A Road To Siachen

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Excellent analysis.

One thing I would like to ask. Does your information come from specific sources, or have you based this on common sense?

Also, do you think India will be vulnerable to repeated incidences like Kargil?

Finally, how much of the Kashmiri civilian population (apart from the freedom fighters) do you think actually opposes India, and supports independence? I think this will be the deciding factor, in any battle involving Kashmir.

I find your analysis very plausible, to some extend it puts in context various statements by the pak politicians.

One thing i cannot understand is what is the importance of siachen glacier, is it of strategic importance, why cant the paks walk away, now that indians are there.

Some comments indicated that pak wants a time frame for the kashmir `issue`, and kargill was supposed to deliver it.

As it turned out, by india refusing to cross the LOC, the paks find themselves totally isolated. The PM of a country at war running around the world for peace creates a comic situation, where the public opinion at large seem to tell the PM that the tensions will be over when the pak support for the infiltrators are withdrawn.

I enjoy your perceptive analysis and look forward to the post kargil analysis hopefully in a months time.

events have moved so fast and have overtaken the chowk. Kargil is over and i look forward to your rejoinder, may be explaining the following report from Dawn

PM`s dash to Washington surprises envoy

By Masood Haider

NEW YORK, July 4: Pakistan embassy officials in Washington and New York were taken aback on Saturday afternoon over the announcement of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif`s unscheduled meeting with President Clinton on Sunday at Blair House over the deteriorating situation in Kashmir.

Ambassador Riaz Khokhar was not aware of the secretive developments resulting in Mr Sharif`s visit as he was in New Orleans, attending the meeting of the Association of Pakistani Physicians.

Officials at Pakistan Mission to the United Nations and the Consulate General in New York had also no knowledge of it.

Compounding the confusion was the fact that the prime minister took a normal New York-bound PIA flight from Islamabad and was supposed to take a connecting flight to Washington from New York with his entourage of 20 or more officials.

The PIA officials in New York working in conjunction with the Pakistan Mission officials, however, convinced the Federal Aviation Authority to allow the plane to divert to Washington to enable the prime minister`s party to disembark and then fly back to New York with its normal load of passengers.

But, there was confusion as to which one of the two Washington`s airports would be used for landing until the last minute.

The Pakistani press party was first told by the Pakistan International Airlines that the plane would land at National airport while the officials at the embassy kept guessing that it would be Dulles international airport, which is far from the city.

At the last minute, the embassy officials told Dawn that the Prime Minister`s plane would be landing at Dulles airport. The journalists who were shuttling between the two airports managed to get there in the nick of time as the plane landed before noon.

But Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his party were whisked away by the US secret service officials to Blair House without meeting the press.

Feroz:

Congradulations. You have finally made it to the ECL!

For the un-initiated, ECL stands for 1: Exit Control List (Sort of Who`s Who of Amir ul Momaneen`s real or perceived detractors) and
Entry Control List (which is self explanatory).

You are on the Entry Control List. Please inform the US Postal Services to forward your mail care of ISI anytime you chose to visit Pakistan. Do not forget to pack some extra toilet rolls, you do not appear to be the lota kind. Also inform Amnesty Int`l of your intentions. We will try and get you released unharmed. (Sorry, no 30 days warrantee with this advice).

regards

Why is India seeking so much help from America to solve this problem, when India completely denounced the USA for opposing its nuclear tests?

These 600 freedom fighters have really proven too much for the whole Indian army and air force. How have they been so successful?

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A very good analysis of the current situation. Keep it up Feroz.

Asfand Yar Siddiqui

Sacramento CA

This is one of the most ridiculous analyses I have ever come across! Mr Khan is merely trying to piece together an essay aimed at misinforming and ill-informing the readers. Many of the ``facts`` mentioned by him are nonsensical gibberish of drunk Pak generals at hush-hush cocktail parties.

For example, he says that at one time the Indian Army could not pay its officers! From where did he get this crap? What do you think our Army is? The Pak federal government? For the record, yes, it is true that India (unlike rogue states like China or Pakistan) has been continuously cutting down defence spending and allocating those resources to more productive purposes. This is in keeping with our peaceful motives and intent. But our soldiers are well taken care of. The defence budget cuts certainly have made things harder, but on a relative basis, we can still kick China`s pants off! Pakistan is not even a concern. It is just a nuisance, promoting terrorism.

In one breath, he says India overwhelmingly out-matches the Pak Navy just in numbers and ships etc. Yet, he also says that the Pakis have `parity` with Indian Navy, just beacuse some Pak admirals have cooked up an `apparently` infallible `strategy`! Come on, has he completely forgotten the immense damage that our aircraft carrier INS Vikrant inflicted on Pak?

Amazingly, Mr Khan contends that the Pakis have military parity (even superiority) with India. FALSE! The Pak army decided not to intervene directly and fight a proxy war instead (by using terrorists who shamelessly use Islam to justify their misdeeds). This was based on just one conclusion: Fghting a war against India would lead to yet another humiliation for the Pak army.

India has a superiority over the Pakis in ALL fields. This should not be seen by Pakistanis as a discomforting fact. The basic problem with Pakistanis is that they are keen on `competing` with a country 10 times bigger. Something like Nepal trying to compete with China! The result? Pakistan spends 85% of its resources on just two things: servicing foreign loans and spending on its military (the corrupt generals like that!).

When will Pakistan learn? It is now only HALF its original size and has lost three wars since its inception. It should pay more attention to the mis-treatment of Mohajirs and Ahmadiyas, and the possible creation of Sindhudesh.

Najib:

F.R. Khan`s article (assuming his sources of information are genuine) makes a lot more sense than your comments.

I was a member of the Pakistan military for 13 years, and have a pretty good understanding of the military strengths of both India and Pakistan. In my current profession, most the people I work with are Indian expats, so I have developed a some understanding of the Indian civilian infrastructure, as well.

India has a gigantic army, a huge air force, and a big navy. The Indian army is nearly three times the size of the US army. Paksitan has a very big army, a medium sized air force, and a small navy. Assuming the capabilities of the soldiers on both sides to be equal, one could naively deduce that India should be able to run all over Pakistan. However, that has not happened. The only major success India has achieved is the independence of Bangladesh. However that was mainly due to the civilian uprisings in East Pakistan, against West Pakistan.

It is much more difficult in war to attack than it is to defend. You need at the very least, a 3 to 1 superiority in numbers, and equipment. India has never had that kind of a superiority against Pakistan. In fact the numbers game seems to be favoring Pakistan more and more. Currently, nearly half of the Indian army is occupied in Kashmir. Another portion of the Indian army has traditionally been utilized as a defence against China. This means that the actual size of the Indian army facing Pakistan (outside Kashmir) is relatively close to the size of the Pakistan army. The Indian army has to defend a much larger border than does the Pakistan Army. This makes it impossible for India to score any major gains against Pakistan.

It is of course a given, that Pakistan cannot score any major gains against India, because the Pakistani military is just not big enough. That is why the Pakistani military has always been designed for a defensive role. However, India is vulnerable to internal strife. Currently, there are over ten freedom movements going on in India. A few of these like the Kashmiris and the Sikhs have gained a lot of momentum. In an all out war, the movements could really get out of control, and occupy a major poriton of the Indian military resources.

The other aspects are too detailed to get into here. With the advent of nuclear weapons, and the reasons I mentioned above, India and Pakistan are in a virtual stalemate. This the strongest position Pakistan has had against India, since indpendence. Any country that now initiates a full-fledged war will end up destroying both India and Pakistan.

It has been India`s good luck, that Pakistan has been ruled by corrupt and incompotent politicians. That is the main reason that Pakistan has not been able to act as an able spokesperson for the Kashmir cause. That is why I say, the Kashmiris will eventually have to win their independence on their own. Even though the common man in Pakistan is genuinely dedicated to the Kashmiri cause, the politicians will continue to make a mess of it.

Re: Najib # 9

It is always wrong and a mistake to review military matters through a Freudian prism. Like everything else in life, it is not the size of the military that matters, but how it is used!

My information about the inability of the Indian Army to pay its officer corps came from a varity of Indian newspaper accounts and from e-mails with a host of Indian friends, who confirmed those reports by their own observations. This fact was widely reported in the Indian media, which unlike its Pakistani counter-part is not shy about about demanding answers from its officals.

Whether the Indians are curtailing their defensive costs for more productive uses maybe true, but it does not distract from the truth that the Indian military has severed a serious degradation in terms of weapons procurement, deployment and in its ability to maintain an operational posture. In real terms, Indian armed forces` advantage over Pakistan is only in numbers and Pakistanis know that there is a `` window of opportunity`` to re-equate the balance of forces in the next few years.

It is true that India is buying advanced weapons platforms, but it takes, on an average five-seven years for those weapons to be fully intergrated and deployed. Lets take the example of Pakistan`s Agosta 90B submarines. From the moment Pakistan placed its order, in the early 1990s, to the time they will be fully operational with the Pakistani Navy, in 2003 hopefully, a decade would have passed. Pakistan just signed with China to co-produce FC-1 aircraft(Fighter China)and seeks to begin its serial production and its induction into Pakistan Air Force squandrons some time in 2005.

When was the last time Indian Air Force`s fighters were fitted with MLUs?

My friend, Indians are, as UR suggested, in a parity with Pakistan`s armed forces in actual combat ratios and given the lack of their force modernizations, they are having serious problems in maintaining their operational ``organizational order of battle``. Indian Air Force currently has nerarly 900 aircraft, most of them old Soviet MiG 21s, 25s, 27s, and 29s. Aside from the MiG 29, and some of its MiG 27s, its fleet of MiG 21s and 25s are nearly thirity years old and are based on designs, which are nearly forty and fifty years old. It is collection of British Sea Harriers and Speecat Jaguars are twenty plus years old.

The IAFs most modern and able weapons systems are its Mirage 2000s, and Sukhoi 30s fighter aircrafts. These aircraft, with the MiG 27s and 29s, consitute only about 250-300 of the IAFs total frontline aircrafts. Coupled with the Jaguars and some MiG 25s with MLUs, that total comes to nearly 400 aircrafts. In contrast Pakistan has 38 F-16s and nearly 200 Mirage aircraft. Even when the Chinese made fighters of PAF are discounted, that still gives the Indians a three to one parity over Pakistan and the PAF has traditionally trained with those odds in mind.

If you still think that IAF is so superior to Pakistan, then why are the Indians thinking of cutting their aircraft strenght from 900 to nearly 450 planes? The answer is that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, India does not have a cheap and easy access to Soviet spare parts to keep its planes flying and the Russians are no longer interested in being paid in ``soft money``, that is Indian rupees, for their weapons. Also, the lack of financial support has made it impossible for the Indians to maintain a 900 plane airforce.

Lets turn our attentions to the naval parity. Again, the size of the force does not matter, but the war doctrines the two forces does. Your statement, about size of the Indian Navy superiority, was flawed, because it was like comparing two software programs without understanding their applications!

Pakistan Navy does not intend to engage the Indians on open seas, but interdict their vital sea lanes and supply lines. Your carrier forces will have to come closer to Pakistan`s coastline to fight the Pakistan Navy and that will put them under our ``missile belt`` and within the range of our anti-shipping aircrafts. All of this is designed to force the Indians to adopt a defensive posture and more importantly, take away the advantage from them and make them operate their forces to the tempo of Pakistani Navy`s war aims.

Before you re-state your original cliams, I would suggest that you do a little reading and find out what is the difference between the Indians` ``carrier bubble`` and Pakistan Navy`s forward defensive tactics.

Why do you think your admirals were so concerned about the deployment of Pakistan`s Navy to their war patrols that they alreted the entire Indian western fleet? If the Indians are so powerful on the seas as you claim, then what are they afraid of vis a vis Pakistan?

My friend, military strategy depends more on intentions, force multipliers, and capabilities than it depends on a numbers game!

Re: UR

My information came from browsing through newspapers, both Indian and Pakistani, and through reading specialized defense journals like Jane`s. Also, most of the analysis came from talks, and e-mails with friends who are in the Pakistani military; in junior to middle level rannks (majors to colonels).

Some of the information/ situational analysis came from friends who are in the American militry; a few had rotated out of Pakistan on special training assignments with Special Services Group and had served with Pakistani military advisors in Saudi Arabia in the pre-Gulf War period.

The naval parity analysis was done over a weekend playing a simulated war game pitting the Indian and Pakistani navies in a war situation and finding out what the optimal performance, the battle utility and combat risk minimization would be for both navies.

Hope this helps!

Nobody can deny that in sum Kargil has been a major setback of disastrous proportions. The tragedy is that not only we were in the right but what was won on the snowy

heights with the blood of our youth has again been lost on

the slippery slopes of the negotiating table. For the sake of

national unity and the morale of the Armed Forces this is no

time to indulge in finger-pointing and recriminations but to

close ranks lest divided we fall.

Let us first count the losses viz (1) we have never been so

politically and diplomatically isolated in the full 52 years of

our existence, even when counting 1971 (2) in accepting

the ``Mujahideen were across the Line of Control (LOC)``

when in fact they were in no-man`s land, we were stupid

enough to tacitly accept ``intrusion`` (3) by insisting that we

were not aiding the Mujahideen when every child knows

that we do (as we must) we shot our credibility into oblivion

(4) we exposed our ``China Card`` needlessly and lost

psychologically on that count when they remained mostly

neutral (5) militarily we have unnecessarily jeopardized the

morale of the Armed Forces when in fact they performed

``above and beyond the call of duty`` and (6) we have lost

the media battle across the globe in a manner that could be

devastating in the future.

Ikram Sehgal

Feroz,

I must admit that my knowledge about the military hardware and srtategies is rather limited, and, hence, I will not touch them with a ten foot gun, I mean, pole. As such, I will, for the sake of argument, accept your premise as it is.

A major flaw in your anlysis, however, is the sole emphasis that if you have the most modern weapons and fire-power, bingo! IMO, three things are crucial and very critical in attaining either a military victory or superiority. You have, for obvious reasons, completely ignored them. Let`s talk about them.

1. INFRASTRUCTURE: For a country to mount an effective attack, or defense against an attack, you need to have the infrastructure, logistic, industrial, manufacturing base, technical & technological, etc. You can mount skirmishes here and there in its absence, but cannot sustain your efforts, attack or defense, with a weak infrastructure. Pakistan, I am afraid, is woefully lacking in this respect, and, most certainly compares unfavorably with its neighbor India.

2. PERSONNEL, the HUMAN factor: The Friday Times reports that ex-chief of ISI, Gen, Gul said that India is trapped in Kashmir, that its forces will die of hunger, that in six weeks India will climb down and leave Siachin. The calibre you stupid! This person once headed a very important military arm of the country. Gen. Beg said the other day that Indian Army is frustrated and demoralized, and, hence, US and the West has hatched a conspracy to bail India out. This person was once the highest military brain. Add to this the odd collection from a short history of the nation, such military geniuses as, Yahayya Khan, Tikka Khan, Niazi, one R. Khan,etc. These were not just ordinary soldiers, they controlled the destiny, at least militarily, of the nation. We know their competency through their actions and the results generated by their commands. So, the question raised is how an army comandeered by such a motely crew bordering on a lunatic fringe will be able to utilize all that highly technologically superior hardware effectively. You may think the new generation personnel are better, but then who were their mentors and teachers? The same fringe, nay?

Another problem with the Pakistani rank and file is the religion and bigotry as the driving force, negates professionalism.

3. RESOURCES: The most important aspect of a nation`s military might is obviously resources. By resources I mean hard cash, foreign reserves, self sufficiency and continuous and consistent earning power. Pakistan in comparison to its arch rival fares extremely bad in this respect. With all that expensive and modern hardware, Pakistan cannot sustain a full-fledged military operation for more than, IMO, four months. This I believe is a very optimistic estimate. When you are at war you cannot rely on the Arabs nor on the Western agencies to bail you out financially. On the other hand, you have to replenish continuously the military supplies. Pakistan does not have a defense industry to fall back on.( This was a rush job, please excuse me for the typos.)

Re: Kant Patel # 14

You are two steps ahead of me, as usual!

The issues you have astutely refered to were to be a subject of another article, presently under work, that would have dealt with the political-strategic imperatives of the Pakistani actions. This article was the second installment in a series, which would seek to analyze the Pakistan`s motives in the present crisis. The nature of this article was to highlight the thought process of the Pakistani military leading up to the present crisis.

The next article would have addressed the issues you have raised. The intent of this article was to suggest that this operation was carefully thought out and it was not staged ad hoc, in the aftermath of Lahore, as the prima facie evidence seems to suggest.

To directly answer your points, I am in agreement with what you seem to suggest. The critical unknown in this equation is the calibre of Pak army`s leadership. Yes, the higher elechon`s leadership seems to be a matter of concern, but please try to remember this point; they planned the operation and they are not fighting it. The fighting is being mostly done by lieutants, captains, majors, colonels and NCOs, who are responsible for the tactical decisions.

Contary to what the Indian media might claim, the real Pakistani intention seems to be to internationalize the issue rather than seek to militarily deny the Indians the heights around Kargil. In this respect, the plan worked given the Clinton-Sharif joint statement on the issue.

As to the resources-infrastructure aspect, Pakistani defense industry, which is primarily a small arms industry is well suited for such a low intensity warfare. Concerning the duration of the conflict, I agree four months is too optimistic. In real terms, like I said before, the intention was not to fight the Indians, but to use the crisis as an excuse to bring it into the world`s forums and force the Indians to deal with it against their historic wishes; no third party mediations.

Once my article is posted, hopefully, you will see all your comments addressed in some detail, but the questions you have raised are very apt and important ones.

All I ask from you is for a little patience in this matter.

Ha! That was an amusing article. Thank you!

I also read some of the responses. And noticed that the author (of the article) mentions ``a variety of Indian newspapers`` and ``email from Indian friends`` as his sources on the ineptitude of the Indian military.

If his sources are genuine, why doesn`t the author post, say, 5 of those articles/email messages? Come to think of it, it always bothers me when I read in newspapers about ``reliable sources`` or ``credible sources.`` I wonder about such sources.

Let the authors set a trend, here on chowk.com, of showing reasonable evidence of veracity when they claim that they are expressing facts. Let all else remain opinions.

Re: jrspringer

I can post the e-mails as you claim and list the name of my sources to verify the information in my article. On the other hand, you are absolutely entitled to discount all of the article`s analysis for a lack of verification. If I had a choice in the matter, I would rather wish you discount this article than compromise my sources just to satisfy your incredulity.

The reason that these people offer me such information is, because I have promised not reveal their true identities. The nature of this communication is a ``back channel`` oriented one and such can not be disclosed. You are correct to imply that background sources can be dubious and open to question.

However, I can tell you, being involved in politics myself, that most newspapers who want access to key information agree to use such classifications to maintain their access to the infomation and the people who give them such information do so only under cases of ``deep background``.

Like the newspapers, if I opted to disclose their names and this precedent becomes known, I will be effectivily out of the information loop. Furthermore, I need these sources for the future intentions and I can not justify buring them for any reasons, even if that means to protect myself from my distractors.

Consequently, I can not disclose them and if this chargrins you, I am trully sorry, but access to information is not free; it has certain limitations, which have to be rigidily observed. There is a gentlemen`s agreement on this issue that I will be given certain information and in return, I have to guard the identity of my sources at all costs.

My friend, I would dearly love to oblige you in this matter, but the practical considerations do not allow me that luxury.

Re: Najib

I will post a reply to you soon.

For your info, the inability of the Indian Army to pay its officiers came from an article in India Today a few months ago.

A detailed reply will soon be posted, which should hopefully answer your post.