Citizenship Rights for a Better Future

MWZAMAN`S RESPONSE #2

In response to BAHMAD Response # 4:

I enjoyed reading bahmad`s quotations on Mohammad Ali Jinnah. He was a man of integrity and honesty. He was the sole spokesman of Indian Muslims in 1940s. It was Jinnah who had spearheaded the Pakistan movement. Doubtless, he was admired and even adored by millions of millions of people. For millions of Pakistanis he is still Quaid-i-Azama. Yet, Jinnah was not above criticism. On genuine grounds, Jinnah`s performance as the undisputed leader and later as the most powerful Governor General of Pakistan can be subject of critical asseessment. A man who had to rule the new nation for 13 months with iron fist can hardly be characterized as the founder of democracy.

Jinnah had zero level tolerance for any kind of corruption or nepotism. Even the vehement crirtics of Jinnah couldn`t blemish his character. Yet, he was totally intolerant about criticism of his policies and programs. He left a behind a legacy of authoritarian mode of governance. That`s my point. He left behind a legacy or a precedent of an undemocratic mode of governance. The autocratic leaders like Ghulam Mohammad,Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan took the full advantage of an undemocratic and definitely authoritarian precedents. Instead of eulogizing Jinnah, it is more meaningful to initiate a critical assessment of Jinnah`s administration of 13 month. It is even more relevant to evaluate how the rulers of Pakistan since the sad and sudden demise of Jinnah had governed the country. For accomplishing that objective, I am posting the following write-up on Ghulam Mohammad`s authoritarian regime. Thank you.

Sincerely, M. Waheeduzzaman Manik

The Specter of Ghulam Mohammad’s Ruthless

Authoritarianism in Pakistan

M. Waheeduzzaman Manik

After Mohammad Ali Jinnah`s untimely death on September 11, 1948, Pakistan’s ruling oligarchy had co-opted Khawaja Nazimuddin, the Chief Minister of East Bengal, to be the Governor General of Pakistan. Yet, there was no reason for Bangalees to be gloating about such elevation of their Chief Minister. He was not only a non-Bangalee Jinnah loyalist but an anti-Bangalee collaborationist Muslim Leaguer from East Bengal. He was neither a match nor a substitute for Jinnah. He was selected to be the Head of the State because of his willingness to be subservient to Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

For the first time after Jinnah’s demise, the Governor General’s office was made secondary or an appendix to the Prime Minister’s office. Nazimuddin had to remain content with various mundane and ceremonial functions of the Head of State. At Prime Minister’s initiative, the CAP had restricted certain powers of the Governor General. In other words, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan had emerged as the real head of the government. This power relationship between the head of the state and head of the government continued till Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination on October 16, 1951.

After Liaquat Ali Khan’s death, Nazimuddin stepped down from his position of Governor General to become the Prime Minister. The ruling oligarchy of Pakistan inducted Ghulam Mohammad (a Punjabi bureaucrat with well-entrenched connections with the ruling establishment), the powerful Finance Minister of Pakistan, to be the Governor General of Pakistan. It seems that Nazimuddin wanted to exercise real power as the head of the government! Unfortunately, Ghulam Mohammad had something else in his mind. One thing for sure is that the Punjabi bureaucrat was not willing to be satisfied with his ceremonial role as figurehead of the state. Therefore, Gholam Mohammad reversed the power relationship in favor of his highest office. Once again governmental powers were centralized in Governor General’s office. The Prime Minister’s office of Khawaja Nazimuddin was made an appendix to Governor General’s office.

Following the legacy of the founding father of Pakistan, Ghulam Mohammad had also exercised absolute authoritarianism in one form or another. Yet, he outshone and superceded the Quaid-I-Azam in the process of employing absolute powers during his tenure as the Governor General of Pakistan! For instance, he had summarily dismissed Prime Minister Nazimuddin and his cabinet in 1953 even though the Prime Minister was apparently enjoying the confidence of a substantial majority in the Constituent assembly. In lieu of employing appropriate parliamentary procedure for dismissing a Ministry for valid cause, Ghulam Mohammad had used the following capricious and arbitrary statement for removing the Prime Minister (issued on April 17, 1953): “I have been driven to the conclusion that the cabinet of Khwaja Nazimuddin has proved entirely inadequate to grapple with the difficulties facing the country. In emergency which has arisen I have felt it incumbent upon me to ask the cabinet to relinquish office so that a new cabinet better fitted to discharge its obligations towards Pakistan may be formed.”



The dismissal of Nazimuddin’s Cabinet by Governor General Ghulam Mohammad was discussed by most of the celebrated writers on government and politics of Pakistan of that period (including Keith Callard, K.J. Newman, Khalid Bin Syed and Frank Goodnow). Most of them discredited the Governor General for dwarfing the role of office of the Prime Minister. For example, K.J. Newman had observed in 1959 that “Ghulam Mohammad left the path of constitutional government by dismissing Prime Minister Nazimuddin in 1953, even though the latter enjoyed the confidence of a majority of the Constituent Assembly” (K.J. Newmamn, “ Pakistan’s Preventive Autocracy and Its Causes,” Pacific Affairs, 32, 1959, p. 25; cited by Henry F. Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan, 1964, p. 55).

Instead of providing an opportunity to the dismissed Prime Minister to demonstrate that he enjoyed majority support in the central legislature (CAP) by seeking a vote of confidence, Ghulam Mohammad conveniently handpicked Mohammad Ali (Bogra), another spineless Jinnah loyalist from East Bengal, to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan. It was reported that that the members of Mohammad Ali Bogra’s first cabinet were selected by the Governor General. It has been widely stressed by many scholars that during his tenure as Prime Minister, he was a captive in Ghulam Mohammad’s hand. Quite often the Cabinet was shuffled or reshuffled at the behest of the Governor General.



Although Mohammad Ali Bogra was known for his timidity and loyalty to Ghulam Mohammad, he was conniving with the members of CAP for curtailing the powers of Governor General. In fact, the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was in the process of further reducing the powers of the Governor General. In his (infamous) book titled Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 50), the self-declared President Ayub Khan mentioned: “He [Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra] told me quietly that his colleagues wanted some amendment to be made in the Government of India Act [1935] by which Governor-General’s powers would be limited. A resolution was printed in the middle of the night and placed in the pigeonholes of Members of the National Assembly [CAP]. In the morning the [Constituent] Assembly met as a Constitution-making body, an hour before its scheduled time, and revoked Sections 9, 10, 10-A, 10-b, and 17 of the Government of India Act [1935], thus stripping the Governor –General of the powers in exercise of which he [Ghulam Mohammad] had dismissed the Nazimuddin Cabinet [on April 17, 1953]. The Resolution was moved and passed within ten minutes. The Governor General was convalescing in Abbotabad at that time.”



In retaliation, the Governor General had dismissed the Cabinet and dissolved the Constituent Assembly --- the highest law-making body of Pakistan. Obviously, his hostility toward democratic principles and parliamentary institutions got fully exposed when he dissolved the (first) Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on October 24, 1954 by issuing the following Proclamation: “The Governor General having considered the political crisis with which the country is faced has, with deep regret, come to the conclusion that the constitutional machinery has broken down. He, therefore, has decided to declare a State of Emergency throughout Pakistan. The Constituent Assembly as at present constituted has lost the confidence of the people and can no longer function” (cited by Goodnow, 1964, p. 57; and also by Callard, 1957, p. 141).



Henry Frank Goodnow succinctly summarized the situation: “On October 24, 1954, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad reacted by declaring emergency. Censorship was imposed on all Karachi newspapers. All gatherings of more than five persons were banned on October 25. A strong police cordon was placed around the building in which the Constituent Assembly customarily held its meetings, and members of the Constituent Assembly were forcibly prevented from entering” (Goodnow, 1964, p. 57).

Goodnow also noted that according to one constitutional authority [Goodnow was referring to K.J. Newman’s observations which he made in his 1959 Pacific Affairs article on “Pakistan’s Preventive Autocracy…”], Governor General’s dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in 1954 was “clearly unconstitutional since the Governor General’s powers had been specifically amended so as to exclude the power to dissolve the Constituent Assembly. ----- Governor-General’s Ordinance 22 of 1947, issued according to Section 9 of the Indian Independence Act, by which paragraph 5 and 6 of Section 19 of the Act of 1935 were validly amended” (Quoted in Henry Frank Goodnow’s, The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964, p. 57).

The Governor General’s arbitrary dissolution of the Constituent Assembly pushed the new nation of Pakistan to the brink of a serious constitutional and political crisis that was avoided with the implementation of Supreme Court’s creative verdict by forming the second Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. As pointed out by Donald N. Wilbur: “the dissolution of the first constituent assembly by the governor general touched off a chain reaction of judicial activity which, but for the good judgment of the Federal Court and the patience of the governor general, might have resulted in complete legal chaos in Pakistan” (Donald N. Wilbur, Pakistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, New Haven, CT: Hraf Press, 1964, p.238).

Although the Chief Court of Sind (Tamizuddin Khan, the President of the CAP, had challenged the action of the Governor General) found Governor General’s actions as “illegal” and “ultra vires,” the Supreme Court (federal court) had reversed the decision. Briefly stated, while Sind Court asserted that since the Acts of the Constituent Assembly did not require the “assent” of the Governor General, he (Ghulam Mohammad) had “no power of any kind to dissolve the Constituent Assembly.” On the contrary, the Federal Court of Pakistan quickly declared that the Provincial (Sind) Court “had no authority to issue such writs because the 1954 amendment to the Government of India Act (1935), had never received the assent of the Governor general” (Donald N.Wilbur’s above mentioned book, p. 239). The Federal Court finally came out with the verdict that the Governor General had lawfully “dissolved the First Constituent Assembly”, and the constitutional legislation needed the “assent” of the Governor General. The verdict also ordered the Governor General to form a new Constituent Assembly.

However, there was a gestation gap between the court deliberations and court decisions. Yet, there also remained a constitutional vacuum between dissolution of the first CAP and the formation of second CAP (approximately six months). While the Federal Court decisions provided a bridge to fill the gap, Ghulam Mohammad`s disdain for democratic principles and constitutional process was responsible for creating legal chaos throughout Federal Government. Wilbur (in the above-mentioned book) succinctly summarized the immediate legal effects of Gholam Mohammad’s willful violation of constitutional principles: “since the [Constituent] Assembly for seven years [1947-‘54] had assumed that the assent of governor general to ‘constitutional’ legislation was not required, the Federal Court’s decision [in favor of Governor General’s arbitrary actions] created general consternation. Altogether, forty- four acts of far-reaching legal consequences suddenly were found to be invalid. The implications were staggering. The provincial legislatures had been elected under voided procedures. The governors of three provinces, under emergency conditions, had issued 143 acts, all of which were invalid. The State Bank of Pakistan had been regulating the currency and exercising exchange controls under invalidated legislation. The administration of Karachi [Federal Capital] had been illegal since 1948. Many persons had been imprisoned, including some convicted of conspiracy, under invalidated laws. It was even discovered that one of the federal judges in the case had been appointed under one of the invalidated acts. (He was quickly re-appointed under a different law.)” (Donald N. Wilbur, Pakistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, New Haven, CT: Hraf Press, 1964, p. 239).

The most interesting fact is that the Governor General, the creator of that constitutional nightmare, had complicated the crisis further through his arrogant actions. In response to the constitutional limbo, Ghulam Mohammad had declared another emergency (based on his interpretation of 1935 India Act) for the purpose of assuming “legislative powers under such conditions, promulgated an ordinance retroactively validating thirty-five of forty-four invalidated laws and, at the same time, amend certain provisions of the existing Constitution Order to preclude suits against the government in respect of any acts arising out of the emergency proclamation. The Federal Court within a few weeks declared that the governor general had gone beyond his legislative powers and threw out the emergency ordinance” (Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, New Haven, CT: Hraf Press, 1964, p. 239).

Ghulam Mohammad’s vanity knew no bounds. He could never settle with the idea that even the Governor General of Pakistan was not above law. He had “issued a proclamation assuming to himself, until other provision could be made by the constituent assembly, such powers as were necessary to validate and enforce laws designed to avoid a breakdown in the constitutional and administrative machinery of the country. He then again validated retroactively most of the laws in question” (Wilbur’s above mentioned book, pp. 239-240).



The Second Constituent Assembly that consisted of 80 members (40 from each wing) was formed in June 1955. Pursuant to Governor General’s order, the Provincial Assemblies elected the CAP. The second CAP met for the first time on July 8, 1955. (What were the chief accomplishments of second CAP? It validated most of the legislation/acts that were hanging in between the dissolution of the first CAP and creation of the second CAP; it passed the “One Unit” bill; and the adoption of the 1956 Constitution).



As noted earlier, Ghulam Mohammad had concentrated all executive powers in his office. Mohammad Ali Bogra could be characterized as the ‘ceremonial’ Prime Minister of Pakistan. There were instances when Mohammad Ali Bogra was rebuked or scolded like a grade school boy by the Punjabi Governor General. For example, it is on the record that the Prime Minister was hurriedly summoned back to Karachi by the Governor General from the middle of a trip to North America before the first CAP was dismissed. On his arrival at the Mauripur Airport at midnight of October 23, 1954, he (the Prime Minister) was surrounded by the emissaries of the Governor General “as soon as he came down the runway of the aircraft. ……. Like a prisoner Mr. Ali [Mohammad Ali Bogra] was escorted to the car and driven to the residence of the Governor General.” It was reported that Mohammad Ali Bogra was “weeping when he came out” of Ghulam Mohammad’s residence. It was said that Ghulam Mohammad gave him an ultimatum: ‘Do as I order or go to prison’.” (Joyti Sengupta, “Eclipse of East Pakistan’, cited in Mazharul Islam’s Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib (Agamee Prakashanee, 1993, pp. 151-152).

The way the Governor General had scolded and reprimanded the incumbent Prime Minister of Pakistan was less than civilized or dignified. Yet, the prestigious position of Prime Minister was more preferable to Mohammad Ali Bogra than to be satisfied with a sense of self-respect and dignity. Although he was allowed to retain his title as Prime Minister, a new cabinet was formed by Ghulam Mohammad on October 24, 1954. That Cabinet included, among others, General Ayub Khan, the Commander Chief of Armed Forces (took over Defense Ministry), Iskander Mirza, Governor of East Pakistan, (became Minster of Interior), Choudhri Muhammad Ali (Finance) and Dr. Khan Shahib. (To the chagrin of many Bangalee leaders, Suhrawardy had joined the so-called talent-cabinet in December 1954 as Law Minister. He, however, resigned from the cabinet in August 1955].

It is a verified fact that Ghulam Mohammad had appointed the members of the so-called “Cabinet of Talent” without any input even from Mohammad Ali Bogra, the lame-duck Prime Minister. There is little wonder why this cabinet was dubbed as “Ghulam Mohammad’s Cabinet.” However, the formation of this cabinet subsequently had paved the way for the Army Generals and bureaucrats to take over the political process of the country. As noted earlier, the second Constituent Assembly was formed in June 1955. Once the second Constituent Assembly met in July 1955, Mohammad Ali Bogra’s “obedience” or “subservience” to the Governor General was not enough for him to continue as the Prime Minister. Although he had managed to win a seat in the second CAP from East Pakistan, he did not have any real constituency being the sole Muslim League member from East Pakistan. This renegade from East Pakistan was no more capable of serving any useful purpose for the Punjabi dominated ruling coterie of Pakistan. Therefore, Mohammad Ali Bogra was ejected from the position of Prime Minister. The members of the ruling Muslim league parliamentary party decided to lend their support to Chaudhri Mohammad Ali to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan. It was on August 11, 1955 when Chadhuri Mohammad Ali, a Punjabi bureaucrat (he was Finance Minister of Pakistan since Ghulam Mohammad was selected to be the Governor General), became the fourth Prime Minister of Pakistan.



It was once again demonstrated that the Prime Minister of Pakistan could be recruited, retained, disciplined and fired by the sweet will and pleasure of the Governor General. Being disgusted with the humiliating experience of both Nazimuddin and Mohammad Ali Bogra, H.S. Suhrawardy had said the following in the Second Constituent Assembly on September 10, 1955: “to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan which has been held by certain honouarable gentlemen who have turned out, taken by the ears and thrown out as it suited the ruling coterie is not a matter of very great honour” (quoted by Khalid Bin Sayeed, “The Political Role of Pakistan’s Civil Service,” Pacific Affairs, 31, 1958, p. 137 cited in Goodnow, 1964, p. 155).

Some more serious changes in the political leadership of Pakistan also took place at that time. Given the fact that Ghulam Mohammad was seriously ill since late 1954, Iskander Mirza was acting as Governor General when the Governor General decided to take leave for treatment. Of all the cabinet members, Ghulam Mohammad had trusted Iskander Mirza to be officiating as Governor General during his absence! Iskander Mirza, a master of cliques and tricks, had devised a blueprint to oust the Governor General. It was on August 11, 1955 when Iskander Mirza unceremoniously replaced Governor General Ghulam Mohammad in office.

Ghulam Mohammad’s successors (Iskander Mirza, Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan) also demonstrated their insatiable passion for ruthless authoritarianism and centralized mode of governance. Of all the notorious political characters, it was Iskander Mirza who had formally invited the military take-over of Pakistan Government. What was the making of Iskander Mirza? What were his accomplishments? What was his mode of governance? What were the main features of 1956 Constitution? How did he treat the Prime Ministers during his tenure first as Governor General and later as the President of Pakistan? How did he abrogate the 1956 Constitution and introduce Martial Law in October 1958 ? Hopefully, most of the concerned or well informed or at least open-minded Pakistanis know the answers to these truthful questions.

The worst brunt of Governor General’s unlimited power fell on Bangalees when Ghulam Mohammad had summarily dismissed the elected provincial Government of Sher-e-Bangla Fazlul Huq in East Bengal in 1954. After dismantling the Huq’s United Front Cabinet, Ghulam Mohammad promulgated the Governor’s rule in East Bengal through the use of infamous Article 92 (A), an instrument enacted during Jinnah’s tenure as Governor General. (Jinnah had also used 92-(A) provision to oust the Prime Ministers of both Sind and West Punjab). The mistreatment of the provinces especially of East Pakistan in the hands of the arrogant rulers of Pakistan have always been source of discontent throughout Pakistan`s 52 years history.

In response to Ferozk:

I am not sure if I could agree with the statement that the ``day of the nation state has been in a decline for over a hundred years.`` It is not clear if the notion of decline entails the decline in the number of the nation-states, or a decline in national sovereignty, or a decline in the ability to act independently of a more powerful nation

British scholars Stuart Hall and David Held argue that the nation-state is being eroded and challenged by the processes of globalization as well as regional and local nationalisms. The process of centralization that tends to create a homogenous culture within a state has currently given way to decentralization that leads to the multiplication of identities and politics. In many countries, the process of decentralization is likely to encourage separatist movement that call for the creation of homelands from the existing homelands (states). Ironically, these homelands may be threatened by the same process of national fragmentation which permitted their own birth. Furthermore, the new homelands may have to seek admittance to supranational organizations to become politically viable entities. In short, the nation-states are not only challenged by subnational identities but are under pressure to form supranational organizations (like the European Union or the SAARC).

In Europe, the nationalist rhetoric is still alive and well and the citizenship rights are still defined in a rather restricted sense. In 1992 Prime Minister John Majors said: ``We are all British citizens and we will always remain British citizens.`` He further maintained: ``I will never, come hell or high water, let our distinctive British identity be lost in a federal Europe.`` (Guardian, October 10, 1992). Hence, the community in the European Community is imagined to include both national and supranational considerations.

I have long misunderstood and undermined the significance of Mr. Jinnah as a great political leader. My judgment of Mr. Jinnah was like that the Monday morning quarterback. However, given the post-independence history of the Pakistani (and South Asian) politics, I am in the process of reevaluating some of my previous conceptualizations of Mr. Jinnah and his politics.

Mr. Manik`s article has provided an interesting twist to our understanding of the political culture of Pakistan in its early days. As Mr. Manik has himself argued that there ``is no heritage of democracy in Pakistan``, we need to see the main thrust and arguments of his article in the context of the political (or apolitical) culture of those days. As a sample, I want to quote a few paragraphs from Akbar S. Ahmad`s book Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity (1997; Routledge) and leave the audience of this forum to form their own opinions. Ahmed writes (pp. 188-89):

``Jinnah`s death early in Pakistan`s history preserved him in the minds of Pakistanis. They never knew him frustrated in office or foiled by the ambition of lesser leaders or facing the nepotism and corruption in society. To Pakistanis he remains the triumphant hero, defeating every enemy to attain a homeland for them. Since his illness was not generally known, he does not appear as a tragically sick man either. For Pakistanis he remains an almost mythical figure. They now look back nostalgically to a golden time when they were united and had a clear objective.``

``‘By the time that he got Pakistan for the Muslims,` wrote Admiral J. W. Jefford, Pakistan`s first naval chief, `he was a demi-god to the masses` (Bolitho 1954: 201). The Dawn carried an editorial arguing he should be crowned Shah-in-Shah Of Pakistan, imperial successor to the Mughals (also see A. Husain 1996: 60). In Pakistan Jinnah received `adulation amounting almost to worship` (Callard 1958: 19). For E. H. Enver, Jinnah is `The Modern Moses` (1990); for Professor Riaz Ahmad, `the greatest leader of the Muslims of South Asia` (1994: 178). If Jinnah had asked his people to walk into the Arabian sea, they would have done so, said Dr Zaidi.``

```A man like Jinnah is born once in a millennium; not once in a century but once in a millennium,` pronounced Dr Jaffar Qureshi of India. . . . Devdas Gandhi, son of Mahatma Gandhi, declared that Jinnah was the greatest Muslim since the holy Prophet of Islam. The Aga Khan, not easily impressed, was as emphatic in his praise: `Of all the statesmen that I have known in my life, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Churchill, Curzon, Mahatma Gandhi - Jinnah is the most remarkable. None of these men, in my view, outshone him in strength of character and in that almost uncanny combination of prescience and resolution which is statecraft` (Merchant 1990: 6).``

``The secretary-general of the Arab League called Jinnah `one of the greatest leaders in the whole world` (Mujahid 1981: 660). Even Jinnah`s opponents acknowledged him after he died. The president of the Hindu Mahasabha in India wrote: `In the death of Quaid-i-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Muslim world has lost a unique personality endowed with the highest qualities of head and heart` (ibid.).``

``The Times in its obituary captured the essence of his achievement: Mr. Jinnah was something more than Quaid-i-Azam, supreme head of the State, to the people who followed him; he was more even than the architect of the Islamic nation he personally called into being. He commanded their imagination as well as their confidence. In the face of difficulties which might have overwhelmed him, it was given to him to fulfil the hope foreshadowed in the inspired vision of the great Iqbal by creating for the Muslims of India a homeland where the old glory of Islam could grow afresh into a modern state, worthy of its place in the comity of nations. Few statesmen have shaped events to their policy more surely than Mr. Jinnah. He was a legend even in his lifetime. (The Times, London, 13 September 1948).``

``Jinnah`s life must be seen in the context of the huge changes taking place in the world during the last century. Consider him as a young man pursuing his studies in London late in the last century - when Queen Victoria was at the height of her power, when the world was seen through the eyes of the British empire, when the dominant values and attitudes in India were formed by the British - to the last year of his life when we already discern the global themes that would engage Muslims up to our own times.``

MWZAMAN Responds:

I agree with the following statements or generalizations of the author:

``The autocracy established in colonial India is alive and well in contemporary Pakistan. It has become rather a ruthless and chaotic autocracy where the feudal lords, urban-based elite, and bureaucracy (particularly the army) have taken refuge in the dominant ideology and the perceived threat to national security to quell dissent and resistance. Moreover, too much power in the hands of the corrupt and unresponsive ruling elite (supported by the rule of danda and monopoly over the means of violence), an unjust system for the distribution of resources, poor economic performance, conspicuous consumption, a very high rate of population growth, and an overall lack of appreciation of nonviolent means of resolving domestic and international conflicts has created enormous difficulties for the evolution of society that recognizes and values its rights and duties...``.

However, I would most respectfully point out the following facts: It needs to be recognized that Pakistan is not known for respecting human rights. There is no heritage of democracy in Pakistan. Doubtless, the British had systematiocally employed various black laws for the purpose of sustaining their colonial rule in British India. Yet, the British rulers were known for following rule of law, notwithstanding the enactment of various unfair and immoral laws and procedures. The British were ruthless colonizers, but they not heartless autocrats. Therefore, the ruling elite of Pakistan must be given credit for introducing ``autocracy`` in independent Pakistan.

Various forms of autocratic and authoritarian modes of administration were invented and experimented once Pakistan got independence on August 14, 1947. Most of the repressive laws were replenished after the independence of Pakistan.

The roots of autocracy and authoritarianism can be traced back to the beginning of independent Pakistan even though Quaid-i-Azam, the Founding Father of Pakistan had both the charisma and authority to experiment with the rudiments of democracy in Pakistan. Instead of introducing democracy, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah had laid the foundation stone of autocracy and authoritarian regime in Pakistan. I am posting the following excerpts from one of my recent articles for the perusal of the readers. Thanks. W.Zaman:

Jinnah’s Passion for Unlimited Power & Undemocratic Mode of Governance

M. Waheeduzzaman Manik

Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was undoubtedly the most effective and powerful President of All-India Muslim League (AIML). There was a total absence of any leader of Jinnah’s stature in the entire AIML to question or challenge his policies or desires in the mid-forties. His words were like dictates from the absolute monarch. He always encouraged lieutenants or loyalists in the party, not colleagues per se.

Thus, at the independence of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, Jinnah was all of the following: Quaid-I-Azam, Governor General of Pakistan, President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (which was also the Central Legislature of Pakistan) and the President of Pakistan Muslim League.

In his seminal book titled Pakistan: A Political Study, Keith Callard, one of the early writers on the government and politics of Pakistan, had succinctly observed that people of Pakistan “looked for guidance to their Great Leader, Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. There was no one else, he was Pakistan; and wherever he went he was received by vast crowds with adulation amounting almost to worship.” Keith Callard also underscored that Jinnah “was by nature a commander and leader of men. He was not to be treated as a colleague or even primus inter pares, for he demanded lieutenants who would serve him rather than partners who would argue with him. In manner he was cold, brilliant and unyielding, a man to inspire either fury or devotion. He organized the campaign for Pakistan as though he were a commander-in-chief issuing orders of the day to encourage the troops and tactical directions to control the provincial commanders” (Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, (New York, N.Y: The Mcmillan Company, 1957, pp. 19-20. Henceforth this book will be cited as Keith Callard, 1957).

Jinnah’s passion for the assumption and consolidation of state powers was evident when the date of partition was nearing. He had selected himself to be the Governor General of Pakistan. According to Ayesha Jalal, “On July 2, 1947, Jinnah formally told Mountbatten that he intended to become Pakistan’s first Governor General. Of course Mountbatten was outraged. It complicated the partition process, as planned by him [Mountbatten], and especially the already odious business of dividing the Indian army. ------- He knew that as Governor-General he would have wide ranging powers over the Muslim areas, powers which he could not possibly afford to let any other individual exercise. Moreover, as the Governor-General of Pakistan, Jinnah felt he would be better placed to ensure the division of the army, and the army was what he needed most of all to clamp central authority over Pakistan’s provinces. At any rate, the Prime Minister of Pakistan would have to take orders from the Governor-General. ‘In my position’, Jinnah told the bemused Viceroy, ‘it is I who will give the advice and others will act on it.’ Mountbatten concluded that Jinnah had either gone ‘mad’ or was suffering from an acute form of ‘megalomania ” (Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 292).

It is apparent from Ayesha Jalal’s observation that Jinnah made a deliberate choice to assume the position of Governor General of Pakistan. He had planned ahead of time to dictate the terms of reference to the Prime Minister. As the undisputed leader of the All-India Muslim League (AIML), Mohammad Ali Jinnah had consolidated all organizational authorities and powers in his hands even before Pakistan came into being on August 14, 1947.

Therefore, he knew it well that there will be no one from his party to oppose him. In fact, he used to act like the Head of the Muslim State before Pakistan was even created. Keith Callard had pointed out long time back in 1957 that as “President of the Muslim League he (Jinnah) felt that he was the effective head of the Muslim nation” (Keith Callard, 1957, p. 20).

The first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (CAP) met on August 10, 1947 (Four days before independence). Jogendra Nath Mondal was made the interim President of CAP. Aimed at controlling both the process and outcome of the Central legislature of Pakistan, Jinnah, the Governor General designate of Pakistan, expressed his desire to be the President of Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. The members of the CAP obliged, and on August 11, 1947, they unanimously elected Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the President and Tamijuddin Khan, the Vice President of the CAP. The CAP also passed a resolution conferring on Mohammad Ali Jinnah the title of Quaid-I-Azam (the Great Leader) – a title to be invariably employed in official correspondence of the Government of Pakistan. As noted by Keth Callard, “When Pakistan was formed the Quaid-I-Azam was recognized to be above the political battle, a figure to whom all might turn for authority and justice and protection. He became Governor- General and President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan; ---- he (Jinnah) was the personification of the state” (Keith Callard, 1957, p. 20).



As the Governor General, Jinnah had handpicked Nwabzada Liaquat Ali Khan to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan. There is no doubt that Quaid-I-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan was capable of running the administration. Yet, Jinnah decided to retain the de-facto authorities of the Head of the Government in his hands. The Prime Minister and his Cabinet had to hold offices at the pleasure of Jinnah, the Governor General of Pakistan.

In other words, Jinnah combined the roles of both the Head of the State and Head of the Government. Was it unconstitutional on the part of Governor General to intrude in carrying out of executive functions of the Prime Minister? I don’t think that it was unconstitutional per se because of the existence of contradictory constitutional provisions.

Henry Frank Goodnow has summarized the context: “Prior to 1956 [Constitution] the governing constitutional laws were similar, but the relationship between the Governor General and the cabinet ministers was not entirely clear. The Pakistan Provisional Constitutional Order of 1947 had provided that the Governor General and the provincial governors would act on the advice of their ministers. On the other hand, an unrepealed provision of the Government of India Act of 1935 provided that the ministers were to be chosen by the Governor General and would hold office at his pleasure” (Henry Frank Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964, p.54).

In view of the above-mentioned provision of 1935 Act, Jinnah had the legal basis to establish the Governor General’s hold on the Cabinet. Yet, it needs to be recognized that he had deliberately ignored the provision in the 1947 Provisional Order in which it was stated that the Governor General would act on the advice of the Cabinet. It is also fair to suggest that it was Jinnah’s responsibility to see to it that the contradictory provision of 1935 was being repealed with the passage of 1947 Provisional order. It is very difficult for me to comprehend after so many years how and why a constitutional lawyer of Jinnah’s stature had used a dead provision of 1935 Act over a provision of 1947 for the purpose of dwarfing the independence of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet.

At any rate, Jinnah had created a dangerous precedent that directly impacted the relationship between the Governor General and the Prime Minister of Pakistan in the following years.

With assumption of the Presidency of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Governor General Jinnah virtually controlled the functions, the process, and the outcomes of the legislative branch of the central government. Such concentration of both the legislative and executive powers of the State in Jinnah’s office of Governor General was nothing short of nullification of the separation of powers between the legislative and the executive branches of government. It was unfortunate that the legislative branch of the central government was rendered impotent from the very beginning of independent Pakistan.

Additionally, Jinnah had retained substantial decision-making powers of the Muslim League even though Chowudhury Khaliquzzaman was chosen to be the Chief organizer of the party (later he became the President of Pakistan Muslim League).

In his assessment of the nature of Jinnah’s power, Keith Callard observed: “No constitutional ruler and few autocrats have possessed such plentitude of power. He had full authority over the civil administration and armed forces. By his own order he could amend the existing constitution and promulgate laws that would be beyond the effective of review of any court. These were not powers which existed only on paper and which in practice were limited by the conventions of constitutional responsibility. On the contrary, cabinet ministers understood clearly that they held office as the agents of the Governor-General, and the [Constituent] Assembly, with its powerless opposition, was in no mood to challenge any action of its own President” (Keith Callard, 1957, p. 20).

Concluding Remarks

The political history of Pakistan is replete with anti-democratic tendencies and anti-people policies. The authoritarianism has always been the hallmark of government and politics of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of the nation, was known for his honesty and integrity of character.

Yet, it was Jinnah who had laid the foundation of ruthless authoritarianism and centralized political structure in Pakistan. It was Jinnah who created the precedents of undemocratic and autocratic modes of governance in Pakistan. He was as much responsible as his successors for the continuation of the undemocratic tradition of authoritarian mode of governance in Pakistan.

At the independence of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, Jinnah had both the charisma and authority to introduce democratic norms and institutions in the new nation. Yet, from the beginning, he demonstrated his disdain towards democratic norms and practices. At his behest, an oligarchy was formed for ruling Pakistan with iron fist. The ruling oligarchy was completely divorced from the rudiments of democratic principles and values.

Although Mohammad Ali Jinnah had ruled the nation only for 13 months, his tradition of assumption and exercise of “absolute” state power had dangerous effects on the subsequent rulers of Pakistan. Instead of instituting the ‘institutional rule’, he installed his ‘personal rule’. The way the nation was administered by the founding father and his chief lieutenant Liaquat Ali Khan had invariably conditioned the behavior of the successive regimes.

Re: Bilal Ahmad

Interesting article on the issues of civic responsibility.

The day of the nation state has been in a decline for over a hundred years, which brings up the question of citizenship rights. Citizenship rights in the next century will not be based on the notions of nation state bounderies, but on the idea of mobility based on the individual`s contribution to the commonwealth, what ever it might be. Look at the European Union; are the Britishers citizens of Britain or the EU.

Very interesting article. The word ``Rights`` occurs 29 times in the article, and ``Responsibility`` ZERO times.

Question - Can one exist without the other?

My sense is that HAVES are using it as a political weapon - and HAVE NOTS are just reacting depending on their situation.