Citizenship Rights for a Better Future
Bilal Ahmad July 10, 1999
#22 Posted by ferozk on July 22, 1999 5:31:51 pm
Re: wasiqnawaz # 21
I would agree with you, but the question is just how does a nation pick the right man on the horse back to rule it?
It is cases like these, which reminds one of what Ben Franklin once said,``those who give up some of their liberties for a little security, end up by having neither!``
I would agree with you, but the question is just how does a nation pick the right man on the horse back to rule it?
It is cases like these, which reminds one of what Ben Franklin once said,``those who give up some of their liberties for a little security, end up by having neither!``
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#21 Posted by wasiqnawaz on July 22, 1999 2:10:11 pm
Just to add a few words to my earlier comments: I think you mischaracterize Britain`s political development. Far from being a state whose power was based on popular consent helped along by successful persuasion, the history of Britain especially after the Glorious Revolution of 1689 was very violent. Universal suffrage came very late. Parliament was not elected, but hereditary and exemplified Republican rather than Democratic values. The Industrial Revolution coincided with labor unrest (remember the Luddites) always supressed violently.
Britain was run in ways similar to its colonies. The state in London depended on the loyalty of local powerbrokers, the aristocracy, all seated, unlike workers or peasants, in Parliament. Overtime, this small group of intermediaries grew to encompass the wealthy Industrial Bourgeosie but not the masses. The labor party and populist politicians are relatively recent arrivals,largely confined to the post-war era.
Remember, the great mass-based Democratic Revolution that capped the Enlightenment happened not in Britain, but in 1789 France also producing, immediately afterwards, the Great Terror. The British elite reacted cooly to France`s experiment. For a sample, try reading ``Reflections on the Revolution in France`` by Edmund Burke.
You are right to point to the link between Pakistan and the colonial entity that preceded it; others such as Hamza Alavi, writing about the Post Colonial state, have done the same, however, I don`t believe the link provides useful solutions for Pakistan.
Rather, we must look to other poor countries that are barely functioning because of corruption, popular withdrawal from the political process, and a break down in law and order for answers.
The reason I harp on the idea of strong central authority is that a certain kind of dictatorship focused on law, order, and economic growth has worked to bring several Third World countries back to their feet. Chile`s Augusto Pinochet inherited a country on the verge of meltdown and left it as the fastest growing economy in the world, Fujimoro brought Peru up from the brink of takeover by the Shining Path through violent repression and anti-democratic policy of centralization of authority in his person, in 1965 Suharto took the helm of a country that had gone through a mass slaughter and by 1985 had moved 70% of the population above the poverty line (the recent Currency Crisis and its fallout non-withstanding). General Park Chung Hee of Korea was a ruthless dictator, but ask anyone who is most responsible for turning Korea from a 1950s backwater at a lower per capital income level than Pakistan and transformed it into an international economic power and they`ll invariably credit the dictator.
Obviously, dictatorship only works some of the time. There are at least as many examples of failed states run by despots. What I am trying to argue is that talk of democracy needs to be tempered with a hard look around the world. Democracy may produce governments that are popular with Amnesty international and the liberal Western intelligensia; but it generally takes a very poor and chaotic polity in too many opposing and contradictory directions, all I might add, to the people`s misfortune. What progress requires is discipline and order first and only later can we afford all the high minded talk of citizen`s rights.
Britain was run in ways similar to its colonies. The state in London depended on the loyalty of local powerbrokers, the aristocracy, all seated, unlike workers or peasants, in Parliament. Overtime, this small group of intermediaries grew to encompass the wealthy Industrial Bourgeosie but not the masses. The labor party and populist politicians are relatively recent arrivals,largely confined to the post-war era.
Remember, the great mass-based Democratic Revolution that capped the Enlightenment happened not in Britain, but in 1789 France also producing, immediately afterwards, the Great Terror. The British elite reacted cooly to France`s experiment. For a sample, try reading ``Reflections on the Revolution in France`` by Edmund Burke.
You are right to point to the link between Pakistan and the colonial entity that preceded it; others such as Hamza Alavi, writing about the Post Colonial state, have done the same, however, I don`t believe the link provides useful solutions for Pakistan.
Rather, we must look to other poor countries that are barely functioning because of corruption, popular withdrawal from the political process, and a break down in law and order for answers.
The reason I harp on the idea of strong central authority is that a certain kind of dictatorship focused on law, order, and economic growth has worked to bring several Third World countries back to their feet. Chile`s Augusto Pinochet inherited a country on the verge of meltdown and left it as the fastest growing economy in the world, Fujimoro brought Peru up from the brink of takeover by the Shining Path through violent repression and anti-democratic policy of centralization of authority in his person, in 1965 Suharto took the helm of a country that had gone through a mass slaughter and by 1985 had moved 70% of the population above the poverty line (the recent Currency Crisis and its fallout non-withstanding). General Park Chung Hee of Korea was a ruthless dictator, but ask anyone who is most responsible for turning Korea from a 1950s backwater at a lower per capital income level than Pakistan and transformed it into an international economic power and they`ll invariably credit the dictator.
Obviously, dictatorship only works some of the time. There are at least as many examples of failed states run by despots. What I am trying to argue is that talk of democracy needs to be tempered with a hard look around the world. Democracy may produce governments that are popular with Amnesty international and the liberal Western intelligensia; but it generally takes a very poor and chaotic polity in too many opposing and contradictory directions, all I might add, to the people`s misfortune. What progress requires is discipline and order first and only later can we afford all the high minded talk of citizen`s rights.
#20 Posted by wasiqnawaz on July 22, 1999 12:38:43 pm
I`m familiar with the concept of rule through popular consent rather than state coercion. You bring to light some powerful examples of the horrors of repression and obviously these methods have failed in East Pakistan, but despite the brutality you describe, Baluchistan is still a part of Pakistan. When I visited Quetta, Kalat, and Sibi this March, there was no sign of armed rebellion; the army successfully eliminated secessionists. What I`m getting at is: do not go overboard in underestimating the role of repression and violence in keeping states together and restoring public order while also overestimating the feasability of persuading citizens to offer loyalty and support.
You seem to think that if Britain became a stable democratic society held together by the consent of the masses rather than the repression of the state, the same might, one day, happen in Pakistan--if only we were able to follow their lead.
A cursory examination of several democratic states shows us how, even they, deal with secessionists and those who threaten public order (heavy on coercion almost no effort at persuasion). Britain jails (though it doesn`t torture) IRA cadres. The U.S. guns down self styled militias in Montana (remember Ruby Ridge Idaho, the violent supression of the Black Panthers, the Fire in Waco after the Branch Dravidian hostage drama). Spain violently supresses its Basque seperatists. Granted, there is less evidence of torture, rape, and wanton genocide in all these cases, but that is more a matter of these threats being minor as opposed to very serious threats which are dealt with brutally. Witness the way Union forces destroyed much of the South after defeating the confederacy (i.e. Mobile Alabama).
The more relevant example is the Third World where illiteracy, poverty, and more immediate legacies of social injustice make persuasion through rhetoric less feasible. In Columbia, the President has failed to stop a rebel movement through nonviolence, while in Peru a violent counter insurgency has wiped out a very similar movement.
Wasiq Nawaz
You seem to think that if Britain became a stable democratic society held together by the consent of the masses rather than the repression of the state, the same might, one day, happen in Pakistan--if only we were able to follow their lead.
A cursory examination of several democratic states shows us how, even they, deal with secessionists and those who threaten public order (heavy on coercion almost no effort at persuasion). Britain jails (though it doesn`t torture) IRA cadres. The U.S. guns down self styled militias in Montana (remember Ruby Ridge Idaho, the violent supression of the Black Panthers, the Fire in Waco after the Branch Dravidian hostage drama). Spain violently supresses its Basque seperatists. Granted, there is less evidence of torture, rape, and wanton genocide in all these cases, but that is more a matter of these threats being minor as opposed to very serious threats which are dealt with brutally. Witness the way Union forces destroyed much of the South after defeating the confederacy (i.e. Mobile Alabama).
The more relevant example is the Third World where illiteracy, poverty, and more immediate legacies of social injustice make persuasion through rhetoric less feasible. In Columbia, the President has failed to stop a rebel movement through nonviolence, while in Peru a violent counter insurgency has wiped out a very similar movement.
Wasiq Nawaz
#19 Posted by bahmad on July 22, 1999 10:01:38 am
In response to Wasiq Nawaz (Reply # 18, Reply #12):
In his Reply #18, Mr. Wasiq Nawaz has raised many questions and comments some of which are based on his worldview, some on his understanding of the notions of coercion and repression, and some perhaps on his misunderstanding and misinterpretation of my writing. Mr. Wasiq Nawaz`s response has in a way confused me, and under such a state of mind I would prefer not to answer his questions and comments one by one. Here follows a more general response, and perhaps a clarification, of my position (please refer to my article too).
In modern social thought, the notion of legitimacy suggests that a state (or a regime) is legitimate if it is believed to be legitimate by the people. Although a state cannot maintain the rule of law without the power to coerce, a state becomes autocratic if coercion outweighs persuasion. Repression can win silence not the voluntary consent of the people. A state tends to lose its legitimacy if an increasing number of people tend to withdraw their support in one form or another.
Borrowing from Ranajit Guha (the Dean of Indian Subaltern Studies), I wrote in my article that: ``The British established an autocracy in colonial India in which coercion outweighed persuasion. Ironically, this state was fundamentally different from the one that evolved in England where persuasion outweighed coercion.`` Thus, in colonial India, the British won the hearts and mind of a select few (particularly the rajas, nawabs, and other opportunists). Why? We all know the answer.
Le me restate: A coercive state apparatus is undoubtedly a necessary component of a state. The problem, however, develops when coercion outweighs persuasion. The more a state tends to lean toward coercion vis a vis persuasion the more autocratic (and repressive) it becomes.
In my article, I wrote: ``The autocracy established in colonial India is alive and well in contemporary Pakistan. It has become rather a ruthless and chaotic autocracy where the feudal lords, urban-based elite, and bureaucracy (particularly the army) have taken refuge in the dominant ideology and the perceived threat to national security to quell dissent and resistance.`` The history of Pakistan is full of actions where the state ruthlessly violated the basic citizenship and human rights of Pakistani citizens. A case in point is the immensely sad tale of army action in East Pakistan. Our coercive state apparatus has engaged in many more similar (though smaller in magnitude) actions that most Pakistani citizens are not aware of (or they do not want to be aware of). Tariq Ali, for example, quoted the following paragraph in his book ``Can Pakistan Survive: The Death of a State`` (Verso, 1983):
``In contrast [to the Baluchistan People`s Liberation Front treatment of all Pakistani army prisoners] the enemy [i.e. the Pakistan Army] carries out savage tortures and summarily executes our captured campatriots. The army has captured over 5,000 men, women and children from BPLF zones. 95 per cent of these have been brutally tortured. Apart from the standard practice of severe beatings, limbs are broken or cut off; eyes gouged out; electric shocks are applied, especially to the genitals; beards and hair are torn out; finger nails ripped; water and food withheld, which in the summer months often turns out to be fatal. Ten fighters have become permanently deranged due to electric shock and torture. Women, in addition to being subject to these tortures, are also raped. After this they invariably commit suicide because they are too ashamed to return to their families. The prisoners who are released as being of no further use to the enemy all immediately return to the BPLG and insist on fighting again, although many of them are so badly cut up that they cannot hold a rifle or walk properly (Ali, 1983: 120-21).``
It is our discretion to believe or not believe this story. Our choice, however, will not make this story true or false. What if there is some element of truth in it? If so, what kind of nation are we that continue to support our coercive state apparatus that commits such kind of transgressions? What kind of people are we not to protest against such events? Did we protest the genocide in East Pakistan? Did we ever repent? Did we learn any lesson? Yet, the rulers and the state apparatus still find no difficulty in labeling any form of dissent (peaceful or violent) as an anti-Pakistan act. Najam Sethi saga is a recent example of the misuse of state power. Sethi is now free. If he is what the government thought he was, why he is free? To me, his freedom is an evidence of his innocence. It also shows that there are still people in our country (especially in the Judiciary) who can distinguish between the right and wrong with some degree of freedom. However, the executive branch of the government of Pakistan lacks the decency to ask for forgiveness to this man and his family (and the nation at large). This is a simple example of the violation of the fundamental citizenship and human rights of the people by a ``ruthless and chaotic autocracy.`` This is what I am opposed to. This is what I mean by repression.
Why would a state become overly coercive (autocratic) when it could choose to win public support through persuasion? This is not an easy question to answer, though it must be answered. Mr. Wasiq, I agree with your observation that Pakistan is a weak state. I have already said that: ``Repression and autocracy are signs of weakness (not strength). In this sense, you are right that Pakistan is a weak state. A weak state has every reason to violate the citizenship rights since it cannot by its very nature (capacity) honor such rights`` (see Reply #12). Pakistani political system is top-down. In this sense, the Pakistani state is elitist. We all are aware of the performance of our ruling elite (most of them, not merely a few political leaders). What do the ruling elite do? Using an analogy from Marx, they simply accumulate, and accumulate, and accumulate more political power (and other material benefits). As capitalists have often accumulated wealth through exploitation (of one form or another), the ruling elite accumulate political power and associated material benefits using a number of strategies. In my article, I wrote: [Pakistan has become] a ruthless and chaotic autocracy where the feudal lords, urban-based elite, and bureaucracy (particularly the army) have taken refuge in the dominant ideology and the perceived threat to national security to quell dissent and resistance.`` The ruling elite in Pakistan use the dominant ideology and the rule of danda as a means to legitimize and sustain their power. It is of vital importance to understand that by focusing upon class relations and the constraints on politics imposed by the main sources of power (both domestic and foreign) that an adequate basis can be established for understanding the current crisis tendencies in Pakistan. Why don`t common people resist? In fact, they do by withdrawing their support. This fail safe strategy is insufficient and, in the long run, self-destructive. I wrote: ``. . . too much power in the hands of the corrupt and unresponsive ruling elite (supported by the rule of danda and monopoly over the means of violence), an unjust system of for the distribution of resources, poor economic performance, conspicuous consumption, a very high rate of population growth, and an overall lack of appreciation of nonviolent means of resolving domestic and international conflicts has created enormous difficulties for the evolution of society that recognizes and values its rights and duties.``
Coercion (i.e. following a reasonable level of law and order) for me is not the same as repression. Najam Sethi was not arrested according to the reasonable standards of the law. He was rather kidnaped by the coercive forces of the state. This is what makes a state repressive (though according the interpretation of the law the state had every right to arrest him and try him in a court of law). A person is innocent unless proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt by a ``just`` court of law. In Pakistani police stations, a person is not only considered guilty from the outset but is often brutalized and occasionally punished to death. The death of Mohammad Shafiq is a good example. I recorded my protest against such violence in the following letter to the editor.
Good teacher, bad students
(Frontier Post, June 4, 1999)
Quid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah taught us to stand for our rights. The brutal death of MQM activist, Mohammad Shafiq (alias Kalia) at the hands of Karachi police, suggests to ignore his teachings. Quid-e-Azam was a decent human being but he never dreamt of the atrocious misuse of power by the Pakistani police.
Bilal Ahmad
USA
In Pakistan, most people symbolize the state in the personality and actions of a single leader (BB, NS, or in future perhaps IK). This is a grave mistake. The power of state lies in our state institutions (effective or ineffective; responsive or unresponsive). In any regime, the decisions are never made by a single person. We always talk about the top leader but rarely talk about the institutions. Self-imposed budding leaders, like Imran Khan, may be very honest and sincere. What can such leaders do if the state apparatus is virtually corrupt and rotten? A single leader, or a collection of good leaders, cannot bring change if the society itself is not prepared to bring a change. In order to deal with our problems, we need to understand the underlying structural conditions and develop a new vision for the better future of our coming generations. This in my view is the best course to follow in order to transform our state, civil society, and economy.
Best wishes, Bilal Ahmad
In his Reply #18, Mr. Wasiq Nawaz has raised many questions and comments some of which are based on his worldview, some on his understanding of the notions of coercion and repression, and some perhaps on his misunderstanding and misinterpretation of my writing. Mr. Wasiq Nawaz`s response has in a way confused me, and under such a state of mind I would prefer not to answer his questions and comments one by one. Here follows a more general response, and perhaps a clarification, of my position (please refer to my article too).
In modern social thought, the notion of legitimacy suggests that a state (or a regime) is legitimate if it is believed to be legitimate by the people. Although a state cannot maintain the rule of law without the power to coerce, a state becomes autocratic if coercion outweighs persuasion. Repression can win silence not the voluntary consent of the people. A state tends to lose its legitimacy if an increasing number of people tend to withdraw their support in one form or another.
Borrowing from Ranajit Guha (the Dean of Indian Subaltern Studies), I wrote in my article that: ``The British established an autocracy in colonial India in which coercion outweighed persuasion. Ironically, this state was fundamentally different from the one that evolved in England where persuasion outweighed coercion.`` Thus, in colonial India, the British won the hearts and mind of a select few (particularly the rajas, nawabs, and other opportunists). Why? We all know the answer.
Le me restate: A coercive state apparatus is undoubtedly a necessary component of a state. The problem, however, develops when coercion outweighs persuasion. The more a state tends to lean toward coercion vis a vis persuasion the more autocratic (and repressive) it becomes.
In my article, I wrote: ``The autocracy established in colonial India is alive and well in contemporary Pakistan. It has become rather a ruthless and chaotic autocracy where the feudal lords, urban-based elite, and bureaucracy (particularly the army) have taken refuge in the dominant ideology and the perceived threat to national security to quell dissent and resistance.`` The history of Pakistan is full of actions where the state ruthlessly violated the basic citizenship and human rights of Pakistani citizens. A case in point is the immensely sad tale of army action in East Pakistan. Our coercive state apparatus has engaged in many more similar (though smaller in magnitude) actions that most Pakistani citizens are not aware of (or they do not want to be aware of). Tariq Ali, for example, quoted the following paragraph in his book ``Can Pakistan Survive: The Death of a State`` (Verso, 1983):
``In contrast [to the Baluchistan People`s Liberation Front treatment of all Pakistani army prisoners] the enemy [i.e. the Pakistan Army] carries out savage tortures and summarily executes our captured campatriots. The army has captured over 5,000 men, women and children from BPLF zones. 95 per cent of these have been brutally tortured. Apart from the standard practice of severe beatings, limbs are broken or cut off; eyes gouged out; electric shocks are applied, especially to the genitals; beards and hair are torn out; finger nails ripped; water and food withheld, which in the summer months often turns out to be fatal. Ten fighters have become permanently deranged due to electric shock and torture. Women, in addition to being subject to these tortures, are also raped. After this they invariably commit suicide because they are too ashamed to return to their families. The prisoners who are released as being of no further use to the enemy all immediately return to the BPLG and insist on fighting again, although many of them are so badly cut up that they cannot hold a rifle or walk properly (Ali, 1983: 120-21).``
It is our discretion to believe or not believe this story. Our choice, however, will not make this story true or false. What if there is some element of truth in it? If so, what kind of nation are we that continue to support our coercive state apparatus that commits such kind of transgressions? What kind of people are we not to protest against such events? Did we protest the genocide in East Pakistan? Did we ever repent? Did we learn any lesson? Yet, the rulers and the state apparatus still find no difficulty in labeling any form of dissent (peaceful or violent) as an anti-Pakistan act. Najam Sethi saga is a recent example of the misuse of state power. Sethi is now free. If he is what the government thought he was, why he is free? To me, his freedom is an evidence of his innocence. It also shows that there are still people in our country (especially in the Judiciary) who can distinguish between the right and wrong with some degree of freedom. However, the executive branch of the government of Pakistan lacks the decency to ask for forgiveness to this man and his family (and the nation at large). This is a simple example of the violation of the fundamental citizenship and human rights of the people by a ``ruthless and chaotic autocracy.`` This is what I am opposed to. This is what I mean by repression.
Why would a state become overly coercive (autocratic) when it could choose to win public support through persuasion? This is not an easy question to answer, though it must be answered. Mr. Wasiq, I agree with your observation that Pakistan is a weak state. I have already said that: ``Repression and autocracy are signs of weakness (not strength). In this sense, you are right that Pakistan is a weak state. A weak state has every reason to violate the citizenship rights since it cannot by its very nature (capacity) honor such rights`` (see Reply #12). Pakistani political system is top-down. In this sense, the Pakistani state is elitist. We all are aware of the performance of our ruling elite (most of them, not merely a few political leaders). What do the ruling elite do? Using an analogy from Marx, they simply accumulate, and accumulate, and accumulate more political power (and other material benefits). As capitalists have often accumulated wealth through exploitation (of one form or another), the ruling elite accumulate political power and associated material benefits using a number of strategies. In my article, I wrote: [Pakistan has become] a ruthless and chaotic autocracy where the feudal lords, urban-based elite, and bureaucracy (particularly the army) have taken refuge in the dominant ideology and the perceived threat to national security to quell dissent and resistance.`` The ruling elite in Pakistan use the dominant ideology and the rule of danda as a means to legitimize and sustain their power. It is of vital importance to understand that by focusing upon class relations and the constraints on politics imposed by the main sources of power (both domestic and foreign) that an adequate basis can be established for understanding the current crisis tendencies in Pakistan. Why don`t common people resist? In fact, they do by withdrawing their support. This fail safe strategy is insufficient and, in the long run, self-destructive. I wrote: ``. . . too much power in the hands of the corrupt and unresponsive ruling elite (supported by the rule of danda and monopoly over the means of violence), an unjust system of for the distribution of resources, poor economic performance, conspicuous consumption, a very high rate of population growth, and an overall lack of appreciation of nonviolent means of resolving domestic and international conflicts has created enormous difficulties for the evolution of society that recognizes and values its rights and duties.``
Coercion (i.e. following a reasonable level of law and order) for me is not the same as repression. Najam Sethi was not arrested according to the reasonable standards of the law. He was rather kidnaped by the coercive forces of the state. This is what makes a state repressive (though according the interpretation of the law the state had every right to arrest him and try him in a court of law). A person is innocent unless proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt by a ``just`` court of law. In Pakistani police stations, a person is not only considered guilty from the outset but is often brutalized and occasionally punished to death. The death of Mohammad Shafiq is a good example. I recorded my protest against such violence in the following letter to the editor.
Good teacher, bad students
(Frontier Post, June 4, 1999)
Quid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah taught us to stand for our rights. The brutal death of MQM activist, Mohammad Shafiq (alias Kalia) at the hands of Karachi police, suggests to ignore his teachings. Quid-e-Azam was a decent human being but he never dreamt of the atrocious misuse of power by the Pakistani police.
Bilal Ahmad
USA
In Pakistan, most people symbolize the state in the personality and actions of a single leader (BB, NS, or in future perhaps IK). This is a grave mistake. The power of state lies in our state institutions (effective or ineffective; responsive or unresponsive). In any regime, the decisions are never made by a single person. We always talk about the top leader but rarely talk about the institutions. Self-imposed budding leaders, like Imran Khan, may be very honest and sincere. What can such leaders do if the state apparatus is virtually corrupt and rotten? A single leader, or a collection of good leaders, cannot bring change if the society itself is not prepared to bring a change. In order to deal with our problems, we need to understand the underlying structural conditions and develop a new vision for the better future of our coming generations. This in my view is the best course to follow in order to transform our state, civil society, and economy.
Best wishes, Bilal Ahmad
#18 Posted by wasiqnawaz on July 20, 1999 5:23:21 pm
Reply to B.Ahmed (#14):
You argue implicitly that If a state is repressive, it must be because it has lost its ability to persuade its citizens of its own legitimacy nonviolently, but this framework is overly dualistic. Isn`t public order and the ability to contain chaos (through violence) a prerequisite to developing some modicum of legitimacy? In other words, legitimacy depends on order which depends on a combination of state coercion and public consent.
I disagree with your description of a modern state`s evolution. It seems to imply that if just the proper ideology were to arise and everybody just happened to agree with it, a state with no need for repressive apparatus would come in to existence. This has never happened.
The Pakistani state has tried to manufacture some form of legitimacy by claiming to be Islamic. This, however, has not made up for its inability to provide the basic public goods one expects from a functioning state: safe streets, accountable officials, clean water, secure borders, etc.
Inevitably any ruler who steps in with the intent of remedying the situation will talk about upholding citizen`s rights which include the right to feel safe and secure from criminals in and out of uniform. This will require the new ruler to purge the state apparatus and wipe out banditry--again, this will depend on the efficient and effective use of some violence.
People value their rights to vote, to speak openly, and to participate in public life; but these rights are secondary to our more basic needs: food, health, shelter, and physical safety.
Wasiq Nawaz
You argue implicitly that If a state is repressive, it must be because it has lost its ability to persuade its citizens of its own legitimacy nonviolently, but this framework is overly dualistic. Isn`t public order and the ability to contain chaos (through violence) a prerequisite to developing some modicum of legitimacy? In other words, legitimacy depends on order which depends on a combination of state coercion and public consent.
I disagree with your description of a modern state`s evolution. It seems to imply that if just the proper ideology were to arise and everybody just happened to agree with it, a state with no need for repressive apparatus would come in to existence. This has never happened.
The Pakistani state has tried to manufacture some form of legitimacy by claiming to be Islamic. This, however, has not made up for its inability to provide the basic public goods one expects from a functioning state: safe streets, accountable officials, clean water, secure borders, etc.
Inevitably any ruler who steps in with the intent of remedying the situation will talk about upholding citizen`s rights which include the right to feel safe and secure from criminals in and out of uniform. This will require the new ruler to purge the state apparatus and wipe out banditry--again, this will depend on the efficient and effective use of some violence.
People value their rights to vote, to speak openly, and to participate in public life; but these rights are secondary to our more basic needs: food, health, shelter, and physical safety.
Wasiq Nawaz
#17 Posted by mwzaman on July 18, 1999 8:50:25 am
MWZAMAN’S RESPONSE # 4
JULY 18, 1999
W.Zaman Manik`s esponse to KANTEPATEL (REPLY # 9, Dated July 14, 1999):
I thank you very for your response. I enjoyed your comments. The political history of early years of Pakistan is well documented. Many scholars (both sub-continental and foreign scholars) have written books, dissertations and articles on the early years of Pakistan. A lot of political leaders have also recapitulated their experiences of early years of Pakistan. Yet, many Pakistani scholars conveniently ignore the authoritarian regimes of early years from their narratives of Pakistan’s history. Many Pakistanis try their best to erase the legacies of tyrannies, autocracies and excesses of the earlier regimes of Pakistan. Jinnah is still regarded as the Quaid-I-Azam by millions of Pakistanis. I have no problem with that fact. After all, each nation needs its heroes. Even after 52 years of Pakistan’s independence, it is not politically correct course of action to criticize the Founding Father’s policies, methods, modes and procedures of governance.
But the truth of the matter is that Mohammad Ali Jinnah was not above criticism. Literally speaking, Jinnah had played “GOD” with his powers and authorities as Governor General of Pakistan. Any scholar with an iota of objectivity will admit that Jinnah had left behind dangerous precedents of authoritarianism. His exercise of unlimited power had doomed the possibility of flourishing democratic norms and values in Pakistan. His successors especially Ghulam Mohammad and Iskander Mirza were like bulls in a china shop, and they had misused their positions as Governor General. Ayub Khan had introduced a self-serving totalitarian and centralized system Government.
Yet, serious studies on Quaid-I-Azam have thus far confirmed that Jinnah had left scores of precedents of authoritarianism. I welcomed Mr. Bilal Ahmad’s commentary on the rights of Citizens in Pakistan mainly because that he is at least willing to say that “autocracy is alive and well in Pakistan.” It seems to me that he is also willing to recognize that democratic values, norms and practices need to be nurtured in Pakistan. I regularly peruse soc.culture.pakistan (through dejanews) and Chowk postings just to gauge the pattern of Pakistani thinking pertaining to their government and politics—past and present. I also read books and articles on Pakistan with open mind. Unfortunately, most of those writings are characterized by jingoistic generalizations and selective narratives of the past and present. Many Pakistani scholars are also stuck up with false pride. I found some Pakistanis who even try to take pride in Pakistan’s 1971 heritage of ethnic cleansing, bloodbath and genocide in Bangladesh. That’s really despicable.
However, in all fairness, I must note that Bilal Ahmad’s analyses or generalizations about Pakistan or recommendations for Pakistan are welcome departure from many jingoistic Pakistanis. This commendable variation is quite significant given the fact that many Pakistanis don’t want to discuss the pattern of governance and politics in Pakistan of pre-1971 era.
There are some Pakistani scholars who have already critically assessed Government and Politics in Pakistan with reference to both pre- and post- 1971 era. For example, Khalid Bin Sayeed (an outstanding Pakistani scholar settled in Canada) had written two outstanding books in late 1960s: Pakistan: The Formative Phase`(Oxford University Press, 1968) and Political System of Pakistan (Houghton Mifflin, 1967).
Any scholar interested in objective study of Pakistan’s government and politics of first twenty three plus years will find relevant information and analysis ranging from Pakistan movement through the disintegration of Pakistan. These are the most authoritative works on the early years of Pakistan. Khalid Bin Sayeed is also the author of many other celebrated works and articles on Pakistan. In her much publicized book, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Cambridge University Press, 1985), Ayesha Jalal has shattered many myths about Jinnah’s leadership in spearheading the movement for Pakistan.
Let me now quickly respond to some of the points you have raised in your response:
i. yes, the imposition of Urdu as the ONLY official STATE language of Pakistan was a blatant violation of democratic norms and human decency. Jinnah sincerely believed that no ONE in Pakistan including Eastern Province would dare to question his ONE language policy. He clearly stated that both in Dhaka and other places that URDU and URDU alone shall be the State language in Pakistan. Although Bangalees vehemently challenged his one-eyed language policy, he did not deviate from his one language, one nation and one state policy. Liaquat Ali Khan and Khwaja Nazimuddin also followed Jinnah’s one language policy. They did everything to impose urdu language on the majority people of Pakistan. What a shame! I want to elaborate on this language issue in some of my writings to be posted in News From Bangladesh. I also post through deja.com in soc.culture.bangladesh, soc.culture.pakistan, soc.culture.indian, and soc.culture.bengali. (The chowk is yet to carry any of my articles for reasons only known to Chowk management).
ii. Yes, it was Jinnah’s sweet will that Karachi was selected to be the central Capital of Pakistan. I don’t think any one in Muslim League could oppose Jinnah’s desires or will both before and after the emergence of Pakistan on August 14, 1947. There is hardly any wonder why Khalid Bin Sayeed said in his 1967 book (Political System of Pakistan, P.62) that “as long as Jinnah was alive (he died in September, 1948), he was Pakistan.” I don’t think that Bengali leaders would have vehemently opposed the location of federal capital to be in Karachi. At any rate, majority of Pakistanis (East Bengalis) were not consulted by the Jinnah about the location of Pakistan’s capital. Additionally, this decision was never democratically or collegially taken. That’s the issue. This kind of personalistic ruling was everything but democratic. At the behest of Ayub Khan, the federal capital of Pakistan was transferred from Karachi to Rawalpindi and then to Islamabad without taking any input from East Pakistanis. Ayub Khan had just followed his Quaid-I-Azam’s precedent or footprint!
About your third comment: Jinnah was alive only for 13 months after Pakistan became a reality. Even within that short gestation gap, Jinnah had used his extraordinary powers to dislodge or browbeat several provincial ministries including the Government in North West Frontier Province (NWFP). By the way, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan was not the Chief Minister of NWFP. Immediately after independence, Jinnah had dismissed the Ministry of Dr, Khan Sahib (elder brother of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan) in NWFP. The following commentary this paper (which is still in the making) on the nature of centralization process in Pakistan may be relevant to you:
THE NATURE CENTRALIZATION PROCESS DURING THE EARLY YEARS OF PAKISTAN
By M. Waheeduzzaman Manik
It seems that Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the most powerful Governor General of Pakistan, was intolerant about criticism of his policies. All forms of disagreement or dissenting views from the provinces or other jurisdictions were thwarted with iron fist. From the beginning of independence, all strategies, tactics, laws, rules, and procedures were employed the Central Government for controlling the provincial ministries. As noted earlier, Jinnah had dismantled the pro-Congress Ministry of Dr. Khan Sahib in NWFP for the sole purpose of quickly installing a Muslim League Government even though the dismissed Chief Minister was enjoying majority support both inside and outside the Assembly. On a matter of principle, neither Dr. Khan Sahib nor his younger brother Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan had refused to be on their knees in front of Qiad-I-Azam or his successors.
Mohammad Ayub Khuhro, the Chief Minister of Sind, was also summarily dismissed on April 26, 1948 on the charges of corruption, favoritism, nepotism, embezzlement and misconduct. There is no doubt that some of the charges against the Chief Minister of Sind had some merits. Yet, the main reason for Khuhro’s immediate removal was opposition to Jinnah’s plan for separating the city of Karachi from the province of Sind. (Khuro’s dismissal was followed by more dismissals of ministries in Sind between 1948-’51). Although his dismissal by Jinnah was a temporary set back for him, Khuhro had proved beyond any reasonable that he had mastered the art of surviving and thriving in those early years of Pakistan’s politics of conspiracy and conflict.
Donald Wibur succinctly captured the context: “His [Khuhro’s] career in the first years of independence was marked by venality. When Jinnah ordered his dismissal as premier of Sind in 1948 [on April 26], the charge sheet contained sixty-two specific allegations of maladministration, misconduct, and corruption. Khuhro was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, only to be acquitted on appeal to the chief court of the province. Premier [of Sind] again by early 1951 Khuhro was forced to resign later the same year [1951] in the face of further allegations of corruption and mal-administration. In 1953 on the recommendation of a special tribunal the Governor general [Ghulam Mohammad] disqualified Khuhro from holding any public or representative office for six years, but the act under which his disqualification had been ordered was repealed the next year [1954], and Khuhro resumed his post [Ghulam Mohammad ousted Pirzada Abdus Sattar, the Chief Minister of Sind for his staunch opposition to One Unit Scheme], having meanwhile gained the endorsement of the central authrities by espousing a single province of West Pakistan. ……… In October, 1958 Khuhro was again arrested on charges of corruption and again disqualified from holding public office” ( Pakistan: Its People, Its Society, and Its Culture, 1964, p. 225).
Although Khan of Mamdot, first Chief Minister of West Punjab, was not fired by Jinnah, his administration was sternly reprimanded by the Governor General. Subsequently, the Central Government of Pakistan unceremoniously dismissed Khan of Mamdot, the Prime Minister of West Punjab (Punjab) on flimsy ground. He was accused of inefficiency in the administration of refugee problems. The real reason of Khan of Mamdot’s unfair dismissal in January 1949 was that his opinions on refugee issues were at sharp variance with Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan. As noted by Keith Callard that Section 92A was invoked in West Punjab by the Central Government. On the advice of the then Governor General of Pakistan (Khwaja Nazimuddin), Sir Francis Mudie, (British) Governor of West Punjab had dismissed the Ministry was Khan of Mamdot, the Provincial Assembly was dissolved, the Governor’s rule was imposed (Keith Callard, 1957, p. 160). Donald Wilbur also confirmed the imposition of Section 92A in West Punjab: “In January 1949, acting on instructions from the Governor General, Mudie dissolved the provincial legislature and established governor’s rule—which was to continue until the provincial elections [in West Punjab] in March 1951” ( Donald Wilbur’s 1964 book, p. 227).
I thank you very much for perusing my comments.
Sincerely, M. Waheeduzzaman Manik
JULY 18, 1999
W.Zaman Manik`s esponse to KANTEPATEL (REPLY # 9, Dated July 14, 1999):
I thank you very for your response. I enjoyed your comments. The political history of early years of Pakistan is well documented. Many scholars (both sub-continental and foreign scholars) have written books, dissertations and articles on the early years of Pakistan. A lot of political leaders have also recapitulated their experiences of early years of Pakistan. Yet, many Pakistani scholars conveniently ignore the authoritarian regimes of early years from their narratives of Pakistan’s history. Many Pakistanis try their best to erase the legacies of tyrannies, autocracies and excesses of the earlier regimes of Pakistan. Jinnah is still regarded as the Quaid-I-Azam by millions of Pakistanis. I have no problem with that fact. After all, each nation needs its heroes. Even after 52 years of Pakistan’s independence, it is not politically correct course of action to criticize the Founding Father’s policies, methods, modes and procedures of governance.
But the truth of the matter is that Mohammad Ali Jinnah was not above criticism. Literally speaking, Jinnah had played “GOD” with his powers and authorities as Governor General of Pakistan. Any scholar with an iota of objectivity will admit that Jinnah had left behind dangerous precedents of authoritarianism. His exercise of unlimited power had doomed the possibility of flourishing democratic norms and values in Pakistan. His successors especially Ghulam Mohammad and Iskander Mirza were like bulls in a china shop, and they had misused their positions as Governor General. Ayub Khan had introduced a self-serving totalitarian and centralized system Government.
Yet, serious studies on Quaid-I-Azam have thus far confirmed that Jinnah had left scores of precedents of authoritarianism. I welcomed Mr. Bilal Ahmad’s commentary on the rights of Citizens in Pakistan mainly because that he is at least willing to say that “autocracy is alive and well in Pakistan.” It seems to me that he is also willing to recognize that democratic values, norms and practices need to be nurtured in Pakistan. I regularly peruse soc.culture.pakistan (through dejanews) and Chowk postings just to gauge the pattern of Pakistani thinking pertaining to their government and politics—past and present. I also read books and articles on Pakistan with open mind. Unfortunately, most of those writings are characterized by jingoistic generalizations and selective narratives of the past and present. Many Pakistani scholars are also stuck up with false pride. I found some Pakistanis who even try to take pride in Pakistan’s 1971 heritage of ethnic cleansing, bloodbath and genocide in Bangladesh. That’s really despicable.
However, in all fairness, I must note that Bilal Ahmad’s analyses or generalizations about Pakistan or recommendations for Pakistan are welcome departure from many jingoistic Pakistanis. This commendable variation is quite significant given the fact that many Pakistanis don’t want to discuss the pattern of governance and politics in Pakistan of pre-1971 era.
There are some Pakistani scholars who have already critically assessed Government and Politics in Pakistan with reference to both pre- and post- 1971 era. For example, Khalid Bin Sayeed (an outstanding Pakistani scholar settled in Canada) had written two outstanding books in late 1960s: Pakistan: The Formative Phase`(Oxford University Press, 1968) and Political System of Pakistan (Houghton Mifflin, 1967).
Any scholar interested in objective study of Pakistan’s government and politics of first twenty three plus years will find relevant information and analysis ranging from Pakistan movement through the disintegration of Pakistan. These are the most authoritative works on the early years of Pakistan. Khalid Bin Sayeed is also the author of many other celebrated works and articles on Pakistan. In her much publicized book, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Cambridge University Press, 1985), Ayesha Jalal has shattered many myths about Jinnah’s leadership in spearheading the movement for Pakistan.
Let me now quickly respond to some of the points you have raised in your response:
i. yes, the imposition of Urdu as the ONLY official STATE language of Pakistan was a blatant violation of democratic norms and human decency. Jinnah sincerely believed that no ONE in Pakistan including Eastern Province would dare to question his ONE language policy. He clearly stated that both in Dhaka and other places that URDU and URDU alone shall be the State language in Pakistan. Although Bangalees vehemently challenged his one-eyed language policy, he did not deviate from his one language, one nation and one state policy. Liaquat Ali Khan and Khwaja Nazimuddin also followed Jinnah’s one language policy. They did everything to impose urdu language on the majority people of Pakistan. What a shame! I want to elaborate on this language issue in some of my writings to be posted in News From Bangladesh. I also post through deja.com in soc.culture.bangladesh, soc.culture.pakistan, soc.culture.indian, and soc.culture.bengali. (The chowk is yet to carry any of my articles for reasons only known to Chowk management).
ii. Yes, it was Jinnah’s sweet will that Karachi was selected to be the central Capital of Pakistan. I don’t think any one in Muslim League could oppose Jinnah’s desires or will both before and after the emergence of Pakistan on August 14, 1947. There is hardly any wonder why Khalid Bin Sayeed said in his 1967 book (Political System of Pakistan, P.62) that “as long as Jinnah was alive (he died in September, 1948), he was Pakistan.” I don’t think that Bengali leaders would have vehemently opposed the location of federal capital to be in Karachi. At any rate, majority of Pakistanis (East Bengalis) were not consulted by the Jinnah about the location of Pakistan’s capital. Additionally, this decision was never democratically or collegially taken. That’s the issue. This kind of personalistic ruling was everything but democratic. At the behest of Ayub Khan, the federal capital of Pakistan was transferred from Karachi to Rawalpindi and then to Islamabad without taking any input from East Pakistanis. Ayub Khan had just followed his Quaid-I-Azam’s precedent or footprint!
About your third comment: Jinnah was alive only for 13 months after Pakistan became a reality. Even within that short gestation gap, Jinnah had used his extraordinary powers to dislodge or browbeat several provincial ministries including the Government in North West Frontier Province (NWFP). By the way, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan was not the Chief Minister of NWFP. Immediately after independence, Jinnah had dismissed the Ministry of Dr, Khan Sahib (elder brother of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan) in NWFP. The following commentary this paper (which is still in the making) on the nature of centralization process in Pakistan may be relevant to you:
THE NATURE CENTRALIZATION PROCESS DURING THE EARLY YEARS OF PAKISTAN
By M. Waheeduzzaman Manik
It seems that Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the most powerful Governor General of Pakistan, was intolerant about criticism of his policies. All forms of disagreement or dissenting views from the provinces or other jurisdictions were thwarted with iron fist. From the beginning of independence, all strategies, tactics, laws, rules, and procedures were employed the Central Government for controlling the provincial ministries. As noted earlier, Jinnah had dismantled the pro-Congress Ministry of Dr. Khan Sahib in NWFP for the sole purpose of quickly installing a Muslim League Government even though the dismissed Chief Minister was enjoying majority support both inside and outside the Assembly. On a matter of principle, neither Dr. Khan Sahib nor his younger brother Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan had refused to be on their knees in front of Qiad-I-Azam or his successors.
Mohammad Ayub Khuhro, the Chief Minister of Sind, was also summarily dismissed on April 26, 1948 on the charges of corruption, favoritism, nepotism, embezzlement and misconduct. There is no doubt that some of the charges against the Chief Minister of Sind had some merits. Yet, the main reason for Khuhro’s immediate removal was opposition to Jinnah’s plan for separating the city of Karachi from the province of Sind. (Khuro’s dismissal was followed by more dismissals of ministries in Sind between 1948-’51). Although his dismissal by Jinnah was a temporary set back for him, Khuhro had proved beyond any reasonable that he had mastered the art of surviving and thriving in those early years of Pakistan’s politics of conspiracy and conflict.
Donald Wibur succinctly captured the context: “His [Khuhro’s] career in the first years of independence was marked by venality. When Jinnah ordered his dismissal as premier of Sind in 1948 [on April 26], the charge sheet contained sixty-two specific allegations of maladministration, misconduct, and corruption. Khuhro was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, only to be acquitted on appeal to the chief court of the province. Premier [of Sind] again by early 1951 Khuhro was forced to resign later the same year [1951] in the face of further allegations of corruption and mal-administration. In 1953 on the recommendation of a special tribunal the Governor general [Ghulam Mohammad] disqualified Khuhro from holding any public or representative office for six years, but the act under which his disqualification had been ordered was repealed the next year [1954], and Khuhro resumed his post [Ghulam Mohammad ousted Pirzada Abdus Sattar, the Chief Minister of Sind for his staunch opposition to One Unit Scheme], having meanwhile gained the endorsement of the central authrities by espousing a single province of West Pakistan. ……… In October, 1958 Khuhro was again arrested on charges of corruption and again disqualified from holding public office” ( Pakistan: Its People, Its Society, and Its Culture, 1964, p. 225).
Although Khan of Mamdot, first Chief Minister of West Punjab, was not fired by Jinnah, his administration was sternly reprimanded by the Governor General. Subsequently, the Central Government of Pakistan unceremoniously dismissed Khan of Mamdot, the Prime Minister of West Punjab (Punjab) on flimsy ground. He was accused of inefficiency in the administration of refugee problems. The real reason of Khan of Mamdot’s unfair dismissal in January 1949 was that his opinions on refugee issues were at sharp variance with Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan. As noted by Keith Callard that Section 92A was invoked in West Punjab by the Central Government. On the advice of the then Governor General of Pakistan (Khwaja Nazimuddin), Sir Francis Mudie, (British) Governor of West Punjab had dismissed the Ministry was Khan of Mamdot, the Provincial Assembly was dissolved, the Governor’s rule was imposed (Keith Callard, 1957, p. 160). Donald Wilbur also confirmed the imposition of Section 92A in West Punjab: “In January 1949, acting on instructions from the Governor General, Mudie dissolved the provincial legislature and established governor’s rule—which was to continue until the provincial elections [in West Punjab] in March 1951” ( Donald Wilbur’s 1964 book, p. 227).
I thank you very much for perusing my comments.
Sincerely, M. Waheeduzzaman Manik
#16 Posted by mwzaman on July 18, 1999 8:50:25 am
MWZAMAN`S RESPONSE # 5
ADEENDUM to MWZAMAN`s Response # 4
In response to KANTEPATEL (reply # 9), the following segments of my commentary got inadvertently deleted from my earlier post:
Pursuant to Section 8 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Government of India Act, 1935, with necessary and proper adaptations, was to be employed as the Interim Constitution of Pakistan.
Although 1935 Act of India had a semblance of a Federal system, the Governor General of British-India had retained methods and procedures for controlling and monitoring the governments of Provinces. However, most of the Indian provinces including Bengal from 1937 till independence in August 1947 had gained some degree of self-governance. Therefore, it was reasonably expected that Pakistan would have genuine Federal Governmental structure in which the constituent units and provinces would be granted provincial autonomy. Yet, after Pakistan emerged as independent nation-state, the provinces had lost out to the Central Government whatever rudimentary form of self- rule they enjoyed under the British from 1937 through August 14, 1947.
For instance, the Central Government of Pakistan from the days of Jinnah had ruthlessly used the powers of Governor General’s office for dislodging or controlling provincial ministries. Aimed at installing a Muslim League Government in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) under Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, Governor General Jinnah had dislodged the pro-congress Ministry of Dr, Khan Sahib (brother of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan) immediately after independence. In fact, Dr. Khan Shahib’s Ministry was dissolved on August 22, 1947. False and frivolous charges of “conspiracy” against Pakistan were brought against the Chief Minister even though the British Governor of that province vouched that Dr. Khan Shahib was not at all disloyal to Pakistan. (Adul Gaffar Khan was arrested in June 1948 for allegedly instigating masses and “conspiring” against the Government of Pakistan, and he was imprisoned for six years).
Thank you.
Sincerely, M. Waheeduzzaman Manik
July 18, 1999
ADEENDUM to MWZAMAN`s Response # 4
In response to KANTEPATEL (reply # 9), the following segments of my commentary got inadvertently deleted from my earlier post:
Pursuant to Section 8 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Government of India Act, 1935, with necessary and proper adaptations, was to be employed as the Interim Constitution of Pakistan.
Although 1935 Act of India had a semblance of a Federal system, the Governor General of British-India had retained methods and procedures for controlling and monitoring the governments of Provinces. However, most of the Indian provinces including Bengal from 1937 till independence in August 1947 had gained some degree of self-governance. Therefore, it was reasonably expected that Pakistan would have genuine Federal Governmental structure in which the constituent units and provinces would be granted provincial autonomy. Yet, after Pakistan emerged as independent nation-state, the provinces had lost out to the Central Government whatever rudimentary form of self- rule they enjoyed under the British from 1937 through August 14, 1947.
For instance, the Central Government of Pakistan from the days of Jinnah had ruthlessly used the powers of Governor General’s office for dislodging or controlling provincial ministries. Aimed at installing a Muslim League Government in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) under Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, Governor General Jinnah had dislodged the pro-congress Ministry of Dr, Khan Sahib (brother of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan) immediately after independence. In fact, Dr. Khan Shahib’s Ministry was dissolved on August 22, 1947. False and frivolous charges of “conspiracy” against Pakistan were brought against the Chief Minister even though the British Governor of that province vouched that Dr. Khan Shahib was not at all disloyal to Pakistan. (Adul Gaffar Khan was arrested in June 1948 for allegedly instigating masses and “conspiring” against the Government of Pakistan, and he was imprisoned for six years).
Thank you.
Sincerely, M. Waheeduzzaman Manik
July 18, 1999
#15 Posted by bahmad on July 16, 1999 9:32:36 am
In response to Reply #14:
I need not stress that you have every ``right`` to form an opinion about the issue at hand (and other matters too). I think, I have already answered your questions in my earlier response (Reply #8).
However, I should make my point explicit regarding the word ``inaccurate.`` You found no mention of responsiblity in my article (zero time). It is the word ``zero`` that makes your observation inaccurate. Kindly read the following part of my article and decide yourself. I wrote:
The autocracy established . . . and resistence. Moreover, too much power . . . created enormous difficulties for the evolution of society that recognizes and values its rights and duties.``
In my Reply #8, I have used ``duties``, ``obligations``, and ``responsibilities`` interchangeably. However, in Pakistan, the rights of a large number of ``duty-conscious`` citizens are violated by the state apparatus on a routine basis. This is something deplorable. You can see the evidence of such violations in our free (and responsible) press--such as the Dawn, the News, and the Frontier Post. My plea for the citizenship rights is for the future health of Pakistan and her citizens.
Regards, Bilal Ahmad
I need not stress that you have every ``right`` to form an opinion about the issue at hand (and other matters too). I think, I have already answered your questions in my earlier response (Reply #8).
However, I should make my point explicit regarding the word ``inaccurate.`` You found no mention of responsiblity in my article (zero time). It is the word ``zero`` that makes your observation inaccurate. Kindly read the following part of my article and decide yourself. I wrote:
The autocracy established . . . and resistence. Moreover, too much power . . . created enormous difficulties for the evolution of society that recognizes and values its rights and duties.``
In my Reply #8, I have used ``duties``, ``obligations``, and ``responsibilities`` interchangeably. However, in Pakistan, the rights of a large number of ``duty-conscious`` citizens are violated by the state apparatus on a routine basis. This is something deplorable. You can see the evidence of such violations in our free (and responsible) press--such as the Dawn, the News, and the Frontier Post. My plea for the citizenship rights is for the future health of Pakistan and her citizens.
Regards, Bilal Ahmad
#14 Posted by nameless on July 16, 1999 6:45:43 am
Ref: BAhmed Repy # 8
Sorry, I do not get it. What is inaccurate? I was not challenging your views on RIGHTS. I only asked a fundamental question. ``Can Rights exist without responsibilities?``.
If your answer is yes - we are poles apart (even though you seem to recognize only one pole!)
If answer is no - talking of one without the other is meaningless (at least for me).
Sorry, I do not get it. What is inaccurate? I was not challenging your views on RIGHTS. I only asked a fundamental question. ``Can Rights exist without responsibilities?``.
If your answer is yes - we are poles apart (even though you seem to recognize only one pole!)
If answer is no - talking of one without the other is meaningless (at least for me).
#13 Posted by bahmad on July 16, 1999 6:45:43 am
In response to Reply #12 (Wasiq Nawaz`s response #1):
Repression and autocracy are signs of weakness (not strength). In this sense, you are right that Pakistan is a weak state. A weak state has every reason to violate the citizenship rights since it cannot by its very nature (capacity) honor such rights.
A state facing a legitimation crisis cannot effectively enforce law and order. The condition becomes much more severe when the state is controlled by corrupt an unresponsive ruling elite.
You are right that the government of Pakistan (Central or otherwise) is currently competing with a civil society full of armed power groups. This is a phenomenon that needs much more serious and critical scholarly attention. It is, however, important to realize that the kind of dilemma that we are facing in contemporary Pakistan is very much a product of the way that state has been controlled by the unscrupulous ruling elite. In my commentary of Dr. Mubashir Hasan`s article (published in the South Asian Survey, Vol 4, No. 1, pp. 7-12), I wrote:
``In drawing some indirect parallels between the colonial and post-independence state institutions, Hasan suggests that the existing state institutions in South Asia suffer from a legitimation crisis due to: (1) the misallocation of resources, and (2) the use of brute physical force against the common people. He argues that the coercive South Asian states lack the capacity to win public support because they are controlled by unscrupulous elites who cannot afford to let ``consideration of ethics and esthetics, environment and morality, and peace and war come in their way when power or profit are at stake.`` He (a la K. K. Aziz) identifies nine characteristics of the Pakistani ruling elites. These are: (1) intolerance, (2) self-righteousness, (3) inconsideration, (4) selfishness, (5) hypocrisy, (6) irresponsibility, (7) emotionalism, (8) violence, and (9) hatred. Although Hasan suggests that most common people do not possess these negative attributes, he portrays the vast majority of them as ``childlike in manner, emotional in disposition, and spontaneous in response.`` In the final analysis, he links the predicament of the people of South Asian to the lack of capacity and confidence of the ruling elites to provide leadership. Are the ruling elites the only source of leadership? Hasan fails to raise this question. Why should the people look toward those who have repeated failed to provide leadership? Shouldn`t the leadership evolve organically from us: ``We the people. . . .``? `` (Pakistan Link, March 12, 1999).
Mr. Nawaz, I invite you to read the rest of my commentary where Hasan`s (and my) solutions to the problems of Pakistan are diametrically opposite to the ones that you have suggested. For example, you suggest centralization and violence (repression), where we suggest decentralization and non-violence. Moreover, I want to focus on the extension of the ideal of citizenship whereas you want to focus on increasing coercive power of the state.
The point raised by you in the second paragraph of your response is already covered in my statement that: ``The autocracy established in colonial India in alive and well in contemporary Pakistan. It has become rather a ruthless and chaotic autocracy where the feudal lords, urban-based elite, and bureaucracy (particularly the army) have taken refuge in the dominant ideology and the perceived threat to national security to quell dissent and resistance.``
Regarding the British state and politics, I would like to point out that my little understanding is somewhat different from that of yours. I view state formation as a contingent process in which the state, civil society, and economy shape each other in a rather complex manner. I am, nevertheless, prepared to learn if you kindly suggest me a few references.
Regards, Bilal Ahmad
Repression and autocracy are signs of weakness (not strength). In this sense, you are right that Pakistan is a weak state. A weak state has every reason to violate the citizenship rights since it cannot by its very nature (capacity) honor such rights.
A state facing a legitimation crisis cannot effectively enforce law and order. The condition becomes much more severe when the state is controlled by corrupt an unresponsive ruling elite.
You are right that the government of Pakistan (Central or otherwise) is currently competing with a civil society full of armed power groups. This is a phenomenon that needs much more serious and critical scholarly attention. It is, however, important to realize that the kind of dilemma that we are facing in contemporary Pakistan is very much a product of the way that state has been controlled by the unscrupulous ruling elite. In my commentary of Dr. Mubashir Hasan`s article (published in the South Asian Survey, Vol 4, No. 1, pp. 7-12), I wrote:
``In drawing some indirect parallels between the colonial and post-independence state institutions, Hasan suggests that the existing state institutions in South Asia suffer from a legitimation crisis due to: (1) the misallocation of resources, and (2) the use of brute physical force against the common people. He argues that the coercive South Asian states lack the capacity to win public support because they are controlled by unscrupulous elites who cannot afford to let ``consideration of ethics and esthetics, environment and morality, and peace and war come in their way when power or profit are at stake.`` He (a la K. K. Aziz) identifies nine characteristics of the Pakistani ruling elites. These are: (1) intolerance, (2) self-righteousness, (3) inconsideration, (4) selfishness, (5) hypocrisy, (6) irresponsibility, (7) emotionalism, (8) violence, and (9) hatred. Although Hasan suggests that most common people do not possess these negative attributes, he portrays the vast majority of them as ``childlike in manner, emotional in disposition, and spontaneous in response.`` In the final analysis, he links the predicament of the people of South Asian to the lack of capacity and confidence of the ruling elites to provide leadership. Are the ruling elites the only source of leadership? Hasan fails to raise this question. Why should the people look toward those who have repeated failed to provide leadership? Shouldn`t the leadership evolve organically from us: ``We the people. . . .``? `` (Pakistan Link, March 12, 1999).
Mr. Nawaz, I invite you to read the rest of my commentary where Hasan`s (and my) solutions to the problems of Pakistan are diametrically opposite to the ones that you have suggested. For example, you suggest centralization and violence (repression), where we suggest decentralization and non-violence. Moreover, I want to focus on the extension of the ideal of citizenship whereas you want to focus on increasing coercive power of the state.
The point raised by you in the second paragraph of your response is already covered in my statement that: ``The autocracy established in colonial India in alive and well in contemporary Pakistan. It has become rather a ruthless and chaotic autocracy where the feudal lords, urban-based elite, and bureaucracy (particularly the army) have taken refuge in the dominant ideology and the perceived threat to national security to quell dissent and resistance.``
Regarding the British state and politics, I would like to point out that my little understanding is somewhat different from that of yours. I view state formation as a contingent process in which the state, civil society, and economy shape each other in a rather complex manner. I am, nevertheless, prepared to learn if you kindly suggest me a few references.
Regards, Bilal Ahmad
#12 Posted by wasiqnawaz on July 15, 1999 6:25:10 pm
The problem in Pakistan is exactly the opposite of what you say. Instead of having a repressive an autocratic state that suppresses our rights as citizens, Pakistan has a very weak state that seems incapable of enforcing law and order precisely because it is competing with a civil society full of armed power centers. If the state was, as you say, repressive and autocratic, we might be better off in having the order and stability that promotes public works and investment.
Secondly, instead of inheriting the mantle of the British Raj, Pakistan has turned what was an efficient state apparatus into an ineffectual one.
Your characterization of Britain`s political development misses one very important issue: democratic institutions always come after a state establishes itself by eliminating all competition (usually through violence and repression). A strong state is a pre-requisite for democracy, not the other way around, as you seem to think.
What Pakistan needs is strong central authority (i.e. law and order), efficient tax collection (i.e. public funds), and an end to the looting of government money. All of the above, I fear, will only come with repression (i.e. disciplinary measures).
Wasiq Nawaz
Secondly, instead of inheriting the mantle of the British Raj, Pakistan has turned what was an efficient state apparatus into an ineffectual one.
Your characterization of Britain`s political development misses one very important issue: democratic institutions always come after a state establishes itself by eliminating all competition (usually through violence and repression). A strong state is a pre-requisite for democracy, not the other way around, as you seem to think.
What Pakistan needs is strong central authority (i.e. law and order), efficient tax collection (i.e. public funds), and an end to the looting of government money. All of the above, I fear, will only come with repression (i.e. disciplinary measures).
Wasiq Nawaz
#11 Posted by bahmad on July 15, 1999 6:25:10 pm
In response to Dr. Manik`s response #3 (reply # 10):
I am thankful to Dr. Manik for his appreciation of my effort. The purpose this short article was threefold: (1) to bring into focus the issue of citizenship rights in contemporary Pakistan; (2) to identify the authoritarian nature of the Pakistani state; and (3) to suggest the need for a national covenant of state-civil society partnership based on the notion of citizenship rights. My article is in a way non-conventional since it provides several social-theoretic insights for understanding the dilemma of Pakistan. I, however, expect the readers to help in highlighting some concrete aspects of the problem at hand. Dr. Manik has definitely taken the first step.
I agree with Dr. Manik that some of my generalizations (abstractions) are global. One can easily notice that, for some of my theoretical insights, I have relied upon two noteworthy scholars: T. H. Marshall and Ranajit Guha. Nevertheless, Dr. Manik finds an element of vagueness and evasiveness in some of my statements. This is a point that I would like him to elaborate. He has also asked me to speak the whole truth. This suggests that my article is based on partial truth. I would like him to elaborate his point too.
The history of South Asia is full of some very sad moments (particularly the Partition of India and the fall of East Pakistan). I have no problem with Dr. Manik`s Bengali background. I also have no problem with his narrative of the evolution of democracy or autocracy during the early years of Pakistan. I can`t understand why some of his writings were not accepted by the Chowk. Dr. Manik has every right to form his opinions based on his perspective and background. Don`t we all have our own perspectives and backgrounds. However, I commend him for his contribution and hope that he would write an unbiased and critical treatise on the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971.
Although I definitely prefer democracy over autocracy, I don`t view the representative form of democracy as a flawless political system. I also do not view too much centralization as conducive for the health of any socio-political system. As the Pakistani state is overly centralized, a decentralized system of governance may lead to good governance and peoples` empowerment.
Regards, Bilal Ahmad
P.S. On July 2, I published the following letter in the Frontier Post:
Another Call for Devolution
Many Pakistani citizens have recently stressed the need for a change in the structure of power through devolution. Devolution refers to the transfer of power from the center to a subnational jurisdiction. In Pakistan, a call for devolution is basically a call for some sort of provincial autonomy. Interestingly, Benazir Bhutto has also shown her belief in the devolution of decision-making since it would provide a more effective government to our people (Letter to the Editor, Washington Post, June 28).
In her letter, she further maintains that ``greater regional autonomy`` would ``help our people make the best use of available resources ... in tackling the problems of poverty, illiteracy and backwardness``. I wonder what she really means by ``our people,`` a select few or all Pakistani citizens irrespective of their class, gender, ethno-linguistic, religious, and other bases of individual and collective identities? Regardless of her real intent, the significance of devolution cannot be undermined since this measure may lead to greater citizen empowerment, a responsive government, and above all, national unity and security. If there is any merit in these expectations, then the issue of devolution must be placed on the forefront of our national agenda.
Bilal Ahmad
USA
I am thankful to Dr. Manik for his appreciation of my effort. The purpose this short article was threefold: (1) to bring into focus the issue of citizenship rights in contemporary Pakistan; (2) to identify the authoritarian nature of the Pakistani state; and (3) to suggest the need for a national covenant of state-civil society partnership based on the notion of citizenship rights. My article is in a way non-conventional since it provides several social-theoretic insights for understanding the dilemma of Pakistan. I, however, expect the readers to help in highlighting some concrete aspects of the problem at hand. Dr. Manik has definitely taken the first step.
I agree with Dr. Manik that some of my generalizations (abstractions) are global. One can easily notice that, for some of my theoretical insights, I have relied upon two noteworthy scholars: T. H. Marshall and Ranajit Guha. Nevertheless, Dr. Manik finds an element of vagueness and evasiveness in some of my statements. This is a point that I would like him to elaborate. He has also asked me to speak the whole truth. This suggests that my article is based on partial truth. I would like him to elaborate his point too.
The history of South Asia is full of some very sad moments (particularly the Partition of India and the fall of East Pakistan). I have no problem with Dr. Manik`s Bengali background. I also have no problem with his narrative of the evolution of democracy or autocracy during the early years of Pakistan. I can`t understand why some of his writings were not accepted by the Chowk. Dr. Manik has every right to form his opinions based on his perspective and background. Don`t we all have our own perspectives and backgrounds. However, I commend him for his contribution and hope that he would write an unbiased and critical treatise on the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971.
Although I definitely prefer democracy over autocracy, I don`t view the representative form of democracy as a flawless political system. I also do not view too much centralization as conducive for the health of any socio-political system. As the Pakistani state is overly centralized, a decentralized system of governance may lead to good governance and peoples` empowerment.
Regards, Bilal Ahmad
P.S. On July 2, I published the following letter in the Frontier Post:
Another Call for Devolution
Many Pakistani citizens have recently stressed the need for a change in the structure of power through devolution. Devolution refers to the transfer of power from the center to a subnational jurisdiction. In Pakistan, a call for devolution is basically a call for some sort of provincial autonomy. Interestingly, Benazir Bhutto has also shown her belief in the devolution of decision-making since it would provide a more effective government to our people (Letter to the Editor, Washington Post, June 28).
In her letter, she further maintains that ``greater regional autonomy`` would ``help our people make the best use of available resources ... in tackling the problems of poverty, illiteracy and backwardness``. I wonder what she really means by ``our people,`` a select few or all Pakistani citizens irrespective of their class, gender, ethno-linguistic, religious, and other bases of individual and collective identities? Regardless of her real intent, the significance of devolution cannot be undermined since this measure may lead to greater citizen empowerment, a responsive government, and above all, national unity and security. If there is any merit in these expectations, then the issue of devolution must be placed on the forefront of our national agenda.
Bilal Ahmad
USA
#10 Posted by mwzaman on July 15, 1999 12:35:19 am
MWZAMAN`S Response # 3
In response to Mr. Bilal Ahmad`s reply # 7:
I found Mr (Dr.?)Bilal Ahmad`s article very interesting and informative. I think that he deserves our thanks for writing and posting such an excellent article on relevant topic. However, many of his observations and generalizations are global and vague. Some of his comments are even evasive. His comments on Pakistan`s autocratic tendencies are facial at best. Bilal Ahmad needs to speak the whole truth. However, his articles deserves wider dissemination.
I decided to comment on Bilal Ahmad`s article with great deal of hesitancy. Given the fact that I am from Bangladesh, my comments could be quickly misconstrued or distorted by the so-called patriotic Pakistanis as anti-Pakistanis. Therefore, I have posted my comments on this thread simply because of the fact that I have open mind, and I would like to hear what the objective observers of Pakistan politics-- past and present- have to say. Neither my observations nor my conclusions are cast in concrete. I want to learn more.
Another reason is that the CHOWK management has thus far not carried some of my write-ups on Pakistan`s political heritage. I thought one of the best ways to share my thoughts with the readers of CHOWK is to add response to some of the relevant articles. In all fairness, I need to say that I found Mr. Bilal Ahmad`s article on the rights of the citizens very relevant. I have no hidden agenda. My sole objective is to make critical assessment of Pakistan`s past. I want to fully comprehend the fundamental nature of Pakistan`s Government and Politics. I want to understand the main reasons for the break up of Pakistan. I want to know why democracy could never flouriish in Pakistan. I would like to know why authoritarianism had become the hallmark and characteristic feature of Pakistan from the early years of her emergence. In other words, I would like to examine the INHERITANCE of today`s Pakistan.
In general, Pakistani scholars are very shy in admitting that there was no rudiments of democracy in Pakistan. To my mind, Bilal Ahmad`s short note was bold enough considering the fact that many Pakistani scholars have serious difficulty in dealing with hard facts. Most of the Pakistani scholars even point out that democracy could not take its roots in Pakistan because the Founding Father Jinnah died too soon on September 11, 1948.
They also claim that the assissination of Liaquat Ali Khan on October 16, 1951 was a serious blow to the prospect of establishing true democracy in Pakistan. Such claims are based on the wrong assumption that both Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan were champions of ``democracy`` in Pakistan. As if they were serious advocates of democracy. These claims have neither relevance nor credibilty to the truth.
In fact, it is a travesty of truth to claim that Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan were working hard to establish democracy in Pakistan. Neither their policies nor their utterances demonstrated their willingness to give democracy a chance in Pakistan. Their actions and postures against the MAJORITY people of Pakistan were less than democratic. Thanks a lot for perusing my comments.
Sincerely,
W.Zaman Manik
Potscript: Let me share with you the concluding part of my earlier comments on Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Khwaja Nazimuddin and Ghulam Mohammad, and Mhammad Ali Bogra:
A SHORT NOTE ON THE EARLY RULING ELITE OF PAKISTAN
M. Waheeduzzaman Manik
Neither Mohammad Ali Jinnah nor his handpicked Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, had demonstrated any sincerity in establishing democratic institutions in Pakistan. This is an established fact. Both before and after the 1971 genocide and ethnic cleansing in Bangladesh, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was not known for instituting any semblance of a democratic mode of governance. In fact, the government of Pakistan during pre- or post-1971 era can be characterized as a laboratory of ruthless authoritarianism and centralization.
It is crucial to underscore that neither Jinnah nor Liaquat Ali Khan was a champion of decentralized and federal system of government. They had installed a centralized-- unitary system of government, and as long as they were alive they had wholeheartedly propagated the benefits of a strong centralized form of government. They had little or no concern for ensuring provincial autonomy and democracy.
The relationship between Governor General Jinnah and Prime Minister Liaquat was unequal. Jinnah was both head of the state and head of the government. Jinnah’s unlimited power and personal charisma did provide no opportunity for the Prime Minister to question any action of Jinnah. Given the fact that Liaquat Ali was a loyal lieutenant of Jinnah from pre-independence years, that convenient arrangement worked well as long as Jinnah was alive. Yet, The concentration of executive powers of the Centarl Government of Pakistan in the hands of Governor General Jinnah was against the acceptable norms of a Parlimentary democracy. Thus, the founding father Jinnah had left behind a dangerous precedent of authoritarian mode of administration.
However, Liaquat Ali Khan emerged as a strong Prime Minister (first and last) when Khwaja Nazimuddin was co-opted as the titular Governor General (first and last) of Pakistan after the demise of Jinnah.
After Liaquat Ali Khan`s assassination on October 16, 1951, Nazimuddin became the Prime Minister, and the Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammad was selected to be the Governor General. Ghulam Mohammad concentrated all executive powers of the government in Governor General’s office. He had fired Nazimuddin and his cabinet. He appointed Mohammad Ali Bogra as the new Prime Minister.
It was Ghulam Mohammad who had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Prime Minister of Pakistan could hold office at the pleasure of the Governor General. He had dissolved the newly elected Government of East Pakistan and introduced infamous Governor’s Rule there in 1954 through the use of Article 92(A). He had declared Emergency throughout Pakistan and dissolved the first Constituent Assembly. He pushed the country to an unprecedented constitutional crisis.
It was Ghulam Mohammad who had become the source of law when there was no Central Legislature in Pakistan during the gestation period between the dissolution of the first CAP on October 24, 1954 and the convening of the second CAP on July 8, 1955. It is not very difficult to comprehend why several political scientists had characterized Ghulam Mohammad’s excesses and intrusions in legislative and constitutional matters as Pakistan’s “constitutional autocracy’ or “preventive autocracy.”
The worst brunt of Governor General’s unlimited power fell on Bangalees when Ghulam Mohammad had summarily dismissed the elected provincial Government of Sher-e-Bangla Fazlul Huq in East Bengal in 1954. After dismantling Fazlul Huq’s United Front Cabinet, Ghulam Mohammad promulgated the Governor’s rule in East Bengal through the use of infamous Article 92 (A), an instrument enacted during Jinnah’s tenure as Governor General. (Jinnah had also used 92-(A) provision to oust the Prime Ministers of both Sind and West Punjab).
The founding leaders of Pakistan including Jinnah and Liaquat were not at all sincere believers of democratic rule in Pakistan. Nor were they champions of a decentralized and federal form of government. Instead of fostering better understanding through nurturing diversity, they had demanded hardcore uniformity. They were the greatest champions of “one nation,” “one state,” “one religion,” “one government,” “one leader,” “one party,’ and of course “one language.”
Their successors (non-Bengali East Pakistani Jinnah loyalist Khwaja Nazimuddin, ruthless Punjabi bureaucrat-turned-autocrat Ghulam Mohammad, most obedient collaborationist Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra, notorious traitor Iskander Mirza, Dictator General Ayub Khan and Jallad General Yahya Khan) had unsuccessfully tried to implement the policy of deadline uniformity, centralization and authoritarianism through the use of brute force. In sum, personal rule, authoritarianism and autocracy were the salient features of government and politics during early years of Pakistan.
Dr. M. Waheeduzzaman Manik writes from Tennessee, USA whose e-mail address is: Mwzaman@Aol.Com
#9 Posted by Kant_Patel on July 14, 1999 2:29:40 pm
mwzaman,
A very interesting and objective analysis about the circumstances and events leading upto the autocratic and undemocratic style of governance in Pakistan from its formative years to the current.
A majority of Jinnah`s admirers are unable to differentiate between Jinnah,the founding father, and Jinnah, the administrator- the Governor General of the state. Most of the salutory quotes, as mentioned by BAHMAD`s post, are in the context of the former Jinnah. There are few quotes
regarding Jinnah`s running the Govt. They, however, are not complimentary.
The most visible and significant autocratic and undemocratic actions by Jinnah as GG that come to my mind are three:
1. Urdu as the national language; was his decision without consultation or consensus. This, to me, was the beginning of the end of East Pakistan.
2. Karachi as the nation`s capital; again a personal decision.
3. Dismissal of an elected govt. of Abdul Gaffar Khan and instalment of a minority Muslim League in NWFP in its place. Khan was imprisoned and later was exiled in Afghanistan.
If you know the circumstances and events leading upto Khan`s dismissal, I would like to know . Also, what,if any, legal course resorted to justify it?
A very interesting and objective analysis about the circumstances and events leading upto the autocratic and undemocratic style of governance in Pakistan from its formative years to the current.
A majority of Jinnah`s admirers are unable to differentiate between Jinnah,the founding father, and Jinnah, the administrator- the Governor General of the state. Most of the salutory quotes, as mentioned by BAHMAD`s post, are in the context of the former Jinnah. There are few quotes
regarding Jinnah`s running the Govt. They, however, are not complimentary.
The most visible and significant autocratic and undemocratic actions by Jinnah as GG that come to my mind are three:
1. Urdu as the national language; was his decision without consultation or consensus. This, to me, was the beginning of the end of East Pakistan.
2. Karachi as the nation`s capital; again a personal decision.
3. Dismissal of an elected govt. of Abdul Gaffar Khan and instalment of a minority Muslim League in NWFP in its place. Khan was imprisoned and later was exiled in Afghanistan.
If you know the circumstances and events leading upto Khan`s dismissal, I would like to know . Also, what,if any, legal course resorted to justify it?
#8 Posted by bahmad on July 14, 1999 2:29:40 pm
In response to reply #1 (by Nameless):
An interesting, though inaccurate, observation. Although the issue of rights and obligations (duties; responsibilities) go hand in hand, they cannot be reduced to simple statistics. Let me state my position, only briefly.
British scholar David Held, in his book Models of Democracy (1987: 284-85; Stanford), wrote: ``If people are to be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their own lives, and enjoy equal rights as well as equal obligations in the specification of the framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them, they must be in a position to enjoy a range of rights not only in principle, but also in practice. The rights of citizens must be both formal and concrete. This entails the specification of a far broader range of rights, with a far more profound ‘cutting edge`, than is allowed typically [in the West]. Such a ‘system of rights` would both constrain and enable collective activities across a broad domain.``
In a society governed by an unscrupulous and unresponsive ruling elite, the question of rights needs to be recognized and struggled for the empowerment of common people. Obligations cannot be enforced by corrupt, authoritarian regimes. This has long been a dilemma that we need to understand and try to deal with. Empowerment of the people, I think, would slowly and gradually lead to a balance between rights and obligations. The following letters provides a glimpse of my position on the issue of rights (and responsibilities).
Frontier Post, June 25, 1999
Peace, not war
The ruling elites in most so-called less-developed countries are obsessed with: (1) the lust for power; and (2) the expectation of sacrifices from the common people without protecting their basic citizenship and human rights. The Pakistani ruling elites are, in addition, obsessed with the desire to make a fool of Pakistani people by diverting their attention from the issues of their everyday livelihood and welfare. This process must stop.
We are on the verge of another bloody war. The Pakistani ruling elites need to truthfully and effectively inform the people around the world (which includes Pakistan) that Pakistan wants peace and not war. Peace in South Asia is necessary for the welfare of common Pakistani citizens and for earning global respect for our homeland and our people. Is Pakistan`s credibility at stake at the moment?
Bilal Ahmad
USA
Frontier Post, June 11, 1999
Protect minorities, ensure national unity
The Quid-e-Azam was very sensitive to the minority question. In pre-Partition India, particularly during the 1930s and the 1940s, the Muslim minority developed a sense of insecurity. It was this sense of economic, political, and cultural insecurity that eventually led to the creation of Pakistan.
Given the ethno-linguistic setup of Pakistan, the Baluchis, the Pukhtuns, and the Sindhis are some of the leading minority groups. Pakistan, however, is the home of numerous additional minority groups. Majority-minority relations exist in every province of Pakistan. Can we say with pride that the minorities in Pakistan are fully protected against the kind of alienation, oppression, and deprivation that the Indian Muslim minority felt some fifty-two odd years back?
The imagined community of the Indians was shattered in the late 1940s. Can we protect ours in this period of gradual and persistent decadence? If we, as a Pakistani nation, have some hope, then we must find ways to save ourselves from further disintegration. One major step would be to show real concern for our socially and geographically variable economic, political, and cultural insecurities.
Bilal Ahmad,
USA
An interesting, though inaccurate, observation. Although the issue of rights and obligations (duties; responsibilities) go hand in hand, they cannot be reduced to simple statistics. Let me state my position, only briefly.
British scholar David Held, in his book Models of Democracy (1987: 284-85; Stanford), wrote: ``If people are to be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their own lives, and enjoy equal rights as well as equal obligations in the specification of the framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them, they must be in a position to enjoy a range of rights not only in principle, but also in practice. The rights of citizens must be both formal and concrete. This entails the specification of a far broader range of rights, with a far more profound ‘cutting edge`, than is allowed typically [in the West]. Such a ‘system of rights` would both constrain and enable collective activities across a broad domain.``
In a society governed by an unscrupulous and unresponsive ruling elite, the question of rights needs to be recognized and struggled for the empowerment of common people. Obligations cannot be enforced by corrupt, authoritarian regimes. This has long been a dilemma that we need to understand and try to deal with. Empowerment of the people, I think, would slowly and gradually lead to a balance between rights and obligations. The following letters provides a glimpse of my position on the issue of rights (and responsibilities).
Frontier Post, June 25, 1999
Peace, not war
The ruling elites in most so-called less-developed countries are obsessed with: (1) the lust for power; and (2) the expectation of sacrifices from the common people without protecting their basic citizenship and human rights. The Pakistani ruling elites are, in addition, obsessed with the desire to make a fool of Pakistani people by diverting their attention from the issues of their everyday livelihood and welfare. This process must stop.
We are on the verge of another bloody war. The Pakistani ruling elites need to truthfully and effectively inform the people around the world (which includes Pakistan) that Pakistan wants peace and not war. Peace in South Asia is necessary for the welfare of common Pakistani citizens and for earning global respect for our homeland and our people. Is Pakistan`s credibility at stake at the moment?
Bilal Ahmad
USA
Frontier Post, June 11, 1999
Protect minorities, ensure national unity
The Quid-e-Azam was very sensitive to the minority question. In pre-Partition India, particularly during the 1930s and the 1940s, the Muslim minority developed a sense of insecurity. It was this sense of economic, political, and cultural insecurity that eventually led to the creation of Pakistan.
Given the ethno-linguistic setup of Pakistan, the Baluchis, the Pukhtuns, and the Sindhis are some of the leading minority groups. Pakistan, however, is the home of numerous additional minority groups. Majority-minority relations exist in every province of Pakistan. Can we say with pride that the minorities in Pakistan are fully protected against the kind of alienation, oppression, and deprivation that the Indian Muslim minority felt some fifty-two odd years back?
The imagined community of the Indians was shattered in the late 1940s. Can we protect ours in this period of gradual and persistent decadence? If we, as a Pakistani nation, have some hope, then we must find ways to save ourselves from further disintegration. One major step would be to show real concern for our socially and geographically variable economic, political, and cultural insecurities.
Bilal Ahmad,
USA
#7 Posted by bahmad on July 14, 1999 2:29:40 pm
In response to Mr. MWZaman`s response #2:
I am delighted to read Mr. Manik`s response. His essay on Ghulam Mohammad`s authoritarian regime is very informative. Thank you for sharing this excellent piece with all of us.
One major purpose of my reference to the material from Akbar S. Ahmad`s book was to suggest that Mr. Jinnah was a product of a period when the ruling elite in many parts of South Asia uncritically imitated the values and attitudes of the British ruling elite. Yet Mr. Jinnah possessed some qualities which distinguished him from most other political leaders in Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah governed Pakistan under very difficult circumstances. A political history of Pakistan`s early days has yet to be examined critically and contextualized adequately. If Mr. Jinnah was not the founder of democracy in Pakistan, he may at least be viewed as the founder of absolutist-bourgeois democracy in Pakistan.
Regards, Bilal Ahmad
I am delighted to read Mr. Manik`s response. His essay on Ghulam Mohammad`s authoritarian regime is very informative. Thank you for sharing this excellent piece with all of us.
One major purpose of my reference to the material from Akbar S. Ahmad`s book was to suggest that Mr. Jinnah was a product of a period when the ruling elite in many parts of South Asia uncritically imitated the values and attitudes of the British ruling elite. Yet Mr. Jinnah possessed some qualities which distinguished him from most other political leaders in Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah governed Pakistan under very difficult circumstances. A political history of Pakistan`s early days has yet to be examined critically and contextualized adequately. If Mr. Jinnah was not the founder of democracy in Pakistan, he may at least be viewed as the founder of absolutist-bourgeois democracy in Pakistan.
Regards, Bilal Ahmad
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