources under the military dicattorship:

* First Five Year Plan the 54% of the population of EP gets only 26% share of resources.

* Second Five Year Plan the EP gets only 32% share of resources

* Third Five Year Plan that ended in 1970 the EP got only 36% share of resources.

Where was the money. It was being used to pamaper the memebers of mafia of Napak fouj. Na Pak fouj was building cantonments, hospitals, schools, banks, and what not to benefit just themselves with all that money that belonged to the people of Pakistan.

The tradition of East India company of which NaPak fouj is the Naajaiz Aulaad, still continues to this day. Now the NapPak fouj is the biggest property dealer in Pakistan. They are the political party with most deadly weapons in the world. They do not hesitate to massacre school children. The butcher of Islamabad is a fouji dicatator who massacred over 1500 school children in a day in Islamabad in this day and age. And you have the testicles to comne on this forum and tell us, the people of Pakistan, that we are to blame for all the tragedies that has befallen on Pakistan?? Come to think of it, I would say that you are right because it is our fault that we were eating grass to raise the snakes and haramkhors of fouj. These rabid dogs should have been shot and put to kennels the very first day.

NaPak fouj and only NaPak fouj is absolutely responsible for the tragedy of East Pakistan. NaPak fouj is the criminal who has committed the grave crimes against the people of Pakistan. Stop writing these sappy episodes and take the blame like half the men that you criminals should have been.

please editors of chowk. This has happened some 40 years ago. Many more lucid and factual analytical pieces/books/reports etc have been writen since then on this subject. And these throw some very good light on the events as they happened then.

Why then do we have to be inflicted by apologias of a poor quality?