A Road To Siachen

This is one of the most ridiculous analyses I have ever come across! Mr Khan is merely trying to piece together an essay aimed at misinforming and ill-informing the readers. Many of the ``facts`` mentioned by him are nonsensical gibberish of drunk Pak generals at hush-hush cocktail parties.

For example, he says that at one time the Indian Army could not pay its officers! From where did he get this crap? What do you think our Army is? The Pak federal government? For the record, yes, it is true that India (unlike rogue states like China or Pakistan) has been continuously cutting down defence spending and allocating those resources to more productive purposes. This is in keeping with our peaceful motives and intent. But our soldiers are well taken care of. The defence budget cuts certainly have made things harder, but on a relative basis, we can still kick China`s pants off! Pakistan is not even a concern. It is just a nuisance, promoting terrorism.

In one breath, he says India overwhelmingly out-matches the Pak Navy just in numbers and ships etc. Yet, he also says that the Pakis have `parity` with Indian Navy, just beacuse some Pak admirals have cooked up an `apparently` infallible `strategy`! Come on, has he completely forgotten the immense damage that our aircraft carrier INS Vikrant inflicted on Pak?

Amazingly, Mr Khan contends that the Pakis have military parity (even superiority) with India. FALSE! The Pak army decided not to intervene directly and fight a proxy war instead (by using terrorists who shamelessly use Islam to justify their misdeeds). This was based on just one conclusion: Fghting a war against India would lead to yet another humiliation for the Pak army.

India has a superiority over the Pakis in ALL fields. This should not be seen by Pakistanis as a discomforting fact. The basic problem with Pakistanis is that they are keen on `competing` with a country 10 times bigger. Something like Nepal trying to compete with China! The result? Pakistan spends 85% of its resources on just two things: servicing foreign loans and spending on its military (the corrupt generals like that!).

When will Pakistan learn? It is now only HALF its original size and has lost three wars since its inception. It should pay more attention to the mis-treatment of Mohajirs and Ahmadiyas, and the possible creation of Sindhudesh.

Najib:

F.R. Khan`s article (assuming his sources of information are genuine) makes a lot more sense than your comments.

I was a member of the Pakistan military for 13 years, and have a pretty good understanding of the military strengths of both India and Pakistan. In my current profession, most the people I work with are Indian expats, so I have developed a some understanding of the Indian civilian infrastructure, as well.

India has a gigantic army, a huge air force, and a big navy. The Indian army is nearly three times the size of the US army. Paksitan has a very big army, a medium sized air force, and a small navy. Assuming the capabilities of the soldiers on both sides to be equal, one could naively deduce that India should be able to run all over Pakistan. However, that has not happened. The only major success India has achieved is the independence of Bangladesh. However that was mainly due to the civilian uprisings in East Pakistan, against West Pakistan.

It is much more difficult in war to attack than it is to defend. You need at the very least, a 3 to 1 superiority in numbers, and equipment. India has never had that kind of a superiority against Pakistan. In fact the numbers game seems to be favoring Pakistan more and more. Currently, nearly half of the Indian army is occupied in Kashmir. Another portion of the Indian army has traditionally been utilized as a defence against China. This means that the actual size of the Indian army facing Pakistan (outside Kashmir) is relatively close to the size of the Pakistan army. The Indian army has to defend a much larger border than does the Pakistan Army. This makes it impossible for India to score any major gains against Pakistan.

It is of course a given, that Pakistan cannot score any major gains against India, because the Pakistani military is just not big enough. That is why the Pakistani military has always been designed for a defensive role. However, India is vulnerable to internal strife. Currently, there are over ten freedom movements going on in India. A few of these like the Kashmiris and the Sikhs have gained a lot of momentum. In an all out war, the movements could really get out of control, and occupy a major poriton of the Indian military resources.

The other aspects are too detailed to get into here. With the advent of nuclear weapons, and the reasons I mentioned above, India and Pakistan are in a virtual stalemate. This the strongest position Pakistan has had against India, since indpendence. Any country that now initiates a full-fledged war will end up destroying both India and Pakistan.

It has been India`s good luck, that Pakistan has been ruled by corrupt and incompotent politicians. That is the main reason that Pakistan has not been able to act as an able spokesperson for the Kashmir cause. That is why I say, the Kashmiris will eventually have to win their independence on their own. Even though the common man in Pakistan is genuinely dedicated to the Kashmiri cause, the politicians will continue to make a mess of it.

Re: Najib # 9

It is always wrong and a mistake to review military matters through a Freudian prism. Like everything else in life, it is not the size of the military that matters, but how it is used!

My information about the inability of the Indian Army to pay its officer corps came from a varity of Indian newspaper accounts and from e-mails with a host of Indian friends, who confirmed those reports by their own observations. This fact was widely reported in the Indian media, which unlike its Pakistani counter-part is not shy about about demanding answers from its officals.

Whether the Indians are curtailing their defensive costs for more productive uses maybe true, but it does not distract from the truth that the Indian military has severed a serious degradation in terms of weapons procurement, deployment and in its ability to maintain an operational posture. In real terms, Indian armed forces` advantage over Pakistan is only in numbers and Pakistanis know that there is a `` window of opportunity`` to re-equate the balance of forces in the next few years.

It is true that India is buying advanced weapons platforms, but it takes, on an average five-seven years for those weapons to be fully intergrated and deployed. Lets take the example of Pakistan`s Agosta 90B submarines. From the moment Pakistan placed its order, in the early 1990s, to the time they will be fully operational with the Pakistani Navy, in 2003 hopefully, a decade would have passed. Pakistan just signed with China to co-produce FC-1 aircraft(Fighter China)and seeks to begin its serial production and its induction into Pakistan Air Force squandrons some time in 2005.

When was the last time Indian Air Force`s fighters were fitted with MLUs?

My friend, Indians are, as UR suggested, in a parity with Pakistan`s armed forces in actual combat ratios and given the lack of their force modernizations, they are having serious problems in maintaining their operational ``organizational order of battle``. Indian Air Force currently has nerarly 900 aircraft, most of them old Soviet MiG 21s, 25s, 27s, and 29s. Aside from the MiG 29, and some of its MiG 27s, its fleet of MiG 21s and 25s are nearly thirity years old and are based on designs, which are nearly forty and fifty years old. It is collection of British Sea Harriers and Speecat Jaguars are twenty plus years old.

The IAFs most modern and able weapons systems are its Mirage 2000s, and Sukhoi 30s fighter aircrafts. These aircraft, with the MiG 27s and 29s, consitute only about 250-300 of the IAFs total frontline aircrafts. Coupled with the Jaguars and some MiG 25s with MLUs, that total comes to nearly 400 aircrafts. In contrast Pakistan has 38 F-16s and nearly 200 Mirage aircraft. Even when the Chinese made fighters of PAF are discounted, that still gives the Indians a three to one parity over Pakistan and the PAF has traditionally trained with those odds in mind.

If you still think that IAF is so superior to Pakistan, then why are the Indians thinking of cutting their aircraft strenght from 900 to nearly 450 planes? The answer is that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, India does not have a cheap and easy access to Soviet spare parts to keep its planes flying and the Russians are no longer interested in being paid in ``soft money``, that is Indian rupees, for their weapons. Also, the lack of financial support has made it impossible for the Indians to maintain a 900 plane airforce.

Lets turn our attentions to the naval parity. Again, the size of the force does not matter, but the war doctrines the two forces does. Your statement, about size of the Indian Navy superiority, was flawed, because it was like comparing two software programs without understanding their applications!

Pakistan Navy does not intend to engage the Indians on open seas, but interdict their vital sea lanes and supply lines. Your carrier forces will have to come closer to Pakistan`s coastline to fight the Pakistan Navy and that will put them under our ``missile belt`` and within the range of our anti-shipping aircrafts. All of this is designed to force the Indians to adopt a defensive posture and more importantly, take away the advantage from them and make them operate their forces to the tempo of Pakistani Navy`s war aims.

Before you re-state your original cliams, I would suggest that you do a little reading and find out what is the difference between the Indians` ``carrier bubble`` and Pakistan Navy`s forward defensive tactics.

Why do you think your admirals were so concerned about the deployment of Pakistan`s Navy to their war patrols that they alreted the entire Indian western fleet? If the Indians are so powerful on the seas as you claim, then what are they afraid of vis a vis Pakistan?

My friend, military strategy depends more on intentions, force multipliers, and capabilities than it depends on a numbers game!

Re: UR

My information came from browsing through newspapers, both Indian and Pakistani, and through reading specialized defense journals like Jane`s. Also, most of the analysis came from talks, and e-mails with friends who are in the Pakistani military; in junior to middle level rannks (majors to colonels).

Some of the information/ situational analysis came from friends who are in the American militry; a few had rotated out of Pakistan on special training assignments with Special Services Group and had served with Pakistani military advisors in Saudi Arabia in the pre-Gulf War period.

The naval parity analysis was done over a weekend playing a simulated war game pitting the Indian and Pakistani navies in a war situation and finding out what the optimal performance, the battle utility and combat risk minimization would be for both navies.

Hope this helps!

Nobody can deny that in sum Kargil has been a major setback of disastrous proportions. The tragedy is that not only we were in the right but what was won on the snowy

heights with the blood of our youth has again been lost on

the slippery slopes of the negotiating table. For the sake of

national unity and the morale of the Armed Forces this is no

time to indulge in finger-pointing and recriminations but to

close ranks lest divided we fall.

Let us first count the losses viz (1) we have never been so

politically and diplomatically isolated in the full 52 years of

our existence, even when counting 1971 (2) in accepting

the ``Mujahideen were across the Line of Control (LOC)``

when in fact they were in no-man`s land, we were stupid

enough to tacitly accept ``intrusion`` (3) by insisting that we

were not aiding the Mujahideen when every child knows

that we do (as we must) we shot our credibility into oblivion

(4) we exposed our ``China Card`` needlessly and lost

psychologically on that count when they remained mostly

neutral (5) militarily we have unnecessarily jeopardized the

morale of the Armed Forces when in fact they performed

``above and beyond the call of duty`` and (6) we have lost

the media battle across the globe in a manner that could be

devastating in the future.

Ikram Sehgal

Feroz,

I must admit that my knowledge about the military hardware and srtategies is rather limited, and, hence, I will not touch them with a ten foot gun, I mean, pole. As such, I will, for the sake of argument, accept your premise as it is.

A major flaw in your anlysis, however, is the sole emphasis that if you have the most modern weapons and fire-power, bingo! IMO, three things are crucial and very critical in attaining either a military victory or superiority. You have, for obvious reasons, completely ignored them. Let`s talk about them.

1. INFRASTRUCTURE: For a country to mount an effective attack, or defense against an attack, you need to have the infrastructure, logistic, industrial, manufacturing base, technical & technological, etc. You can mount skirmishes here and there in its absence, but cannot sustain your efforts, attack or defense, with a weak infrastructure. Pakistan, I am afraid, is woefully lacking in this respect, and, most certainly compares unfavorably with its neighbor India.

2. PERSONNEL, the HUMAN factor: The Friday Times reports that ex-chief of ISI, Gen, Gul said that India is trapped in Kashmir, that its forces will die of hunger, that in six weeks India will climb down and leave Siachin. The calibre you stupid! This person once headed a very important military arm of the country. Gen. Beg said the other day that Indian Army is frustrated and demoralized, and, hence, US and the West has hatched a conspracy to bail India out. This person was once the highest military brain. Add to this the odd collection from a short history of the nation, such military geniuses as, Yahayya Khan, Tikka Khan, Niazi, one R. Khan,etc. These were not just ordinary soldiers, they controlled the destiny, at least militarily, of the nation. We know their competency through their actions and the results generated by their commands. So, the question raised is how an army comandeered by such a motely crew bordering on a lunatic fringe will be able to utilize all that highly technologically superior hardware effectively. You may think the new generation personnel are better, but then who were their mentors and teachers? The same fringe, nay?

Another problem with the Pakistani rank and file is the religion and bigotry as the driving force, negates professionalism.

3. RESOURCES: The most important aspect of a nation`s military might is obviously resources. By resources I mean hard cash, foreign reserves, self sufficiency and continuous and consistent earning power. Pakistan in comparison to its arch rival fares extremely bad in this respect. With all that expensive and modern hardware, Pakistan cannot sustain a full-fledged military operation for more than, IMO, four months. This I believe is a very optimistic estimate. When you are at war you cannot rely on the Arabs nor on the Western agencies to bail you out financially. On the other hand, you have to replenish continuously the military supplies. Pakistan does not have a defense industry to fall back on.( This was a rush job, please excuse me for the typos.)

Re: Kant Patel # 14

You are two steps ahead of me, as usual!

The issues you have astutely refered to were to be a subject of another article, presently under work, that would have dealt with the political-strategic imperatives of the Pakistani actions. This article was the second installment in a series, which would seek to analyze the Pakistan`s motives in the present crisis. The nature of this article was to highlight the thought process of the Pakistani military leading up to the present crisis.

The next article would have addressed the issues you have raised. The intent of this article was to suggest that this operation was carefully thought out and it was not staged ad hoc, in the aftermath of Lahore, as the prima facie evidence seems to suggest.

To directly answer your points, I am in agreement with what you seem to suggest. The critical unknown in this equation is the calibre of Pak army`s leadership. Yes, the higher elechon`s leadership seems to be a matter of concern, but please try to remember this point; they planned the operation and they are not fighting it. The fighting is being mostly done by lieutants, captains, majors, colonels and NCOs, who are responsible for the tactical decisions.

Contary to what the Indian media might claim, the real Pakistani intention seems to be to internationalize the issue rather than seek to militarily deny the Indians the heights around Kargil. In this respect, the plan worked given the Clinton-Sharif joint statement on the issue.

As to the resources-infrastructure aspect, Pakistani defense industry, which is primarily a small arms industry is well suited for such a low intensity warfare. Concerning the duration of the conflict, I agree four months is too optimistic. In real terms, like I said before, the intention was not to fight the Indians, but to use the crisis as an excuse to bring it into the world`s forums and force the Indians to deal with it against their historic wishes; no third party mediations.

Once my article is posted, hopefully, you will see all your comments addressed in some detail, but the questions you have raised are very apt and important ones.

All I ask from you is for a little patience in this matter.

Ha! That was an amusing article. Thank you!

I also read some of the responses. And noticed that the author (of the article) mentions ``a variety of Indian newspapers`` and ``email from Indian friends`` as his sources on the ineptitude of the Indian military.

If his sources are genuine, why doesn`t the author post, say, 5 of those articles/email messages? Come to think of it, it always bothers me when I read in newspapers about ``reliable sources`` or ``credible sources.`` I wonder about such sources.

Let the authors set a trend, here on chowk.com, of showing reasonable evidence of veracity when they claim that they are expressing facts. Let all else remain opinions.

Re: jrspringer

I can post the e-mails as you claim and list the name of my sources to verify the information in my article. On the other hand, you are absolutely entitled to discount all of the article`s analysis for a lack of verification. If I had a choice in the matter, I would rather wish you discount this article than compromise my sources just to satisfy your incredulity.

The reason that these people offer me such information is, because I have promised not reveal their true identities. The nature of this communication is a ``back channel`` oriented one and such can not be disclosed. You are correct to imply that background sources can be dubious and open to question.

However, I can tell you, being involved in politics myself, that most newspapers who want access to key information agree to use such classifications to maintain their access to the infomation and the people who give them such information do so only under cases of ``deep background``.

Like the newspapers, if I opted to disclose their names and this precedent becomes known, I will be effectivily out of the information loop. Furthermore, I need these sources for the future intentions and I can not justify buring them for any reasons, even if that means to protect myself from my distractors.

Consequently, I can not disclose them and if this chargrins you, I am trully sorry, but access to information is not free; it has certain limitations, which have to be rigidily observed. There is a gentlemen`s agreement on this issue that I will be given certain information and in return, I have to guard the identity of my sources at all costs.

My friend, I would dearly love to oblige you in this matter, but the practical considerations do not allow me that luxury.

Re: Najib

I will post a reply to you soon.

For your info, the inability of the Indian Army to pay its officiers came from an article in India Today a few months ago.

A detailed reply will soon be posted, which should hopefully answer your post.

FerozK :

I have two points to make.

First, that you should not waste your energy arguing with people regarding facts. Facts cannot be disputed while conjectures can. So pls use your energy to write more intelligent analyses.

Second, the Kashmir dispute is an extremely delicate chess game. It can neither be won by brute force nor by negotiation. It`s a matter of brinkwalking at times and queen`s gambits at others. This is what Pakistan`s strategy was in Kargill and my opinion is that it has been achieved.

Though the exact nature of the agreement reached with Clinton will emerge on Monday during PM`s address to the nation, what`s clear in the meantime in the terminology of the joint communique` is that ``Line of Control will be restored`` in it`s original form. What that means is that India will have to withdraw from Siachin and Pakistan will have to climb down from Kargill. That was the original intended trade-off in which Pakistan appears to have succeeded. Kargill was a pawn threateng the whole queen`s column in the chessboard of Kashmir.

If India does not abide by the agreement and does not vacate Siachin, mind you there are many more cliffs like Kargill to be climbed along the LOC.

FerozK your comments pls. ?

Zeemax

Absolutely Brilliant Analysis Feroz! Masterful. The only thing i don`t agree with is that this was done to forestall a military collapse at Siachin. If you mean financially, perhaps yes I agree with your reasoning, but not military. Pakistan has repeatedly allowed International media access to its side of the LOC, India has rarely done the same. I suspect because Indian troops are faring much worse than Pakistani troops at Siachin. I commend you on writing an absolute gem of an article. Nice to read your work after such a long time old buddy.

OMAR

Re: Zeemax # 19

I am in agreement with what you have said. I think that the real intention of Kargil was to internationalize the issue. Kargil was a cold calculated move by Pakistan to force India`s hand in the matter and contary to what the Indians might claim, this military operation had all the earmarks of a ``hold and drop`` operation. That is to say, it was not designed to wrest the heights from the Indians, but to force them into a situation, which would cause the world to take notice of the crisis.

Your other comment seems to be a distinct possibility. Remember, Indian ingresses on the LoC have effectivily created salients, which are like peninsulas inside Pakistani side of the LoC. In these cases, Indians are surrounded on three sides by Pakistan and these salients can easily be pinched off; hence, this issue will likely flare up again in the future.

On the topic of LoC itself, there seems to be two differing opinions. One is that LoC will revert to as delineated in the Simla agreement and second is that it will only apply to the Kargil situation. The Indians naturally would oft for the second option, because for them it is a losing situation, because of their ingresses in Qumar, Chorbalat and Neelum and Siachen. They would have to vacate all these under the Simla terms and the hawks in India would balk at such a prospect.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, its gambit worked, because the Indians, despite their military gains, are now being presented by a fait accompli: accept Simla or outside mediation. This is the critical ingredient in the whole thing. If the Indians accept Simla, and work though its auxillary the Lahore treaty, the west will not intervene, but if it does not, it will intervene to settle the issue as means to prevent another war.

The other interesting feature of this whole episode is that Pakistan also succeded in keeping this issue localized in the Kargil and managed to prevent a war. Pakistan never wanted a war with India for obvivious reasons, because it would have lost what it had gained in two months fighting in Kargil. Nawaz Sharif`s trip to Washington, and its real intentions, was to freeze the ground realities as they existed in Kargil and set the framework for a discussion on Kashmir and was not intended with the aim to withdraw the forces.

This explains the hue and cry raised by retired Pakistani generals a la Hamid Gul and Mirza Aslam Beg. The initial Pakistani ingress into Kargil was thought to be around 1-5 kms, but it ended up being in the neighborhood of 20-25 kms. Gul and Beg et al wanted a military victory in Kashmir by choking the Indian held Drass-Leh-Siachen road, and do not seem to understand that the real aim of Pakistani intentions was a political end and not a military one. Consequently, it is in Pakistani interests to freeze the situation before it turns against it; Sharif`s trip to Washington is good indicator of this.

All in all, this was a very carefully thought out operation and in review, it seems to have been planned to the last detail. Whatever the final outcome, the sheer audacity of Pakistani military planners is simply mind boggling in this matter.


Re: Najib # 16

A couple of quick points. First of all, thanks for making my point for me and secondly, it seems that we are reading from the same page after all, but with different interpretations.

Before I attempt to answer your points, please be advised that my aricle was not meant as a comparative analysis of Indian and Pakistani war strenghts and I was mildly suprised to find you acrediting it as such. This article was intended to review the military mind of Pakistan and how it came to the conclusion, which in turn intiated the crisis in Kargil.

You mentioned LCA. For the sake of argument, I will add India`s programe to build its own main battle tank, the Arjun. In both cases, even if India begins serial production of these two weapons system today, it will take, in an optimistic sense, up to 5 years before they can inducted into the Indian inventory, because they still would have to undergo field trials and final field evulations.

My question to you is this, how long have the Indians been trying yo build Arjun and LCAs ?

These programs started in early 1980s and nearly twenty years later, these systems are still not deployed with the Indian forces. The point I was trying to make in my article was that Pakistan was watching all of this and it realized that there was a ``window of vunerablity`` and the Indians were in a relative parity with Pakistan vis a vis their force structures. The Pakistanis understood that this would not last for long and they simply exploited the situation for their own ends, while the sun shone so to speak.

The article was intended to describe the Pakistani military`s situational perceptions of what was happening in India and what lessons, rightly or wrongly, it drew from it.

On the naval issues, I agree with you: no plan ever survives the first contact with the enemy and I am sure that the Indians will have counter-vailing strategies in a sea battle with Pakistan. Do you really think that the Indians want to fight Pakistani Navy under the protection PAF`s air cover and away from its own air cover. Also, please remember, Karachi is no longer the principal port of Pakistani naval operations as it was in 1971; it is Gwader.

Hence, Indians can not effectivily bottle up Pakistani navy as they once did. Let me ask you this, are the Indians really willing to come close to the Pakistani shores and risk their surface assets and if prudence suggests they might be cautious, then Pakistani navy has succeded, because it has forced the Indians think twice before they do anything.

On the issue of valor and training, I have never denied the valor of the Indian troops in Kargil and on the same token, you can not deny the amount of planning and training of Pakistani troops prior to this operation.

Pakistan has learned from its mistakes, on Siachen in 1984, well. Prior to Siachen, it had no mountain warfare school and now it does and its Special Services Groups regularly train at the German Army`s Bergjader (Mountain War School) out side of Munich in the Baravain Alps, with the British SAS on the Scottish highlands and with the Americans in the Rockies. Its forces on the Siachen are using plexi-glass igloos and thermal tents and thermal uniforms and for food, its troops are being supplied by high enegry protein bars rich in calories. Pakistani Army has been quite busy since 1984 and it is not the same army, which fought the Indians on Siachen in 1984. Where do think all that money has gone?

On matters of training, I would say that in the present situation the Indians are in a similar position as the Pakistanis were in 1984 and yes, the learning curve is going be high, but the Indians will get those heights back soon or later.

The IAF had no more losses, because it never ingressed Pakistani side of the LoC and secondly, PAF has a rigid set of RoE (rules of engagement) dealing with LoC violations. Three conditions have to be meet before PAF or Army SAMs will engage the Indians. One; the violation of LoC has to be more than 15 kms; it has to be a combat aircraft and lastly, if engaged the aircraft has to fall within Pakistani side of LoC to confirm Indian violations. All of these conditions have to be meet, before Indian planes can be engaged and destroyed.

My friend this way, you can not deny your ingressions into the Pakistani side of the LoC as you did after your MiGs were downed and then you back tracked once the evidence was shown. There is a reason and rhyme to everything, the Pakistani armed forces does! :)

The rest of your points will addressed in another article, and there is no need to get into the details here.

Hope this explantion suffices!

Refer Ferozk #20

Yeah. The Paki spin has begun. Pakistanis, both in government and out of it, have started explaining away their defeat in Kargil (this defeat is the latest in the series of humiliating defeats Pakistan has suffered). Indeed, now that the Indians have begun capturing point after point (Tiger Hills, Batalik, ...), the Pakis are now trying to tell us how all this was planned. But the way Pak reinforcements are still trying to get into the Indian side and launch new offensives, this certainly was NOT an attempt to `hold and drop`. But then, how can you tell the world that you had your butts kicked! So, tell them that all this was `pre-planned`. Interesting. The spin is on.

Dear Feroz,

``On the other side of the coin, its proxy war against the Indians, waged through militant guerrilla movements, seemed to be dying out ...``

Bless you ! Having admitted the truth, I hope now that Pakistanis at Chowk will not ask questions like ``What are 400,000 Indian troops doing in Kashmir`` and will stop using phrases like ``Indian Oppression``.

``The Ukrainian build T-80UD main battle tank, which forms the iron fist of Pakistan Army’s strike corps and is the most technologically advanced and potent tank in the sub-continent ...``

I remember similar words being said about the Patton tank, many years back. The battle of Longewala should remind us not to get carried away. 80 pakistani Patton tanks were stopped in their tracks and decimated by a combination of Indian Centurions (WWII vintage) and Hunter jets. Longewala is still referred to as ``Patton`s graveyard``.

Do you have any proof for these or are you just pandering to the fantasies of your Pakistani readers:

(1) ``The Indian Army was so desperate for financial assistance that it could not even pay its officer corps ...``

(2) ``The Indian middle class, who had traditionally staffed the officer corps of the Indian Army, was leaving it in droves and the army was becoming a hollow shell without any officers to lead it``.

(3) ``The Indian Air Force is so short of spare parts that it had limited its training flights, with the result that its pilots were spending less time in the air.``

Are you aware that Hindustan Aeronautics Limited is producing all the MIGs by a Licensed agreement with Russia.

(4) ``.. the Indian Air Force attained the highest accident rates in the entire world.``



``Furthermore, this was the only road that connected Siachen with the rest of India’s network of military bases in Kashmir. By cutting Indian access to it, it was hoped to isolate Indian troops on Siachen...``

According the Gen. Malik (Indian), this was no longer a threat after the first few days of the Kargil war. Maybe they had worked out something.

This will keep me amused for some time:

``The Pakistani intentions, as explained above, are quite clear, but they seem to get lost, because this military operation, in Kargil, is absolutely brilliant in its simplicity, which makes it impossible to rationalize Pakistani motives.``

Timeliness of this article is amazing, so much has happened in the two weeks since this article.

The clinton sherif accord is there, indian army is continueing with its campaign. It appears that pak will have to organise the withdrawal of intruders quickly. India has already captured the strategic heights overlooking the highway.

I dia can very well leave the rest of the peaks for better times.

Any pak organised withdrawal should include talks of safe passage, which india will disagree.

It all leads to only one conclusion, the clinton-sheriff accord has faileed to deliver and as such there is no `internationalisation` of kashmir.

The intruders have been driven out by the indian troops, the declaration is redundant. The mujahideen comments of not agreeing is god sent for the indians. Sherif has failed again by not acting and agreeing to withdraw promptly. A categorical statement that mujahideen will not get military support from the pak army would have been a concrete step and such would havebeen in line with the clinton sherif accord.

FerozK :

The naval doctrines analysed by you make a lot of sense i.e. India geared for open sea warfare (air-craft carrier based strategy) while Pakistan geared for coastal warfare (submarines, gunboats)in a defensive mode.

What would be the scenario in the case of a naval blockade of the merchant shipping lanes leading to Karachi in the open sea ? I understand this option was seriously considered by India of being the ONLY viable one to gain bargaining power over Kargill, given it`s disadvantageous position in land and air.

Re: Anarayan`s comments

Hahaha An! Don`t even mention HAL producing MIGs in front of the poor IAF pilots that have to fly them, you`ll hear an earful that would make a

whore blush. India has lost 12 aircraft plus appx 3 probables in the last 4 months (only 2 admitted combat losses 1 Mig, 1 Mi-17), i.e the rest to maintenace problems; they have crashed and IAF pilots have been killed in the Mig21 `deathbed`, (pun on the `fishbed`:) especially. In the 80s and uptil 1995 the IAF was losing 40 aircraft a year (in peacetime!)to crashes alone. So, this can only be accounted for by a combination of 3 factors 1) Poor pilot flying skills, (and each subsequent crash only lowers morale further, and keeps bright, intelligent Indian Individuals away from the Airforce to say nothing of the pay scale) 2) Poor standards of local manufacture by HAL and quality of production 3) Poor maintenace (here also, pay scales determine the quality of individuals that join to serve and this quality is obviously not at a par with the PAF, as in the case of pilots as well).

How else do you explain the fact away that the IAF has had very high `accident` rates over the past 12-15 years. (There was some improvement from 1995 on after a concerted program, but it all seems to be sliding away now). Every crash, every death during peacetime is a dagger piercing the heart of the IAFs Pilots cadres. Will i be next, will my engine fail today/tommorrow ...? is the unspoken thought on most IAF pilots minds, to say nothing of their wives and family`s worries. There are at any given time over 300 pending letters of resignation at IAF HQ from pilots (Source Bharat-Rakshak site I believe from memory). The best simply want out, whats left is garbage just keeping its fingers crossed until the next engine failure (forget about encounters with the PAF being a likely cause of death for right now, when that happens there are gonna be a lot more ladies in India permenantly wearing white, with the saffron wiped off their heads like we see in dramatic moments in Indian flicks). Oh, the tears of the widows, can all be laid at the doorsteps of the 3 above factors. Its a known fact that nowadays only below average people with few other prospects in life join the Indian armed forces. The smart ones for whom the private sector can pay their real value (like the case of the webmaster of the 1965 site on Bharat-Rakshak) get out pretty fast.

On the other hand its also a well known fact that the PAF selects only 1/100 applicants after screening and maintains high quality. And the PAF is also flying old aircraft, but its Falcons (Cheels/eagles) are not just falling out of the sky at the rate the IAFs pigeons (kabutars) are!:) so, pardon my smug hehehe at your attempt to speak highly of HAL manufacturing Migs (now or in the future). The fact is the Indians are just inferior quality material. And will remain such, until they can pay better and motivate better. The fire in their bellies is missing. The willingness to take risks and to die if necessary is missing in this bunch of jokers-mediocres. Dal-roti and lungi plus chappals are their raison d`etre, not a willingness to embrace martyrdom (for what? Possibility of reincarnation as cats/dogs/Cows/etc?) Gimme a break buddy. Ain`t too likely. They have NOTHING worth dying for at stake. Thats India`s problem and that is the difference between them and the mujahideen who continue their stuggle against over half a million soldiers/police in Kashmir even today. The death of every Indian soldier is being celebrated in Indian occupied Kashmir by Indian citizens today. So you open your eyes!

Omar